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Abstract

The thesis focuses on law reform in Indonesia during 1998-1999 when BJ
Habibie took over the presidency from Soeharto who was forced to step down by
the students’ movement. I examine seven laws signed by Habibie: three political
laws, human rights and press laws, and two anti-corruption laws. The thesis takes
the position that since good governance and the rule of law had been absent
during the thirty-two years of Soeharto presidency, law reform in the post
Soeharto era should fulfill the characteristics of good governance and promote the
rule of law. Therefore, the main question addressed here is: did the seven laws
produced under Habibie government achieve the standard of the promotion of
good governance and the rule of law? In order to answer the question, I evaluate
those laws at three levels: drafting process, content, and implementation. The
thesis also considers demands for reform, Habibie’s motivation/interest, political
tension and compromise, along with national and international pressures, as
additional explanations.

Having examined all research questions, data and

evidence, the thesis argues that Indonesian law reform in Habibie’s term fell a
long way short of the maximum standard for promoting good governance and the
rule of law.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Reform (reformasi, in Indonesian) is a magical word in Indonesia today.
Soeharto’s resignation from the presidency of Indonesia provided an opportunity
for meaningful social, economic, political and legal reforms.1 Following the
economic crisis which hit Indonesia in mid 1997, mass demonstrations, student
demands for reform, along with international pressures, were critical in the fall,
after 32 years, of the Soeharto government. President BJ Habibie, who took over
the presidency, had to face all the major problems, such as systemic and
systematic corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN, in Indonesian), lack of
accountability, transparency, and public participation in the political and legal
systems, lack of protection for human rights, including the freedom of the press,
and so on.
This situation led Habibie to take initial steps to reform the country.
Habibie’s first priority was to reform election and party laws. In June 1999, the
country held its first pluralistic and competitive parliamentary campaigns and
elections in 43 years. The elections were judged free and fair by international
1

As is known, on 21 May 1998, Soeharto stepped down and was replaced by his Vice President,
B.J. Habibie. Popular pressure, student demonstrations and the economic crisis forced Soeharto to
resign. On 20 October 1999, in accordance with constitutional procedures, the new People’s
Consultative Assembly (MPR) elected Abdurrahman Wahid as the new President and Megawati
Soekarnoputri as Vice President. On 23 July 2001, President Wahid faced ‘impeachment’ during
the special session of the MPR and, consequently, Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced him.

1

monitors. In October 1999, the new Parliament (People’s Representative Council,
hereafter DPR)2 and the new People’s Consultative Assembly (hereafter MPR)3
were installed.
Habibie went further by allowing the press to write reports and investigate
freely. Quite often the press criticised his government openly — which did not
happen in the Soeharto era. The Habibie government also introduced the Law on
Human Rights as a sign of his political will to protect human rights. He was also
aware that one of the biggest requirements in bringing about reform is the
eradication of KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism) leading him to sign two
Laws concerning anti-corruption. In all, in only 512 days, his government
reformed more than fifty laws.
It is worth noting that law reform is always political. In the words of
Professor Lev, “the principal and most problematic starting point is political
reform, without which legal reform is highly unlikely, though the reverse is nearly
as true: legal reform is essential to political reform.”4 Lev’s suggestion highlights
the intersection between law and politics. Habibie’s law reforms should be seen in
2

The DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) is the principal legislative body of Indonesia. Members of
the DPR are automatically members of the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat).
3

The MPR is constitutionally the highest authority of the State, and is charged with meeting every
five years to elect the President and Vice President and to set the broad guidelines of state policy.
However, based on the Amendments to the 1945 Constitution, the composition of the MPR, which
following the 2004 elections will consist of the People’s Representative Council (DPR) and the
Regional Representative Council (DPD), both of which will be fully elected bodies. Therefore, the
MPR itself will become simply a joint session of the DPR and the new DPD. Its sole remaining
powers – to amend the Constitution and to formalise the removal of a president convicted under
the new, stricter impeachment procedures — are still significant but much narrower than before.

4

Daniel S. Lev, ‘Comments on the Course of Law Reform in Modern Indonesia,’ in Drew Duncan
and Tim Lindsey (eds.), Indonesia After Soeharto: Reformasi and Reaction, (Centre for AsiaPacific Initiatives, 19 March 1999), 102-103.

2

this context. Whilst he attempted to reform the legal system, he was seen as a
product of the Soeharto government. His close association with Soeharto was no
secret. In addition, many of Soeharto’s followers were in Habibie’s Cabinet, and
the bureaucracy and military were still in favour of Soeharto’s policies. This
forced Habibie to make a political compromise between demands for reform and
political stability; between democracy and his personal and political interests.
This study of law reform in the post-Soeharto era will examine whether or
not law reform has brought the Indonesian people towards democracy and good
governance. Special focus will be given to the era of Habibie’s Cabinet (May
1998 – October 1999), since it is believed that this period was a critical one in the
history of Indonesia’s moves toward becoming a democratic country. The study of
the reform of Indonesian law in the post-Soeharto period is important, since it will
investigate how law reform dealt with the issues of democracy, the rule of law and
human rights. The thesis will cover not only legal aspects, but also historical,
socio-cultural and political aspects. It aims to make a contribution to our
understanding of the history of Indonesian law and our understanding of the
nature and processes of law reform.
This chapter consists of six sections. After explanations on the background
of the study, the next section will ‘locate’ this thesis in the existing literature. The
third section discusses the questions addressed in the thesis. It provides several
explanations of the reasons behind the questions, the relationship between one
question and another, and the expectations for each answer. The hypothesis of the
research is also offered. Afterwards, the manner in which these questions will be

3

answered is described in the methodology section. The fourth section also
examines which data are needed for the research. The fifth section contains a
research statement. Finally, in the last section, the outline of the thesis is
described.

Significance of the Study
The aim of this section is to ‘locate’ this thesis with respect to the existing
literature, and to explain the contribution which it endeavours to make. Several
leading scholars have examined the efforts of the Indonesian people to reform
their country, ranging over the issues of monetary problems, national
disintegration, military matters, and the role of Islam during the Habibie era.5 It is
acknowledged that their contributions are important. However, the main concern
of this thesis —law reform in the Habibie era— has not yet been fully examined.
This does not mean that law reform has been completely ignored. For
instance, Adi Andojo Soetjipto’s article, ‘Legal Reform and Challenges in
Indonesia,’ is based on his experience as a judge for thirty-nine years. However,

5

See, for instance, Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (eds.) Reformasi:
Crisis and Change in Indonesia, (Monash, Monash Asia Institute, 1999); Geoff Forrester (ed.),
Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?, (Singapore, ISEAS, 1999); Hal Hill, The
Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons, (St. Leonards, NSW, Allen &
Unwin, 1999).

4

as he admitted, his article “is of personal and practical rather than more academic
nature.”6
David K. Linnan7 and Daniel S. Lev8 have also written on law reform in
the post-Soeharto era. They have deeply examined the historical debate on law
reform in Indonesia. Their works are undoubtedly useful as links between law
reform before, and law reform after, the New Order government, but they do not
specifically address the main subject matter of this thesis — the seven bills passed
by the Parliament and signed by President Habibie during 1998-1999.
Timothy Lindsey, one of the most authoritative scholars in the field of
Indonesian law, has examined aspects of law reform in the first six months of the
Habibie period focusing on the Law on Judicial Powers, the Unfair Competition
Law, and the Law on Regional Autonomy.9 He argues that very few of the new

6

Andi Andojo Soetjipto, ‘Legal Reform and Challenges in Indonesia,’ in Chris Manning & Peter
van Diermen (eds.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, (London,
ZED Books, 2000).
7

David K. Linnan, ‘Indonesian Law Reform, or Once More Unto the Breach: A Brief Institutional
History’ (1999) 1 The Australian Journal of Asian Law 1.

8

Lev, above n 4.

9

See Timothy Lindsey’s articles on law reform in Indonesia. For example, ‘Indonesia’s negara
hukum: walking the tightrope to the rule of law,’ in Budiman, Hatley and Kingsbury (eds.), above
n 5; ‘Corruption as Rational Response in the Aspal State: The Failure of Reformasi Hukum,’ in
Drew Duncan and Timothy Lindsey (eds.), above n 4, 176-187; ‘Indonesia: Reinventing a Legal
System - Too Much, Too Little, Too Late’, in Alice Tay (ed.), East Asia - Nation Building, Human
Rights & Trade (Baden-Baden, Nomas Verlaggesellchaft, 1999), 515-537. Lindsey adopts the
tripartite schema of Italian scholar Ugo Mattei, whereby the law is either traditional (small-scale,
families as the basic unit, gender distinctions emphasised), political (law courts as the servants of
the ruler), or professional (independent judiciary, rule of law). Under ‘rule of political law’, Mattei
notes that law is ‘weak’ and subservient to other forms of authority, in particular political power.
Lindsey often applies this label to Indonesia. More information can be read in Ugo Mattei, ‘Three
Patterns of law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems’ (1997) 45 American
Journal of Comparative Law 5–44; Tim Lindsey and Teten Masduki, ‘Labour Law in Indonesia
after Soeharto: reformasi or replay?’ in Sean Cooney (et.al), Law and Labour Market Regulation
in East Asia, (London, Routledge, 2002), 27-54.

5

laws and amendments in the Habibie era contained essential and significant
reforms. Lindsey has also written (with Veronica Taylor) on Indonesian
Insolvency Reform.10 His overall assessment of these reforms is not positive. He
opines that “the reforms are superficial rush-jobs, minimalist gestures intended to
satisfy a neo-colonialist agenda of bailing out foreign lenders and inventors.”11
Lindsey’s work does not address laws introduced in the last six months of
the Habibie period, specifically, laws dealing with human rights and political
reform. This thesis addresses the substance of these developments, as well as the
process, the debate and the political compromises behind the reforms. The focus
of Lindsey’s subsequent research and writings has been on the period after
Habibie, such as the fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid,12 constitutional
reform13 and Islamic law.14 This thesis, then, is designed to contribute to the work
undertaken by Indonesian law scholars — by analysing aspects of Habibie’s law
reform agenda which have not previously been the subject of detailed
examination.

10

Tim Lindsey and Veronica Taylor, ‘Rethinking Indonesian Insolvency Reform: Contexts and
Frameworks’, in Tim Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Bankruptcy, Law Reform & the Commercial
Court: Comparative Perspectives on Insolvency Law and Policy, (Sydney, Federation Press,
2000), 2-14.

11

Tim Lindsey, ‘Introduction’, in Drew Duncan & Timothy Lindsey (eds.), Indonesia after
Soeharto: Reformasi and Reaction, (International Colloquium Proceedings, 19 March 1999), 1.

12

Tim Lindsey, ‘Abdurrahman, the Supreme Court and Corruption: Viruses, Transplants & the
Body Politic in Indonesia’, in Arief Budiman and Damien Kingsbury (eds.), Indonesia: The
Uncertain Transition, (Adelaide, Crawford House, 2001).

13

Tim Lindsey, ‘Indonesian Constitutional Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy’ (2002) 6
Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 244-301.

14

Tim Lindsey and M.B. Hooker, Islam in Southeast Asia: Indonesia – A National Mazhab?,
(Singapore, ISEAS, Forthcoming).

6

It is also worth recalling that Habibie’s supporters produced two volumes,
which explain Habibie’s vision and achievements.15 Although the two volumes —
which have been translated into English — are useful, particularly in clarifying
several policies adopted by Habibie, they do not offer a critical analysis of
Habibie’s law reform activities. Another attempt to explain Habibie’s
achievements is made by Bilveer Singh. In his Habibie and the Democratisation
of Indonesia, he explores several policies adopted by Habibie and puts them in the
context of “democratisation”.16

He claims that Habibie is the “father of

democratisation of Indonesia”.17 It is worth noting that Singh uses a political
science approach, while this thesis uses a multi-disciplinary approach focusing on
the intersection between law and politics. This different approach will have a
somewhat different direction. As a political scientist, Singh does not specifically
evaluate law reform of the Habibie period.
In 1999 The Federation Press published a compilation of articles from
leading scholars on Indonesian law and society.18 Although there were some
articles related to law reform after the Soeharto era, they did not provide an indepth analysis of the three case studies discussed here. Furthermore, several
discussions in the book were out of date by the time of publication, owing to the
fast development of law reform under Habibie’s presidency.

15

Ahmad Watik Pratiknya, Umar Juoro, Indria Samego (et.al), Reform in Indonesia: Vision and
Achievements of President Habibie, two volumes, (Jakarta, The Habibie Centre, 1999).

16

Bilveer Singh, Habibie and the Democratisation of Indonesia, (Sydney, Book House, 2001).

17

Ibid., 262.

18

Timothy Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society, (Sydney, The Federation Press, 1999).

7

In 2000 the final report of a two-year study by Ali Budiardjo, Nugroho,
Reksodiputro (in cooperation with Mochtar, Karuwin & Komar) was published
under the title Law Reform in Indonesia.19 The Indonesian government was
granted funds to undertake research of the ‘diagnostic assessment of legal
development in Indonesia’ by the World Bank in 1995. The research was
completed in 1997. Although the final report comprises more than 1,200 pages,
this study was conducted in the Soeharto era. The report does not cover
developments in the Habibie era.
Two recent books do investigate the situation of Indonesia in the postSoeharto era. Kees van Dijk published his book, A Country in Despair: Indonesia
between 1997 and 2000,20 followed by Kevin O’Rourke’s book, Reformasi: the
struggle for power in post-Soeharto Indonesia.21 Both van Dijk and O’Rourke
interestingly report the stories (even the stories behind some stories) on politics,
economics, and legal conditions. However, these works are based mainly on
newspaper and/or magazine reports, and do not focus specifically on the course of
law reform.
This thesis is designed to contribute to the body of work produced by
those scholars who have addressed the meaning and the significance of law
reform in the Habibie era. It aims to fill a gap in the literature by examining the
19

Ali Budiardjo, Nugroho, Reksodiputro, Law Reform in Indonesia: Diagnostic Assessment of
Legal Development in Indonesia (IDF Grant No. 28557), (Jakarta, CYBERconsult, 2000).

20

Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 2000, (Jakarta, KITLV
Press, 2001).

21

Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi: the struggle for power in post-Soeharto Indonesia, (NSW, Allen &
Unwin, 2002).
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legal dimensions of the magical word reformasi. It will analyse seven laws signed
by Habibie: three laws on political laws, human rights and press laws, and two
laws on anti-corruption. These laws will be examined using two primary criteria
or standards of analysis: good governance and the rule of law. The thesis will also
examine Habibie’s motivation and interests, as additional explanations in judging
Habibie’s law reform.
Indonesian law reform is expected to meet popular demands in the postSoeharto era, such as a less powerful presidency, a multi-party system, a more
powerful Parliament, and a reduction in, or eradication of, parliamentary seats for
the Military in the DPR.22 There is a school of thought that law reform will convert
Indonesia into a Negara Hukum (literally, a nation of law) which is based on the
rule of law; not the law of the ruler.23
All Indonesian jurists agree that Indonesia needs law reform as a basis for
becoming a Negara Hukum, although they have different interpretations of law
reform. David K. Linnan outlines these different approaches:

a) a sociological qua political science approach, asserting that “elite”
preferences have trumped formal governance structures including
law;
b) a psychological or cultural approach asserting that traditional
Indonesian (or more properly Javanese) “feudalistic” attitudes
must be changed before the rule of law can take hold; and
c) an approach stressing basic problems of government organisation
under Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution (or UUD 1945) linked with
22

See Judith Bird, ‘Indonesia in 1998: the pot boils over’ (1999) 39 Asian Survey 29.

23

Information regarding the practice of the rule of law in the Soeharto government can be read in
Hans Thoolen (ed.), Indonesia and the Rule of Law: Twenty Years of ‘New Order’ Government,
(London, Frances Pinter, 1987).

9

bureaucratic competition in a public choice sense immobilising
reform within government.24

In practical matters, there are also differing opinions regarding the
necessary first step in the reform of Indonesian law. Some scholars suggest a
reform of the Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court) by replacing the Chief Justice
and other judges.25 Some take the view that the 1945 Constitution should be
reformed either by amendment, or by introducing a new constitution.26 There is
another school of thought that law reform should be initiated by repealing old
laws, which are the product of the Dutch colonial times. Others believe that law
enforcement should be the priority, instead of producing new laws.27 Although the
dynamic nature of discussions of Indonesian legal reform is reflected in these
different opinions, key issue in debate is positive or negative assessment of the
law reform agenda pursued by Habibie. This brings us to the key questions
addressed in the thesis.

24

David K. Linnan, above n 7, 2.

25

Daniel S. Lev, ‘Reformasi Hukum Dimulai dari Penggantian Hakim Agung (interview),’
Kompas, 27 October 1999. The reasons, as the critics say, are that the Supreme Court is
subordinated to the executive and suffers from pervasive corruption. Probably, it is one of the most
corrupt institutions in the whole of Indonesia.
26

Dr. Adnan Buyung Nasution, a prominent lawyer, suggested amendment, while Professor Harun
al-Rasyid of the University of Indonesia argued that the 1945 Constitution should be replaced with
a new one. See Kompas, 6 May 1999. During the period 1999-2002, Indonesia has amended its
Constitution four times. The overall results of the constitutional reform are highly criticised by
scholars and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This has forced the MPR to provide for the
establishment of the Constitutional Commission in 2003, in order to reread, review, and revise the
Constitution.

27

Dr. Amir Santoso and Ghazali Abbas Adan (both were Members of Parliament) highlighted this
issue when they were interviewed by Kompas (Indonesian daily newspaper). See Kompas, 24
January 1998.
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Research Questions
This thesis is based on the contention that a primary objective of
democratic reform law reform should be the promotion of good governance and
the rule of law. The first question it addresses is: What is the link between law
reform, good governance and the rule of law?

The establishment of such a

link is essential, not only to set the aim of law reform, but also to set the criteria or
the standards of analysis — to be able to judge, at the end of the thesis, whether or
not law reform in the period 1998-1999 achieved the maximum standard in terms
of following good governance and promoting the rule of law.
The concept of good governance is employed in this thesis to
accommodate the attributes of transparency, accountability, anti-corruption,
respect for human rights and others. In other words, good governance
encompasses a number of expectations in relation to the nature of the functioning
of a state’s institutional and structural arrangements, decision-making processes,
policy formulation, implementation capacity, information flows, the effectiveness
of leadership, and the nature of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled.
Good governance is intended to lead toward a governmental framework
accepted by a participatory public as legitimate, responsive to the needs of the
population, and committed to improving its welfare, competent in providing law
and order and delivering public services, providing an effective policy
environment, and open-handed in its conduct.
The second standard of analysis employed in this thesis is the rule of law.
The rule of law entails equal protection of human rights of individuals and groups,
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as well as equal punishment under the law. It protects citizens against arbitrary
state action. It ensures that all citizens are treated equally and are subject to the
law rather than to the whims of the powerful. The law should also afford
vulnerable groups protection against exploitation and abuse.
The rule of law is needed to achieve a “Negara Hukum” (or rechtsstaat in
the civil law system). Although the concepts of the rule of law, rechtsstaat, and
Negara Hukum have different meanings,28 they share the common view that the
government and the state apparatus should be subject to the law, that areas of
discretionary power would be defined and increasingly limited, and that citizens
should be able to turn to the courts to defend themselves against the state and its
officials.29 The rule of law must determine the offices to be filled by election, the
procedures to elect those officeholders, and the definition of, and limits to, their
powers, in order for the people to be willing to participate in, and to accept, the
outcomes of the democratic regime.
Under the Soeharto government, the Indonesian state was not a rule of law
or good governance system, even though it was quite successful, both
economically and politically, for almost thirty years. However, an economic crisis
28

See Timothy Lindsey, ‘From Rule of Law to Law of the Rulers – to Reformation?’ in Timothy
Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society, above n 18, 13; See also Gottfried Dietze, Two
Concepts of the Rule of Law, (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1973).

29

Stern distinguishes the following elements of the rechtsstaat principles: The constitutional state,
liberty and equality, the separation and control of government authority, legality, judicial
protection, a system of reparation and a prohibition of excessive use of government authority. See
Francois Venter, Constitutional Comparison: Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as
Constitutional States, (Cape Town, Juta & Co., 2000), 49. Regarding the concepts of the rule of
law and rechtsstaat, it is acknowledged that the Anglo-American idea of rule of law is different
from the historical idea of rechtsstaat, owing to the common-law tradition in English speaking
countries. I will further elaborate on this in Chapter 2.
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hit Indonesia in 1997, and invited a political crisis which led to the fall of
President Soeharto. When a country has no rule of law and does not practice
‘good governance’, and, at the same time, faces social, economic and political
crises, the need for reform is acute. The opportunity for Indonesia came when
Habibie replaced Soeharto as President. Therefore, second question considered in
this thesis is: How did Habibie respond to demands for law reform?
Although public participation is important, successful reform programmes
suggest that the key factor is strong political will, demonstrated by a commitment
from the leadership. Without it, governments’ statements and claims to reform
law, strengthen transparency and accountability, and re-invent the relationship
between government and civil society, remain mere rhetoric. Neither the presence
nor the absence of political will can be presumed in any single initiative. Political
will is affected by many variables which can be the subject of action. The rules of
the political game, such as the prevalence of democratic institutions and contextspecific incentives, some of which may be affected by international actors, affect
political will.
Apart from good governance and the rule of law, this thesis will explore
the roles and activities of the central actors (Habibie and his Cabinet). I will
consider their motives, and the choices they made to promote and implement law
reforms. Habibie had to consider and calculate international and national
pressures, political interests from within his own circle, political bargains with his
opponents and military officers, economic support from international donors such
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as the IMF, the World Bank, the CGI,30 and demands for reform from the
Indonesian people. Once again, all of these matters will be considered as
additional explanations for the law reform process and outline; not as the main
criteria for assessing the merits of the reforms.
For example, those factors described above will contribute to the analysis
of Habibie’s choice to move forward and hold the 1999 General Election in
unstable political and economic conditions, risking political disintegration and
chaos which could have led to the end of Indonesia as a nation. Habibie’s personal
political interests also will be taken into account, as when Habibie and the
Attorney General dealt with the accusations against Soeharto, on corruption
charges. While sending a message to the public that he was not Soeharto’s crown
prince, Habibie also carefully built the concept in the minds of Soeharto’s
supporters in Golkar, and those of members of Cabinet, ABRI and other groups of
society, that he had not betrayed Soeharto. This made his decision ambiguous.
This example illustrates one of the main concerns of this thesis: to demonstrate
the complex factors which impacted on the law reform process under Habibie.
This thesis does not attempt a comprehensive of all laws enactment during
the Habibie period. Rather, it adopts a case study approach, focusing on key legal
reforms. Therefore, the third research question is: How were political laws,
human rights protections and anti-corruption legislations reformed in the
Habibie era? Three political laws, two laws on the issue of human rights, and two
30
Members of the Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI), including Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and so on.
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other laws on anti-corruption, will be analysed in order to determine: first, what
contribution these laws have made to democratic law reform in Indonesia; second,
whether these laws have met the demands of the reform movement; and third,
whether the Habibie government succeeded in implementing legal reforms. The
case studies have been selected not only because these areas are considered as
fundamental aspects to implement both good governance and rule of law,
particularly in the field of public law, but because they were also considered the
main targets of law reform by both government and the Indonesian people.
In order to achieve a transition to genuine democracy, following the fall of
President Soeharto, Indonesia had to establish a new governmental structure and
elect a new government with popular legitimacy. Under Habibie’s transitional
government, Indonesian political and civic leaders, and government officials,
began the process of developing a new political order, including a legal
framework for early national elections, to be held under democratic rules. On
January 28, 1999, the existing parliament, which had been elected in May 1997
under the rules of Soeharto’s New Order, enacted new laws governing elections,
political parties and the structure of legislative bodies. President BJ Habibie
signed these bills into law on February 1, 1999.
Meanwhile, Habibie had also to deal with human rights abuses, corruption,
collusion and nepotism, practiced widely at all level of society. He consequently
signed the Law on the Elimination of Corruption Crime (Law No. 31 of 1999),
Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, Law No. 40 of 1999 on the Press. He also
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signed Law No. 28 of 1999, which requires all state functionaries to report their
wealth.
Each of the laws in the three case study areas will be analysed on three
levels: process, content and implementation. The political process, before and
after the bills were enacted by parliament, will be examined. This requires
analysis of the process of drafting the laws, debate in Parliament and public
responses. The aim is to show whether or not the process was democratic,
accountable and transparent. It will also show the compromise achieved between
elites on several issues.
After having analysed the political and legal processes of those laws, the
thesis will compare the drafts and the laws signed by the President. There will
also be selected comparisons with the laws in other countries, and relevant
international human rights laws and documents. The implementation of the laws is
another important variable in judging Habibie’s law reform, and so will also be
considered. This is important, since the lessons from Habibie’s law reform will be
reflected on at the end of the thesis. Political compromise before and after the bills
passed might have influenced Habibie's efforts to enforce the law. The thesis will
discuss how the laws were implemented, in order to show the connection between
the law in theory and the law in action.
The fourth research question links to previous questions: Did Habibie’s
law reform follow good governance and promote the rule of law? This is the
central question of the thesis. All the answers to the previous questions will
provide data, evidence and arguments as to whether Habibie’s law reform in the
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three areas above (political laws, human rights protection and anti-corruption)
fulfil the requirements of good governance, and respect the notion of the rule of
law.
The final question will be: What were the main factors which
influenced the degree to which the reforms did or did not meet the standards
of good governance and the rule of law? Answering this question will provide
some lessons and reflections for future reform. The thesis will identify the range
of influential factors, including the effects of political compromise, as described
earlier, and the consequences of pursuing an overcrowded reform agenda in a very
limited time.
In summary, there are five questions addressed in the thesis:
1. What is the link between law reform, good governance and the rule of
law?
2. How did Habibie respond to demands for law reform?
3. How were political laws, human rights protection and anti-corruption
legislation reformed in the Habibie era?
4. Did Habibie’s law reform follow good governance and promote the rule of
law?
5. What were the main factors which influenced the degree to which the
reforms did or did not meet the standards of good governance and the rule
of law?
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Methodology
The thesis uses documents (archival data) such as Indonesian laws and
regulations, reports of conferences, meetings, or studies, articles in the mass
media, papers written by individuals or groups, and books regarding this issue.
For instance, the autobiography of Andi Ghalib (former Attorney General) and the
book written by Wiranto (former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) were
very useful.
Each law discussed here has its own uniqueness in terms of the theoretical
background, political backgrounds, legal processes, characteristics, natures,
significances, problems and impacts. In this context, the thesis establishes a link
between those case studies. The draft Bills and the parliamentary debates, as
recorded in minutes of meetings, have been examined in order to obtain a feel for
the ‘atmosphere’ and sense of law reform in Indonesia. This is necessary since
governments struggling to create a minimal political consensus may find that their
laws, often filled with last minute additions and deletions, conflict with one
another or fail to serve the purposes intended. In addition, several products of
regulations and political statements from the Government and the DPR/MPR have
been analysed, in order to find elements of law reform. The Secretary of the DPR
and the MPR has granted me access to read and copy all related documents.
A number of people who were involved in the process of law reform
during 1998-1999 have been interviewed, in order to gain a comprehensive
understanding of the law reform. In-depth interviewing of selected resource
persons is necessary to capture their opinions, thoughts and feelings, on specific
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issues. By employing this method, not only should facts be collected, but also the
relations between those facts. In other words, the thesis is able to capture the
process rather than the end product only. A former minister, an advisor and
government officials of Habibie’s Cabinet, and members of parliament were also
interviewed in order to understand the vision, goal, and obstacles to performing
law reform. The thesis also obtained the benefit of interviews with several
political actors, the results of which have been published in the mass media.
For instance, I have met Ryaas Rasyid, Chair of the Team of Seven
responsible for drafting the package of new electoral legislation. I also have had
communications with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a spokesperson for President Habibie.
M. Yunus Yosfiah, Minister for Information in the Habibie Cabinet, was very
keen to tell his experience and story. A former student leader, an NGO activist,
two attorneys, and the editor of a national magazine have shared their perspectives
with me. The Vice Chairperson of the KPKPN (The Commission for Examination
of the Assets of State Functionaries) has spent several hours with me.

Thesis Statement
Having examined all research questions, data and evidence, the overall
argument of this thesis is that Indonesian law reform in Habibie’s term (May
1998-October 1999) was not adequate to achieve the maximum standard possible.
Law reform under Habibie era could be characterised as pragmatic and politically
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oriented. The thesis shows where the Indonesian government (1998-1999) had
reached the limits of its respective capacities and where it could not move
forward, despite the needs and demands of the Indonesian people to go further.

Structure of the Analysis
This thesis is divided into three parts and comprises seven chapters,
including the introduction and conclusion sections. The first part is the foundation
of the thesis which consists of chapter 1, 2 and 3. The first chapter describes the
background of the study, the topic, the questions, and the method. The second
chapter examines the theoretical background to law reform, and its relationship to
social change, good governance and the rule of law. Chapter 3 deals with law
reform in the Indonesian context. A brief historical background is provided, as
well as a brief outline of Indonesian legal systems. In general, the chapter
describes the attempts of the Indonesian people to reform Indonesian law during
the time of Habibie’s presidency — from May 1998 to October 1999 — providing
a foundation for the case studies.
The second part of the thesis is case studies. It consists of chapter 4, 5 and
6. Chapter 4 provides a critical analysis of law reform in political areas: General
Elections, Political Parties and the Structure of Legislative Bodies. Chapter 5
analyses law reform on human rights protection and press freedom. Chapter 6
examines law reform on anti-corruption measures.
The third part of the thesis is conclusion. Chapter 7 summarises the
arguments made in previous chapters, and presents the answers to the key
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questions addressed in the Introduction. Several reflections on the current state,
and the future, of Indonesian law reform, also will be provided. This concluding
chapter will place the analysis of law reform in the larger context of democratic
transition, and will consider the prospects for the consolidation of good
governance and the rule of law in Indonesia, based on the lessons gained from the
Habibie period.

21

CHAPTER 2
EXPLAINING LAW REFORM

At the heart of this thesis is an assumption that there is a link between law
reform, good governance and the rule of law. It is thus important to explain how
and why this assumption matters. This is a departure from a complex debate on
law and social change between Savigny and Bentham. When existing legal
institutional arrangements no longer fulfil the interests of political actors — or
when new actors emerge, whose interests are not accommodated by these
arrangements — significant legal change can occur, but the changes should be
aimed at the promotion of good governance and the rule of law. This is the focus
of this chapter, which outlines the theoretical framework for analysis of such
change.
It begins with a summarised discussion of the interaction between law, on
the one hand and social development, on the other. It takes the position that law
reform is a product of social change. It argues that law reform can maintain the
relationship between law and the needs of society. I then turn to a discussion on
the rule of law and good governance. The meanings, elements, characteristics of,
and debate on, both terms will be examined. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the relevance for the establishment of a link between law reform,
good governance and the rule of law, in the context of Indonesia, as a lead-in to
the next chapter’s examination of law reform after the Soeharto era.
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Law and Social Change
There is a view that law is not generally associated with change. Law and
lawyers are more often identified with stability and continuity, with the
preservation of established traditions and precedents. In the most favourable
construction, law, and those who work in it, are seen as maintaining valuable
principles against the winds of superficial fashion or impulse. Accordingly, law is
usually viewed as a blunt instrument for effecting change much less effective
than, for instance, economic power or political mobilisation.
This view may be criticised as too simplistic for failing to consider the
concept that law is more properly viewed as a dynamic entity and that, far from
being a set of abstract rules largely impervious to the changing social climate.
Law is directly implicated in both changing, and being changed by, social events.
It may be acknowledged that the relationship between law and social
change is complex, and often contradictory. Sometimes law works to bring about
change in expected ways, but often it miscarries, fails to engage, has undesirable
side effects or, in some other way, introduces unexpected results. Often law is
seen as failing to produce the intended change, because it seeks to alter practices
without understanding the economic or ideological considerations which underpin
them or because it meets resistance.
The question of whether law can, and should, lead, or whether it should
never do more than cautiously follow changes in society, has been, and remains,
controversial. The conflicting approaches of the German legal scholar, Friedrich
Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) and the British social reformer, Jeremy Bentham
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(1748-1832), have provided the contrasting classical paradigms for this
proposition. Savigny was the principal proponent of the evolutionary thesis,
according to which law should essentially follow, and not endeavour to lead,
social sentiment. On the other hand, Bentham believed that law could be the
determining agent in the creation of new norms.
Savigny’s thought was very much a part of the German romantic
movement, with its emphasis on the Volksgeist [spirit of the people], folk culture,
and national history. Thus, he opposed the movement for legal codification on the
grounds that it represented an arbitrary interference with the natural product of the
national consciousness. He emphasized the organic connection of law with its host
nations. He also took the view that law grows with the growth and strengthens
with the strength of the nation, and finally dies away as the nation loses its
nationality. Therefore, for him, law was ‘found’, not ‘made’.1
By contrast, there is for Bentham no myth of an organic community. The
individual is an end in himself; every man counts for one, and the aim of law is
the creation of conditions which make possible the maximum freedom of each
individual, so that he/she might pursue what is good for him/her. He takes the
view that law must serve the totality of the individuals in a community. For him,
the ultimate end of legislation is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.2
While Savigny condemned the sweeping legal reforms brought about by
the French Revolution, which were threatening to invade Western Europe, and

1

Wolfgang Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (Abridged Edition, Penguin Books, 1964), 19.

2

Wolfgang. Friedmann, Legal Theory (London, Stevens & Sons Limited, 1953), 212.
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believed that only fully developed popular customs could form the basis of legal
change and that these changes can be only national (never universal); writing at
the same period, Bentham expected legal reforms to respond quickly to new social
needs, and to restructure society. He freely gave advice to the leaders of the
French Revolution, since he thought that countries at similar stages of economic
development needed similar remedies for their common problems.3
Almost six generations later, the relationship between law and social
change remains controversial.4 In one view, it is believed that law is determined
by the sense of justice, and the moral sentiments, of the population, and that
legislation can achieve results only by staying relatively close to prevailing social
norms. Based on this view, legal changes would be impossible, unless preceded
by social change, and law reform could do nothing except codify custom.
According to the other view, law, and especially legislation, is a vehicle through
which a programmed social evolution can be brought about.

3

Steven Vago, Law and Society (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1997), 286.
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In order to illustrate the on-going debate, one could consider Richard L Abel’s, ‘Law as Lag:
Inertia as a Social Theory of Law’ (1982) 80 Michigan Law Review 785. His article is a critique of
Alan Watson’s book Society and Legal Change (Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1977).
Alan Watson argues that law fails to keep step with social change, even when that change is
massive. To illustrate the ways in which law is dysfunctional, he draws on the two most innovative
western systems, those of Rome and of England, to show that harmful rules continue for centuries.
Watson’s main thesis, according to Abel, is that the law of any given society cannot be explained
by that society’s needs. Instead, law frequently is disconnected from society, and can be best
explained by societal inertia. Abel criticises Watson’s concepts of both ‘law’ and ‘society’ as
excessively vague, and argues further that Watson’s theoretical approach actually shares the flaws
of the functionalist view he critiques. Watson’s discussion of ‘inertia’, says Abel, is more vague
metaphor than theory. Finally, Abel claims that the most fundamental problem with Watson’s
book is its neglect of politics. Especially important in this regard are the refusal to recognise
fundamental class conflicts in society, and the political uses of law to legitimise and mystify the
existing social structure. This neglect of politics, Abel asserts, stems from Watson’s own
conservative worldview. The second edition of Watson’s book was published by Temple
University Press in August 2001.

25

The views above represent the problem of the interplay between law and
social change. The above theoretical debate raises several questions relevant to
this thesis. The questions may not be, ‘Does law change society?’ nor ‘Does social
change alter law?’ Both contentions are likely to be correct. It is thought that the
question should be, ‘Under what circumstances, at what level, and to what extent,
can law bring about social change?’ or ‘Which conditions of social change will
alter the law?’5 However, in the context of the thesis, it would be more
appropriate to ask further, “What is the ultimate goal of legal change?” This
question brings in the idea of law reform since, in the words of Justice Michael
Kirby, ‘reform does not mean simply change; reform is change for the better.’6
This is a point of departure from the complex theoretical debate examined above.
The thesis argues in the next section that the goal of law reform should be the
promotion of good governance and the establishment of the rule of law.

Law Reform
Reform becomes necessary to ensure that the principles underpinning the
law, and the way it is applied, are just, and consistent with current social attitudes
and values. It is also necessary to help simplify and rationalise ever-expanding

5

Vago, above n 3, 287.

6

‘The word of ‘reform’ is a word of approbation. In our history it is a word which has been used
to describe movements that restored peace, improved the religious order and changed the system
or parliamentary representation. In our language, the word ‘reform’ tends to connote an
improvement, an advance: not just for a change, a change for the better.’ Michael Kirby, Reform
the Law: Essays on the Renewal of the Australian Legal System (Melbourne, Oxford University
Press, 1983), 7.
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volumes of case and statute law and, where appropriate, to assist in harmonising
the laws between individual states within the same country and, at the
international level, between nation states. Another aim of law reform is to make
the law more certain, easier to locate and easier to understand for members of
those societies, and by doing so, enabling the maintenance of the essential
relationship between law and the needs of society.7 In other words, law reform is a
process whereby the present law is altered in answer to society’s changing needs
and values, the result of which should constitute some genuine progress and
improvement in the law, and of the problems to which it is directed.8
Several scholars have divided law reform into two categories: lawyers’
law reform and politicians’ law reform.9 The first category suggests a very
technical, narrow approach to reform, by concentrating efforts on tidying up the
statute and case books, consolidating and repealing laws, where appropriate, and
proposing reforms to defects and anomalies which affect legal rule. This first
category has been developed almost exclusively by lawyers.
The second category refers to the ever-expanding body of law giving
expression to political, economic and social reforms. Recommendations for law
reform are often based on extensive research and wide consultation, to assess
community perceptions about how the law impacts on their daily lives. It is based
on the notion that the law needs reform where it is inconsistent with prevailing
7

Western Australian Law Reform Commission, Annual Report, 1975-1976 (Perth, Government
Printer), 6.

8

Canadian Law Reform Commission, Third Annual Report, 1974-1975, 3.

9

See for example John H. Farrar, Law Reform and the Law Commission (London, Sweet &
Maxwell, 1974), 2.

27

social attitudes, and where it causes injustices. It can safely be stated that it is the
government, or politicians, who play in this area of law reform.
This division of law reform is over simplistic, to the extent that it suggests
that ‘lawyers’ law reform’ is without social context and importance. However, it
is valuable because it focuses attention on the respective roles played by lawyers,
and by government or politicians.
According to the second category, reform of the law is a task for
politicians in both government and parliament, and not for the judges who, in the
course of deciding a particular case, are not usually able to consider the wider
social and legal implications of a particular decision. However, proposals for
reform may well not be satisfactory unless they are preceded by research, and by
wide consultation with the political parties; public opinion stimulated by the mass
media; pressure groups of differing sizes and influence; permanent officials in
government departments; more forward-looking members of the practising and
academic legal professions, official law reform bodies and, lastly, with those who
may be affected by such reforms.
In summary, law reform is needed, on the grounds that there is an
interaction between law, on the one hand, and social development, on the other.
Law reform can maintain the essential relationship between the law and the needs
of society. But if law reform is a change for the better, what does “the better”
mean? What is the criterion, or the standard, by which the merits of law reform
proposals should be assessed?
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This thesis argues that one of the aims of law reform, particularly in the
context of democratic transformation, as in Indonesia in the late 1990s, is to
establish good governance. Good governments provide for the public good, secure
peace and social harmony, and assist citizens in their collective efforts to achieve
better lives. In other words, the process of reforming law is most legitimate when
it is infused with principles of good governance such as transparency, pluralism,
citizen involvement in decision-making, representation, and accountability.
Second, law reform should also promote the rule of law. Economic
growth, political modernisation, the protection of human rights, and anticorruption measures are all believed to hinge, at least in part, on “the rule of law”.
The establishment of the rule of law ensures that the content of law is clear and
understood by citizen. It also maintains that no one is above the law. Therefore,
law reform should be in line with good governance and the rule of law.

Rule of Law
The term ‘rule of law’ has no fixed meaning.10 It originated in normative
writings on law and government, principally by Western authors, and each
tailored the term to fit his or her vision of the ‘ideal’ or ‘just’ state. As a
consequence, one recent survey of how the term has been used in Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States concludes that it “belongs to

10

See David Clark, ‘The Many Meanings of the Rule of Law’ in Kanishka Jayasuriya (ed.), Law,
Capitalism and Power in Asia: the rule of law and legal institutions (London, Routledge, 1999),
28-38.
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the category of open-ended concepts which are subject to permanent debate”.11
The term is worth taking seriously because it suggests the possibilities and
limitations of a law-based approach. Whatever may be its ultimate scope, the rule
of law conveys itself as a counter-proposition to arbitrary rule, or rule by caprice.
It is a statement of the supremacy of law over personal rule, or expedient politics.
As such, the rule of law acts to restrain the exercise of power, by imposing the
need for accountability on those who employ power in the name of the public
good.
The modern conception of the rule of law derives from the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century movements in Anglo-American legal scholarship, to
convey the operation of law, law-making, and the functioning of the legal system,
as scientific processes governed by ascertainable and predictable rules.12 The rule
of law, as the embodiment of governance by fixed principles rather than by the
discretion of political expediency, fits into this mode by serving, in the view of its
best known exponent of that period, Albert Venn Dicey, three functions. These are
a) supremacy of the law and absence of arbitrariness, b) equality before the law,
and c) constitutional law as part of the ordinary law of the land.13
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Rainer Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and Etat de Droit,’ in Christian Starck (ed.),
Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy – A Comparative Analysis (Baden-Baden, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 271.
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Information on the origins of the rule of law can be obtained from F.A. Hayek, The Rule of Law
(California, Institute for Humane Studies, 1975); See also Robert S. Summers, ‘A Formal Theory
of the Rule of Law’ (1993) 6(2) Ratio Juris 127-42. Summers presents a relatively formal theory
of the rule of law which includes three basic components: conceptual, institutional and axiological.
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See A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London, Macmillan,
1959).
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Since then, the exposition of the concept has largely revolved around
subjecting the government, and, in particular, the lawmakers, to the same laws as
ordinary people. That is, the effectiveness of the law in restraining and, where
necessary, punishing, the abuse of political power. Considering the historical
context in which the concept was propounded, it is not surprising that its focus
was political.14 Though some effort has been made since the 1960s to direct the
concept to economic issues, it has largely remained a political imperative.15
Lon Fuller claimed that the rule of law is part of the ‘internal’ morality of
law.16 Radin interprets this to mean that the complex of ideas associated with the
term ‘rule of law’ is essential for the efficacy of any system of legal rules.17 This
instrumental conception of the rule of law is presented in Fuller’s engaging
parable of King Rex, who failed to make law by ignoring the eight elements of the
rule of law. These eight elements compromise “the morality that makes law
possible”.
1. Generality. Roughly, there must be rules, cognisable separately
from (and broader than) specific cases, such that the rules can be
applied to specific cases, or specific cases can be seen to fall
under, or lie within, them.
2. Notice or publicity. Those who are expected to obey the rules
must be able to find out what the rules are.
3. Prospectivity. The rules must exist prior in time to the actions
being judged by them.
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For more information see Judith N. Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law,’ in Allan C.
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4. Clarity. The rules must be understandable by those who are
expected to obey them.
5. Non-contradictoriness. Those who are expected to obey the rules
must not simultaneously be commanded to do both A and not-A.
6. Conformability. The addressees must be able to conform their
behavior to the rules.
7. Stability. The rules must not change so fast that they cannot be
learned and followed.
8. Congruence. The explicitly promulgated rules must correspond
with the rules inferable from patterns of enforcement by
functionaries (e.g., courts and police). 18

The eight elements above can be reduced to two primary principles.
Firstly, there must be knowable rules; secondly, those rules must be capable of
being followed. Fuller points out that law is “the enterprise of subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules”.19 In order to constitute a system of law, rules
must be able to guide human behaviour; and to guide human behaviour, rules
must exhibit the virtues of the rule of law.20
In addition, Joseph Raz argues that most of the content of the rule of law
doctrine can be subsumed in two propositions: (1) that people should be ruled by
the law and obey it, and (2) that the law should be such that people will be able to
be guided by it. In order to discipline the use of the term (and thereby to salvage
its continuing usefulness), Raz argues that the rule of law is concerned with those
virtues which legal systems must possess, in order to provide citizens with
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guidance in following the law. 21 In other words, “This is the basic intuition from
which the doctrine of the rule of law derives”,22 and unless this virtue is present,
the law is unable to perform any useful social function at all.23
Then, Raz enumerates what he sees as the main principles embodied in the
concept of the rule of law, and explains how they can all be deduced from this
basic idea. Those main principles are: (1) all laws should be prospective, open and
clear; (2) laws should be relatively stable; (3) the making of specific legal orders
or administrative directives should be guided by open, stable clear and general
rules; (4) the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; (5) the principles
of natural justice must be observed if the law is to be able to guide action; (6) the
courts should have the power to examine the actions of the other branches of
government, to determine whether they conform with the law; (7) the courts
should be accessible, so that a person’s ability to vindicate legal rights is not made
illusory by long delays or excessive costs; (8) the discretion of law-enforcement
agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.24
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Both Fuller and Raz propose eight elements, and the spirits of those
elements are similar. Their views of the rule of law can be categorised as the
‘thin’ concept of the rule of law. It focuses on the formal or procedural aspects
“that any legal system allegedly must possess to function effectively as a system
of laws, regardless of whether the legal system is part of democratic or nondemocratic society, capitalist, liberal or theocratic.”25 The Civil Law Rechtsstaat
is often described, by Peerenboom26 for example, as a ‘thin’ version of rule of
law. A more apt label for this version might be ‘rule by law’, for it entails no
connotation of legal limitations. The idea of rule by law is that law is a means by
which the state operates in the conduct of its affairs; “that whatever a government
does, it should do through laws.”27
Another theoretical version of the rule of law is the ‘thick’ (substantive)
concept of the rule of law. It consists of the basic elements of the formal rule of
law, and then goes further by adding on content requirements in various
combinations
“…such as particular economic arrangements (free market capitalism,
central planning, ‘Asian developmental state’ or other varieties of
capitalism), forms of government (democratic, socialist, soft
authoritarian) or conceptions of human rights (libertarian, classical
liberal, social welfare liberal, communitarian, ‘Asian values,’ etc.).28
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In this sense, advocates of ‘thick’ theory, such as Ronald Dworkin,29 have
allowed the rule of law to be extended beyond civil and political rights to social
and economic entitlements, without sacrificing its essential nature. For instance,
as the product of a multi-national conference, the Declaration of Delhi in 1959,
stated that the rule of law is, apart from its traditional concerns, intended “to
establish social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under which
[individuals’] legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realized”.30 That is what
makes this conception of the rule of law

‘thicker’ than the formal version

discussed earlier.
This thesis uses the ‘thin’ version of the rule of law as a criterion for
assessing law reform under Habibie. According to Lindsey, rule by law or the
‘thin’ theory is “often linked to the ‘Civil Law’ Rechtsstaat idea”.31 This provides
a justification for using the ‘thin’ theory for present purposes since, as will be
explained below, Indonesia follows the rechtsstaat tradition.
Having considered the views of Fuller and Raz on the thin concept, what
then does the rule of law, as a necessary criterion for law reform, mean? Three
things warrant attention. Firstly, it refers to the values embedded in the process, or
procedural aspects, of regularised law-making and law-enforcement. Secondly, it
means the existence of specific rules or laws that are compatible with the elements
of the rule of law outlined above (that they must be general, public, prospective,
29
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clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, and enforced). Thirdly, the
discretion of law-enforcement agencies should not be unlimited.
In the context of the rule of law, discretion can be described as the space
between or within rules. In other words, discretion may be described in terms of
situations where there is power to make choices between courses of action, or
where the end is specified but a choice exists as to how it should be achieved.32 It
is a recognition of the limited capacity of rules to deal with every conceivable
situation and, at the same time, a recognition that purely rule-based government is
an ideal which could never be attained in any country.
There have been two extreme positions regarding discretion.33 The first
perspective sees discretion as an aberration on rule and a springboard for
arbitrariness, corruption and unpredictability. The second view sees discretion as
both inevitable in a body polity and an efficient and realistic mechanism for
development.
Ronald Dworkin has argued that there are three types of discretionary
power.34 The first type is a weak discretion, where standards exist but there is
room for choice. The second is another kind of weak discretion, where an official
has the final authority and final say on the matter. The last one is a strong
discretion, where no standards are prescribed for the official to follow. The last
two senses have been criticised widely.
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Botchway explains more:
The merits of discretion, however, lie beyond its characterization, its
inevitability or realism. In the first place, discretion responds to some
of the shortcomings of rules. It must be pointed out, however, that the
accommodation of discretion is not incompatible or subversive to the
principle of rule of law. After all, discretion is mainly provided for by
rules. By far, the most important utility of discretion is its flexibility.
The processes of making rules are often elaborate and time
consuming, as is the process for changing them. Once promulgated,
the rules take a long time to be amended or changed. Unless otherwise
stated or implied, the rules themselves provide for strict application. In
the circumstances, the all-time strict application of the law to all
relevant situations is likely to be unjust, time-consuming and
inefficient. To forestall this, the legislature provides for the exercise of
discretion by the persons applying the law in the light of the particular
facts before the decision-maker.35

In addition, discretion fills the gap left by legislators, as well as situations
where two or more rules challenge each other. It also fills the gap where rules
break down, or work unfavourably as in cases where the consequences of the
application of the rule is incompatible with the stated purposes of the legislature.
Above all, it is impossible for the law-maker to anticipate and provide for all
possible cases which the particular rule may be required to cover.
Despite the advantages, Botchway argues that, if taken too far, or granted
carte blanche, discretion can be contrary to efficiency, stability and transparency.
Discretion could be seen as ad hoc decision-making. This means that it does not
loan itself to long-term planning and certainty. It is in such circumstances that it
runs counter to the doctrine of the rule of law. Besides, it can confer too much
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power, which could corrupt and be abused. Factors other than transparent
scientific considerations could contaminate the decision-making process.36
One of the main reasons for the democratic political system is the
achievement of legitimacy and stability. In this context, the basis of discretion
may be questioned if it is seen as derogating the tenets of the rule of law. The
issue then is how much discretionary power can be tolerated. Regarding the limits
of administrative discretion, Botchway points out that:
Beyond emphasis on rules, discretion can be controlled in a number of
ways. Three main means of restraining discretion have been identified
as Confining, Structuring, and Checking. Discretion, to be effective
and tolerable, must be confined within necessary bounds and those
aspects of discretion that may not be necessary, pruned. First, this may
be achieved by establishing standards and rules for the exercise of
discretion. Second, discretion can be structured by prescribing the
processes for the exercise of discretion. These can be done by
requiring reasons to be given, open and transparent policies, rules,
findings, and resort to precedents. And third, some of the excesses of
discretion can be checked by a process of hierarchical supervision.
The common structure for supervising discretion is by the court
system or administrative tribunal. In other words, finality of
discretionary power would not rest with the primary decision-maker.
The courts have established three main grounds for reviewing
discretion. These are the way in which the discretion has been
exercised or non-exercise of discretion, factors that were considered or
implicated in the discretion, and whether the exercise of the discretion
is reasonable.37

The bottom line is that although the role of discretion is recognised in
order to cope with political, social and economic change, governments cannot use
discretionary power in an unlimited or uncontrolled way. The rule of law provides
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such limitation since it is rightly regarded as central principle of constitutional
governance.38
Critically surveying the work of such theorists as Friedrich von Hayek,39
Ronald Dworkin40 and Roberto Unger,41 Judith Shklar takes the view that the rule
of law should be recognised as an essential element of constitutional government
in general, and of representative democracy in particular. Its boundaries are set by
enduring concerns over the fear of violence, the insecurities of arbitrary
government and the discriminations of injustice.42 Although the term ‘rule of law’
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means many things to many people, basically the rule of law means governance
by general and settled rules, impartially applied.

Good Governance
The terms ‘good government’ or ‘governance’43 have been used mainly by
international financial and development institutions when depicting the obverse of
improper or unsatisfactory functioning of governmental machinery, or when
discussing the need for more efficient administration. However, it would be
incorrect to assume that the idea of good governance was conceived by, or
originated from, the international financial institutions (IFIs). In the early
twentieth century, without necessarily using the term ‘governance’, the works of
classical philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean J. Rousseau, Montesquieu,
Machiavelli, Plato, Confucius, J.S. Mill, Adam Smith, Karl Marx and many
others, have examined the idea of proper governance of society.44
Max Weber, for example, outlined the functions of a bureaucracy that
would facilitate development. He called for the strict observance of the rule of
law and legal rationality and advised against an admixture of private interests with
the public responsibilities of the bureaucrat.45 Weber started his inquiry with two
questions: why did a capitalist economy develop in Europe and what were the
43
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necessary conditions for such development? Weber found that a rational system of
law played a crucial role in the ‘rise of capitalism’ among the Protestant West by
allowing individuals to order their transactions with some predictability.46
In the 1960s, the modernists, largely under the sponsorship of the United
States, researched and took the message of the place of law in efficient
administration to the newly independent developing countries. To the extent that
law is passed and enforced by branches of government, advocating a place for law
in economic and social development is a discourse about governance. Indeed,
academic works have been produced not only on the substance of law and
development, but some have also explicitly used the term ‘governance’ in their
titles and other significant parts.47
By the turn of the millennium, the law and development movement had
achieved a new momentum. It is now even claimed that the law and development
movement is back in vogue again. Kennedy observes that “Law and Development
is back – taught again in law faculties, the focus of policy initiatives at the leading
development institutions, the subject of numerous books and conferences”.48 The
‘new’ good governance championed by international development institutions
may be described as the third phase of the discourse. The first, in the twentieth
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century, was the Weberian phenomenon and the second, the Law and
Development movement.49
Definitions of the term governance are varied. The contemporary origin of
the term ‘good governance’ is attributed to the World Bank.50 The World Bank
argued that “by Governance is meant the exercise of political power to manage a
nation’s affairs.”51 This might be a definition aimed more for general consumption
than for the World Bank’s own purposes. This is because, by its legal mandate,
the World Bank is restrained from delving into political matters and so in
“analyzing governance, the World Bank draws a clear distinction between the
concept’s political and economic dimensions.”52 In a more measured approach,
the World Bank defined governance in terms of the manner of exercising power
for economic and social development.53
Although an effort is made at emphasising the economic and social
aspects, while excluding the political undertones of governance, the World Bank
is unable effectively to distance its concept of governance, for its specific
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purposes, from the political trappings of the term. Furthermore, the definition is
silent on the operation of governance in such micro-contexts as local government,
and international relations.
In the meantime, besides the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has paid attention to the issue of governance. Admittedly, given its
preoccupation with macro-economic management issues, the IMF has been less
conspicuous in its interest in good governance. In 1997, however, the IMF took
the position of including good governance in its criteria for assistance. The IMF
suggested establishing links with other bilateral and multi-lateral funding sources,
concerning governance.54 Some of these funding agencies have themselves
touched on the issue of good governance. For instances, the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) declared that “it is only with good governance
that we can find solutions to poverty, inequity and insecurity.”55
Ibrahim Shihata, (the World Bank’s General Counsel), elaborates this
position further, when he observes that the World Bank’s decisions on lending
may be influenced by a country’s political situation, where such a situation has a
direct effect not only on its economy, but also on the feasibility of the
implementation and monitoring of the World Bank’s economic reform
programmes. In these circumstances, human rights may, to some extent, become
relevant, but the degree of respect paid by a government to human rights cannot,

54

See International Monetary Fund, Good Governance: The IMF’s Role, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ exrp/govern/govindex.htm

55

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Governance Policy Paper, available at
http://magnet.undp.org/policy/

43

of itself, be considered an appropriate basis for the Bank’s decision to make loans
to that government, or for the voting of its Executive Directors. Shihata adds that
the cost of politicising international financial institutions ‘further’, by having them
assume human rights protection functions, notwithstanding their ‘moral purpose’,
could undermine the institutions’ standing in financial markets, and their ability to
play the role for which they were established. 56
Apart from Shihata’s views, most of the work on governance appears
satisfied with a description or provision of a ‘shopping list of ingredients’ for
good governance.57 Such elements include accountability, transparency, anticorruption efforts, the rule of law, advancement for women, democracy, and
decentralisation.58 It is thought that the concept of good governance has sufficient
capacity to accommodate the issues of transparency, accountability, anticorruption efforts, civil society, and human rights.
It is important to recognise that good governance is not only defined by the
World Bank or the IMF. These definitions of governance are a small sample of
many one can come across when assessing the literature. According to Rhodes,
“Governance refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized
by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant
56
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autonomy from the state.”59 Kooiman explains governance as “the patterns that
emerge from governing activities of social, political and administrative actors.”60
In addition, Pierre and Peters observe that “Governance is the capacity of
government to make and implement policy, in other words, to steer society.”61
Meanwhile, the UNDP outlines its own ‘shopping list’ of the
characteristics of good governance, as follows:
•

•

•

•
•

•

•
58

Participation
All men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either
directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions which represent
their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of
association and speech, as well as on the capacity to participate
constructively.
Rule of law
Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly
the laws on human rights.
Transparency
Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes,
institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned
with them, and enough information is provided to understand and
monitor them.
Responsiveness
Institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders.
Consensus orientation
Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad
consensus on what is in the best interests of the group, and, where
possible, on policies and procedures.
Equity
All men and women have the opportunity to improve or maintain their
well-being.
Effectiveness and efficiency
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•

•

Processes and institutions produce results which meet needs, while
making the best use of resources.
Accountability
Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society
organisations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional
stake-owners. This accountability differs, depending on the
organisations, and whether the decision is internal or external to an
organisation.
Strategic vision
Leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on
good governance and human development, along with a sense of what
is needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the
historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is
grounded. 62

The UNDP is aware that these characteristics represent the ideal; and that
no society has them all. Therefore, good governance should have, amongst others,
at least accountability, transparency, and participation. This means that, at all
possible levels, the process, the content and the implementation of law reform
should be consistent with these core values. According to the UNDP, governance
can be seen as the effective exercise of economic, political and administrative
authority to manage a country’s affairs well at all levels. In other words, although
the rule of law, particularly regarding laws on human rights, is one of the
characteristics of good governance, the UNDP’s concept of good governance is
mainly borne on three legs: the economic, political and administrative.63 I wish to
argue that a fourth leg should be added: ‘law’. This requires more discussion on
the rule of law than what has been provided in the UNDP’s desirable
characteristics, above.
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The chapter establishes links between good governance and the rule of
law, by adding law as the fourth leg of good governance. In this sense, good
governance is examined in terms of rules, where rules include norms and formal
codes of behaviour. In this context, good governance refers to the setting,
application and enforcement of rules. One may suggest that the ideas of good
governance and the rule of law overlap. There is some truth in this claim.
However, this does not mean that one cannot treat them as two different criteria
for judging law reform. There are at least two reasons. First, this thesis argues that
the inter-relationship between the rule of law and good governance is important
not only in relation to human rights protection (as suggested by UNDP), but also
in relation to reform of the electoral system, the position and function of
parliament, the role of political parties, and anti-corruption measures.
Second, the core elements of good governance and the rule of law that
have been used in this thesis are different. According to the ‘thin’ version of the
rule of law, laws must be general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of
being followed, stable, and enforced. The core elements of good governance, as
described above, are participation, accountability, and transparency. For instance,
in the context of the thesis, reform of political laws not only should be guided by
open, stable clear and general rules, but should also encourage the participation of
society, and the government elected under the new law should be accountable.
Reform of human rights legislations should provide freedom of information
(transparency) and should be capable of being followed and be enforced. A free
press is an invaluable asset to good governance. It is the torch which brings abuses
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to light, and forces accountability. Such rules need to be legitimated if they are to
be stable. In addition, lack of transparency, accountability and participation would
invite corruption at all levels of society, especially when the laws on anticorruption are inconsistent and unclear.
The relationship between rule of law and good governance seems to be
symbiotic indeed. Rule of law is likely to advance good governance; conversely,
good governance is likely to advance the rule of law. The inter-relationship
between good governance and the rule of law will be a major theme of the
examination in this thesis of political laws, human rights protection and anticorruption legislation, in chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively.

Criticisms of the Use of Good Governance and the Rule of Law in
Transition Societies
Engaging in the intricacies of good governance and rule of law is a
delicate undertaking. The amount of literature on these concepts is staggering. A
simple search on ‘governance’, in the Social Sciences Index, results in the
identification of nearly 2000 articles published between 1999 and 2003. In the
1990s, the new law and development movement, now frequently couched in terms
of rule of law and good governance, gained steam. Under the umbrella of these
terms, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund require loan and aid
recipients in the developing world to adopt Western-style commercial law as a
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condition of receiving help.

64

This emphasis on Western-style commercial law

contains assumptions about the importance of establishing the rule of law in
developing countries in the face of the pressures exerted by global economic and
capital markets.
It assumes that the injection of Western law, imitation of Western legal
institutions, and building upon Western legal expertise into the developing
country’s legal culture would facilitate a rapid economic growth in the developing
countries. Accordingly, massive law reforms based upon Western type legal
models have been suggested and implemented in developing nations for the
purpose of ensuring quick development therein.65
However, when the development strategy of injecting the rule of law and
good governance principles fails to produce the desired results, foreign law
reformers have tended to identify the ‘culture’ of the developing country as cause
of such failure. One of the main reasons is that:
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… cultural norms or habits can create the difference between a system
that resembles the Western notion of the rule of law and a system that
uses the same tools, but in ways that vary from Western expectations.
Thus, the role of law in a culture dramatically influences how the rule
of law operates in a society.66
It is in this context that one should consider the views advanced by leading
scholars such as Tim Lindsey and Howard Dick. They have advanced a strong
critique of the notions of ‘good governance’ and ‘rule of law’, particularly when
deployed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). They have argued that
the good governance/rule of law idea fails to take account of the political nature of
economic development, while at the same time being suffused with its own
political agenda. They also argue that notions of governance, the rule of law and
corruption are still “under-theorised”, leading to “definitional confusion, fuzzy
policy, flawed projects and ineffectual reforms”.67
Governance is seen as just a return of the Law and Development movement,
and as inevitably sharing the same flaws. Just as earlier aid to the economy was
wasted because it ignored political realities, so too, it has been argued,
governance/rule of law programmes proposed by IFIs often act as if they can
avoid confronting vested power structures.68 Dick argues for a deconstruction of
the terms ‘governance’ and ‘corruption’, which he says would reveal their
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political (rather than technocratic) intent as part of the “neo-liberal reform agenda
promoted by the IMF and the World Bank”.69
Lindsey also criticises the use of culture as an excuse for the failure of the
IFI’s law reform project since the ideology behinds this excuse is legal
orientalism.70 He explains further:
In its legal form, this Orientalism can demonise local ‘Asian’ legal
culture as immature, primitive, backward, subjective, and irrational,
while valorising Western laws as developed, modern and advanced,
objective and rational.71

The main problem for legal culture as the tool for examining the rule of law is “an
underlying assumption that culture-driven behaviour is not rational.”72 This
explains why the IFIs see the failure or the slowness of the implementation of the
rule of law and governance as a product of ‘legal culture’, which is seen as an
obstacle to development. It appears to assume that values and institutional
approaches grounded in non-Western cultures are inherently inferior and could
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not produce anything to equal or exceed existing Western standards. Lindsey does
not regard this excuse as legitimate. Instead, he argues that the key problem of the
IFIs’ project is “an over-simplistic approach to the introduction of new legal
frameworks and a rushing of major changes in an extremely complex and volatile
political context of radical change.”73
Another associated criticism which has been advanced relates to the use of
legal transplants. The IFIs often suggest importing foreign legislative schemes
or institutional models to developing countries. Thome asserts that all law
reform, and judicial reform in particular, rests on three premises: first, that
development requires a modern legal framework resembling that in the United
States; second, that this model establishes clear and predictable rules; and third,
that the model can be easily transferred.74 Critics assert that one of the most
significant reasons for the failure of IFI programmes is the naive belief that the
Western legal system, particularly the American model, can be easily
transplanted to recipient countries.
For instance, Gunther Teubner has examined the difficulty of legal
transplants, preferring to describe a foreign legal element as an ‘irritant’ rather
than a transplant. According to Teubner, the transfer of a legal concept from one
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system to another will have unpredictable affects, because structural coupling
will change:

When a foreign rule is imposed on a domestic culture…it is not
transplanted into another organism, rather it works as a fundamental
irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected
events… ‘Legal irritations’ cannot be domesticated; they are not
transformed from something alien into something familiar, not
adapted to a new cultural context, rather they will unleash an
evolutionary dynamic in which the external rule’s meaning will be
reconstructed and the internal context will undergo fundamental
change.75

Legal transplants can range from the wholesale adoption of entire systems
of law to the copying of a single rule. There is little agreement among scholars on
transplant feasibility and the conditions for successful transplants, or even how to
define ‘success’.76 Those who oppose legal transplants generally point out that it
is a form of colonial imposition and, as such, contrary to the principles of
democratic governance. It interferes substantially with the sovereignty of the
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recipient country and clashes with the concept of local ownership of the reform
process as the process does not originate from a home grown product, but is
externally imposed. From this perspective, the rule of law promoted by IFIs is
seen as a form of economic, legal, cultural and political hegemony.77
Another significant criticism is that the donor community is imposing neoliberal models of governance on the developing world. Ohnesorge labels the
model as “the neoliberal rule of law of the 1990s”.78 It is often seen as
synonymous with the phrase ‘Washington Consensus’, coined by Williamson in
1990,79 which focuses on privatisation, deregulation, trade liberation, and so on.
The main criticism is that the donors’ concept of governance is ideological and
based on the currently dominant Anglo-American/liberal/pluralist socio-political
doctrine. Accordingly, good governance was introduced on the agenda by the
World Bank (1989), because it needed to explain why a number of countries
failed to develop in spite of the fact that they had adopted the neo-liberal
adjustment policies imposed on them by the International Monetary Fund and the
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World Bank. The answer given was: ‘bad governance’ ― understood as selfserving public officials and corruption in the public service.80
The phrase ‘Washington Consensus’ has become a lightning rod for
dissatisfaction

amongst

anti-globalization

protestors,

developing

country

politicians and officials, trade negotiators, and numerous others. There now exists
an ‘Augmented’ Washington Consensus or Post-Washington Consensus (PWC).
Jayasuriya explains that:
Here we see one of the key differences between the governance
programs advocated within the framework of the Washington
Consensus and the PWC. In the former, ‘governance’ connoted the
effective implementation of policies of economic liberalisation; in the
latter, there is greater emphasis on governance as an instrument to
promote the regulative capacities of the state. In fact, from the PWC
viewpoint, one of the main causes of the Asian crisis has been a
failure to reinforce the regulative capacities of the state.81

Regulation seeks to address the tension which can arise between free market
principles as supported by instruments of private law, and public interest goals as
promoted by the state. Jayasuriya points out that the new regulatory state82 is not
simply about the transformation and reorientation of policies and institutions
80
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(although these are important); rather, it reflects a deeper structural transformation
of the state.83 The transformation of the economic order as implied in the new
regulatory state can involve a confrontation with deeply embedded national
traditions in state–economy relations, administration and regulation. This suggests
that new economic ideas and imperatives arising from the IFIs may not be
compatible with national conditions. In Jayasuriya’s words, “a comprehensive
understanding of economic reform is possible only within the context of the wider
set of political and institutional structure.”84 It follows that real change cannot be
achieved by the sort of short-term legal reform programmes supported by the IFIs.
Thus far, in this section, I have summarised the main arguments advanced
by opponents of the use of good governance and the rule of law in relation to the
role of the IFIs in transition societies. These arguments do not require an
abandonment of the concepts of the ‘rule of law’ and ‘good governance’ as tools
for evaluating law reform under Habibie, but they do highlight the need to
consider IFI pressure for Indonesia to follow good governance and the rule of law
as ‘additional explanations’ for the process and dynamic debate of law reform,
along with the other factors outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Moreover, in
response to these arguments, I make a distinction, in this thesis, between IFI
pressures (e.g. ‘conditionality strategy’) and the core elements of good
governance and the rule of law, regardless of whether those fundamental elements

83

Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism, Governance and the Emergence of the
Regulatory State in Post-Crisis East Asia’ in Richard Robison (et al), Politics and Markets in the
Wake of the Asian Crisis, (London, Routledge, 2000), 315-330.

84

Jayasuriya, above n 67, 34.

56

are claimed to be promoted by the IFIs or not. Drawing this distinction is
necessary for a number of reasons.
The first reason is that IFI projects in Indonesia have related mainly to
economics issues such as monetary policy, commercial law, the social safety net,
banking

system and

corporate

restructuring,

bankruptcy

reform,

trade

deregulation, and privatisation of state enterprises85 — whereas the three case
studies examined in this thesis are aspects of public law (political laws, human
rights, and criminal aspects of anti-corruption laws). I will explain in the next
chapter that, from the perspective of the student movements which were central to
the struggle for democratic transition in Indonesia, these areas of public law were
considered the top law reform priorities. This is an important reminder that not all
aspects of the reform agenda pursued during the Habibie era were driven by the
IFIs. In this sense, the popular demand that corrupt individuals be held
accountable for their activities was an important part of the post-Soeharto
democratic transition agenda. Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison also point out that:
The tumultuous events that led ultimately to the re-establishment of
free and open elections in 1999 and to the rise of parties and
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parliaments were the product of domestic political dynamics rather
than any policy initiative by the IMF or the World Bank.86

This does not mean that the IFIs did not play any role at all in public law
areas during the Habibie era. Rather, their role in the three areas of law reform
with which this thesis is concerned was not as prominent as it was in areas of
private and commercial law. For instance, along with Indonesian political elites,
the IFIs: put pressure on the Habibie government to hold democratic elections;
encouraged Habibie’s agenda on human rights through their public statements;
organised seminars on press freedom which facilitated meetings between the
government and journalists; and, more importantly, they were strongly concerned
with corruption issues, including the social safety net and the Bank Bali scandal
in which members of Habibie’s inner circle were implicated. All of these aspects
of the influence of IFIs will be discussed in the main chapters of this thesis, as part
of the environment in which Habibie was operating.
Second, as will be explained briefly in Chapter 3, during the Habibie
period, the Indonesian government was required to sign no less than sixteen
Letters of Intent (LoI) to the IMF drawing its agreement to act in accordance with
several reform programmes.87 Some of the agreements required the cancellation of
huge industrial projects and trading cartels at the heart of the Soeharto regime.
Moreover, the two crucial IMF demands were those relating to the recapitalisation

86

Vedi R. Hadiz & Richard Robison, ‘Neo-Liberal Reforms and Illiberal Consolidations: The
Indonesian Paradox’, SEARC Working Papers, No. 52, September 2003.

87

See the official documents of
country/idn/index.htm?pn=9

Indonesia and IMF in http://www.imf.org/external/

58

of Indonesia’s banks and the decentralisation of administrative authority (otonomi
daerah). In these areas, the IFIs played a very active role in ‘helping’ the
Indonesian government to draft the required bills. However, this thesis does not
discuss those laws. The thesis will demonstrate in the main chapters, through a
detailed examination of the political and legal processes associated with the three
areas of law reform that are the subject of this thesis — political laws, human
rights laws, anti-corruption laws — that the IFIs were not the ‘authors’ of the
seven laws in question. This suggests that criticisms of the the IFIs’ deployment
of the concepts of the rule of law and good governance, and the use of legal
transplants, discussed above, do not apply with equal force to law reforms which
were not part of the LoI process – such as the laws which are the subject of the
three case studies examined in this thesis.88
Third, apart from considering the relative impact of the IFIs’ programmes
in different areas of law reform, it is also necessary to counter the assumption that
concepts such as good governance were ‘foreign’ and ‘unknown’ to the
Indonesian people. Although one should not assume that what works in Western
liberal democracies will necessarily work for Indonesia, at the same time one
needs to avoid treating Indonesia as so different from other states that none of the
elements of good governance and the rule of law can apply. In fact, principles
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associated with good governance have traditionally been used and performed in
several parts of the Indonesian archipelago such as in West Sumatra, Bali and
many other areas.89 The elements and the spirit of good governance such as
participation, accountability and transparency, which in the past were employed at
certain village or regional levels, are now being ‘repackaged’ in line with current
terminology and implemented at the national and international levels.90
However, despite their connections with Indonesian traditions, the
institutionalisation of those elements in Indonesian legal systems has been rightly
questioned for at least 32 years. Governance is an old concept; what is new is the
demands for reform that governance must confront.91 In the final section of this
chapter, below, I provide a general picture of the status of good governance and
the rule of law in modern Indonesia prior to the resignation of President Soeharto.
The Indonesian people’s call for reform in the last days of the Soeharto era was
for the implementation of “clean and good governance which is accountable,
constitutional, transparent, democratic, just, and free from corruption, collusion
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and nepotism.”92 It is safe to state that the Indonesian people themselves
recognised and valued the principles of good governance. In the context of an
examination of the relationship between democratic transformation and law
reform, this is perhaps the strongest argument in support of their employment as
evaluation criteria.
In sum, the arguments advanced by Lindsey, Dick and others are important
in prompting re-evaluation and re-examination of the linkages between the ‘thick’
(substantive) concept of the rule of law, legal transplants, legal culture, national
economies and world markets. However, it does not follow from their critique that
the ‘thin’ (conventional or formal) account of the rule of law and the three main
elements of good governance (accountability, transparency, and participation)
should not be used as the standards to measure Habibie’s law reform in the three
case studies to be examined in this thesis. Rather, these criticisms suggest that the
IFIs’ rule of law-economic development rhetoric must be approached with
caution.

In addition, the Lindsey/Dick position does suggest that it is also

necessary to examine the way in which IFI pressure for Indonesia to follow good
governance and the rule of law influenced the processes and dynamics of law
reforms in the post-Soeharto period.
In other words, whilst the way in which the concepts of the rule of law and
good governance have been deployed by the IFIs has been subject to heavy
criticism, the thesis takes the position that the core elements of those concepts

92

Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, Proses Reformasi Konstitutional: Sidang Istimewa MPR 1998,
(Jakarta, MPR-RI, 2001), 42.

61

remain useful as criteria for evaluating Habibie’s public law reform programmes.
As Brietzke has pointed out, “Even critics of the IMF and WB admit that these
multilaterals’ litany of transparency, accountability, predictability and public
participation is a worthy addition to a good governance/rule of law doctrine.”93
In this regard, Goran Hyden makes an attempt at clarifying the concept of
governance by removing it from the arena of practical donor programs and using
it instead as an analytical tool.94 Here, governance refers to the setting of rules that
guide rule-making. The focus is on the setting of rules, precisely because a
transition implies a move away from one institutional set up towards another.95
Consequently, Hyden suggests that the concept of governance is suitable to
analyse regime transitions.
In a similar vein, Peerenboom has argued that both ‘thin’ and ‘thick’
accounts of the rule of law have value as analytical tools. 96 In this thesis ‘thin’
rule of law theory is deployed, not because it is a ‘sneaky’ way of adopting
governance, but because it is a useful reference point for micro-level evaluation of
selected legislative reforms. It is acknowledged that ‘thick’ rule of law theory
would be a better tool for macro-level analysis of the law-economics
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relationships, but this is not the objective of this thesis. The point is that there is
no single correct answer to which is the ‘correct’ theory of the rule of law.
Peerenboom has applied ‘thin’ rule of law theory as a diagnostic tool for
assessing legal reform in China. He explains his approach that:
My approach is … pragmatic: to the extent that a thin rule of law is a
useful way to understand some of the obstacles faced by citizens,
investors, or legal reformers in China or can be used as a metric for
cross-cultural comparisons or for analyzing political or economic
phenomena, then use it. There is no need to wait for a fully developed
thin or thick theory of the rule of law. In my view, the elements of a
thin theory are sufficiently specified for the present purpose of
determining the direction of China’s legal reforms and providing a
workable standard for measuring the progress of such reforms. More
generally, rather than attempting to further hone the elements into a
fully developed ideal thin theory, a more useful approach would be to
consider specific cases as they arise in the context of particular legal
system to determine whether more clarity or consistency is desirable
or the gap between law and practice should be narrowed.97

This thesis follows Peerenboom’s position that the choice to use ‘thin’ or
‘thick’ rule of law theory depends on one’s purpose.98 Given the objectives of this
thesis, the ‘thin’ version of the rule of law will be used because this thesis
examines selected legislative reforms to determine whether those laws can be
regarded as general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being
followed, stable and enforced.
This chapter has demonstrated that there is a strong foundation in the
theoretical literature for employing good governance and the rule of law as tools
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for evaluating the merits of particular law reform initiatives. Nonetheless, it might
be suggested that given that the meaning of these concepts is contested, and in
light of the claim that they have been employed and manipulated by IFIs and
governments seeking development funds, it would be better simply to discuss the
core elements without reference to the terms good governance and the rule of law.
However, other key legal and political concepts which have been used widely for
evaluation purposes, such as democracy, constitutionalism, civil society, and
human rights, are also contested. One should not abandon these terms and the
values they embody simply because they are contested. The same applies to both
the rule of law and good governance. Instead of insisting that both terms be
avoided altogether, the thesis considers both terms as providing a useful guide for
legal reform, in that their core elements can be used to clarify demands for reform
and to examine the outcome of such reforms.
Thus far this chapter has discussed the road to law reform, raising issues
on law and its relationship with social change, the rule of law and good
governance. As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the chapter provides a
basic foundation for the thesis to analyse Habibie’s law reforms. It is time to ask a
more specific question. Why do good governance and the rule of law matter in
Indonesian law reform?
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Indonesia: Governance and Rule of Law
At the heart of Indonesia’s problems lies at least a thirty-two year absence
of governance and the rule of law. The term Negara Hukum or rechtsstaat is
practically used in Indonesia as an equivalent of the Western notion of the rule of
law. According to Lindsey, the rule of law “is a highly charged notion that has
played a central role in Indonesian political and legal thinking.”99 However, as
Lindsey has correctly pointed out, “the use of common law traditions of ‘rule of
law’ to understand Negara Hukum is problematic” since no consensus has been
reached on the exact meaning of Negara Hukum.100
It is also worth considering that the concept of rechtsstaat, which had been
introduced into the German constitutional and political debate in the early
nineteenth century, has also been interpreted in various ways. It has evolved over
time in Europe to incorporate democracy and fundamental rights.101 Some have
tried to distinguish the rule of law from the rechtsstaat, by stressing that the
former is a theoretical ideal whilst the latter is concerned with actual obedience to
99
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the law.102 I have referred earlier to Tim Lindsey when he states that rule by law
or the ‘thin’ version of the rule of law is “often linked to the ‘Civil Law’
Rechtsstaat idea”.103
The literal meaning of rechtsstaat was stipulated in the Elucidation of the
1945 Constitution.104 However the Elucidation did not explain the notion of
rechtsstaat. It said only, “Indonesia is a state based on law (rechtsstaat), not
merely based on power (machtsstaat).” In other words, the spirit of the 1945
Constitution is that Indonesia is based on right rather than might. Lack of a clear
definition of rechtsstaat invites the criticism that its meaning is subject to
interpretation “which is frequently done subjectively by the government.”105
The debate over Negara Hukum in Indonesian legal history is reflected in
the writings of (to name but a few):106 Sunaryati Haryono, who interpreted Negara

this material version of rechtsstaat is closely related to the ‘thick’ version of the rule of law, the
formal rechtsstaat is quite similar to the ‘thin’ version of the rule of law.
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Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, University of Melbourne, 10 April 2001; Mary
Gaudron, ‘Reply to Professor Michel Troper “The Limits of the Rule of Law”’, Rule of Law
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Indonesia’ (2004) 18 Asian Pacific Economic Literature 1, 17.
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Hukum in the light of the rule of law;107 Oemar Seno Adji, who opined that
Negara Hukum has its own Indonesian characteristics based on family
principle;108 Padmo Wahyono, who related the concept Negara Hukum with the
political philosophy of organic statism (integralism or integralistik);109 Ismail
Suny, who adhered to the literal meaning of Negara Hukum as rechtsstaat;110 and
Hartono Mardjono, who took the view that elements of Negara Hukum are
supremacy of law, equality before the law and due process of law.111
A brief explanation of the structure of the Indonesian state, according to
the 1945 Constitution, will assist in understanding the debate over Negara
Hukum.112 Political institutions in Indonesia did not assume a three-way
separation of state powers, with ‘checks-and-balances’ among the legislature, the
executive, and the judicial branches in order to prevent misuse of state power.
Professor Soepomo, a leading figure in the drafting process of the 1945
Constitution as a chairperson of the Small Committee of Drafting the Constitution
107

Sunaryati Hartono, Apakah Rule of Law Itu? (Bandung, Alumni, 1982), Chapter 5.
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Oemar Seno Adji, Peradilan Bebas Negara Hukum (Jakarta, Erlangga, 1980), 24-58; and
Oemar Seno Adji, ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the American Constitutional Influence’ in
Lawrence Ward Beer (ed.), Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979), 102-110. His view is supported by Tahir Azhary,
Negara Hukum (Jakarta, Bulan Bintang, 1992), 99.

109

Padmo Wahyono, Konsep Yuridis Negara Hukum Indonesia, unpublished paper, September
1988; see also Padmo Wahyono, Guru Pinandita: Sumbangsih untuk Prof. Djokosoetono, SH
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2001), 139.
112

During 1999-2002, Indonesian Constitution has been amended four times. Therefore, it should
be note that my descriptions of the structure of Indonesian state in this section are based on the
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(Panitia Kecil Perancang Undang-Undang Dasar) under the Investigating
Committee for the Preparation of Independence, explained that the reason why
Indonesia should not adopt the separation of powers was
“…because in practice a law-making institution was handed over
governmental works, a court was handed over governmental works,
and the government was given authority making laws. Because of it,
the separation of three powers (Trias Politica) in theory did not fit
with reality.”113
The MPR, as the highest organ of the state, was not the same type of
institution as a parliament.114 As stated in Article 1, Clause 2, of the 1945
Constitution, the MPR was the manifestation of all the people of Indonesia, fully
exercising sovereignty in the name of the Indonesian people. The MPR as a
political institution was literally the highest state organ, positioned above all other
state organs, such as the President, the DPR, and the Supreme Court. The MPR
was to hold a general assembly at least once every five years (Article 2, Clause 2)
for the amendments of the constitution, decision-making on the Broad Outlines of
State Policy (GBHN)115 laid down for guidance during the President’s term in

Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy’ (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International &
Comparative Law 244-301.
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Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Risalah Sidang BPUPKI-PPKI 28 Mei 1945-22
Agustus 1945 (Jakarta, Sekneg RI, 1995), 221-222.
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A full two-thirds of the MPR was the DPR itself. Thus the MPR did not at all function as an
upper chamber does in many bicameral legislatures, i.e., as a gathering place of more experienced
politicians with cooler heads than those that sometimes prevail in the lower chamber. In this way,
the upper chamber provides another useful check within a larger system characterised by the
separation of powers and multiple checks and balances. Instead, the MPR was simply an extension
of the DPR, in which the same political conflicts were played out in a body with much more
extensive powers. I will explain this further in Chapter 3.
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GBHN was a set of policy guidelines drafted by the MPR, passed as a decree, and presented to
the newly elected president as the policy agenda for his or her five years in office. Establishing the
GBHN was one of the three functions of the MPR explicitly mentioned in the 1945 Constitution
(besides establishing and amending the Constitution and electing the president and vice president).
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office, and the election of the President/Vice-President (Article 3; Article 6,
Clause 2; Article 37). Then, according to the GBHN decided by the MPR, five
high state organs below the MPR — the President, the DPR, the Supreme Court,
the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung or DPA), and the
Board of Audit (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan or BPK) — exercised their
respective functions. The MPR was thus the ‘embodiment’ (penjelmaan) of the
entire Indonesian nation.
After rejecting individualism and liberal democracy as being the basis of
the new democratic regime, the founding fathers adopted the ‘Big Family
principle’ (kekeluargaan) as a philosophical base for constructing original
political institutions in Indonesia. The constitution was expected to establish
political institutions in which power was concentrated in the president as the Head
of the Big Family, standing over all the people.116 The clearest manifestation of
this philosophical heritage was the status, composition and purpose of the
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), as described above, and the position,
power and status of the President, as examined below.
The 1945 Constitution was described as ‘executive heavy’ since the
superiority of the executive over the legislative was expressed clearly in the

The GBHN was one of the primary yardsticks by which the MPR evaluated the performance of the
president at its Annual, General and Special Sessions. As an MPR decree, the GBHN was thus
legally binding; as a set of policy guidelines, it was a political yardstick.
116

For a full account see Marsilam Simanjuntak, Pandangan Negara Integralistik: sumber, unsur
dan riwayatnya dalam persiapan UUD 1945 (Jakarta, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1994). In addition,
David Bourchier has argued that the “integralism” (kekeluargaan) philosophy behinds the 1945
Constitution owes a considerable intellectual debt to a stream of European organicist theory
developed mainly by German Philosophers including Adam Muller and von Savigny —transmitted
to Indonesia through the influence of the legal scholars of Leiden University in the 1920s and
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Constitution. Articles about the president in the constitution numbered 13.117 The
most important aspect of the president’s authority in terms of the concentration of
power in his hands was the right to legislate. Article 5, Clause 1 said that “the
President holds the right to determine a law with the agreement of the DPR”. This
shows a formulation that the President and the DPR co-hold the right of
legislation, which is different from the systems in which the right of enacting
legislation only belongs to the parliament. Thus, the 1945 Constitution did not
reflect the idea that the power of executive should be restricted by legislation.
Rather, the President and the DPR should cooperate and coordinate in enacting
legislation.
The chapter on the judiciary was one of the most inadequate parts of the
1945 Constitution. Article 24, Clause 1 only stated that “the right of Justice is
exercised by the Supreme Court and ... other organisations of justice” and that
organisations, authority, and ways of appointing the judges would be regulated by
laws concerned. This has made the judiciary subordinate to the President.118 As
the provisions regarding state institutions were to be enacted in laws, and given

1930s— in strong opposition to positivism. See David Bourchier, ‘Lineages of Organicist Political
Thought in Indonesia’, PhD Thesis, Monash University, 1996.
117

Chapter III, Articles 4-15 about “The State Administration Power”; Chapter V, Article 17 about
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For discussion of the political subordination of the Supreme Court see Tim Lindsey,
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in Veronica Taylor (ed.), above n 70, 90-110.
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that the president held legislative authority, it was not difficult to predict the
result: whoever held the presidential power would hold absolute power under the
1945 Constitution.
The unlimited power of the executive is clearly against the rule of law.
The 1945 Constitution had facilitated the establishment of two authoritarian
regimes. This provides evidence that both the Soekarno (1945-1966) and the
Soeharto (1966-1998) governments used the notion of Negara Hukum as their
rhetoric. Both governments did not create institutions and frameworks; nor did
they establish basic infrastructure. Lubis explains this problem further:
The Old Order government, for example, subscribed to a rechtsstaat
cast in terms of the romantic vision of Soekarno’s notion of unfinished
revolution, enabling him to interfere in the judiciary. The New Order
government, by contrast, interprets the rechtsstaat in a sense that
supports the goals of economic development, stability, security and
order. Implicitly, the rechtsstaat is subordinated to those goals.119
Legal frameworks are necessary for creating a predictable and secure
living and working environment for ordinary citizens, and for entrepreneurs and
investors. A fair and effective legal framework requires that a set of rules be
known in advance, that the rules be enforced, that the means to ensure the
application of the rules exist, that any conflicts be resolved by binding decisions
made by an independent and credible judiciary, and that procedures be available
for changing the rules, when they cease to serve the purpose for which they were
intended. Those legal frameworks have been absent in Indonesia.
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In addition, during the Soeharto era Indonesia had government, but not
good governance. Soeharto’s New Order government focused mainly on
economic development, in order to provide steadily improving standards of living
for Indonesians. Both the political and the legal systems had to support the
development strategy of the nation. Therefore, the principles of good governance
and the rule of law were accepted, only as long as they supported development,
and Soeharto’s assessment of the national interest. Accordingly, the rule of law
seems to have played a very minor role, if any, in the economic development of
the nation.120 In the words of the Asian Development Bank, “Perhaps the weakest
link in Indonesia’s past development strategy was governance.”121
Soeharto controlled the legal machinery and the destiny of a nation. The
Indonesian legal system was marred by flaws. Electoral bodies suffered from the
lack of independent and transparent elections. In almost all affairs, effective
checks and balances were absent. Even the formally installed rules, regulations,
and laws, were not effective, and weakly enforced in almost all sectors and at all
levels of organisation. Informal institutions and the prevailing social norms also
suffered from the same predicament. When a very high profile political or
business case was at stake, the ultimate decision generally was understood to have
come from the very top person. Often, that would be Soeharto himself, or a
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member of his inner circle. In this sense, he was practically the only effective
institution in the country.
R. William Liddle of Ohio State University argues that the political
structure of the New Order government can be described as a steeply ascending
pyramid in which the heights were thoroughly dominated by a single office, the
Presidency.122 It can safely be stated that Soeharto centralised all power in Jakarta,
with himself as the supreme leader.

The New Order government was a

government with the avowed aim of restoring the nation’s confidence in itself and
ensuring stability, even if authoritarian methods were needed.
A U.S. Library of Congress study completed during Soehartos’ presidency
described the Indonesian political system as follows:
Since independence the nation has been centrally governed from
Jakarta. In a system in which the lines of authority, budget, and
personnel appointment run outward and downward, regional and local
governments enjoy little autonomy. Their role is largely
administrative: implementing policies, rules and regulations. Regional
officialdom is an extension of the Jakarta bureaucracy. In the early
1990s, there was neither real power sharing or upward political
communication through representative feedback.123

Soeharto also controlled the legal system, including all judicial
appointments. Judges earned a living by selling justice to the highest bidder.124 It
could be argued that the legal system was simply another arm of Soeharto’s
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corrupt machine. Judicial power was systematically abused so that the justice
system was like a business controlled by a ‘mafia’ of court officials, and bribery
was ‘the standard’ practice. It was reported that up to 50% of all Indonesian
judges took ‘bribes’.125 Judges did not uphold the rule of law, bringing neither
security nor predictability to social, political and economic relations.
When Soeharto left office, he transferred all powers (and all problems) to
President BJ Habibie. The new president had to reform the country. It was
imperative for the Habibie government to promote good governance and the rule
of law since their absence under Soeharto was central to the weaknesses of that
undemocratic regime. What did he do and what were the obstacles he faced? Did
he reform the law under the guidance of good governance and the rule of law?
Was his reform — borrowing Justice Kirby’s words — “a change for the
better”?126 These questions will be examined fully in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
INDONESIA: FROM CRISIS TO LAW REFORM

Indonesia is a nation of 210,000 million people in search of a path to
political, social, economic and legal reform. In 1998, after fifty three years of
independence, Indonesia entered a transition era from an authoritarian toward a
democratic system, when President Soeharto was forced to resign. President BJ
Habibie, Soeharto’s successor, had to grapple with the enormous challenges of
simultaneously promoting broad economic, political and legal reform.
The first aims of this chapter is to discuss why legal flaws were an
important element of the economic and political crisis hit Indonesia during 19971998 and why legal reform is considered essential. As noted in Chapter 2, under
Soeharto, the concept of Negara Hukum was subordinated to the goals of
economic development. However, when the economic crisis hit Indonesia, unlike
in other Asian countries, without the support of the rule of law, Indonesia faced
chaos and riots. What went wrong with Indonesian’s choice of development,
rather than the rule of law? It was an economic crisis, not an economic
achievement, which launched Indonesia into its transition.
Second, this chapter examines the nature of the demands for reform which
Habibie faced when he became President. The search for explanatory factors
begins with the assumption that law reform is an inherently political process, i.e.
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one that is explicitly rooted in the give-and-take of mundane conflicts over the
distribution of power. It was politics which opened the window for the law
reform movement to develop. Law reform is not only political, but also a struggle
between the status quo and change for the better.
The chapter then examines Habibie’s response to the demands for reform.
This framework “emphasizes a micro-analytic approach to political behavior,
centered on real people, not grand abstractions, on the individuals’ surrounding
social, political, and economic constraints, and on the sometimes creative activity
of individuals to avoid, avert, outdistance, or overthrow their institutions”.1 Other
actors to whom attention should be paid in this context, are the military and
members of parliament at the national level; and both the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, at the international level. This chapter will provide the
necessary background and context for the law reform case studies presented in the
main part of this thesis.

Indonesia at the Edge
In the previous chapter, I argued that Indonesia under Soeharto’s2 rule did
not have a political system based on good governance and the rule of law. I will
1

Ruth Lane, The Art of Comparative Politics (Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 3.

2

Soeharto was born in 1921 in a small village near Yogyakarta in Central Java. He had six years
of primary school education, and then worked briefly as a bank clerk until he joined the Royal
Netherland’s Indies army (KNIL) in 1940 at the age of nineteen. After Indonesia became
independent he held different commanding positions until, in 1964, he became a Major General
and the Commander of KOSTRAD (the Army’s Strategic Reserve). Soeharto emerged as the
dominant figure in the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI) in October 1965, following the
campaign against the Communist Party (PKI). In March 1966, President Soekarno handed over
power to Soeharto and instructed him to take all necessary steps to establish public order and to
safeguard the President. Shortly afterwards, Soeharto replaced Soekarno as President (1968). He
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elaborate this position further in this section. Whilst explaining the unlimited
power Soeharto had, and how he successfully managed the country under the
exercise of his rule, authority and patronage (which included corruption and
bribery), this section argues that lack of both good governance and the rule of law
contributed to the crisis, thereby necessitating law reform which promoted good
governance and the rule of law.
President Soeharto had ‘unlimited’ powers. Two factors contributed to the
power of the presidency in Indonesia during the New Order Government3. First,
the 1945 Constitution provided for a very strong chief executive. Nine of thirteen
articles in the Constitution, dealing with the presidency, provide powers to the
President (key executive, legislative, judicial, foreign policy and security powers).
Limitations and checks and balances on the Presidency were not the main
concerns of the 1945 Constitution. It is understood that President Soeharto did not
want to change or make amendments to the 1945 Constitution during his
presidency, partly for this reason.4
Second, in accordance with Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, the president
and vice-president are elected by the country’s highest legislative body, the
held the presidency for thirty two years. More information can be obtained from Michael R.J.
Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Soeharto: order, development and pressure for change
(London, Routledge, 1993), 1-31 and Angus McIntyre, ‘Soeharto’s Composure: Considering the
Biographical and Autobiographical Accounts’, Working Paper, No. 97, Clayton, Centre of
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1996.
3

In order to distinguish the different orientations, the Soeharto government is called the New
Order Government, whilst the Soekarno era is called the Old Order Government. Soeharto
formally took over the presidency from Soekarno in 1968, in the wake of an abortive coup attempt
(1965) in which six top army generals were murdered. In the Soekarno era, Indonesia had a very
unstable government, so that economic development was not possible. New Order Government
orientations were to maintain political stability and to develop economic growth
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Peoples’ Consultative Assembly (MPR). This one-thousand member body
consisted of the five hundred members of parliament and another five hundred
representatives of different functional groups and of Indonesia’s twenty-seven
provinces. The appointment of these five hundred delegates, together with that of
the hundred appointed members of the military faction of parliament, was in the
hands of the president. In practice, Soeharto controlled the appointment of sixty
per cent of the delegates in the assembly which elected him. This is against the
characteristics of good governance and the rule of law. As a result, every fifth
year until 1998, the MPR unanimously re-elected Soeharto to the presidency.
Soeharto allowed only three political parties/interest groups: Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Golongan Karya (Golkar), and Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia (PDI).5 In the Soeharto era, Golkar (Soeharto’s party) won more than
60% of the vote in each of six heavily stage-managed elections between 1971 and
1997.6 For instances, the results of the May 1997 election were that Golkar
gained votes and seats, moving from 68 per cent of the votes in 1992 to 74.5 per
cent in 1997, and winning 325 out of the 425 seats being contested (the number of
seats at stake rose from 400 in 1992 to 425 in 1997 owing to the reduction in the
number of seats allocated to the Armed Forces, from 100 to 75, out of the total
500 seats in the DPR).

4

See Marsilam Simanjuntak, Pandangan Negara Integralistik: sumber, unsur dan riwayatnya
dalam persiapan UUD 1945 (Jakarta, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1994).

5
6

See Law No. 3 of 1975 on Political Parties and Golkar.
HD. Haryo Sasongko, Pemilu’99: Komedi atau Tragedi (Jakarta, Pustaka Grafiksi, 1999), 28.
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Why did Golkar win? The Soeharto government did not allow the
establishment of an independent supervisory committee for the election.
Consequently, it was difficult to have genuine elections during the Soeharto era.
The vote-counting process was completely dominated by the government
apparatus, whilst the other two political parties were completely excluded. The
Indonesian military (ABRI), and the government bureaucracy, were not neutral.
Directly or not, they supported Golkar. This could be seen in the existence of
three channels (tiga jalur): A (ABRI), B (the bureaucracy), G (Golkar). The
channels had the responsibility to secure the New Order’s political and economic
policy.7
To a large extent, the political system depended on the government’s
control and distribution of economic favours. A boom in the oil price from the
mid-1970s provided the government with access to financial resources, on a
previously unprecedented scale, which enabled it to build up a political economy
where economic rewards were exchanged for political loyalty. The system
encompassed both national elites and those community leaders and local and
regional politicians who were willing to comply with the government’s wishes.
Economic rewards and political patronage flowed downward in the system, whilst
political loyalty flowed upward, in what resembled a giant pyramid of patrimonial
relationships.8
7

Valina Singka Subekti, ‘Electoral Law Reform as Prerequisite to Create Democratization in
Indonesia’, in R. William Liddle (ed), Crafting Indonesian Democracy (Bandung, Mizan, 2001),
113.
8

More information can be obtained from Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion: capital mobility and
the Indonesian state (New York, Cornell University Press, 1996).
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The good economic performance of the New Order provided for improved
general levels of prosperity, with increases in rice production, literacy, health
services,

education,

transportation,

communications

and

employment

opportunities in industry. Soeharto was accorded personal recognition and credit
for his central role in these accomplishments. During his thirty two years in
power, Soeharto presided over tremendous changes in the social and economic
spheres.
Moreover, the fruits of development also trickled down to Indonesia’s
thousands of villages and urban neighbourhoods, in the form of new schools,
roads, health-care centres and irrigation projects. The legitimacy of Soeharto’s
government relied on development. The ‘Father of Development’ was an official
title bestowed on him by the Parliament.
However, from the end of the 1980s, popular resentment against the
government’s economic policies also increased, largely due to the increasingly
obvious and rampant corruption and nepotism which thrived in the system. A
great deal of the resentment focused on President Soeharto’s blatant favouritism
towards his own relatives. In the 1980s, several of the President’s children
founded conglomerates — big groups of companies related by ownership rather
than by their economic activity. The children’s companies were active in a wide
range of economic fields.9
9

For instance, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, known as Mbak Tutut, Soeharto’s eldest daughter, held
interests in telecommunications, agribusiness, toll road construction and ship manufacturing. She
had a big stake in toll roads around Asia, under 25-year ‘build operate and transfer’ contracts.
Tutut’s husband was a key shareholder in the Medco group, involved in drilling oil in Khazakstan,
Turkmenistan and Burma. Bambang Trihatmojo, the second son, controlled the large Bimantara
group, which was active in the food, retailing, construction, electronics, real estate, and other
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The Indonesian Military, another important national institution, was loyal
to Soeharto.10 With support from the Military, violations of human rights occurred
during the Soeharto era. Student and mass demonstrations had been prohibited
and many of them were sent to gaol with or without trial. Military officers served
not only as members of parliament, but also were appointed as Governors,
Ministers, Ambassadors, and even as Chief Judge of the Supreme Court.
When the economy was booming, the military gradually transformed itself
from a repressive force into a mechanism to share some of the national wealth.
When the country was awash in cash, money was the mechanism for national
solidarity. Most of the wealth was held by Soeharto, his children and cronies. This
once again points to Soeharto being the only effective institution.
Under Soeharto, the press was restricted in its publication of reports.
Journalists who departed from the ‘appropriate’ guidelines were subject to both
criminal and civil proceedings in the courts. In 1994, three national media were

fields. He also had links with companies in Manila and Sydney forming a multinational company
called Asia-Pacific Infrastructure Ltd, listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange. Meanwhile, the
youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra, had interests in, to name but a few, the fields of shipping,
agribusiness, air travel, and petrochemicals. Soeharto’s other children, Sigit Harjoyudanto, Siti
Hediati Hariyadi and Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih had their own business conglomerates, as did
some other Soeharto relatives and cronies, such as Probosutedjo, Bob Hasan, and Liem Sioe
Liong. See George Junus Aditjondro, Guru Kencing Berdiri, Murid Kencing Berlari (Jakarta,
MIK and PIJAR, 1998) and George Junus Aditjondro, ‘Soeharto Inc’, The Weekend Australian,
30-31 May 1998.
10

See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Itacha, Cornell University Press,
1978); J. Kristiadi, ‘The Armed Forces,’ in Baker, Soesatro, Kristiadi, Ramage (eds), Indonesia
the Challenge of Change (Netherlands, KITLV Press, 1999), 99-113.
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banned. Tempo, Editor, and Detik lost their licence to publish, on the grounds that
their reports threatened national security.11
It was no secret that a large chunk of business undertakings had fallen
under the domination of either members of Soeharto’s family, or his cronies,
leaving establishment of control over only a small portion of business activities to
be competed for by others. Even some foreign investors and external partners in
joint ventures operating in Indonesia tended to comply with such a socially nonoptimal norm. In looking for domestic partners, they preferred to enter a venture
in partnership with those who had close political connections.
Mark McGillivray and Oliver Morrisey clearly describe how control over
resources and major companies was granted to friends and family, if not for free,
then at highly subsidised rates. 12 Beneficiaries could maximise their incomes by
generating profits. This means that there was the appearance of economic
prosperity. Much of this was built on debt (not on a strong economic foundation)
however, implicitly underwritten by the government. When the bubble burst in
1997, political and economic turmoil followed. Furthermore, although direct
credit may sometimes be warranted, in the Soeharto New Order Government this
too easily lead to subsidised credit being allocated on non-market criteria; the
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government made the winners instead of picking them. Again this is clearly
contrary to the idea of good governance.
During the 1990s, Indonesian companies took advantage of good
economic times to rack up foreign debt, which quickly ballooned to about $US80
billion with the rapid depreciation of Indonesia’s currency, the Rupiah. These
loans financed speculative investments in areas of Indonesia's economy, such as
real estate. Unfortunately for Indonesia, a high proportion of this debt was shortterm, carrying an average maturity of eighteen months. Such short-term debt
arrangements as these are not necessarily risky, as long as economic growth and
stability proceed apace.
After more than thirty years of steady economic progress, businesses did
not seem to fear an economic downturn nor, least of all, a devaluation of the
Rupiah, which could make it more difficult for them to repay their short-term,
dollar-denominated debt obligations.13 A monetary crisis, beginning in the
summer of 1997, exposed broader financial weaknesses, causing investors to flee
Indonesia’s financial markets, and leading to the collapse of the country’s
financial system.
The World Bank, in September 1997, stated that Indonesia had achieved
remarkable economic developmental success over the past decade, and was
considered to be among the best-performing East Asian economies.14
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Remarkably, on the Bank’s public website in March 1998, it was reported that
Indonesia had made great strides in diversifying its economy and promoting a
competitive private sector, through sound macro-economic management,
increased deregulation and deeper investment in infrastructure services.15
Those remarks mistakenly supported the Soeharto government, whose
currency had plunged more than one hundred per cent and whose ‘dynamic
economy’ was being subjected to an astonishingly detailed and interventionist set
of conditions linked to a package of US$43 billion in bail-out loans. This package
was intended to ‘stabilise exchange market conditions, ensure an orderly
adjustment of the external current account in response to lower capital inflows,
and lay the groundwork for a resumption of sustained rapid growth’.16
Moreover, the World Bank reportedly knew their loans to Indonesia were
being funnelled to Soeharto family businesses. The World Bank also turned a
blind eye toward corruption in projects it funded, and accepted false government
economic statistics to allow Indonesia to get better credit ratings.17
The collapse of Indonesia’s currency brought the country’s economy to a
standstill, which essentially persists to this day. More than eight hundred
companies having debts in US dollars suffered cash-flow problems, owing to their
interventions such as public works programmes, case and in-kind transfers, and price subsidies.
The brief asserted that, over time, more attention would be given to democratisation, institutional
reform and governance. More information can be obtained from World Bank, Social Crisis in East
Asia (Washington, World Bank, 1998).
15
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April, 1999.

16
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high debt level. While borrowers are unable to repay their debts, Indonesian banks
cannot secure foreign loans. As a result, banks are pushed into insolvency and are
unable to provide the credit which could spark economic activity and foster
growth. Without access to export financing, exporters are unable to earn hard
currency by selling their products abroad. Manufacturers and producers no longer
can afford the inputs and raw materials required to assemble their products.
Because these manufacturers and producers earn no money from production, they
cannot service their debts to banks and other creditors, and the process begins
again.18
With regard to this substantial debt, commonly used debt indicators show
a number of things.19 First, there is debt to service ratio (DSR), which measures
the ability of a country to settle the principal and interest on its debt using net
revenues from exports (gross exports less oil and natural gas imports). In 1998,
Indonesia’s DSR stood at fifty two per cent. This means that half of state revenues
from exports were used to settle debt principle and interest. It is thought that a
reasonable DSR is between twenty per cent and forty per cent.20 Second, the ratio
of total debt to GDP was 167%. This means that the external debt amounts to 1.6
times gross domestic product. Lastly, the ratio of total debt to exports was 375%.
17
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This means that state revenues from exports were less than one quarter of the total
external debt. Overall, these ratios were at danger levels.21
Thus far I have demonstrated that Indonesia, in the Soeharto era, was a
complex web of corrupt deals and political payoffs. Soeharto’s New Order
Government focused mainly on economic development, in order to provide
steadily improving standards of living for Indonesians. However, as has been
discussed above, the economic performance was built on debt. It was not from a
convergence of expectations based on commonly understood and enforced legal
rules, but from a system of hierarchical relationships: unlimited state power,
control and authority, in which orders flowed down from the ‘top’ with little input
from the ‘bottom’. This is one explanation why Indonesia, under Soeharto, was
quite successful in economic development terms, even though it had little regard
for the state of its laws and legal system. Both political and legal systems were
engineered to support the development strategy of the nation. But this also
explains why Indonesia was so fragile, when it was hit by the economic and
political crisis.
Moreover, the centralisation of power in the hands of Soeharto damaged
the idea of Negara Hukum. First, Soeharto’s intervention in the military, the
courts, political parties, and parliament was against the concept of the rule of law.
Second, Soeharto’s power was reflected in the corrupt behaviour of many military
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officers, much of government apparatus, and judges. There was neither
transparency nor a system of check and balances.
Third, the legal system simply did not work in a sense that Soeharto
controlled its operation. The Government drafted bills and ‘influenced’ the
parliament to accept them. All the Parliament’s substantive discussions took place
outside the official meetings. Only when substantive agreement had been already
attained would the members of parliament meet in public. This was a concept of
“consultation for consent” (musyawarah untuk mufakat) introduced by the
Soeharto government. Voting, as a mechanism to reach a decision, was avoided.
Members of parliament who dared to speak out would be recalled by their parties.
The Government then issued Government Regulations, at its discretion, to
interpret laws. With regard to the dependence and the subordinated position of
both the judiciary and the legislature, no one could challenge such interpretations
or discretions.
When the economic crisis hit Indonesia, instead of supporting the very
foundation of the nation, the legal system contributed significantly to the crisis.
This could be one of the reasons why, of all countries affected by the crisis,
Indonesia was worst-hit. Unlike in Indonesia, the crisis, which also hit Singapore
and Malaysia, did not lead to political chaos, riots and the fall of their
governments. As Gary Goodpaster predicted, “Simply put, Indonesia will find that
it cannot manage and function effectively in the global economy, nor continue
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strong economic growth, without the rule of law and widespread rule-based
behaviour”.22

The Fall of Soeharto and Demands for Reform
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explain all of the factors that led to
the resignation of President Soeharto. Therefore, I will only examine several
factors and conditions which relate to the overall argument of this thesis. As
observed above, Soeharto had everything: military support, the loyalty of his
followers, and economic growth. However, when the economic crisis hit
Indonesia and led to mass demonstrations and disturbances, it became clear that
he had lost his legitimacy as the ‘Father of Development’. This opened up a new
era for Indonesia.
The day following Soeharto’s re-election for another five-year term, by the
MPR on 10 March 1998, student protests begin to spill out of the campuses. 23
They demanded the total eradication of corruption, collusion and nepotism, and
since Soeharto was seen as part of the problem, students also asked him to step
down. The first serious clashes between university students and security forces
took place in the Central Javanese town of Solo and in the East Javanese capital,
Surabaya. On 14 March 1998, Soeharto announced his new cabinet, which
included his daughter, Mbak Tutut, and his close friend, Bob Hasan. The new
22
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cabinet was immediately condemned by students and other critics as a ‘crony
cabinet’.
In April 1998, clashes between security forces and students occurred in
many big cities, such as Medan, Jambi, Mataram, Bandung, Yogyakarta and in
East Kalimantan. On the first day of May, Interior Minister Hartono informed the
press that Soeharto had stated that political reform must wait until after 2003, the
year of the next scheduled MPR session.
While Soeharto was in Cairo for a summit conference, on 12 May 1998,
four university students were shot dead after a peaceful protest outside Jakarta’s
Trisakti University. On the following day, the four Trisakti students were buried.
Professor Amien Rais of Gadjah Mada University and Chair of Muhammadiyah
(the second largest Muslim organisation) told the crowd that the military had to
choose between defending ‘a certain family’ or the people of Indonesia.24
Meanwhile, rioting broke out in Jakarta, centred on the districts surrounding the
Trisakti campus.
14 May 1998 was the worst day of rioting in Jakarta. Jakarta looked like a
death city. By the end of the day, in Jakarta and neighbouring cities, two hospitals,
two sub-district offices, thirteen markets, forty shopping malls, eleven police
stations, over sixty bank offices, 383 private offices, twenty four restaurants,
twelve hotels, over one thousand private homes and thousands of shops had gone

166 and James Luhulima (ed), Hari-hari Terpanjang: Menjelang Mundurnya Presiden Soeharto
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up in flames, or had been seriously damaged.25 The police and military could not
do much to control the situation. In fact, soldiers were very visibly present in the
streets. Some symbols of the Indonesian development under Soeharto were
destroyed. On the next day, rioting began to abate in Jakarta and elsewhere. It was
reported that many Chinese women were raped during the riots.26
However, when Soeharto returned from Cairo, he stated that he was not
willing to resign. Instead, he was willing to re-shuffle the cabinet. Responding to
that statement, Amien Rais announced that Soeharto should step down within the
week. The ruling elite began to crumble as Mien Sugandhi, head of the Golkar
organisation MKGR, called on the President to resign.
Although the word ‘reform’ dominated the demonstrations, in free speech
rostrums there were at least six popular demands. They were:
i) repeal of five notorious laws on politics;
ii) abolition of the army’s involvement in politics;
iii) reduction of the prices of basic foodstuffs;
iv) the elimination of corruption, collusion and nepotism;
v) the resignation of Soeharto and the establishment of a court to try Soeharto,
his followers and other perpetrator of human rights abuses.27
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As can be seen, demands for reform were in three areas: economic, political, and
legal. Three out of six demands were for law reform: repealing the laws on
politics, elimination of KKN, and sending perpetrators of human rights abuses to
the courts.28
However, the main target was Soeharto. Without his resignation, the other
five demands could not possibly addressed. In other words, substantive reform
could not be pursued within the system while Soeharto remained in charge. This
explains why the Soeharto’s offers to initiate reform was rejecyed. Soeharto
responded to the demands by calling for calm and stressing that he would not seek
re-election and announcing that a general election, based on a new law, was to be
held as soon as possible. Students no longer put any trust in him.
In the words of Amien Rais:
My thesis is simple: it is not possible for us to hope for a change in the
style of leadership, state management, central or regional government
administration, if there is no replacement of the president. So, it’s not
possible to change the system without changing the president. As I
have repeatedly said, it’s precisely the ‘person’ (sang figur) who
influences the system. And the ‘person’ perpetuates the system to
maintain the status quo for all time. It is an illusion if people hope
that, whit his advanced age, Soeharto can carry out fundamental or
drastic reform.29

Pressure was increased by unremitting student demonstrations, and the
constant stream of delegations visiting parliament. Critics finally made Harmoko
and the other chairpersons of Parliament realise that the institutions they headed
represented the people and that the time for foot-dragging was past; they had to do
28
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something immediately. On 19 May, Harmoko, Chair of the Parliament, reiterated to a rowdy press conference that the Parliament wanted the President to
resign as soon as possible30, while, at the same time, numbers of students
demonstrating at the DPR increased, and large demonstrations continued
elsewhere around the country. People asked the MPR to hold a special session to
impeach the President.
General Wiranto responded to Harmoko’s statement above: “Today’s
statement by parliamentary leaders was a statement of individual opinions, even
though it was presented by a group.”31 According to Wiranto, for Harmoko’s
statement to have a sound legal basis, all members of parliament would first need
to be consulted through a regular session of parliament. Legally speaking,
Wiranto was right. There needed to be a lengthy process before the Parliament, as
an institution, could ask the President to step down.32 Because parliament was not
in session, a formal resolution ratified by the full membership could not be
produced. This was a legal procedural constraint. However, politically speaking,
30
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Wiranto’s statement could be read as indicating that the military remained loyal to
Soeharto. This was a clear message from the Commander of the Armed Forces.33
On the evening of 20 May, 1998, fourteen ministers in the economic,
financial and industry fields decided to send letters to Soeharto, saying that they
resigned.34 Prior to this evening, Harmoko announced that the President had to
resign by 23 May, or the DPR would initiate a Special Session of the MPR, to
unseat him. Soeharto then issued a Presidential Decree which empowered General
Wiranto to take emergency measures. However, Wiranto hesitated to follow the
order for two main reasons. Firstly, Soeharto whispered to him, “It is up to you
whether you follow the decree or not.”35 Secondly, he was aware that by
following the order, he would be declaring martial law, and clashes between the
security forces and the people would take place. The situation would become
worse. Therefore he decided not to follow the order.36
Three former Vice Presidents (Umar Wirahadikusumah, Soedharmono and
Try Sutrisno) visited Soeharto. All suggested Soeharto resign for the sake of the
nation. Afterwards, Vice President Habibie himself met the President. Habibie
advised Soeharto to retire, but to do so on his own terms, rather than being pushed
to do so by others. Soeharto also invited forty-five persons to cooperate with him
in the new Cabinet, but forty-two refused. Nor could he find politicians prepared
33
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to join his new cabinet. It was the final blow. Unable to compose a cabinet,
Soeharto surrendered.
Finally, on 21 May, 1998, Soeharto read his resignation speech and, based
on the 1945 Constitution, the Vice President, BJ Habibie37, was sworn in as his
replacement. General Wiranto, of the Indonesian military, announced that the
military would protect the former President and his family. This announcement
indicated that while Soeharto might have lost power, he retained loyal supporters,
particularly in the military and bureaucracy.
The next section of this chapter will pay particular attention to Habibie’s
attempts to build an image as a genuine reformer. I will also outline Habibie’s
vision of law reform and some of his responses and achievements in addressing
the demands for reform. This is important, particularly in order to understand the
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rationale of his policies, the situations he faced, the vested interests he had, and
the compromises he made.

Habibie’s Law Reform: Vision, Achievements and Criticisms
Habibie’s Vision
This section begins by quoting Habibie’s personal account of the transfer
of power:
The presidency came to me very suddenly, less than 13 hours after a
telephone call from the President’s secretary, on the night of May 20,
1998, informing me of the former President’s decision to relinquish
his mandate the next day…I had very little preparation for this high
position, and had to spend almost 16 hours a day during the coming 3
months to crash-study basic laws and regulations, to run the
government, and to formulate appropriate management strategy for
the tumultuous situation in Indonesia.38

This account suggests that Habibie was aware from the beginning that law
reform was essential. He also mentioned this, in a very clear way, when he
delivered his first presidential address, the night after the swearing-in. “It is my
commitment to be guided by the aspirations of all the people, in realising
comprehensive reforms, by establishing a responsible government, in accord with
the rule of law.”39
The question is: What was his view on the idea of the rule of law? In the
view of President Habibie, the idea of rechtsstaat needed to become more closely
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integrated with that of democracy. People’s sovereignty can be expressed
according to the supremacy of the law. What is at stake is not the technicalities of
individual laws but instead the coherence of a system of law which exists as a
unified entity. In his view, a legal system must combine five basic and interconnected elements: the laws of the constitution, the legal infrastructure and its
institutions, human resources which make up the legal apparatus, the
dissemination of information, attitudes toward the legal infrastructure, and
leadership which ensures the integrated functioning of the legal system.40
The first, second and third components are each closely related to the role
of the legislative and judiciary institutions. The fifth component relates to the role
of the executive, whereas the fourth is concerned with the role of the information
system. According to him, these are four pillars in the life of the nation and the
state.41 In other words, Habibie believes that the press should be taken into
account as the fourth estate of a system of democracy.42
According to Bilveer Singh, Habibie’s law reform aspirations had four
elements:
1.
2.
3.

The laws should be the product of people’s sovereignty and
be constitutionally couched.
The laws must reflect the culture and values of the country as
well as give credence to human rights.
The laws must reflect the establishment of a market-oriented
economy.
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4.

The laws must reflect the operation of a market-oriented
political system.43

Habibie himself has explained that, basically, his philosophy on reform
and change could be summarised as a commitment to systematic, planned and
predictable reforms and changes. He believes that this kind of change, which he
called ‘accelerated evolutionary change’, is superior to random or revolutionary
changes. He admits that a general timetable was set up in his mind, with clear lead
times for strategic decisions and policies. He claims that the strategic decisions
and policies were announced at the right time and the right moment in order to
avoid a counter-productive implementation of any decisions made.44
In his state of the nation address, delivered in parliament on 15 August
1998, Habibie shared his vision:

Honestly, we must admit that one of the causes of the current crisis is
that the rule of law was often disregarded, not only in the political and
economic domains but also in the socio-cultural realm. The law has
often been used as an instrument of power, deviating from the goal of
enforcing justice and creating welfare for the people. Therefore legal
reforms should be carried out with a view to making the law truly
authoritative…We want all of us to be consistent by properly
regarding Indonesia as a law-based state (Negara Hukum). By the
same token we should try our best to realise and enforce the
supremacy of the law…In that regard, we should always be aware that
a democratic government can only be effected if we always place the
supremacy of the law as one of its main pillars.45
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Habibie’s Achievements
Habibie made a key decision when he pledged to hold genuinely
democratic elections, shortly after Soeharto stepped down. According to the
Constitution, Habibie could have stayed in office until 2003. However, he was
aware that only through fair and free elections would Indonesia have the
opportunity to reform its whole system, as demanded by the students who forced
Soeharto to resign. He was also calculating that the best chance for a long term in
office was to deal with the aspirations for reform, since he was seen as Soeharto’s
successor.
As part of its institutional and instrumental reforms, Habibie’s government
produced more than fifty statutes. For instance, it repealed Law No. 1 of 1985 on
General Elections; Law No. 2 of 1985 on the Structure and Status of the MPR and
the DPR, and Law No. 3 of 1985 on Political Parties and Golkar. President
Habibie instructed the Minister for Home Affairs, Syarwan Hamid, to rewrite the
Nation’s election laws to provide for open and fair polling. He assigned a group of
academic experts (known as the Team of Seven) to assist in drafting the new laws,
which comprised Indonesia’s most important reforms since the beginning of the
New Order. The Team of Seven sought input from many civic leaders and
organisations and also consulted foreign experts.
The three election laws were passed on 1 February, 1999 by the
Parliament.46 In general, the laws are significant advances and show the
commitment of the administration and major opposition figures, to creating a new
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system, in which free and fair elections are possible. All major parties and
political leaders appeared willing to participate in the elections under these new
ground-rules. The three laws cover the requirements for forming political parties,
the election system, and the composition of the national and local representative
bodies. 47
As Edward Master points out, “three critical issues threatened to derail the
process: the political status of civil servants, the size of electoral districts (whether
provincial or district), and the numbers of seats to be allocated to the Armed
Forces, but compromises were reached in all three cases”.48 The result was that, in
October 1999, for the first time, Indonesian citizens successfully changed their
government through an open, transparent democratic process.
On 7 June 1999, forty-eight parties competed in the election, with twentyone winning at least one of the 462 contested seats in Parliament. The PDI-P party
won 34% of the vote and 153 seats in Parliament, while the Golkar party, which
had run the country for thirty years, won only 22% of the seats.49
Furthermore, on 30 July 1999, the DPR amended Law No. 14 of 1970, as
part of the Government’s efforts to undertake law reform, placing all courts under
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the supervision of the Supreme Court.50 Significant changes were to be brought
about by the newly adopted ‘one-roof-policy’. According to Article 11 of the
amended law, the Supreme Court will take over the organisational, financial and
administrative affairs of the judiciary from the Ministry of Justice. The transfer of
authority will be made over five years (Article 11A).51 Therefore, from 2004, the
Ministry of Justice will no longer be able to control the budget of the courts and
the posting, transfer and promotion of court members. Prior to this amendment,
judges had been reluctant to act independently in cases unpopular with the
government, particularly in cases with political overtones. Although there is no
guarantee that the independence of the judiciary will improve soon, this
amendment is a step forward in ensuring such independence.
In June 1998, the Government revoked the decree allowing the Minister
for Information to cancel press publication licences. It also simplified the
licensing procedure for starting up a publication.52 As a comparison, in the
Soeharto years, a person required a press licence to print a paper. Obtaining the
license, called a Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers or SIUPP, entailed a longwinded and costly process. The licence was the device to keep the Press in
compliance with government directives. Any deviation from the directive could
mean withdrawal of the licence, as in the case of the weekly publications Tempo,
Editor and Detik in 1994. The licence scheme also kept the numbers in check.
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Now, under the new law, no such permits are required. Any Indonesian can
simply start a paper by setting up a corporation. The investor is obliged only to
announce the name, the address, the name of the person in charge, and the name
and address of the printing house. Foreign investors can become minority
shareholders of a local print media company. For journalists, the new law
abandons the old rule that journalists must belong to a government-sanctioned
journalists’ organisation. Now journalists can join the organisation of their choice.
The Government had previously used the decree concerning the SIUPP to
control the press. In September 1999, the Parliament enacted a new press law
which provides for freedom of the press, prohibits censorship, and prescribes
penalties for anyone violating these rights. However, the law obliges the press to
report events and opinions, ‘with respect to the religious and moral norms of the
public,’ and to adhere to the presumption of innocence. 53
The new law replaced previous press laws, which were viewed as being
more restrictive of press freedom, and established a Press Board to create and
enforce a code of journalistic ethics. Members of the board consist of journalists
nominated by journalists’ associations, representatives of press companies, and
public figures nominated by journalists and press companies.
After assuming office, President Habibie began the release of political
prisoners, although he pursued a gradualist approach, and many of the most highprofile political prisoners remained in gaol. Independent labour leader Dr.
Muchtar Pakpahan, former Member of Parliament Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas,
53
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and other activists, were released in May 1998. In June, seven political prisoners
in East Timor were released. In August, the Government freed twenty-seven more
political prisoners. In December, it freed forty-three more political prisoners and
rehabilitated the citizenship and job status of twenty-six others, who had been
released previously. The forty three included prisoners from East Timor,
Lampung and Aceh.54 In total, during its sixteen months in office, President
Habibie’s government released two hundred and thirteen political prisoners.55
The MPR passed a decree at its November, 1998, special session, which
included a provision calling for the revocation of the Anti-subversion Law, and its
replacement with a law on national security. The Anti-subversion Law carried a
maximum penalty of death, and made it a crime to engage in acts which could
distort, undermine, or cause deviation from the State ideology or the broad
outlines of State policy, or which could disseminate feelings of hostility, or arouse
hostility, or cause disturbances or anxiety amongst the population.56
The excessive vagueness of this law made it possible to prosecute persons
merely for peaceful expression of views contrary to those of the Government.57
The Parliament repealed the 1963 Anti-subversion Law in April 1999.58 Another
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significant step was that Parliament also enacted a law on human rights designed
to strengthen the protection of individual rights, and the role of the National
Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM).59
The Government produced two laws on the ratification of the international
law treaties in the field of human rights, namely Law No. 5/1998, on the
Ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and Law No. 29/1999, on the Ratification of
the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Indonesia has also ratified four international conventions in the field of labour
rights, related to freedom of assembly and organisation, on the abolition of forced
labour, on the minimum age for employment and on discrimination in work
opportunities and in obtaining employment.
As part of the reforms, shortly after being sworn as the third President of
Indonesia, Habibie made significant changes to his office. In Habibie’s hands, the
office of President was no longer the office of the ‘King’. Under the Soeharto
presidency, people looked at the office as the most powerful, elite office in the
land. Habibie was different. He not only opened his door to the people, but also
received his guests in a non-formal way. Indria Samego, an Indonesian political
observer, has expressed the view that Habibie’s biggest accomplishment was to
demystify the institution of the presidency. When Soeharto was in charge, he
couldn’t be criticised. One couldn’t make a move without his say-so. One couldn’t
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talk of a future without him. According to Samego, because Habibie was so
eccentric, so candid, so open, he did away with all that.60
In addition, Soeharto would call the leaders of the Parliament and political
parties and brief them in his own office. However, it was Habibie who changed
that ‘culture’ and, instead, came to the Parliament and consulted its leaders. He
also spoke to the press easily, and the press could ask him any question, without
having to fear that the President would send them to gaol. For the Indonesian
people, the changes meant a lot in the process of gaining democracy.

Criticisms
Thus far, Habibie’s major law reform achievements on law reform have
been briefly outlined. However, several criticisms have been made of his legal
reform programme. Habibie’s choice in performing political, economic and legal
reforms was, at once, borrowing Professor Liddle’s words, ‘full of promise and
peril’.61 It was an indication that the restraints of Soeharto-style authoritarianism
were finally gone. Habibie announced the lifting of decades-long restrictions on
press freedom and on the right of Indonesians to form political parties. Both are
parts of the elements of democratic government. Habibie’s significant steps, noted
above, were full of peril as well as promise, as Indonesia had no recent experience
of democracy, no understanding of democratic institutions and procedures, and no
rule of law. Therefore, the substance of Habibie’s law reform was in question
60
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whether or not it supported rule of law, good governance and popular demands for
reform. Law reform does not mean only changing or modifying the old laws.
The main obstacle for Habibie (and also the main criticism) was that he
was seen as part of the New Order Government. It was not a public secret that he
was Soeharto’s ‘golden boy’, for more than twenty years. As is known, part of the
reform agenda was to eradicate KKN or corruption, collusion and nepotism.
However, Habibie was allegedly as corrupt as Soeharto and consequently was
seen as part of the Indonesian problem; not part of the solution.62
In this context, Habibie’s decision to drop the corruption investigation into
former president Soeharto (discussed in Chapter 6) was of great significance. The
case was widely seen as a real challenge for his position: was he to be a Soeharto
loyalist or a reformist. Many people at the grass-roots level simply took the view
that law reform was nothing but bringing Soeharto to court, so for them, the
Soeharto case was the symbol of law reform.
While Habibie named his cabinet as a ‘reform cabinet’, to show his
intention to perform political, economic and legal reforms, his cabinet was seen as
‘the second New Order cabinet’. Most of his ministers were from the Soeharto
cabinet. Twenty of Soeharto’s ministers remained in Habibie’s thirty-six-member
ministry, including the four main Coordinating Ministers for Political Affairs, the
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Economy, Development and Public Welfare. While one of the reform agendas
was to send the military back to its barracks and to pull them out from political
activities, Habibie included six generals in his cabinet63. However, it should be
noted that the two most obvious cronies were gone: Soeharto’s daughter, Mbak
Tutut, and his wealthy golfing partner Bob Hasan.64
Habibie also followed Soeharto’s steps in maintaining power by using
military force. In November 1998, student demonstrations continued, and
escalated during the MPR Special Session. Thousands of students and
demonstrators assembled on the first day of the Session and demanded Habibie’s
resignation, demanded that Soeharto be put on trial and called on the military end
its ‘dual function’ (dwifungsi) –a legitimacy for the military to be involved in nonmilitary areas. Sixty people were injured in clashes between security forces and
demonstrators, and nine killed near Atma Jaya University in Jakarta.
In addition, many people were worried by the poor economy, frustrated by
the sheer extent of New Order corruption, which was revealed daily in the
reinvigorated press, and distrusted the Habibie government, which was the same
one instated by Soeharto after the 1997 general elections. Evidence consistently
came to light regarding past and on-going human rights abuses in several
provinces, most notably Northern Sumatra (Aceh), and sectarian/inter- ethnic
violence erupted elsewhere. Hundreds were killed and thousands forced from their
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homes in Maluku province (Ambon), in clashes between Christians and Muslims,
and in West Kalimantan, where indigenous ethnic groups clashed with migrants
from Madura. Once again, Habibie used security forces to handle the situation.
The most controversial issue of Habibie’s tenure as President was East
Timor.65 On 26 Jan 1999, Habibie raised the option of giving the province
independence if it refused a special autonomy package. Thus he seeded the clouds
for the horrific storm which broke there after the 30 August referendum. In his
mind, the offer of independence was the most sensible solution to a two-decadeold problem. The territory was both a drain on scarce resources and a foreignpolicy millstone.
However, it seems that he was too naive to realise the impact this
‘rational’ decision would have on the psyche of pro-integrationists, and too naive
to realise that he had to keep a tight rein on the military. Being Commander-inChief does not automatically mean being in command. Unlike Soeharto who had
been a five-star-general, Habibie, a civilian President, could not control the

ministers from other political parties (two from the PPP and one from the PDI). This was quite
surprise since Soeharto always appointed only people from the Golkar party.
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military effectively. He thought he could hand over a task to his aides and trust
they would do it well, just like an engineer or a pilot.66
Following the results of the June 1999 election, Habibie was selected as
Golkar’s next presidential candidate, although his reputation was further tarnished
by the Bank Bali scandal, in which billions of rupiah were allegedly channeled
into Habibie’s campaign fund. This scandal severely discredited the President
domestically, and led to a suspension of IMF aid. Prior to this, in April 1999, half
of the social safety net funding provided by the World Bank (around eight trillion
rupiah) was reported missing (discussed in Chapter 6).
At the end of his presidency, Habibie’s accountability speech was
narrowly rejected, 355 to 322, by MPR members, implying rejection of the man
himself. Habibie was forced morally to withdraw from the presidential race. It
was seen as the end of his political career. For some people, the rejection leads to
the assumption that the Indonesian people took the view that Habibie was not
capable of carrying on his reform agendas.
Unlike Soeharto, Habibie had no strong leadership, nor full political
support from the military67 and the political parties. His own party, Golkar, was
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divided into several factions.68 He also made some political compromises, but
could not satisfy all people. It is assumed that all of these matters contributed to
the rejection of his accountability speech.
However, others might consider his achievements in a more balanced way,
since Habibie only had 512 days in office while the Indonesian political,
economic and legal systems had been wrongly maintained for more than thirty
years. In the words of Ray Rangkuti (former student leader during May 1998),
“Habibie’s main task was to establish genuine general election. And he succeeded
in establishing the foundations of democracy. It would be the task for the next
president, based on the election, to carry on the reform agenda.”69

The Role of IMF and Other Donors
Habibie’s critics also claim that most of the reforms he made were driven,
not by government commitment to change, but rather by the pressure of the IMF
or ‘IMF conditionalities’. Lindsey explains that:
They are, they say, the price of continued lending assistance to a
nation so severely damaged by economic crisis that it has suffered the
greatest GDP collapse of any nation this century. According to this
analysis, the reforms are superficial rush-jobs, minimalist gestures
intended to satisfy a neo-colonialist agenda of bailing out foreign
lenders and inventors. They argue that the reforms have achieved little
significant change to Soeharto’s system of state control. In particular,
they failed to effectively dilute the corrupt political and commercial
stranglehold of his cronies—chief amongst them, Habibie.70
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It also appears that President Habibie’s interest in economic reform was
geared primarily toward meeting the minimum requirements for the continuation
of international financial assistance, including a $US 43 billion IMF financial
assistance package, tied to an economic reform programme. The World Bank, and
over 30 countries comprising the Consultative Group on Indonesia, pledged
another $7.9 billion in aid to Indonesia.
The IMF memorandum of economic and financial policies with the
Government of Indonesia covered macro-economic policies, financial sector restructuring, and structural reforms. The macro-economic policies included fiscal
policy and monetary and exchange-rate policy. Financial sector re-structuring
included the bank re-structuring programme and the strengthening of the legal and
supervisory framework for banking. Structural reforms covered foreign trade and
investment, deregulation and privatisation, a social safety net (poverty
alleviation), and the environment.
With the resignation of Soeharto, donors were no longer restrained by their
own national interest in stability. Instead, they did some programming which
fundamentally challenged the status quo within the Indonesian polity. For
instance, the Habibie government received technical assistance from donors in
preparing for the June 1999 General Election and in the voting process of the East
Timorese conflict.71 In the context of the thesis, the question remains: Did the
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support from donors help Habibie’s law reform to promote good governance and
the rule of law? I will deal with this issue in the main chapters of the thesis.

Concluding Remarks
In order to close this chapter, I will quote once again from Habibie’s
personal account of the situation he faced:
Because of my training background, I like to use aeronautical terms
and symbols in describing our national problems and challenges, and
in my approach to solving them. I observed our national situation,
when I was appointed President, was like a big plane very near to
crashing. The Passengers — a population of 207 million — did not
realize that the aeroplane, the Republic of Indonesia, was going into a
“super stall”. If an aeroplane increases its angle of attack, then the
aeroplane will react by appropriately increasing its lift, up until a
maximum angle of attack with an appropriate maximum lift is reach.
Exceeding the maximum angle of attack will suddenly change the
maximum lift to become zero and cause a “free fall” of the aeroplane.
This phenomenon is called “super stall”. Depending on the size of the
aeroplane, its performance and stability and control behaviour and on
top the skill of its pilot, the aeroplane could be brought out of its super
stall before hitting the ground and being totally lost.
…At this critical time the pilot lost consciousness and the co-pilot
takes over, not knowing whether he can save the airplane. At this
stage the co-pilot can do two things. Go to the cabin and explain to the
passengers what is going on and as a result certainly the crash will be
imminent. The other is to stay in the cockpit and try hard to control
the aeroplane coming out of the “super stall”, and there is no time to
lose, as the only limit is the time before the plane hits the ground.
….Whoever the pilot is in such a critical situation, he cannot do just as
he wants. He has to deal with the situation.72

In this aeronautical metaphor, Habibie describes the critical situation he
faced when he assumed the presidency of Indonesia (May 1998). As the co-pilot
who took over control of the aeroplane from the pilot he could not simply do as he
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wanted. He was forced to make compromises in order to save the aeroplane. The
question remains: how much compromise could be tolerated? In the following
chapters, I will discuss how political compromise influenced Habibie’s decision,
and whether the compromise achieved was in contradiction with the principles of
good governance and the rule of law, and whether such compromise could be
justified in terms of changing the law for the better.
Thus far, Chapter 2 has outlined the criteria to gauge Habibie’s law
reform. The elements of good governance and the rule of law will be the standard
criteria. Chapter 3 has just discussed other explanations in searching for the
possible answers: Habibie’s choice, interest, interaction and compromise with
several actors such as the military, political parties, popular demands for reform,
and international donors. All these discussion will assist the thesis to perform
analysis in three case studies: political laws, human rights protection and press
freedom, and anti-corruption legislations.
The next chapter of this thesis will consider the first case study: law
reform on political laws. The reform of those laws was one of six popular
demands of the 1998 reform movement. It was expected that legal reform in this
area would serve as the very foundation for the holding of a democratic general
election to achieve the first largely democratic and peaceful transfer of executive
power in Indonesia’s history.
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CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL LAWS∗

Introduction
Following the resignation of President Soeharto, political and civic
leaders, along with governmental officials, began the process of developing a new
political system. The most important step was to create a new legal framework for
early national elections. Based on new regulations, Indonesia had to elect a new
government with popular legitimacy and establish a new governmental structure.
Under Habibie’s transitional government, on January 28, 1999, the existing
parliament, which had been elected in May 1997 under the rules of Soeharto’s
New Order, passed three new political laws governing elections, political parties
and the structure of legislative bodies. These bills were signed into law by
President BJ. Habibie on February 1, 1999.
The main question posed in this chapter is: Did the three political laws
promote good governance and the rule of law? In order to answer the question, I
will first examine the link between electoral systems, good governance and the
rule of law. In this discussion I will identify the factors that are significant in
reforming electoral system, political parties and legislature, and will articulate
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specific criteria to determining whether or not Habibie’s political laws reform
achieve the standards of good governance and adherence to the rule of law.
Second, the question posed above will be answered by looking at the
political and legal processes of the new political laws enacted under Habibie. Did
the political and legal actors follow the elements of good governance, such as
transparency, accountability and participation, when discussing and drafting the
political laws? Were the three laws products of political compromise, and if so, to
what extent did political expediency compromise the objectives of good
governance and adherence to the rule of law? In order to provide the necessary
reference points for this evaluation, political laws in the Soeharto era, demands for
reform in this area, and responses from Habibie’s government will be evaluated in
turn.
Third, this chapter will analyse the content of the new political laws,
including by comparing the drafts and final versions of the bills and by comparing
the bills with constitutional legal principles, particularly theories of electoral
systems, political party systems, position and the function of parliament in a
democratic system. The implementation of the political laws will also be
examined. Special attention will be given to the June 1999 General Elections. On
7 June 1999, more than 125 million Indonesians went to the polls to elect 462 of
the 500 members of a new national parliament or People’s Representative Council
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR). The remaining 38 seats were appointed from
the Indonesian armed forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI).
Elections were held simultaneously for the provincial assemblies (Dewan
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Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I or DPRD I) and the district assemblies (Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah II or DPRD II). The 500 members of parliament
joined with 135 representatives chosen by the provincial assemblies (five from
each of the country’s 27 provinces) and 65 representatives of functional groups1 to
form

the

700-member

People’s

Consultative

Assembly

(Majelis

Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR). In October 1999, the MPR then met to choose
Indonesia’s next president.
Having examined the three political laws, the Chapter argues that they did
not effect substantial change in Indonesia’s electoral systems. Habibie’s
government attempted to change the electoral systems significantly, but these
changes were rejected by the parliament. Although there were some positive
aspects such as the establishment of an Independent Committee of General
Elections and, most importantly, the peaceful transfer of executive power as a
result of June 1999 General Elections, the three political laws issued under
Habibie’s government did not achieve the standard required by good governance
and the rule of law.

1

‘Functional groups representation’ is a concept under which people are represented not as
individuals but as members of a group deemed to have a common interest, for example, based on
profession/occupation, religion, ethnicity, gender or other identified position or role in society.
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I. Political Laws, Good Governance and the Rule of Law
Electoral Systems
An electoral system is a technique for casting votes, counting votes, and
allocating legislative seats.2 The electoral system can be seen as a tool of the
people. It is the method by which votes cast in an election are translated into the
seats won in parliament, by parties and candidates. Another important function of
an electoral system is to act as the conduit through which citizens can hold their
elected representatives accountable. In addition, an electoral system helps to
structure the boundaries of acceptable political discourse, by giving incentives to
party leaders to couch their appeals to the electorate in distinct ways.3
A democratic election requires that the legal framework regulating
national elections, and the implementation of the election itself, should be in
conformity with the existing rules and regulations, from the beginning to end,
including the electoral process — political party registration, campaigning, vote
casting and vote counting. If there are no free elections, there will be no
democracy.4 To choose one electoral system means to determine the best system
for casting and counting votes, with regard to the situation in the country
concerned, such as its geography, ethnic composition, demography, political
formats, legal systems, and so on.
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Free and fair general elections are important in the context of good
governance.5 Unfair elections will produce a government which manipulates the
people’s voice. Good elections require a process of consultation and consensus.
This can be performed only by involving all political forces in the process. In
other words, no part of the process can be dictated nor dominated by only one
political party, which runs the country. The idea is to give everyone a stake in
society and ensure that voices are heard, even if not everyone can have his own
way.
In order to promote both transparency and accountability, electoral
commissions need to be balanced and to include those of other political parties, as
well as the government’s supporters. The discretion of electoral committees
should not be allowed to pervert the law. In addition, the drafting of election laws
is important, and may be controversial. Good governance requires that they be
adopted through a process of consultation. Good governance demands that the
process of consultation and inclusion be applied not only to political forces, but to
all elements of society, including minorities and women, in the political process.6
One of the greatest threats to good governance is corruption. It is a special
threat to the electoral process.7 For instance, the use of public office to influence
outcomes, the role of money politics and special interests, to name but two, should
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be avoided. This means that buying votes through money and other facilities
contradicts the idea of free and fair elections. In this context, a reasonable limit on
campaign spending should be regulated in a clear way, and sanctions should be
imposed to those contravening the limit.
Good governance requires transparency. One of the best ways to promote
transparency in elections is through independent electoral observation.
Restrictions placed on the observers (domestic or foreign) undermine
transparency, and threaten good governance. Other criteria to judge whether
political law reform is in line with good governance are: there should be a
mechanism for society to lodge its complaints regarding the process of elections,
and there should be a legal framework to deal with those who abuse those
regulations.
In terms of the rule of law and good governance, electoral laws should be
implemented in a way which is open, predictable and fair.8 As pointed out by
Schedler, elections should have four characteristics: they should be inclusive; be
free (have classical civil, political and human rights which allow the free
expression of choice); be correct (i.e. without electoral fraud); and be competitive,
meaning that there must be the possibility of competing, if not necessarily the
chance of winning. In other words, inclusiveness, competition, freedom and
correctness describe the defining procedural minima of democratic elections. The
absence of any one of them would make for democracy becoming a mere facade
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or having a distorted form.9 However, good governance does not mean merely
having good laws. Although electoral laws may be essentially sound, if they are
poorly or unfairly implemented, the election fails to comply with good
governance and the rule of law.
In the context of the rule of law, not only should the electoral system be
designed through consensus and consultation, as mentioned above, but it also
must ensure two things. Firstly, people should elect their representatives in a
democratic way. People must know who will get their vote. They have rights to
know who will represent them in parliament and/or government. Secondly, those
who are elected must be accountable to the people who chose them. This is to
ensure that people will ‘monitor’ their representatives.10 In other words, along
with consensus and consultation, accountability is also the essential element.
Democracy could be simply described as a legitimate political power
which originates with citizens and flows from the citizens to the government. The
government is responsible for protecting citizen rights, and in turn the citizens
grant government temporary power to make decisions on their behalf.11 In an
authoritarian political system, the government demands service from its people
without any obligation to secure their consent or respond to their needs.
Authoritarian forms of government prevent individuals from choosing their
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leaders or having a voice in public policy. Decisions are imposed without thought
or concern given to the rights of individuals.
In authoritarian countries, the outcome of elections is known before they
are held; that the ruling party or the current government will win the majority of
the votes. Pseudo-elections serve as justification for authoritarian regimes. They
are a reflection of the regime’s will. For democracy to flourish, elections must
reflect the will of the people.12 The election process tests public support for
government policies and gives people the opportunity to choose new
representatives and national leaders. Competition is necessary for democratic
elections. This means that, to be democratic, elections must be competitive.13 It is
worth considering that elections are not merely a necessary condition for
democracy; they are a test of a country’s democratic health. It could safely be
stated that a democratic election indicates a country’s democratic performance.
The rule of law suggests that elections may provide opportunities to rotate
elites, to select leaders, to express grievances and desires. Elections are said to
compel elites to consider the wishes of the rest of the population, to provide
opportunities for public dialogue, to confer legitimacy on governments, and to
strengthen the sense of power, and belonging, of individuals. Democratic
governments are given the authority to make decisions through their electoral
mandate. In other words, citizens choose government representatives. Regular

12

Mark R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition
in the Philippines (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995), 132.

13

Stefano Bartolini, ‘Collusion, Competition and Democracy’ (1999) 11(4) Journal of Theoretical
Politics 445.

120

elections allow opposition parties to compete and present alternative policies to
the voting public. Citizens are then able to hold government officials accountable
by having the periodic right, and opportunity, to vote them out of office.14 In the
context of the rule of law, a good election is a pre-requisite for having a ‘check
and balance’ mechanism between the people, the parliament and the
government.15
Elections also have purposes other than representation. They are useful
internationally because they justify foreign aid and investments. If managed
properly, they also convey a notion that the state is modern and capable of
managing an act of political consent. This helps to convey an image of stability
which is useful in attracting capital. In addition, elections have domestic purposes.
Elections de-legitimise protests, riots, and public violence. They are the obvious
and traditional way of ensuring accountability, and providing an institutional
framework for the peaceful resolution of conflicts among competing political
parties.16 They also moderate some opposition supporters by convincing them that
even though they lost this time, future elections might turn out differently. Finally,
elections can justify state repression of those opponents who do not play by the
‘voter endorsed’ rules.
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Political Parties
When designing an electoral system, the discourse of political parties
should be highlighted. A political party can be simply described as a group of
citizens organised to seek and exercise power within a political system. All parties
participate to some extent in the exercise of political power, whether through
participation in government or by performing the role of opposition. It is worth
considering that parties are the vehicles by which citizens come together freely, to
campaign for public office, to win a majority of seats in a legislative body, to
express their own interests and needs, as well as their aspirations for the society in
which they live. Without parties, citizens lack alternative vehicles for organisation
and the potential for concentration and abuse of power is exacerbated.17 Parties
present, to the public, alternative choices in government, policies and people.
Political parties serve at least two major purposes. Firstly, they define and
express a group’s needs, in a way which the public and political system can
understand. Secondly, they develop common ideas within a significant group so
that it can exercise pressure upon the political system.18 The functions of political
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parties are to nominate candidates, organise political competition, unify portions
of the electorate, translate policy preferences into public policies, and, when out of
power, provide a constructive critical opposition. It is thought that limitations and
restrictions on people establishing organised political parties contradict the idea of
public participation in the political process and decision-making, as elements of
good governance.
In the context of the rule of law, parties should be required to fulfill legal
obligations for official registration and recognition, including a minimum level of
membership, a written constitution and platform, and the election of party leaders.
Depending on a variety of factors (the type of democratic system, the electoral
law, religious groups, and ethnic communities), a country may have anywhere
from two to more than hundred registered parties.19
In some cases, parties may merge or divide over time and new parties may
displace older parties by attracting their supporters. Some parties may be
important because they have the capacity to assemble a national majority in
presidential elections. On the other hand, small parties can also be important by
affecting the balance of power in a parliamentary system, and so can decide which
larger parties will control government and choose the prime minister. Still other
parties can be important because they represent a particular constituency which is,
for example, influential because of economic or social reasons.20
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However, political parties may be the weakest link in the electoral process
if they are undemocratic, under-developed and non-constructive. Political parties
cannot be trusted to have democratic ideas or programmes, if they are tolerant of
corruption (if not, indeed, active in it), self centered, inward-looking, exclusive
and, therefore, unrepresentative and unresponsive to voters’ real interests and
citizens’ real needs for development.21 In other words, how parties behave toward
one another, and in their internal organisation, tells their fellow citizens how
democracy works.
In contrast, if parties are transparent and inclusive in their operations,
respectful of women and ethnic or religious minorities and adhere to the rules
established, in the selection of candidates and adoption of policies, then they are
demonstrating another way in which democracy can work, and providing evidence
of how they will behave in government. It could safely be stated that parties have
been both catalysts and obstacles to democratic reform.22 It is in this context that a
good electoral law should mention the rights, functions, obligations, and even
sanctions imposable on political parties, in order to ensure that political parties
support the electoral laws.

Legislature
The legislature, or parliament, is a fundamental component of democratic
government. The need for strong legislatures is reflected in the very meaning of
21
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democracy: ‘rule by the people’. In order for the people to rule, they require a
mechanism to represent their wishes —to make (or influence) policies in their
name and oversee the implementation of those policies. It is thought that
legislatures serve these critical functions. A legislature reflects in its ranks a broad
spectrum of a country’s political opinion, and as such is the principal forum for
debate on vital issues. A legislature, or parliament, can serve as a demonstration
of pluralism, tolerance of diversity and dissent, as well as a place for compromise
and consensus building.23
In authoritarian systems, the legislature serves as a ‘rubber stamp’ or a
justification of government’s decisions. In other words, the power of parliament is
subordinated, and this is clearly against the idea of the rule of law. The balance of
power between the legislative and executive branches in a country can be changed
through political and legal reform. If new legislatures are going to have a central
role in a nation’s governance, it is up to legislators themselves to build strong
legislative institutions, by asserting themselves in the regular law-making or
oversight functions, or through specific structural changes via constitutional
amendment, legislation, or rules of procedure. In the context of the rule of law, it
can be argued that the executive must act within the confines of laws passed by
Parliament; otherwise its actions will be invalid.
It is essential that all members of parliament should be elected; not
appointed. Parliament is elected by, and responsible to, the electorate. A
governing political party in Parliament is elected on the basis of its manifesto,
23
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which then constitutes its mandate. Accordingly, this is in line with the principles
of equality and non-discrimination, where none can have a seat in the parliament
without having sufficient support from the people, as reflected in the result of a
general election. This is also compatible with the notion that those who are elected
are accountable to the people who chose them. If there are members of parliament
who are appointed, the question will be: to whom they are accountable?
Thus far I have examined the relationship between the electoral system,
political parties and the legislature on the one hand, and good governance and the
rule of law on the other. The examination of whether political reform laws are
genuine includes not only whether the electoral administration is acting
impartially and effectively, but also whether political contestants have the
opportunity to campaign freely for popular support. Other considerations are:
government resources should be properly utilised in the electoral process; and the
military should take a neutral position and act as professional body, along with the
police and prosecutors, who should act properly to maintain order and protect
those seeking to exercise their civil and political rights.
I have shown above that the position of political parties and parliament is
significant in the democratic process. Without strong political parties and political
institutions, which are accountable and effective, which can negotiate and
articulate compromises to respond to conflicting demands, the door is effectively
open to those populist leaders who will seek to bypass the institutions of
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government, especially any system of checks and balances and the rule of law.24
In other words, good governance and the rule of law can only work in a system;
not in the charisma of a populist leader.
An essential factor in this process is to build public trust in elections. In
other words, “unless the electorate feels that it is free to make political choices, is
adequately informed to do so and that its choices will be respected, an election
process will not be truly meaningful.”25 Political contestants should also feel that
they have a fair chance of reaching and winning the support of the voters —as the
incentive to participate in the process. Above all, all political actors should respect
the outcome of the elections. It is crucial that the elections are judged free and fair
by government, political parties, the public and international monitors.

II. Political Laws in the Soeharto Era
When President Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, he left political laws
which had been used to support his regime. The legislature was a controlled and
subservient body, elected every five years. Ten parties contested the first New
Order elections held in 1971. In preparation for those elections, Soeharto
transformed Golkar, founded in 1964 by the Army as a loose coalition of anticommunist organisations, into a political machine. Golkar, with heavy backing
from the military, won 63 percent of the vote in the 1971 elections, surpassing
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even its own expectations.26 In 1973, Soeharto forced the other parties to merge
into two separated party groupings: nationalist parties (PDI (the Indonesian
Democracy Party)) and Islamic parties (PPP (the United Development Party)).27
It is no secret that both parties were government creations — heavily
manipulated, mergers of older political parties. The PDI was the successor to the
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) — a party with symbolic links to former
President Sukarno and the nationalist movement. The PDI also had members from
Protestant, Catholic, and two smaller secular parties. The PPP was a merger of
several Islamic parties, representing quite different wings of Islamic thought —
one with a mainly Java-based constituency and another drawing most of its
support from outside Java. Soeharto often intervened in the selection of the PPP’s
and the PDI’s leaders. The Government was the major financier of both parties.
Neither party had ever nominated an alternative to Soeharto for presidential
elections.28
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The New Order held general elections in 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and
1997, in which only Golkar, the PDI, and the PPP were permitted to compete.
Civil servants were required to support Golkar. Thousands of polling stations
were placed within government office buildings and voting was held during
working hours to ensure that all civil servants supported and gave loyalty to the
Golkar-dominated government.29

Unlike the PPP and the PDI, Golkar was

completely free to use facilities provided by the government. For instance, all
ministers were members of Golkar, and they used government facilities for
political meetings and campaigns.
Elections used a proportional list system, based on Indonesia’s then 27
provinces, with complete central party control over the choice of candidates.
There was no system through which voters could adjust the ranking of the
individual candidates on the list. There was no requirement that candidates reside
in the region where they were competing. Political campaigning was regulated for
content as well as for time and place. Access to media was limited, candidates’
broadcast speeches had to be vetted, and the final tabulation of results was a
closed process. Only Golkar had party offices at the village level throughout
Indonesia.30
It was alleged that much manipulation was undertaken by the government
through the LPU (Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, the National Election Institute) to
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assure a win by Golkar.31 The LPU, headed by the Minister for Internal Affairs,
had no independence to carry out its responsibilities. It was dominated by the
bureaucracy and the government apparatus, which formed one part of Golkar’s
machinery in the elections. Thus, the LPU was not in a neutral position.
In order to respond to these charges of manipulation, the Government
established an official monitoring body, PANWASLAK (the Committee for the
Supervision and Implementation of Elections), which included representatives
from the three official parties. However, the Committee was government-run, and
its members were government-appointed. Independent observers were not
permitted. Government-approved election witnesses from the parties could
observe the vote and vote-counting processes. Moreover, candidate for Parliament
were screened by the Government and the military, and had to receive a letter
indicating that they met the requirements. The system provided no mechanism for
appealing electoral registration decisions, candidate refusal, or final results.32
The Soeharto government banned campaigners deemed too critical, and
used the full weight of the army and bureaucracy, down to the village level, to
ensure victory. Between elections it intervened frequently to remove popular or
outspoken party leaders and members of parliament. It also detained and
threatened to bring to trial those who questioned the legitimacy of the election
process and called for an election boycott.33
31
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However, the participation rate was high. In the 1997 General Election,
more than 124 million voters were registered and 112 million votes were cast. The
Soeharto government at that time claimed that Indonesia might have the highest
election participation rate in the world.34 What the Government did not say was
that Indonesia might have had the most highly controlled election system in the
world.
According to R. William Liddle, Soeharto’s Indonesia relied on a useful,
albeit fragile, fiction of democratic legitimacy. He argues that it had only limited
credibility and that most Indonesians paid lip service to democratic legitimacy
because of the Soeharto government’s development successes, or because they felt
protected or privileged by the New Order or frightened by political change.35 If
democratic legitimacy was a useful fiction, then controlled elections were a
necessary stage prop in maintaining that fiction.
When Soeharto left office, the political system as described above
remained. Therefore, it was Habibie’s task to reform the system prior to holding
the June 1999 elections. In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss
Habibie’s response to demands for reform in this significant field. I will also
identify the obstacles and the challenges faced by Habibie in attempting to reform
political laws.
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III. Demands for Reform and Habibie’s Response
When BJ Habibie took over the presidency on 21 May 1998, he was not
constitutionally obliged to hold elections. Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution
stipulates that if the President ‘stopped serving’, the Vice-President would
complete the remainder of the President’s term. Habibie, therefore, had a
constitutional mandate to see out Soeharto’s term through 2003. However, it was
unfortunate for him that his image was as ‘Soeharto’s man’. The government
needed public confidence to bring the country out of its legal, political and
economic crises.
Shortly afterwards, on 22 May 1998, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, who was
again appointed by the new President as Co-ordinating Minister for Economic
Affairs, was the first member of cabinet to advocate fresh elections to produce ‘a
new government with a new mandate from the people.’36 He seemed to realise
that public trust in the government was essential for bringing Indonesia out of its
economic and political crises. On the following day, the media reported that
Amien Rais (General Chairperson of Muhammadiyah, the second largest
Indonesian Islamic organisation) had demanded fresh parliamentary elections
within six months, to be followed by a presidential election in the MPR.37
Having responded to this demand, on 23 May 1998, Habibie summoned
six credible reform figures, such as Rais, Nurcholish Madjid (Muslim scholar),
Adnan Buyung Nasution (lawyer) and Rudini (former Minister for Internal
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Affairs), in order to seek input on the possibilities of holding parliamentary
elections. Following the discussions, a spokesman announced that the President
wished to hold new parliamentary elections as soon as the election laws could be
revised. According to the spokesman, since this would take time, the President
would study the matter further before announcing a firm timetable.38
Within hours of the spokesman’s statement, the Chief of Staff for Social
and Political Affairs (Kassospol) of the Army, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, held
a press conference of his own. He made the significant statement that a
prerequisite for solving the crisis was a government which was genuinely
empowered by the people.39 This could be read as a sign from the military that
they endorsed Habibie’s call for parliamentary elections.
However, this statement could be also read with suspicion. It was possible
that the generals were not fully accepting of Habibie’s presidency. Although
General Wiranto made a clear statement on 21 May 1998 that the military would
support the new President, it was well known that Habibie did not have a good
relationship with the Indonesian military. This could explain why the military
supported the idea of new elections: they expected that a new person would
emerge from this process as President. Another suspicion was that the military
hoped that the elections could ultimately be made to confer the presidency upon
one of its own generals.40
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The US State Department publicly urged the President to set a firm date
for elections.41 Habibie was reported as having said that, ‘I am not a genie who
can say ‘Zing-a-boom!’ and everything is there. I have to take care that the
election is correct, based on the laws, and legal.’42 Moreover, several groups such
as Barisan Nasional went further by asking Habibie not to run for another term
himself. They argued that Habibie’s role was only as a transitional president, who
should hand over power to a new figure, truly free from past political
contamination (i.e. association with Soeharto’s government). They were afraid
that if Habibie contested the next election, he would manipulate it just as Soeharto
had.
Others also argued that the Habibie presidency was unconstitutional, asked
him to resign, and held the Special Session of the MPR to deal with both Soeharto
and Habibie. As has been said, under the 1945 Constitution, Habibie could have
run the country until 2003. No-one could have forced him to step down in an
unconstitutional way, since this would have caused a reaction from Habibie’s
supporters and led to political chaos. However, not everyone agreed that the
resignation of Soeharto and the swearing-in of Habibie were constitutional. When
Soeharto resigned, at nine o’clock on 21 May 1998, at the Presidential Palace,
Harmoko and the other Chairperson of the MPR were not allowed to attend the
ceremony; Soeharto asked them to wait in another room. Therefore, the
41
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resignation and the swearing-in did not take place in the presence of the leaders of
the MPR, nor did it take place at the MPR building. Habibie was sworn in, before
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, at the Presidential Palace.
Professor Dimyati Hartono of the University of Airlangga argued that the
above process was unconstitutional.43 The main argument was based upon MPR
Decree No. III/MPR/1978. One section declares that the MPR may discharge a
president in one of three situations: at his own request, if he is permanently unable
to perform his duties, or if he has acted in contravention of the GBHN (Broad
Outlines of State Policy). Another section stipulates that before automatically
becoming president, a vice-president should be sworn in before parliament (not
before the Chief Justice).
One additional argument was that a president who had received his
mandate from the MPR had to return it to that institution, or have it withdrawn by
the same body. Therefore, on 21 May 1998, when Habibie was sworn in as the
new President, the 1997 MPR decree, which legally declared Soeharto and
Habibie as President and Vice-President respectively, had not yet been changed.
This meant that, according to constitutional law, the presidency was still held by
Soeharto, but, according to the political process, the president was now Habibie.
Professor Hartono and other public figures were in doubt as to Habibie’s
legitimacy as President.
By contrast, Professor Yusril Ihza Mahendra of the University of
Indonesia, who had prepared the legal process of Soeharto’s resignation, replied
43
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that a ‘unilateral action’ from Soeharto which stated that he had decided to resign,
did not relate to the two MPR decrees in 1978. Soeharto’s action was not a
request to resign, but a statement: “I resign”. He also argued that the swearing-in
of Habibie before parliament was impossible, because of the occupation of the
parliament building by the students, and the fact that 21 May was a holiday.
According to MPR Decree No.VII/MPR/1973, under such circumstances the
swearing-in had to take place in front of the Supreme Court, in order to avoid the
creation of a power vacuum.44
Whatever the reasoning of the constitutional debate above, political reality
and public opinion supported the resignation of Soeharto. The Indonesian people
were waiting for the resignation, and they accepted the fact that Soeharto was no
longer in power. However, what about Habibie’s presidency?
The swearing in of Habibie as President divided the students who had
successfully forced Soeharto to resign. Some had already left the parliamentary
complex shortly after Soeharto’s resignation was announced. Some were satisfied
with Soeharto’s stepping down; others wanted to avoid a conflict over the
question of whether or not Habibie was acceptable. Some of them were not aware
that, under the Constitution, Habibie would take over the office. Therefore, they
were very surprised that Habibie, a Soehato loyalist, became the third President of
Indonesia. Some of them took the view that their struggle for total reform was not
complete.45 Speeches rejecting Habibie’s appointment were given, and posters
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were displayed with texts like “Down with Habibie”, “Reject Habibie”, and
“Habibie is a nepotist: is it right and proper that he becomes President?”
It was in the context of both the constitutional debate and the political
reality described above, that the call for early elections emerged as a smooth
compromise between those who rejected and those who accepted Habibie. It
would be the people, through elections, who should decide on this matter; not the
political and legal actors. In the words of Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Assistant for
Foreign Affairs to the State Secretary, “In order to form a government with strong
constitutional and political legitimacy — seen by most as the prerequisite for
political stability and the restoration of business confidence in Indonesia — a new
general election has to be carried out as soon as possible”.46
The first task then, was to convince President Habibie that the country
needed a President who had strong support regarding his/her legitimacy, to bring
Indonesia out of crisis. It is in this context that one should read Kartasasmita’s
statement, the accounts of Habibie’s meeting with six public figures, and the
statement of Yudhoyono of the ABRI, described above. All these situations
influenced Habibie in preparing the first meeting of his cabinet on 25 May 1998.
Habibie presented an outline of his policy in a 24-page paper. Besides a
commitment to root out nepotism, corruption, and collusion, it called for revision
of the political laws and for a general election to be held as soon as possible.47
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Habibie clearly stated that the election would be the most important step towards
creating a legitimate government. Moreover, he said:
Whatever its results, we must accept it without remorse. The new
government, which would then be instituted, will reflect the people’s
aspirations. Therefore, we can immediately halt the crisis which has
been engulfing us.48
Habibie then instructed Syarwan Hamid, the Minister for Internal Affairs, to
prepare the draft of new political laws.
It was unfortunate that Syarwan Hamid was a man who suffered from
‘past political contamination’. Within a matter of days of his appointment, he was
under attack by students, NGO activists, and supporters of Megawati
Soekarnoputri, who said that, in the past, when he had still been the Chief of Staff
for Social and Political Affairs of the ABRI, Hamid had always come down hard
on movements for greater democracy. He was also alleged to be one of the men
behind the military attack on the PDI Party Headquarters (Megawati’s party) on
27 July 1996. In addition, Syarwan Hamid’s appointment continued the New
Order tradition that the post had to go to an army officer. Habibie did not change
the tradition. How could Habibie entrust the preparation of the election to this
man? However, as will be shown later, Hamid’s role and contribution in preparing
for the election were remarkable.
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Golkar and Habibie
Golkar had a majority of seats in the DPR and MPR following the 1997
elections. This indicated that Golkar was still an important player and a significant
institution in the political configuration. Any draft Bills would be sent to the DPR
and, with its majority of seats, Golkar’s position was significant as to the passing
(or not passing) of such Bills. Moreover, military officers, government officials
and social and religious leaders (most, if not all, of whom supported Golkar) still
largely determined how people would vote, especially in the countryside. Golkar
had the power (and the money) to influence any of Habibie’s political decisions.
Meanwhile, the next election was originally scheduled for 2002. The
questions were: Would Habibie receive support from Golkar to bring the election
forward? What if Golkar refused Habibie’s plan, and consequently, asked him to
step down? And how could Golkar, which had been the target of criticism over its
role under the Soeharto administration, agree to the holding of a new general
election, risking its majority of seats?
Habibie had little time to prepare for his major political test: to gain
control over Golkar, which held the majority of seats in both the DPR and the
MPR. Without Golkar’s full support, it would be difficult for Habibie to defend
his position before his critics. Moreover, if Golkar was chaired by one of
Habibie’s political ‘enemies’, it would be easy for him to impeach and remove
him from office.
Meanwhile, Harmoko, the General Chairman of Golkar and close
supporter of Habibie, had been criticised by Golkar members over his role as
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Chairperson of the MPR. Golkar leaders asked for a Special Meeting to ‘impeach’
Harmoko on the grounds that he urged Soeharto to accept Golkar’s nomination as
Presidential candidate in March 1998 and, following mass demonstrations, asked
Soeharto to resign in May 1998. He was seen as both a hypocrite and a betrayer.
Habibie and his supporters had to win this battle, the Special Meeting of
Golkar, since the new General Chairman of Golkar had the power to replace rival
Golkar members of the MPR by introducing his own supporters and putting the
election of a new President on the agenda of the MPR. Consequently, if Habibie’s
supporters won at the Golkar Special Meeting, this would give his presidency a
greater legitimacy.
In the meantime, Harmoko, who agreed with Habibie’s policy to move
forward the general election, declared that he would not seek re-election as
General Chairman. This meant that Habibie’s supporters had to find another
figurehead. However, although Soeharto was not the President anymore, he was
still the Chairperson of the Council of Patrons of Golkar. Under Golkar’s
Constitution, Soeharto was still in the highest position. He was capable of
mobilising enough support to have one of his own favourites take over the Golkar
leadership, to protect his interests and to take revenge on Harmoko.
Whilst Habibie’s supporters nominated Akbar Tanjung as the candidate,
Soeharto’s supporters put forward the name of General (retired) Edi Sudrajat, a
long time critic of Habibie, as the candidate. One of the reasons why Sudrajat and
other retired generals did not like Habibie was that Habibie, as a Soeharto’s
‘golden boy’, headed the state ship-building company and supervised several
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other key state-owned ‘strategic industries, including munitions factories. The lost
patronage, and also Habibie’s failure to consult before making major decisions
affecting military interests, alienated him from most senior armed forces leaders
such as Benny Moerdani, Try Sutrisno and Edi Sudrajat (known as the nationalist
faction), for at least a decade before he became Vice-President, and then
President.
Suspicion about the prospect of Soeharto’s camp returning to power was
strong enough to have Yudhoyono state publicly, on 19 June 1998, that the Armed
Forces were firmly behind the Habibie government and would thwart all attempts
by the ‘old forces’ to scheme for a comeback.49 With full back-up from Habibie,
Syarwan Hamid, Wiranto and Yudhoyono, finally Tanjung received 17 of the 27
votes. It was enough to beat Sudrajat. Golkar also replaced the Council of Patrons
led by Soeharto with an Advisory Council, headed by Harmoko. Sons and
daughters of Soeharto were also purged from the organisation. Tanjung then
declared his party to be a new Golkar. A new image of Golkar was thus being
projected, to differentiate it from Soeharto’s Golkar. It seemed that Habibie had
won the battle and passed the first exam of his political career.

Legal Procedure to Hold Elections
However, there were three keys important issues left in terms of legal
reform. Firstly, how could the new elections be justified under constitutional law?
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Secondly, when and how would the election laws be revised? Thirdly, when
would elections be held?
Golkar supported Habibie’s plan that before the end of 1998 it would be
necessary for a Special Session of the MPR to convene, after which general
elections could be held in May or June 1999. According to Mujib Rahmat,
Member of Parliament from Golkar, Golkar’s endorsement of the idea of early
elections was a political sacrifice from Golkar, in order to cope with the reform
atmosphere. Golkar supported reforming the political system, and was aware of
the risk that it might lose its power.50 However, according to Ray Rangkuti (a
student leader at 1998 May movement), Golkar actually had no choice at that
time. By supporting political reform, Golkar might lose some of its seats during
the elections, but if it did not support the political reform, people would punish it,
and Golkar might lose everything. In other words, according to Rangkuti, rather
than seeing Golkar’s decision as its political sacrifice, he saw it as a political
calculation, in order to maintain Golkar’s existence and power in the future.51
It seems that Habibie himself was calculating that his best chance for
longevity in office was to follow the demands for political reform from the
principal opponents of the New Order. By his calculations, Golkar, his party, had
almost every chance to win the general elections. Reforming political laws while
Golkar was on his side was the strategic way to stay longer in office. If he had
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refused to bring forward the general elections and to reform political laws, he
would have been forced to resign, just like Soeharto.
Those who opposed Habibie argued that the MPR Special Session should
revoke its decision to elect Soeharto and Habibie formally, and also to replace
Habibie as President, by setting up a presidium or Indonesian People’s
Committee. They took the view that such a committee was the only way to ensure
a total departure from Soeharto’s New Order. However, the 1945 Constitution did
not validate this option.
Sri Soemantri of the University of Padjadjaran (Bandung, West Java)
argued that to reinforce Habibi’s position as president, it would be necessary to
organise a special session of the MPR, in order to abolish MPR Decree No.
IV/MPR/1998, concerning the election of Soeharto as President, and No.
VI/MPR/1998, concerning the election of BJ Habibie as Vice President; and to
issue a new MPR decision on Habibie as President.52 The MPR Special Session
had to meet; not to call Soeharto to account for what had happened between
March and the end of May 1998, as some wanted, or to elect a new President, as
was high on the agenda of others; but simply to revise its regulations relating to
general elections and to support political, economic and legal reform.
Although Habibie was aware that the MPR Special Session could be
another ‘test’ for him, he had to face it, since the Session would provide
justification, and was the only constitutional way to move forward the general
election. According to MPR Decree No.III/MPR/1988 on General Elections,
52
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general elections should be held every five years, and MPR Decree No.
II/MPR/1998 stated clearly that the next general election would be in 2002.53
Therefore, in terms of constitutional law, only another MPR Session could change
the schedule. The MPR Special Session in November 1998 successfully produced
MPR Decree No.XIV/MPR/1998, and MPR Decree No.IX/MPR/1998, in order to
revoke the previous schedule and the regulation on general elections. Based on
those decrees above, the process of drafting political laws was started.
Thus far I have introduced and examined the debate, the tension, the
obstacles and the challenges faced by Habibie in his response to demands for
reforming political laws. Habibie entered office under a cloud of suspicion that he
was simply a continuation of Soeharto’s regime and surrounded by questions
about the constitutionality of the handover. He was forced to call for early
elections despite the fact that the presidential term he inherited was supposed to
last until 2003. I have also described that the constitutional process for early
elections was not easy. Habibie’s supporters won the battle in the Golkar National
Congress, and also succeeded in setting up the MPR Special Session, to end the
debate regarding Habibie’s legitimacy, and to set a new schedule for elections.
The election would be the most critical period in the history of Indonesia towards
a democratic era.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will analyse the three political laws
drafted by the Habibie regime: on political parties; on elections; and on the
structure of the parliament. I will evaluate these laws at three levels: draft,
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content, and implementation. Unlike in Chapter 5 and 6, I will discuss the laws
simultaneously. The reason for this approach is that the political laws were drafted
by the same team (government) and discussed by the same committee
(parliament), and the topics covered in the laws were closely related. It is expected
that this approach will ensure that the analysis in this chapter stays focused.

IV. Political and Legal Processes of Drafting Political Laws
As has been stated earlier, under Habibie’s instructions, the new political
laws were drafted. The drafts were prepared by Syarwan Hamid’s team54 but
debated in a Parliament (DPR) which had been formed after the 1997 election of
the earlier Soeharto regime. As will be discussed later, the new laws thus reflected
a compromise between old and new forces; between reform and the status quo;
between democracy and vested political interests.
There were three significant groups of actors dominating the process. First,
the Habibie government appointed a technical team (the Team of Seven)55,
responsible for drafting the package of new electoral legislation. Much of the
Team of Seven’s drafting took place before international support or involvement
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was available.56 Second, the drafters of bills which would be sent to the
Parliament comprised military appointees and representatives of the three parties
(Golkar, PPP and PDI). Third, new parties formed outside the legislature
endeavoured to be the voices of the reform movement.57 Although the new parties
could not be part of the Special Commission (Pansus )— as the second group
described above — discussing the bills, as they were not members of parliament,
their voices outside the parliament indirectly influenced the debate inside the
parliament. Parliament also invited them to participate in public hearings.
Apart from the work of the Team of Seven, there were also other proposals
on political laws drafted by the Department of Justice, LIPI (the Indonesian
Institute of Sciences), and from the Consortium of NGOs being coordinated by
the YLBHI (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation). This indicated broad participation
from the public sector (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Comparison of Proposals on Main Issues of the Electoral Law58
Department/Committee

System

Election Organiser

Team
of
Seven Combination of Election
and Committee
(Department of Home District
(Government
Proportional
Affairs)
Representatives,
Parties and People)

Department of Justice

Military
(ABRI) and
Civil Servants
(PNS)
ABRI 55 in
DPR
PNS/ABRI is
prohibited
from
managing a
party

District

LPU (same as the ABRI & PNS
old law)
do not vote
and elect
ABRI & PNS,
LIPI
(Indonesian Improved
Independent
Institute of Sciences)
Proportional
Election Organiser anyone
wanting
to
Secretariat
enter
the
DPR/MPR
must resign,
ABRI
represented
by 54 persons
in the MPR
and All members
NGO’s Consortium
Combination of Autonomy
the
independence with of
Proportional
facilities provided DPR/MPR
and District
by the government chosen
through
elections

After nearly three months of work, a blueprint for Indonesia’s new
democracy was finally unveiled in November 1998. A team of seven esteemed
political scientists had produced three draft laws, which promised to
fundamentally reconfigure Indonesia’s electoral and political system: the Law on
58
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Political Parties, the Law on General Elections and the Law on the Composition
and Structure of the MPR, DPR and DPRD. This ‘Team of Seven’, under the
leadership of Professor Ryaas Rasyid, was working under the auspices of Syarwan
Hamid’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ushering in a healthy democratic system
was one way in which Hamid could alter the historical record on his career in
public office. Consequently, Rasyid and his six hand-picked academics enjoyed
free rein to draft the best electoral laws they could.
According to Ryaas Rasyid, he explained the draft bills in six hours in a
Cabinet meeting. Habibie listened carefully and asked many detailed questions of
Rasyid. Habibie said to Rasyid, “That was an excellent presentation. I agree with
it, and would like to pursue it”.59 However, State Secretary Akbar Tanjung (also
the new General Chairman of Golkar) voiced ardent objections. According to him,
the proposed system departed too radically from past precedent. Habibie had two
options here: follow the recommendation of the Team of Seven, or listen to Akbar
Tanjung — his own State Secretary and Chair of his own political party.60
Meanwhile, Habibie made it clear that he was intent on running for
another term in office. For a President seeking re-election in less than a year, it
might have made sense for Habibie to defer to his party chair and order both
Hamid and Rasyid to make changes to the draft bills before sending them to the
Parliament. However, Habibie did not do that. If he had done so, it would have
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broken the image he had built up – that his government supported political reform.
He was aware that after his executive branch sent the draft on to the parliament,
the bills might be amended and rewritten by the members of parliament. Akbar
Tanjung, as chair of the largest party in parliament, would have a central role to
play in that process.
Habibie then decided to invite Ryaas, Tanjung, Bambang Kesowo (a
Harvard law graduate and Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet) and Syarwan Hamid
to his home. This special meeting finalised the draft bills after accommodating
Tanjung and Kesowo’s views. Habibie then sent the bills to the DPR on 16
September, 1998, and, at the same time, forwarded ‘the political battle’ to the
DPR. The message was clear: if the draft was changed, it would not be Habibie
who would be seen to have changed the draft, but the DPR. Any dissatisfaction
should therefore be addressed to the DPR; not to the Government and Habibie.

Electoral System
There are two main democratic electoral systems, which can be selected or
combined. The choice of an electoral system, especially the distinction between
the proportional representation system and plurality, or majority, forms of
electoral rules, is widely regarded by political scientists as one of the three
fundamental institutional decisions made by a democratic polity.61 The first
electoral system is the proportional system (commonly known as the proportional
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representation system). This system is based on the principle of ‘one person one
vote’ and the concept that parties should be presented in an assembly or
parliament in direct proportion to their overall voting results. Their percentage of
seats should equal their percentage of votes gained.62
The rationale underpinning all proportional representation (PR) systems is
consciously to reduce the disparity between a party’s share of the national vote
and its share of the parliamentary seats. This means that if a major party wins fifty
per cent of the votes, it should win approximately fifty per cent of the seats, and a
minor party with twelve per cent of the votes should also gain around twelve per
cent of the parliamentary seats.63
Proportionality is often seen as being best achieved by the use of party
lists, where political parties present lists of candidates to the voters on a national
or regional basis (South Africa and Israel are examples). However, it can be
achieved just as easily if the proportional component of a Mixed Member
Proportional (MMP) system compensates for any disproportionality which comes
out of the district results (New Zealand and Germany). Preferential voting can
work equally well: the Single Transferable Vote (STV), where voters rank-order
candidates in multi-member districts, is another well-established proportional
system (Ireland and Malta).64
The second system is the district system (single constituency system or
majority system) which means that the country is divided into constituencies, each
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approximately the same size. Voters select a single candidate by marking the
candidate’s name on the ballot paper. The candidate with the most votes wins the
district seat (the first-past-the-post rule). The distinguishing feature of pluralitymajority systems is that they almost always use single-member districts. In a firstpast-the-post system (FPTP), sometimes known as a plurality single-member
district system, the winner is the candidate with the most votes, but not
necessarily an absolute majority of the votes (examples: the United Kingdom and
India). 65
The first-past-the-post system is widely seen to be unfair and many
attempts have been made to improve or replace it in countries where it is in use.
However, the system does have a number of advantages. First, when operated
with single member constituencies it provides for a direct relationship between the
member of the legislature and the local constituency. Second, because elections
are contested at the constituency level, there can be a degree of local control over
the party's choice of candidate and parties must take some account of the
constituency's wishes, when selecting a candidate.
Third, the system elects the candidate who receives the largest number of
votes. Candidates cannot be elected as a result of the transfer of a third or fourth
preference, thus defeating the candidate with the largest number of first preference
votes. Fourth, the system is straightforward and easy to understand. Electors are
not required to choose from vast lists of candidates, nor to exercise preferences
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they may not have. The system is uncomplicated and produces a speedy outcome.
Fifth, the system allows electors directly to choose the government and not be
subject to backroom wheeling and dealing which can occur when a large number
of parties are elected to the legislature. Sixth, there are fewer opportunities for
minority parties to be given power disproportionate to their electoral support.
Seventh, there is less likelihood of a proliferation of minor parties which may
make the formation of stable governments difficult. Finally, because elections are
contested at the constituency level, there is a greater possibility of outstanding
candidates being elected regardless of party support. 66
It should be noted that there are, at least, two variations in ways of voting
between the various list Proportional Representation (PR) systems: whether lists
are open or closed in terms of the ability of electors to vote for a preferred
candidate as well as for a party. In a closed system, the order of candidates elected
by that list is fixed by the party itself, and voters are not able to express a
preference for a particular candidate. Voters simply chose the party they
preferred; the individual candidate elected as a result was pre-determined by the
parties themselves.67 One negative aspect of closed lists is that voters have no say
in determining who the representative of their party will be. During the Soeharto
era, Indonesia followed this closed system.68
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Many of the List PR systems used in continental Europe use open lists, in
which voters can indicate not just their favoured party, but their favoured
candidate within that party. This choice becomes highly important, because
people must vote for candidates, and the order in which candidates are elected is
determined by the number of individual votes they receive. This gives voters
much greater freedom over their choice of candidate.69
In February 1995, when Soeharto was in power, he asked the Indonesian
Institute of Sciences (LIPI) to study and recommend the electoral system which
would suit Indonesia. Although LIPI was highly critical of election practices
under the Soeharto governments, instead of suggesting the use of the district
system, LIPI recommended a ‘perfected proportional system’, which was
basically the system which had been used during Soeharto presidency.70 The LIPI
team felt that Indonesia was not yet ready to adopt the district system in the 1997
election. As it would take time to adjust to the district system, the LIPI team
proposed a transitional period for the election in 2002. Indonesia would then aim
to have adopted a perfected district system only in the 2007 election.
In the proportional system, all members of parliament must be elected;
there should be no appointed members.71 However, according to the 1997 election
results (under the New Order government), out of one thousand members of the
MPR, 575 were appointed from regional groups and the armed forces. This meant
69
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that only 425 members were chosen through elections under such a system.
Indonesian democracy could be called a ‘42.5 per cent democracy’ since the
people’s sovereignty was represented by only 42.5 per cent of the parliamentary
members.
Following the resignation of Soeharto, the questions in 1998 were: should
the proportional representation system of the New Order government be
maintained, or replaced with either a district or first-past-the post system, or with
some other arrangement? What should be the design of the electoral system? In
the context of law reform, the question arose: how did the new election law
promote accountability, public participation, and transparency?
The Government’s draft legislation proposed a mixed system of mostly
first-past-the-post districts, with about eighty compensatory national top-up seats
(see Table 1).72 The government proposed to combine them by rewarding local
winners with seats whilst also compensating losing parties with seats drawn from
national party lists. This mixed system was to ensure the principle of participation,
as Indonesia is a plural society. The ‘genuine’ district system would make some
groups unrepresented in parliament.
This was also designed to respond to reformist feeling that members
should not, as previously, be very heavily Jakarta-based and under central party
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direction. This system was chosen since voters in districts73 would know better
who represented them. As voters would choose individuals, not parties, the
elected officials would be more accountable to individual constituencies. As can
be seen, this mixed system was based on two principles: participation and
accountability. Those principles are in line with the notions of good governance
and the rule of law, whereas the proportional system, as had been practiced during
Soeharto’s time, claimed only participation, with no accountability: members of
parliament were accountable to the parties; not to the people. In other words, this
proposal was designed to respond to the reformist feeling that members should
not, as previously, be very heavily Jakarta-based and under central party
direction.74
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There was a hot debate between Mochtar Pabotinggi, a Chair of the 1995 LIPI Team, and Andi
Mallarangeng, a member of the 1998 Team of Seven, on the electoral system. In the closing
section of a seminar called “In Search of the Ideal Democratic System for Indonesia”, Jose Manuel
Tesoro of Asiaweek reported that a panel discussion, wrapping up the day’s debates, turned into an
extremely heated argument between two of the panelists:
The difference between the two was not just a matter of a few decades. It was a gulf
between positions. Pabotinggi defended the “proportional” electoral system, which
had been used in Indonesia for decades up to and including last years’ elections.
Under it, voters choose parties, not people, to represent them. Meanwhile
Mallarangeng sang the praises of the district system, in which voters get to choose
who represents their area. The proportional system had long been misused by the
past Suharto administration to lock down politics. Only three parties were allowed to
compete, and one — former ruling party Golkar — was so well-funded and wellsupported that polls were basically one-party contests. Mallarangeng argued that
under a district system, people would know their representatives, who would in turn
have to be both accountable and responsive to their constituents. This was
something sorely lacking even in today’s parliament, where MPs are still picked by
parties, so many provinces and districts are often represented by strangers from
Jakarta. Pabotinggi held that the proportional system was an adequate check on
popular ignorance, and worked well for a country as diverse as Indonesia.
Mallarangeng told Pabotinggi to update his theories. Pabotinggi shot back by
reading a sentence from a political science tract—something along the lines that
district systems work best in homogenous societies. “That book must be from the
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However, political support for this position came not from the reformists,
but primarily from Golkar.75 It seems that they believed that they could poll thirty
per cent nationwide, and would benefit from heavier support away from Java and
Bali, where districts would be smaller. Golkar also wanted to maintain significant
central party input into candidate nomination. The parties outside the legislature,
after failing until very late in the debate to address the issue at all, because they
regarded it as solely technical, insisted upon a proportional system. And the PPP,
although itself in favour of a district system, emerged as a champion of the
proportional position within the legislature through a ‘district-but-not-yet’
formula.76 The argument was that Indonesia was not ready yet to change the
system radically.
Owing to the complexity and the time required to draw new district
boundaries and prepare parties and voters for the new system, the DPR Special
Commission (Pansus) agreed to drop the proposal in late November 1998. In the
end, virtually all parties, including new parties, unrepresented in parliament,
agreed to keep the proportional system for its simplicity and familiarity.77

50s!” scoffed Mallarangeng. (“1984”" Pabotinggi retorted.) As in many heated
debates, both parties are actually forced further to the extreme than either needs to
be.
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Moreover, the closed PR system that had been used during Soeharto era was used
again. The parliament did not even try to change to an open PR system.
Another reason for this agreement was that all parties hoped to benefit in
the coming elections from the national party list system. Parties tend to be led by
charismatic leaders who can draw the national vote, rather than by local leaders
joined in a national network.78 Another significant reason was that reformist
groups wanted to beat Golkar in the elections, but by reforming the electoral
system (from proportional to district), some of them raised concerns that the
proposed system would only help Golkar to win the election, since only Golkar
had all the requirements (network, human resources, money, and so on), to deal
with the proposed system in the limited time (6-7 months) available.79 This was a
paradox of law reform.
Though the proposal was defeated, the ruling organisation, Golkar,
managed to win a complicated concession on the issue of electoral-unit size. In
the previous general elections, electoral units conformed to the country’s twenty

known, were too short. In the words of Nasution, ‘We cannot directly switch to the district system
in full. The application of the district system in full will benefit the already established parties.’
See their opinions in Liddle (ed), Crafting, above n 58, Session II: Electoral Law Reform in
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Hamid’s suggestion. In answering my questions, Rasyid expressed the view that he did not believe
that Golkar would win the election using his proposed mixed system. He challenged the reformist
groups, “In Soeharto’s time, they believed that people were forced to vote for Golkar and
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seven provinces, and votes were counted province-wide. For instances, East Java
had sixty four seats, South Sumatra had fourteen seats, Maluku had five seats, and
so on. Golkar attempted, until the very end of deliberations, to decree that the 314
sub-provincial districts (rural regencies and urban municipalities) would become
the electoral units. As many districts are small in population, and would send only
one person to sit in parliament, the minority parties argued that Golkar would be
able to maintain overwhelming influence through its networks of local-level
cadres. Golkar would win in such areas.80
This forced the PPP to argue strongly in favour of both retaining the
province as the electoral unit and fielding members of parliament from national
party lists. However, in the end, the PPP had to acquiesce in a compromise
requiring that each party list its candidates at the district level. Votes would be
counted at the provincial level and seats allocated proportionally to the parties, as
had happened in the past. The candidates to fill seats earned must come from
those districts where the party fared ‘best’. The direct accountability of the
individual seat-holder to his or her constituency would at the same time be
eliminated, because of the party-list scheme which accompanies proportional
representation.
The new electoral legislation was finalised in late night negotiations
against a time deadline in late January 1999 (see Table 3). The electoral system —
a ‘proportional system with district characteristics’ — was unique and was the
clear product of political negotiation.
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Political Parties
The proposed bill on political parties opened a new era when it stated that
the establishment of new political parties was not limited and restricted. This
meant that with only fifty members, a new party could be established.81 However,
this did not mean that any party could automatically compete in the elections.
Creating a party and competing in the election were two different processes. The
draft bill provided that, to contest the 1999 elections, a party must have branches
in half the districts in fourteen of Indonesia’s twenty seven provinces. It should
also have the signature of one million party supporters.82 As it emerged from the
parliament, the law provided that parties must have officials in more than half of
all the provinces of Indonesia and have officials in more than half of the number
of regencies/municipalities in the provinces. No signatures were required. Once a
party met these requirements, it could run candidates anywhere in Indonesia.83
The government draft also provided that a party needed to win five percent
of the seats in the parliament to be eligible to compete in the next elections, in
2004.84 That percentage was cut to two percent by the parliament, and elected
legislators whose parties met that requirement were to be permitted to take their
seats in 1999.85 However, the law was silent on what would happen if, during the
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five-year legislative term, the party’s representation fell below two percent
through deaths, defections, or other eventualities.
Preventing parties from participating in the next election, based on their
performance in the current one, would seem to inhibit their right to express their
views at that time. To prevent a party from appearing on the ballot based solely on
performance in previous elections, without an opportunity to demonstrate its
present strength, would seem to deny citizens their right to support a party
advocating a particular point of view. In the words of Dwight King, “a party
falling under the threshold would be rendered a ‘lame duck’ for five years in the
current DPR, since it would be disqualified from competing in the next
election.”86 In such circumstances, it is very unlikely that they would represent
their constituents in an effective way. There is also the school of thought that new
parties would need time to settle and improve their parties’ performances. Most of
them had only one year to prepare for the June 1999 election. By way of contrast,
those parties established for twenty years would enjoy a great advantage.
The issue of whether civil servants could join or campaign on behalf of
political parties threatened to disrupt the legislative process. Golkar had relied
heavily on support from civil servants at all levels. Therefore Golkar argued that
restrictions on this matter would violate their human rights.87 Golkar risked
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deadlock on this issue until the very last minute by insisting that civil servants be
allowed to join and lead parties.
The PPP strongly opposed this view on the grounds that it would
perpetuate a decided Golkar advantage, and PPP and PDI members threatened to
walk out over this issue. Eventually the opposition prevailed, while yielding
ground on the size of voting districts. It was then decided that the actual rules
preventing civil servants on active duty from campaigning would not be
mentioned in the political laws, but would be promulgated by government decree.
Habibie played a significant role in this matter. On 26th January 1999, he
issued Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 5 of 1999 on Civil
Servants who become Political Party Functionaries. According to the regulation,
civil servants were ‘assumed’ to leave their positions or resign from active
membership in political parties. If they chose to remain seated in the political
party, they were required to take temporary leave of absence, in order to be active
in such party. However, they did not need to report their political activities until
three months after the regulation took effect. They were also entitled to their basic
pay for up to one year, renewable for five years. The problem was that with the
elections just over four months away, it was alleged that civil servants still had
ample time to help Golkar.
Having monitored the complaints from other political parties, three days
later Habibie issued another regulation which revised the rules on this crucial
matter. According to Government Regulation No. 12 of 1999, signed on 29
January, 1999, for civil servants who had joined a political party, their
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memberships or positions in a political party would be ‘automatically’ terminated.
If they wanted to pursue political activities, they were required to take a leave of
absence and entitled to their basic pay for only one year.
Accordingly, an estimated 10,000 Golkar officials were threatened with a
choice: resign from the party or resign from the Civil Service. There are an
estimated 5.1 million civil servants in Indonesia, including about one million in
State enterprises. Many others, and probably their relatives as well, support the
Golkar party from either ideological conviction or concern for their jobs.
Dwight King takes the view that:
In forging the new political laws, there was a surprising amount of
genuine give and take. Walkouts were threatened, but never
materialized. Students clashed with police outside, but decorum and
civility prevailed inside the DPR. Despite its numerical majority,
Golkar could not dictate the outcome. Nor was there a united front of
government, Golkar and ABRI versus an opposition. Are there any
parallels in the history of the New Order to the standoff between the
government and Golkar on the issue of civil servants and involvement
in political parties?88

Habibie’s role had ended the political debate on civil servants, which
could have delayed and even derailed the entire the election process. Meanwhile,
Golkar was not happy with the decision, claiming a matter as weighty as limiting
the rights of citizens should only be dealt with in Law; not in government
regulation.
The Golkar deputy chairman, Marzuki Darusman publicly complained,
according to press reports, that President Habibie “somewhat left us out in the
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cold.” He added that Golkar wanted to see Habibie “consistently pursue a line of
policy that is not changed because of pressure from outside, nor from his circle of
advisors.”89 It seems that, in this case, Habibie stood in support of public opinion;
not on the side of Golkar.

Parliament
The draft bill for an MPR downsized thirty percent, from 1,000 to 700
members, was left standing. The Government proposed to empower the position
of parliament vis-à-vis the executive. The empowerment of the MPR was
achieved by separating the executives of the MPR from those in the DPR90,
presumably making it more difficult for the executive to control both of them.
Members of the legislature cannot serve concurrently as government officials91. In
the past, members of cabinet and Chief of Army served as members of the MPR.
Probably the most hotly debated issue inside and outside parliament was
the number of DPR seats to be allotted to the Armed Forces. Under New Order
government, members of ABRI (later the institution of ABRI changed its title to
TNI-Tentara National Indonesia) did not have the right to be elected. Habibie
government maintained this rule.92 Consequently, the Habibie government
proposed to provide fifty five seats for military officers in the DPR (down from a
figure of 75 during the Soeharto era). The PPP wanted ten, Golkar would have
89
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been satisfied with forty, while student groups demanded the immediate and total
elimination of seats allocated to the TNI.
However, discussion in the DPR was interrupted by the Special Session of
the MPR in November 1998. One of its decisions was directly related to electoral
reform: it affirmed the continuation of appointed representatives of the Armed
Forces in the DPR. This meant that the DPR could not eliminate the seats for the
Armed Forces, since structurally an MPR Decree is higher than a DPR decision.
What the DPR could do was to specify the number of seats, since the MPR Decree
was silent on this issue. The final compromise resulted in the parliament reducing
the number to 38 representatives,93 and 10 percent of the seats in the provincial
and district legislatures.94 In the previous system, 75 seats had been reserved for
the military in the DPR, and 20 percent of the seats in the various DPRDs.
The reservation of seats for the military in the legislative branch is
inherently undemocratic, for the reason, amongst others, that military
representatives are not elected. Moreover, the military’s participation in
parliament creates serious conceptual difficulties and potential conflicts of
interest. By participating in politics in this way, the military seems to become, in
effect, another faction or interest group, rather than an institution which acts on
behalf of the entire country, given the role expected of the military, so that it
would seem untenable for the military to act in parliament as an opposition.
According to Liddle, “the presence of appointed Parliamentary and Assembly
93
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members, particularly the 38 armed forces’ delegates, means, according to most
scholarly definitions, that Indonesia is not yet a full democracy”.95
Many have criticised the new legal framework for failing to eliminate the
seats reserved for ABRI in the legislatures. At the same time, many share the
expectation that the provision is a transitional one and that ABRI seats will be
eliminated in the future. MPR Decree No. VII/MPR/2000, concerning the role of
the TNI and the Police, stipulated that the TNI would be represented in the
national parliament and regional parliaments no longer than 2004, and in the MPR
until 2009, ‘at the latest’.
Thus far I have selectively discussed the process of drafting three political
laws. I have also demonstrated some hot topics debated in the parliament. There
were at least 215 issues discussed during parliamentary debate.96 Enacted
following intense political debate and negotiation, the new election laws appeared
to be the result of last-minute political compromises. At the end, consensus was
achieved and the parliament passed the bills. However, in terms of accountability,
the bills failed to change the electoral systems significantly.

V. Content Analysis of Political Laws
After Soeharto’s resignation, Indonesians quickly came to a consensus on
the need to establish new legitimacy for the country’s governing structures.
Notwithstanding that many believed that President Habibie had come to office in
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accordance with the process outlined in the Indonesian constitution, and that the
existing DPR still had four years remaining in its term, there was broad consensus
on the need for early elections under new, reformed rules. Nevertheless, it was
that same parliament and the pre-existing political establishment which had
responsibility for developing and enacting the new system.

Electoral Systems
In this section, I will discuss several important elements of the Law on
General Elections signed by Habibie. One important break with the past was that
voting could now take place on a public holiday. This means that voters may vote
from home and not from their places of employment or education. Election
observers and participants had long complained of a lack of freedom to vote
according to conscience, because voters had to vote at places of employment or
education. This change added to the important principle that balloting should be
perceived by voters to be secret.97
In a major break with the past, the Law on General Elections welcomed
the presence of international observers (Article 27). This was to ensure that
communities, local and international, would be able to accept the results of the
election as it would be considered as being free and fair. This was perhaps the
clearest indication that the Government was dedicated to ensuring the
transparency of the proceedings.
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As a result, the electoral process in Indonesia was successfully overseen
by hundreds of thousands of civil-society domestic monitors, drawn from every
walk of life, but especially from university communities. Students, who had been
instrumental in forcing the resignation of one president, and who threatened to
boycott the elections organised by his successor, instead rallied to ensure that
these elections were open and honest. It was perhaps one of the biggest electionmonitoring efforts the world had ever seen.98
However, the regulations still did not make clear that observers must have
access to the entire election process: registration, campaigning, polling, counting,
tabulation, complaints and appeals. The regulations also failed to establish fair,
reasonable and workable criteria for accrediting election monitoring organisations.
Another achievement was that the general elections were managed by an
independent commission (see Table 2): the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU –
General Elections Commission).99 The Law on General Elections specified that
the KPU was to be composed of one representative from each of the forty-eight
political parties contesting the elections, and five Government representatives.
The KPU’s Chairperson and the two Vice-Chairpersons were elected by and from
the KPU members. The Chairperson was elected from among the political party
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representatives. One Vice-Chairperson was also elected from the political parties
and the other from the Government representatives.
Table 2: Political Laws under the Soeharto and Habibie Governments
Topic

Soeharto Government

Habibie Government

Number of Political Parties

Limited to three political
parties

Funding

Unclear regulation

Ideology

Pancasila

Organiser of Election

Government

148 parties registered, 48
parties permitted to
participate in June 1999
General Election
a. All parties received
funds from Government
b. Allowed funds from
outside sources to a total of
Rp. 15 million/year from
individuals and Rp. 150
million from companies or
other legal organisations
c. All contributors
registered and audited
Must support the unity of
the Republic of Indonesia,
Pancasila and the1945
Constitution
General Election
Committee (KPU)
38 (thirty eight)

Number of Military
75 (seventy five)
Officers in Parliament
Political status of Civil Forced to elect Golkar
Servants
Leaders of DPR/MPR
Electoral system
Composition of MPR

Composition of DPR

a. Free to elect any party
b. Must be neutral; not
member of any party
Leaders of DPR served also Both Houses have their own
as leaders of MPR
leaders
Proportional
Proportional
a. 500 members of the DPR a. 500 members of the DPR
b. 500 members were
(based on general elections)
appointed from military, b. 135 regional delegates
regional and functional (based
on
DPRD
groups representatives.
recommendation)
c. Total: 1000 members
c. 65 social organisations
(based
on
KPU
recommendation)
d. Total: 700 members
a. 425 elected members
a. 462 elected members
b. 75 from Military
b. 38 from Military
c. Total: 500 members
c. Total: 500 members

168

Among the KPU’s tasks were to appoint members of the Indonesian
Election Commission (Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia - PPI), the next lower level of
the election bureaucracy; establish procedures to be used in the polling; coordinate
election monitors; allocate the number of seats assigned to each province; count
votes and announce final results; and determine which ‘social functional groups’
were eligible to nominate people to fill the sixty appointed seats in the MPR.100
Despite these achievements, the electoral system remained proportional
and based on party lists at provincial level, but the legislation was not clear as to
how the list system was to operate (highest average or largest remainder), nor how
elected candidates were to be identified. Since the laws were unclear on these
matters, the issues were resolved by the KPU (General Election Commission) at a
very late stage. This was the first indication of flaws in the political laws. Many of
the 48 party representatives on the KPU wanted to ensure the central control of
their parties. The KPU’s final regulations operated the list system by the largest
remainder system, using the Hare quota,101 as used at previous elections.
As has been mentioned earlier, the electoral system developed in 1999 was
the product of political compromise. The NDI assessment claims that
These compromises resulted in an election system apparently without
exact precedent or parallel anywhere else in the world: a unique
combination of proportional representation by province with some
100
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elements of a district system. But the law itself provides only general
principles; details about exactly how the system will work remain to
be specified.102

According to R. William Liddle, the electoral system was not substantially
changed: “The main argument is that those members of DPR and MPR were still
chosen by national party leaders of their respective parties”. 103 This supports the
argument develop earlier in this chapter: that members are accountable to their
party leaders; not to the people. Representation is nothing without accountability.
An accountable political system holds both the government and the elected
members of parliament responsible to their constituents to the highest degree
possible.
Despite criticisms above, there was also conflicting regulation on the
qualifications needed to become a member of parliament. Article 3 of Law No. 4
of 1999 states that a person must be ‘educated at least to junior high school level’,
while Article 43 of Law No. 3 of 1999 sets the minimum qualifications as having
graduated from senior high school. Due to the vagueness of the Law on General
Elections, the KPU was left to use its discretion and chose to apply the eligibility
criteria established by Law No.4 of 1999.
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Political Parties
The law on political parties provided that all parties should include, in
their articles of association, a statement that Indonesia is a country based on
Pancasila. They did not have to say that the party itself is based on this ideology,
but they were required to acknowledge that the party’s “principles or
characteristics, aspirations and programmes do not conflict with the Pancasila.”104
This clause especially accommodated the demands of some parties to be allowed
to adopt Islam as their founding principle. Previously, the Soeharto government
banned using Islam as a founding principle of Islamic mass organisations or
Islamic political party.
Parties were to be ‘independent, controlled only by their members.105 This
meant a lot, since the government might no longer interfere in their internal
affairs, as in Soeharto’s time. Parties were non-profit organisations, which could
not establish, nor own shares in for-profit firms.106 According to the laws, parties
could be frozen or disbanded only by the Supreme Court after receiving a
conviction in a court. The government could not issue a decree to dismiss the
parties as had happened during the Soeharto era.
The law required parties to report their finances to the Supreme Court, and
these reports could be audited.107 However, the law provided for subsidisation of
parties from public funds, where each party qualifying to compete received an
104
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equal amount.

Due to the economic crisis, this regulation assisted in the

establishment of new parties. Negatively, there were accusations that some
political party leaders were not serious about establishing genuine parties, but
simply intended to obtain funds from the government.
The election law barred parties from using State facilities during the
campaign. For the first time, campaign contributions were limited. The ceiling
was set at 15 million rupiah for individuals and 150 million rupiah for business
firms. This meant that previous sources of automatic funding for Golkar were
curtailed. Civil servants were no longer automatically members, and thus liable to
pay monthly dues to Golkar; and State firms and private enterprises winning
government contracts were barred from making contributions to any party. These
alterations are in line with the principles of good governance and respect for the
rule of law, as outlined in the early sections of this chapter.
Another significant element was that the new legal framework allowed
party organisations to penetrate all the way down to the village level; something
which was prohibited by Soeharto. The security agencies could not screen party
nominees anymore; nor could parties any longer recall their legislative member
mid-term for political reason; a practice used in the Soeharto era to purge
members who were too outspoken or independent of party leaders. Moreover, the
lifting of restrictions on the number of political parties led to pluralism in political
life, and the flowering of parties.
The Law on General Elections provided that individual party members
must be “loyal to Pancasila” and not be members of the Communist Party or any
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other banned organisation.108 The Law on Political Parties went further,
maintaining that the party’s establishment “may not endanger national unity and
integrity”109 and that a party cannot “follow, develop, or spread tenets or concepts
of

Communism/Marxism/Leninism

and

other

tenets

contradictory

to

Pancasila.”110
It is worth noting the views of Adolfo Suarez, Prime Minister during the
Spanish Transition, when faced with the question of whether to legalise the
Communist Party. He replied to the military’s opposition on this issue:
The rejection (of the request of legalization) would not be
consistent with the reality that the Communist Party exists and is
organized. The struggle against it could only be carried out by
repression.
Not only am I not Communist, but I reject strongly its ideology, as it
is rejected by other members of my cabinet. But I am a democrat, and
sincerely democratic. Therefore, I think that our people are
sufficiently mature...to assimilate their own pluralism. I do not think
that our people want to find itself fatally obliged to see our jails full of
people for ideological reasons, I think that in a democracy we must all
be vigilant of ourselves, we must all be witnesses and judges of our
public actions. We have to restore the respect for legal minorities.
Among the rights and duties of living together is the acceptance of the
opponent (adversario). If one has to confront him, one has to do it in
civilized competition. Sincerely, is it not preferable to count in the
ballot boxes what otherwise we would have to measure on the poor
basis of unrest in the streets?111

The ban on mere ideological affiliation appears inconsistent with
international norms of freedom of expression and association. Although it was
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understood that there was a trauma associated with the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI)’s coup d'état attempt (1965) in which six top army generals were
murdered, the law was unfair since the ban should be imposed on the party (PKI)
alone; not the ideology. The government should not prevent any ideology from
competing in free and fair elections.

Parliament
Law No. 4 of 1999 on the Composition and Structure of the MPR, DPR
and DPRD made significant changes, as outlined below:

The number of elected members has been increased in line with the
stipulated election system. The principle of regional representation is
also expressed in the appointment of an equal number of regional
representatives in the MPR for each province. Meanwhile, to
guarantee the representation of “social groups”, their representatives
in the MPR are elected from those groups not adequately represented
in the DPR.
The accountability of the representatives to their electors has been
improved by proposing candidates personally known by the people,
under particular electoral areas. Quality and performance of the MPR,
DPR, and DPRD members have been enhanced by the adoption of
minimum requirements, such as competence, experience, and high
personal integrity.112
Institutional performance was achieved through larger options for the
MPR, DPR, and DPRD to exercise their duties, powers and rights. For instance,
the MPR was no longer limited to meeting once in five years, and was equipped
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with a permanent Working Body and Secretariat. The DPR’s capabilities were
increased with additional new standing commissions and sub-commissions.113
The empowerment of the DPR and DPRD was achieved not only by
adding to the number of elected DPR and DPRD members, but also by specifying
the duties, powers and rights of the DPR and DPRD. Law No. 4 of 1999 gave the
DPR the following rights: to seek information from the President; to conduct
investigations; to amend draft laws; to launch statements and opinions; to propose
draft laws; to propose a person to fill in certain posts specified by the regulations;
and to determine the DPR/DPRD’s budget.114 Under this law, the DPR should no
longer be the ‘rubber stamp’ of the government. This is clearly in line with good
governance and the rule of law.
The legislatures were also given explicit powers they had never had during
Soeharto’s rule, as stated in Article 35:
1) In carrying out their functions based on each capacity, the DPR and
DPRD are entitled to request state officials, government officials, and
members of the public to give information about things which are
important to the interests of state, nation, government, and national
development.
2) Any state official, government official or member of the public who
refuses to give information, as stated in paragraph (1), will be
punished, for having insulted the dignity and courtesy of the DPR and
the DPRD, by a sentence of a maximum of one year’s imprisonment.
3) The implementation of these rights, as stated in paragraph (1) and (2),
is regulated in the DPR and DPRD Rules and Regulations.
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Under Article 41 of Law No. 4 of 1999, a member of the MPR may not
serve concurrently as a state official, a government official with administrative
authority, or as an official of the judiciary. A DPR member might not serve
concurrently in a DPRD, and vice-versa, whilst a DPRD member might not serve
concurrently as a member of a DPRD in another region. This rule is in line with
the rule of law, particularly the idea of the separation of powers.
The 700-member MPR is composed of the 500 members of the DPR
(including the 38 military representatives), 135 representatives chosen by the
provincial assemblies (previously, these positions were appointed by Soeharto’s
government) and 65 representatives of functional groups. In addition to the
participation of the military, the existence of ‘functional’ seats in the MPR gave
certain as yet unidentified elite based groups a substantial say in the choice of the
president. Each member of one of these favoured groups would get a second,
more influential vote in choosing representatives for the MPR and, thus, in the
indirect election of the president.
It remained unclear how representatives of the functional groups would be
chosen in 1999 for the next MPR. In the past, this segment of the MPR included
representatives from such groups as labor, professional associations, the press,
academia, religious communities, teachers and youth. The 1999 election law
stated only: (1) that the new Electoral Commission or KPU would determine
which groups were eligible and the number of representatives to which each such
group was entitled, and (2) that each group should ‘propose’ its own
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representatives, who would then to be officially ‘appointed’ by the KPU and
‘administratively formalised’ by the president.115
For the purposes of this section, it could be stated safely that not all
members of the DPR and MPR were elected. This was against the principle of
accountability mentioned earlier that there should be no appointed members. The
appointment of non-elected members of the MPR could be ‘politicised’ and
contained many problems and difficulties, as will be demonstrated later.
To sum up the discussion above, some of articles in the three political laws
lacked details, were vague and inconsistent. Despite some achievements, such as
the replacement of the ‘three political organisations’ system (multi-parties should
result in better representation of Indonesia’s diversity and a wider spectrum of
ideologies and policy platforms), there were articles which conflicted with the
notion of good governance and the rule of law. The electoral system stressed
participation, and neglected accountability, some members of the parliament were
appointed, legal minority (read ‘communist’) rights were not granted, themes in
the political campaign were limited, and this could be seen as a limitation of the
freedom of speech. I have also discussed at least two serious gaps in the
regulations concerning, in particular, the electoral system and the election of
functional representatives to the MPR.
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Law on General Election, Article 81.
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VI. Implementation of Political Laws
In this section, I will focus on four issues: the role of the KPU, problems
with stembus accord, results of the elections, and functional groups. In the first
issue, I argue that the KPU was made too powerful, since it had to cover serious
gaps in the political laws. Some of its decisions and discretion even contradicted
the laws. As has been noted earlier, the laws governing the elections, political
parties, and the structure of the legislatures, passed by the DPR, often established
only basic principles and left the details to be determined by the KPU. In other
words, the laws lacked specificity, putting enormous burdens on the KPU. At the
same time, the KPU itself was a new institution, unaccustomed to its roles, and,
most importantly, under heavy time constraints to organise an election. Instead of
limiting discretion, as required by the rule of law, the three political laws provided
wide room for the KPU to use its discretion.
It was noted earlier that the electoral system used in the June 1999 General
Elections was complicated. In this section, I will show that the electoral formula
was made even more complex by the late introduction of the ‘stembus accord’,
under which groups of parties could reach agreements to pool their remainders
with the intention of getting more seats. This attempt at introducing pre-election
vote pooling was unsuccessful. Some parties discovered that, given the actual
votes cast, their groupings (or their parties within their grouping) would win more
seats without the ‘stembus accord’ than with it. The result was the retrospective
abolition of all ‘stembus accords’ which was a further regulation being issued
considerably after polling day.
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The next issue concerns the final results of the General Elections. Special
attention will be given to the failure of the KPU to reach agreement to determine
the overall results. Several members of the KPU asked the Election Oversight
Committee (Panwaslak) to follow-up the investigation of money politics before
the results of the election formally released or publicly announced. I will also
explain that part of the problems was the vagueness of the authority and
enforcement powers of the Panwaslak.
The last issue that I will discuss in this section is the selection of
functional-group delegates. Controversy surrounded the KPU’s decision of which
organisations had the right to be represented. KPU’s double standard in selecting
these appointed members of the MPR will be critically examined. The four issues
described above will be discussed in sub-sections below.

Election Committee
In the first week of February, 1999, all the political laws were signed by
President Habibie. The next step was managing the election. Could an election be
organised under the new rules in a sprawling country involving more than one
hundred million voters, in only four months? There were some concerns about
the process: pre- and post- the elections. They included the potential for violence
during the campaign, the possibility of serious disruptions in particular provinces,
such as Aceh and East Timor, gaps in the legal framework, difficulties in
administrative preparations, and the possibility of post-election dissatisfaction.
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However, despite some problems and chaos, it should be acknowledged that the
elections went more smoothly than everyone expected.
The 1999 election law provided that the KPU would be responsible for
carrying out the June 7 elections.116 Since the KPU was not to be formed until the
parties were qualified under the election law, and party representatives had been
named, the Minister of Internal Affairs appointed an eleven-member interim
advisory committee (P3KPU - Election Commission Formation Preparation
Committee) to determine which of the 148 parties met the legal requirements, and
also to prepare guidelines and regulations for approval by the KPU, when it was
operational.
Known as the Team of Eleven,117 it comprised leaders of civil society and
professionals and was chaired by Nurcholish Madjid, a highly respected Islamic
scholar. The Team of Eleven’s most important job was to determine which parties
met the criteria set by the Election Law. Before the team could consider these
cases, however, the parties had to file applications with the Ministry of Justice to
verify that certain technical and administrative requirements had been met. Their
applications were then referred to the Team of Eleven to undertake ‘factual
verification’ that the parties had the required branches in nine provinces and in at
least half of the districts in each of those provinces.

116

Law on General Elections, Article 9.
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Their names are: Nurcholish Madjid, Miriam Budiarjo, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Adi Andojo
Soetjipto, Affan Gaffar, Kastorius Sinaga, Andi A. Mallarangeng, Mulyana W. Kusumah, Eep
Saefulloh Fatah, Anas Urbaningrum, and Rama Pratama. According to Ryaas Rasyid, those names
were selected based on his suggestions. Rasyid, above n 54.
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Table 3: Timetable for Elections118
EVENT
DATE
Party registration (conducted by Team of Eleven*)
1 Feb – March 1999
Decision on the number of legislators at district, 3 - 4 April 1999
provincial, and national levels
Voter registration (conducted by KPU**)
5 April – 4 May 1999
Registration of lists of candidates at national and 5 - 27 April 1999
local levels
Issuance of final list of voters
13 May 1999
Issuance of final list of candidates
22 May – 1 June 1999
Campaigning
20 May – 4 June 1999
Voting and vote counting at polling stations
7 June1999
Announcement of results
28 June – 8 July 1999
Nomination of winners and their notification
12 – 21 July 1999
Induction of members of MPR and legislatures at all 26 July – 1 October 1999
levels
*Team of Eleven: Election Commission Formation Preparation Committee, or
P3KPU
** KPU: Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Election Commission)

After travelling around the country verifying the existence of party
organisations at the provincial and the district levels, the team recommended that
forty eight parties be declared eligible, and its recommendations were adopted
wholesale by the Minister of Justice. Although these recommendations were
accepted, at least twelve of those parties which failed to make the cut filed
protests. It was unfortunate that there was no appeal regulation in this matter.
Not everyone was satisfied with the process. One of the points of
controversy was whether Golkar Party should be ineligible to compete in the June
elections, owing to its ‘political sins’ during the Soeharto era. According to Ray
Rangkuti, students met the Team of Eleven and asked them to declare that Golkar
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KPU Regulation No. 11 of 1999 on Calender of 1999 General Elections, available at
http://www.un.or.id/ge/decres/kpu11a.htm
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was ineligible. Political reform should have proceeded without Golkar’s
involvement.119 The students argued that as Golkar was Soeharto’s party, it would
be unfair if the Golkar Party was given the opportunity to run the country again.
However, the Team of Eleven did not accommodate this demand, since it was
beyond their mandate to do so. Moreover, Law No. 2 of 1999 on Political Parties
had declared that the three political parties established under Soeharto era were
eligible to compete in the election.

Article 20
As of the enactment of this law, the 1997 Election Competing Political
Parties, namely the United Development Party (PPP), the Golongan
Karya (Golkar) , and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) as socialpolitical organisations by virtue of Law Number 3 of 1975 on Political
Parties, and the Golongan Karya as ammended by Law Number 3 of
1985 on the Amendment of Law Number 3 of 1975 on Political
Parties, are considered to have complied with the requirements as
regulated in Article 2 and Article 4 of this Law and are required to
adjust themselves to the provisions of this Law.

Another issue of controversy was that, according to Ryaas Rasyid, the
Team of Eleven reported that fewer than ten political parties met the requirements
to compete in the election. But Rasyid urged them to include the PRD (The
Democratic People’s Party). Because the Team of Eleven included the PRD, then
the number of parties which were declared eligible, increased significantly to forty
eight; with the PRD standing at the bottom.
The PRD was repressed under Soeharto’s rule on the basis of its alleged of
affiliation with communists. The PRD denied this allegation. The PRD was one of
119

Rangkuti, above n 45.
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the symbols of the reform movement. If the PRD had been declared ineligible, this
would have disturbed the process of the elections, and would fuel the perception
that the election result was being engineered. However, if the PRD was allowed to
compete in the election, Rasyid wanted to show that people actually did not
support the PRD since he was sure that the PRD would not win the election.120
And he was right; the PRD received only 78,727 votes or 0.07 percent.
By allowing PRD to compete in the election, the PRD was ‘forced’ not to
express their communist ideas during the campaign (if indeed it was true that the
PRD did endorse communism), as such speech was against the regulation.121 After
the 1999 election, the voice of the PRD was unheard. This was a good illustration
of the way in which an election can serve to de-legitimate protests and opposition.
It was a brilliant move from Rasyid, but it also reflected the political game and
interest of Rasyid. Rasyid’s involvement, as Director General at Department of
Internal Affairs, was too far from the principles of good governance and the rule
of law. He was not member of Team of Eleven. He did not have the rights to
influence the work of Team of Eleven. At the same time, it was unfortunate that
members of Team of Eleven took Rasyid’s opinion without reserve.
After the Team of Eleven finished their work, the KPU was established. A
number of observations can be made concerning the KPU’s performance. First,
the KPU machinery at the national level was replicated through several layers of
bureaucracy, down to the local level. To assist the KPU with the administration of
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a particular election, temporary committees were established at five levels,
paralleling and utilising the vertical lines of Indonesia’s local government
organization, under the Department of Internal Affairs. Second, the KPU did not
have full control over the appeals process but had to ‘coordinate’ with the judicial
system. The judicial committees with which the KPU had to work were composed
of government employees, who might well have been considered biased.122
Third, the Election Law gave the KPU the authority to ‘manage’ the
elections but empowered the secretariat to ‘implement’ it. The secretariat itself
had split lines of authority. It reported to the KPU on ‘operational matters’ but to
the Ministry of Internal Affairs on ‘administrative matters’.123 The differences
between operational and administrative matters were not defined clearly. These
three points indicate that although the KPU was independent, it could not work
without the help of others, including government employees.
Fourth, the Election Law also provided that Election Oversight
Committees be established by the Supreme Court and provincial and district
courts at national and local levels. Their role was to
oversee all phases of the conduct of the elections, settle disputes
which arise in the conduct of the elections, and follow-up findings and
disputes which cannot be resolved by reporting to the proper
authorities.124
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Details of the arrangements between these committees and the KPU would be
“further regulated by the Supreme Court in consultation with the KPU”.125 These
ambiguities, and apparently overlapping responsibilities, highlighted the
importance of good leadership and solid governmental appointees on the KPU,
and an enlightened Minister for Internal Affairs.
Fifth, KPU’s performance drastically declined after it had successfully
managed the June 1999 General Elections. The mass media reported that several
members of the KPU from the political parties played ‘political games’ when the
election results indicated that their parties had won only a few seats, or even none
at all. There were only 21 out of 48 parties which won seats in the Parliament, and
only seven of them which received more than two per cent of the vote. The public
then accused committee members from small political parties (partai gurem) of
trying to delay the counting, sabotaging the election results, and so on. 126 There
were also some indications of corruption in the KPU.127
These criticisms forced the new Parliament, based on the June 1999
General Elections, to amend the Law on General Elections, No. 3 of 1999, by
passing the Law on General Elections No. 4 of 2000. The amendment was
specifically designed to clarify the criteria for KPU membership. It states that
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More information can be found in Saifullah Ma’shum, KPU & Kontroversi Pemilu 1999
(Jakarta, Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2001); and Bernard Dermawan Sutrisno, Konflik Politik di KPU
dalam Pemilu 1999 (Jakarta, PT Mutiara Sumber Widya, 2002).
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Several members of the KPU have not yet returned the vehicles they used. Six thousand typewriters were also missing (Kompas, 21 June 2002). Several members of the KPU were sent to
court concerning a 5.4 billion rupiah corruption case. See Kompas, 14 July 2002.
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KPU members must be independent and non-partisan (not belong to any political
party).128
Table 4: 1999 Indonesian General Elections129
Number of Votes Registered

121 million

Number of Votes Cast

104 million

Number of Polling Stations

300,129

Number of Polling Station Workers

2,701,116

Number of Ballots Printed

413 million

Bottles of Indelible Ink Distributed

850,339

Time

Between

Establishment

of

General

Election 86 days

Commission and Polling Day

Despite these criticisms, it is important to acknowledge the work done by
the KPU. The KPU managed successfully the first largely democratic and
relatively peaceful transfer of executive power in Indonesia’s history. The
Indonesian 1999 General Elections were unique, because of: the size of the voting
population (as illustrated in Table 4); the very compressed schedule (as illustrated
in Table 3); the physical extremes of the archipelago; the general absence of civic
awareness; the political significance attached to this particular change of
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Adopted from Merril Stevensen and Anne-Birgitte Albrectsen (eds), Transition to Democracy:
Report on the UNDP Technical Assistance Programme for the 1999 Indonesian General Election,
(United Nations Development Programme, Indonesia, December 1999).
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government; and a sense of carefully-contained disquiet ready to erupt should
things go wrong. In these circumstances, the KPU did a good job.
The Indonesian elections succeeded in four vital respects: voter
participation was massive, balloting was peaceful, the process was generally seen
as free and fair, and power was transferred without bloodshed, or other serious
challenges. However, I argue that the election could not be seen as in line with
the principles of good governance. One of the pieces of evidence in support of this
assessment is the power of national leaders of political parties. After establishing
the principle that seats would be allocated by party on a proportional basis by
province (Article 67 of Law on General Elections), and that consideration would
be given to how the party had performed in each district (Article 68), the law
included the following article, apparently to address the question of how the
proportional system would work:
Article 69
(1) The remaining votes to determine membership in the DPR are
used up in counting at the provincial level to divide the remaining
seats.
(2) The determination of the elected candidates to fill the abovementioned remaining seats is made by the national leadership of the
relevant political party.

Several public figures such as Yusril Ihza Mahendra (Chairperson of the
PBB party) and Ekki Syahruddin (one of the leaders of Golkar) became members
of the parliament, not because they had the largest number of votes in their
districts, but because the strange and complicated systems under the 1999
electoral laws allowed their parties to discard other candidates from different
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districts, but in the same provinces. It is also interesting to note the political tactic
of Probosutedjo (Soeharto’s step brother) who was a PNI Front Marhaenis party
candidate for North Sumatra. When his party won a seat only in Central Java, as
General Chairperson of the party he replaced the candidate from that district with
himself and then became a member of the DPR from Central Java; not from North
Sumatra. This political tactic, surprisingly, was legalised under a KPU
regulation.130
According to the rules, seats won by ‘full quotas’ were to be filled in a
manner not subject to party discretion, whereas the KPU gave parties full
discretion over seats won by ‘largest remainders’. In practice, parties were
permitted substantial discretion in filling all of their seats, including full quota
seats. Consequently, 97 out of 462 elected DPR members (21 percent) ‘represent’
districts other than those to which they were originally assigned. In other words,
after the elections, parties moved these candidates from the districts to which they
had been previously assigned. It appears that the KPU, in effect, changed the rules
after the elections. The consequence of these developments was to reduce the
significance of the accountability element of Indonesia’s electoral system. In
effect, this was inconsistent with the principles of good governance and the rule of
law.
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Stembus Accord
On 1 September 1999, the PPI (Indonesian Election Committee) finally
completed the process of allocating DPR seats to parties, nearly three months after
the 7 June legislative elections. The most controversial issue surrounding this
process was the use of ‘stembus accords’, or voluntary agreements among parties
to combine their remaining votes with those of other parties, in order to improve
their chances of winning more seats. After much uncertainty regarding the exact
nature of these agreements, in July the KPU determined that only two nationallevel ‘stembus accords’ were valid.
When the eight Muslim parties131 to one of these accords discovered after
the polls had closed that their agreement did not actually work to their benefit (in
fact, collectively they lost three seats owing to the accord), they attempted to
convince the KPU to change the rules under which these accords would be
implemented. After weeks of rancorous debate, the KPU finally decided on 30
August, retro-actively to abolish both of the existing ‘stembus accords’ at the
national level, apparently as the path-of-least-resistance in breaking the deadlock.
The eight parties made political, not legal, arguments for changing the
rules, once election results were known. In finding against the accords, the KPU
reversed the rules it had made before the elections took place. The consequence of
this decision was to take DPR seats away from some parties and give them to
131

The eight Muslim parties were Partai Umat Islam (Islamic People’s Party or PUI), Partai
Kebangkitan Umat (Islamic People’s Awakening Party or PKU), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
(Development Unity Party or PPP), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905 (1905 Indonesia Muslim
Association Party or PSII 1905), Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (Masyumi Indonesian
Muslim Political Party or PPIIM), Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon and Star Party or PBB),
Partai Keadilan (Justice Party or PK) and Partai Nahdlatul Umat (Nahdlatul Umat Party or PNU).
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others. In particular, the PKP and the PBI each lost two seats, and the PDI-P, PPP
and PAN each lost one seat. The beneficiaries were the PDKB and PNU, which
each gained two seats, and the PK, PKD and PPIIM, which gained one each.
Under the rules governing ‘stembus accords’ established before the elections, 19
parties would have won seats in the DPR; once the ‘stembus accords’ were
abolished, 21 parties won seats.
Although these changes occurred on the margins, and, therefore, did not
significantly affect the overall makeup of the DPR, it was neither appropriate nor
in accordance with the rule of law, particularly presumption against
retrospectivity, for election officials to change the rules which determined whether
parties had won seats, or not, after the election results were in.132 This was a
strong indication that unclear regulations in the political laws were used by some
political parties to obtain some benefit; and this, once again, was against the rule
of law and good governance.

Results of the Elections
Another controversial post-election issue was the final results of the June
1999 General Elections. Article 65 of the Law on General Elections, No. 3 of
1999 states:
(1) Based on the tabulation of results, being documents delivered by
the PPI, the KPU shall finalize the counting of results for the
Election throughout Indonesia.
(2) The official results as referred to in paragraph (1) are to be written
in the statement of the count, and the tabulation of results
132

The information on the controversy of the ‘stembus accord’ was summarised from Saifullah
Ma’shum, above n 126, 118-136. I also interviewed Ma’shum in Jakarta, 5 May 2002.
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documents signed by at least 2/3 (two thirds) of the KPU
members.
(3) The format of the statement of counts and the tabulation of results
documents referred to in paragraph (2) is to be stipulated by the
KPU.

The adoption by the KPU of the official election results requires the
signature of 36 members (two-thirds of the members). However, the normal
decision-making process of the KPU did not apply. At least 27 members of the
KPU (more than two-thirds) refused to sign the final results of the election. In
order to complete the whole process of the General Elections, the KPU forwarded
the results to the President. President Habibie, after having consulted with the
Supreme Court and members of Cabinet, then signed the final results based on
Article 8 of Law No. 3 of 1999, “The President is responsible for the holding of
the General Election.” The legal foundation of Habibie’s decision to sign the
results could be questioned, given that the word ‘responsible’ is very general,
compared with Article 66 (4) which states that, “Overall official results of the
elections are determined by the KPU”. However, the Indonesian people widely
accepted Habibie’s decision and, at the same time, were highly critical of the
KPU’s failure to sign the results.
The reason why the KPU could not reach agreement on declaring the overall
results of the election was that several members of the KPU took the view that
there were concerns over ‘money politics’. They asked that these concerns would
be resolved first, before the result of the election was formally signed. Two days
after the 7 June 1999 General Elections, the National Democratic Institute –
Carter Center (NDI–Carter) released a statement. While acknowledging that the
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elections for the national legislature and provincial and district assemblies were
largely peaceful and free of violence, and that the elections appeared to represent
an important movement toward establishing democracy in Indonesia, and an
expression of the will of the Indonesian people for democratic change, the 100member delegation led by former United States President Jimmy Carter raised its
concerns on ‘money politics’. It stated:

The delegation noted claims that money was used inappropriately to
affect the political process (“money politics”). Although it is difficult
to substantiate these allegations, even a perception of such problems
serves to undermine public confidence. Although the delegation does
not possess the resources to assess fully allegations of this type, it
noted the finding of the National Election Oversight Committee
(Panwaslak) of evidence of mis-use of Social Safety Net funds for
campaign activities.133

One of the failures in the implementation of the new political laws was
that the Panwaslak (the Election Oversight Committee) did not follow-up the
investigation of money politics and other complaints, as it was required to do by
Article 26 of the Law on General Elections. One of the reasons for this omission
was that the Panwaslak’s authority and enforcement powers were vague. It was
unclear whether the Panwaslak was linked in a hierarchical appeals structure,
whether each Panwaslak had final jurisdiction in its respective region, and
whether Panwaslak decisions were advisory or binding on the KPU and PPI.
Shortly after the elections, Wardah Hafidz, from the Urban Poor
Consortium (UPC), released a report on money politicking by Golkar and the
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PDR party.134 One of the reasons that 27 parties refused to accept the final results
of the election was that their complaints of fraud were not followed by
investigation. No cases involving specific political finance violations appear
currently to be in progress in the courts.
After Habibie issued Presidential Decree No. 92 of 1999, on the results of
the elections, 12 parties135 went to court and asked for two things: the annulment
of the Presidential Decree and the dismissal or dissolution of the Golkar Party (or
at least an order prohibiting it from taking part in 2004 General Elections), on the
grounds of money politics.136 A five-member panel of justices, presided over by
Justice Asma Samik Ibrahim, said in the verdict that there was a lack of legitimate
evidence to support the suit filed. Justice Asma said the plaintiffs had failed to
provide legitimate evidence. The evidence submitted was consisted of
photocopies of references and articles clipped from newspapers and magazines,
reporting the alleged violations committed by the party. Such evidence was not
acceptable. The court also rejected the demand that the Golkar Party be
133
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Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP), Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan dan Gotong Royong
(MKGR), Partai Buruh Nasional (PBN), Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (PKM), Partai Pilihan
Rakyat (PILAR), Partai Uni Demokrat Indonesia (PUDI), Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI Supeni),
Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PARI), Partai Pekerja Indonesia (PPI), Partai Masyumi Baru, Partai
Kristen Nasional Indonesia (KRISNA), Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (MURBA), Partai
Nasional Demokrat (PND).
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disqualified as a participant in the next general election. After the hearing was
over Justice Artidjo Alkostar told reporters at his office that he was eager to
dissolve the Golkar Party despite the lack of legal evidence. But he was quick to
add that political evidence is totally different from legal evidence. In politics,
assumptions can be categorised as evidence, but are not recognised as such in the
legal sphere.137
Another money-related problem was that neither the political parties nor
the Supreme Court138 had complied with Article 15 of the Law on Political
Parties:

(1)

(2)

The political party is required to report the list referred to in
Article 14, Paragraph (4), including its financial report, at each
end of the year and 15 (fifteen) days prior to and 30 (thirty) days
after the General Election, to the Supreme Court of the Republic
of Indonesia.
The report as referred to in Paragraph (1) may at any time be
audited by the public accountant appointed by the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Indonesia.

The mass media reported that many political parties did not send their
annual financial reports to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court did not
impose sanctions on them139, whereas Article 18 clearly stated, ‘The Supreme
Court of the Republic of Indonesia may impose an administrative sanction in the
form of discontinuing the assistance taken from the State Budget, if a political
party obviously contravenes Article 15 of this Law.’
136
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Functional Groups
Problems also occurred in determining the non-elected members of the
MPR. The 1945 Constitution stipulated that the membership of the MPR included
functional-group representatives, who were intended to represent certain underrepresented sectors of society.140 According to the 1999 Political Laws, the
decision as to which organisations were included as functional-groups was to be
made by the KPU. The selection of functional-group delegates continued to be
mired in controversy during the months before the MPR General Session and even
after the MPR was sworn in on 1 October 1999.141 In some instances, controversy
surrounded the KPU’s choice of which organisations had the right to be
represented.
The KPU’s decision to prevent certain individuals from representing their
organisations was controversial. Abdurrahman Wahid and Muchtar Pakpahan
were at first barred from representing the largest religious organisation in the
country, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the independent labor union Serikat
Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (Indonesian Prosperous Labor Union or SBSI),
respectively, because they were considered to be partisan figures with ties to the
PKB and the Partai Buruh Nasional (National Labor Party or PBN). After
intensive lobbying, Wahid was allowed to take the NU’s seat, but the SBSI had to
find another representative. Apart from sheer power politics, in which the NU has
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much greater political clout than the SBSI, it is unclear why the KPU applied
what appears to be a double standard to these two individuals and
organisations.142
In other instances, some elements of the Buddhist community protested
the selection of Walubi as their representative organisation, because Walubi’s
chairwoman, Siti Hartati Murdaya, was considered to be close to both former
President Soeharto and President Habibie. These protests were ignored on the
grounds that Walubi was the most broadly representative Buddhist organisation,
and Murdaya took her seat in the MPR.143
According to the NDI, these examples demonstrate that the functionalgroup representation is unworkable and undemocratic. The reason is that these
groups were already represented through the political parties, which won seats in
the General Elections. The report explains more:
In principle, these groups are already represented through the political
parties that won seats in the general elections. Their separate
representation as functional groups gives them a second, and much
more powerful, vote for the President and Vice-president and a
disproportionate voice in national policy making. In practice, it is
difficult to justify that certain broad categories and specific
organizations, and not others, should be granted the right to have such
representation.144
It is worth considering that the specific individuals who filled the seats
through ‘functional groups’ were chosen without a process which had connection
to the voting public or, in some cases, even to the membership of the
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organisations they purported to represent. Nor is functional group representation
effective in practice at protecting minority interests such as indigenous people.
These problems demonstrated that functional group representation was
undemocratic and contravened the principles of good governance.

Conclusion
Several critical issues threatened the process of the General Elections until
the last minute, but grudging compromises were reached in the end. The key
points of dispute were: the political status of civil servants; the number of
parliamentary seats allotted to the ABRI; the size of electoral districts; and, last
but not the least, the final results of the general elections. The compromises
achieved indicated the extent to which law reform in the Habibie era was
pragmatic and politically oriented. This reflected the struggle between the
reformist and the status quo movements; and was also a compromise between
Habibie, Golkar, and other parties. In the words of Dwight Y. King:
If the failure of the government’s proposal to change to a
predominantly SMDP (district) electoral system was a victory for the
status quo, the prohibition on civil servants’ involvement with
political parties seems a surprising achievement for the proponents of
reformasi.145

I have argued in this chapter that the post-Soeharto political laws did not
fully promote good governance and the rule of law. First, the laws served the
interests of the political parties, rather than those of the electorate. Although
145
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Ryaas Rasyid’s team significantly changed the electoral systems in their original
draft, other political actors, inside and outside the parliament rejected it. This
rejection of a new democratic model and the maintenance of a modified version of
the old system meant that the party leadership was given too much power to make
decisions over party representatives, and party interest, often prevailed over
constituents’ interests. As has been illustrated throughout this chapter, such rules
contravene the principle of accountability.
Second, there were serious gaps in the election regulations, concerning,
particularly, the electoral system and the election of functional representatives to
the MPR. The lack of a proper complaint resolution mechanism was also a
weakness. The relationships between administrative bodies, Panwaslak (the
Election Oversight Committee), and the legal system, were unclear and should be
clarified by regulation in the future. Hearings on election-related complaints
should be open, and complaints should be resolved expeditiously, and with due
process.
Third, the political laws were vague, and established a complicated hybrid
system of proportional representation. In order to fill the gaps, the KPU used its
discretion and issued more than two hundred regulations. The KPU became too
powerful, and some of its regulations, as have been discussed, were controversial
and, again, products of political compromise. There was no mechanism to
challenge the KPU’s interpretations of the laws and the manner in which it
exercised its discretion. This made the KPU a ‘super body’, which is clearly
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inconsistent with the rule of law, which expects that discretion should not be
unlimited.
Fourth, the laws provided for the appointment of 200 members of the 700member MPR, who would elect the President and Vice President. This means
that, taking into account the 38 appointed military members, around 34 percent of
the MPR membership was not elected directly by the people. Under these
conditions, the outcome of the presidential election could be considerably
different from that of the parliamentary election. As a result, Megawati
Soekarnoputri was not elected as President in the MPR General Session in
October 1999, although her party won the general election.
Despite these criticisms, it is important to acknowledge that voter
participation was massive, and public participation in the process of legal and
political reform was broad. Old and new political parties gave their voices in the
process of decision-making, and other actors (the mass media, intellectuals from
campuses, students, NGOs and so on) also participated constructively. The
election process was also generally seen as free and fair by international
observers. It is essential to note that although the political laws were vague, the
elections were managed smoothly on the Election Day.146 This is the biggest
achievement in the area of the implementation of the political laws. However, as
illustrated in this chapter, the post-election stage presented problems.
Meanwhile, Habibie played a significant role in pushing political reform,
perhaps most strongly evident in his refusal to follow Golkar’s opinion on the
146
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issue of civil servants. He also signed the final results of the election when the
KPU failed to reach a decision. It should be noted that Habibie signed the
Presidential Decree, even though the results showed that his party had been
defeated. This is an indication of good governance. Good governance mediates
between differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best
interests of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures.
Habibie’s supporters took the view that this was his big sacrifice for the
Indonesian people. Habibie’s choice to reform political laws and to hold general
elections risked not only his political career (would he hold the office of President
again?) and the future of his own party (would Golkar loose its majority of
seats?), but also the welfare of the people of Indonesia (would it be the end of
Indonesia if the election failed or lead to chaos?).
Whatever his own political interests, motives and calculations, it is ironic
that Habibie’s achievement in overseeing free, fair and peaceful general elections
in Indonesia directly contributed to his political demise, from the failure of the
Golkar party to maintain its majority of seats, to the rejection of his speech before
the members of the MPR (elected through the 1999 General Elections),147 and
finally the withdrawal of his candidacy for the presidency. Only Habibie knows
whether reform of Indonesia’s political laws was his ‘big sacrifice’ or his
‘political miscalculation’.
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CHAPTER 5
HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRESS FREEDOM∗

Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the elements of good governance is the
protection of human rights. Owing to economic policy, cultural, political and
security reasons, the Soeharto government restricted and abused Indonesian
citizens’ rights. When B.J. Habibie took over the presidency, his government was
expected not only to punish perpetrators of human rights abusers under Soeharto’s
rule, but also to establish legal foundations for human rights protection.
In this chapter, I will first establish a link between good governance, the
rule of law and human rights. This discussion will assist in the identification of
criteria or standards for human rights protection. The chapter will then consider
the legal framework of human rights prior to 1998, followed by a discussion on
human rights abuses in the Soeharto era.
The next discussion will highlight the demands for reform in human rights
area, and the expectations from such reforms. Habibie’s responses to the demands
for reform in the area of human rights, plus the pressures he faced from
international donors will also be demonstrated.

Some progressive moves on

human rights during the Habibie era, compared with Soeharto era, will be
observed.
∗

An earlier version of this chapter was published in Asia Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the
Law (2002) 2. Referees recommended it be published without revision.
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Although I will look briefly at other related regulations, this chapter will
focus on Law No. 39 of 1999, concerning Human Rights, and Law No. 40 of 1999
on the Press, both signed by President Habibie. Whilst the first law is a general
theme, the second is focused on the more specific issue of freedom of the press in
which was one of the most significant sites of anti-democratic human rights
violations under Soeharto. Two questions, reflecting the concerns of this thesis,
will be addressed. Did Habibie’s human rights law reform promote the rule of
law? Did the political and legal processes of human rights reform fulfill the
characteristics of good governance?
Answering these questions requires analysis of the process of the drafting
of the laws, debate in the parliament, and public responses. This examination will
show whether or not the process was democratic and transparent. It will also
highlight the extent to which the laws in their final form were the product of
compromise between elites on several issues.
The chapter will be divided into five parts (excluding the Introduction and
the Conclusion). After a link between good governance, human rights and the rule
of law has been established in Part I, Part II will discuss the legal framework of
human rights prior to the Habibie era, in order to identify the legal and political
deficiencies. Part III will evaluate demands for reform and Habibie’s responses.
Part IV is the venue for a critical discussion on Law No. 39 of 1999, concerning
Human Rights. Part V will critically examine Law No. 40 of 1999 on the Press.
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Both Laws will be approached at three levels: process, content and
implementation. After having analysed the political and legal processes of both
Laws, the chapter will compare the drafts and the laws signed by the President. It
will, where possible, use comparative analysis of the laws, by looking at
comparative human rights laws in other countries or international human rights
laws and documents.
The implementation of Law No. 39 and Law No. 40 will also be
examined, in order to show the connection between the ‘law in books’ and the
‘law in action’. The specific objective of this analysis will be to identify and
explain the obstacles to effective implementation. Were implementation failures
due to substantive deficiencies in the text of the laws? Were they the product of
political considerations or the product of Habibie’s own interests, or those of the
military, or of other elites? Further, the chapter will consider the implications or
the contributions (if any) of the new laws to the discourse on the rule of law and
good governance in Indonesia.
Having discussed all the issues above, the chapter argues that
implementation was the main weakness of the human rights laws passed under
Habibie. Whilst both the drafts and the final content of the two laws indicated
significant improvement in the area of human rights, the implementations fell a
long way short of what was required for meaningful law reform.
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I. Good Governance, Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Human rights are, literally, the rights which one has simply as a human
being.1 The maximum level, or common standard, of the protection of human
rights can be seen in the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR). The UDHR was proclaimed in a Resolution of the UN General
Assembly, on 10 December, 1948. It lists numerous rights to which people
everywhere are entitled.2
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted after the Second
World War, when the world had become aware of the horrors which Nazi
Germany had inflicted on the Jewish and other peoples, who had lived in
Germany and German-occupied Europe. Many countries reached the conclusion
that it would no longer be acceptable under international law for any country to do
whatever it chose, within its own borders.3 The Universal Declaration made it
clear that the international community expected countries to act respectfully to all
their citizens, and the abuse of individuals, by their governments would, under
most circumstances, not be tolerated.
The Declaration was conceived of as affording protections and rights
which apply to all, wherever one might have been born. Someone residing in

1

More information on human rights’ history and philosophy can be read in Costas Douzinas, The
End of Human Rights (Oxford, Hart, 2000).
2

The document was drafted by John Humphrey, a Canadian Professor in law, and Rene Cassin, a
French Nobel Laureate. Three other people played a significant role in subsequent drafting of the
document: Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon and Dr Peng-chun Chan of China. As
can be seen, the last two names were from Asia.
3

Richard Klein, ‘Cultural Relativism, Economic Development and International Human Rights in
the Asian Context’ (2001) 9 Touro International Law Review 1.
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China has no less of a right to certain basic freedoms than someone who may have
been born in the United States. The enumerated rights were considered absolute
and natural, and it was the job of governments to protect their people and to
protect those rights. Therefore, the rights of humanity are said to be universal,
regardless of nationality, race, culture or other factors. These rights are not only
civil and political, they also relate to economic, social and cultural concerns.
In the fifty years since the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, virtually all states have endorsed the
Declaration, which has arguably has, thereby, acquired the status of customary
international law.4 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
currently has 144 signatories.5 The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights has 141 signatories. The Vienna Declaration was adopted by
consensus, by the 171 states which participated in the 1993 World Conference.6
Before moving to consider legal framework of human rights under
Soeharto in Part II of this chapter, I will establish links between the rule of law,
good governance and human rights. I will use the spiral theory of Thomas Risse
and Kathryn Sikkink, and the four elements suggested by Lung-chu Chen. The
criteria drawn from the theoretical insights will be employed later in this chapter
to evaluate Habibie’s law reform on human rights.
4

Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and
General Principles’ (1992) 12 Australian Year Book of International Law 82, 84.
5

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is an expanded hard-law
version of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights The ICCPR sets a basic enforceable
minimum standard for the respect of human rights around the world. The ICCPR covers a wide
variety of rights (fair trial, movement, asylum, voting rights, freedom from arbitrary detention) in
terms which are more specific than the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

205

Spiral Theory
In The Power of Human Rights7, Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink
construct a ‘spiral model’ of the internalisation of human rights norms and
practices. This model incorporates the influence of transnational human rights
regimes on the normalization of state policy. The five-phase spiral model traces
what Risse and Sikkink label as the ‘socialisation process’ of human rights norms,
focusing on the causal mechanisms which facilitate the internalisation of norms
and practices into domestic political arenas.
Phase one of the model is the initial state of repression by instruments of
the state.8 At this stage, norm-violating states enact policies of oppression, while
at the same time domestic human rights organisations attempt to document
violations and bring them to the attention of the international community. Should
these domestic advocacy networks succeed in bringing attention to their cause,
there is a transition into the second phase of the spiral model — denial.
Once human rights abuses are brought to the attention of the international
community, the norm-violating state is placed in the position of having to respond
to accusations of repression. In most instances, the response is to deny the charges
levelled against them, often in the form of questioning the legitimacy of human
rights norms in general by arguing that state sovereignty should supersede

6

Simma & Alston, above n 4.

7

Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms
into Domestic Practices: Introduction’ in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink
(et.al), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-38.
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concerns over human rights. Most, though not all, states go through this denial
phase.9
According to Risse and Sikkink, movement to the third phase of the spiral
model is based primarily on the strength of the human rights networks and the
vulnerability of the state to external pressure. The stage of tactical concessions is,
according to them, the most important stage in achieving sustainable, long-term
human rights improvements. Within this stage, governments begin to enact
policies aimed at curbing human rights abuses, and some may even begin to
incorporate the language of human rights into domestic political discourse.10
States then move to a fourth, prescriptive phase in their internalisation of
human rights norms and practices.11 At this point norm-violating states are
confronted with fully mobilized human rights networks and an increasing
internalisation of human rights norms, which ultimately force the states either to
liberalise their policies permanently, or to accept some form of substantive
constitutional or governmental change. The impact of these human rights
networks can perhaps be most strongly felt when their continued efforts ultimately
lead to a regime change. The final phase of the model is rule-consistent behaviour.
In this last stage, governments institutionalise international human rights norms
into actual state practice.12

9

Ibid, 23.

10

Ibid, 25-28.

11

Ibid, 29-31.

12

Ibid, 31-35.
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Perhaps the greatest asset of the spiral model is its systematic
demonstration of the process through which human rights norms become
internalised into state practice, by states with histories of human rights violations.
Moreover, its social constructivist approach demonstrates the very real role of
domestic opposition groups in mobilising and effecting change. This, coupled
with domestic groups’ relationships to trans-national human rights networks,
helps clarify the underlying dynamics which pressure oppressive regimes to alter
their behaviour and curb their abuses. Risse and Sikkink claim that their model is
generalisable across cases, irrespective of cultural, political, or economic
differences between countries.

Four Elements
According to Lung-chu Chen, in the context of human rights, the rule of
law entails at least the following four elements.13 First, law which is designed to
protect human rights should be properly communicated to the target audience.
Prescription is a two-way communication between the law-maker and the general
citizenry. In other words, the process should be transparent. Second, human rights
law must be applicable to officials as well as non-officials. 14 No one is above the
law. One of the issues here is the provision of ‘equality before the law’.

13

See Lung-chu Chen, ‘Human Rights Protection Needs Rule of Law and Independence of
Judiciary to Succeed’, in Uwe Johannen and James Gomez (eds), Democratic Transitions in Asia
(Singapore, Select Publishing, 2001).

14
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Third, provision is made to allow complaints against human rights
violations, by invoking relevant prescriptions. Invocation means special provision
is made to enable individuals, who allege that their human rights have been
violated, to advance the allegations, before reliable decision makers. Provision can
also be made for specialised invocation by representatives of the community, such
as a human rights commission, an ombudsman or the attorney-general. Chen sees
invocation as the significant link between general prescription and concrete
application.15
Fourth, appropriate structures of authority and procedures should be
established, in order to assist the application of human rights law in real cases. In
other words, law reform in the human rights area should facilitate the bringing of
perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice. Further, human rights prescriptions
should be applicable to all decision makers and community members, whether
official or non-official. It is essential that officials at all levels of government,
from central to local, are required to observe and endorse human rights. At the
same time, non-officials must also necessarily to respect the comparable rights of
others, in all social relationships.16
Prescriptions which are designed to protect human rights should be
enforceable by special institutions, such as courts of human rights. Allocation of
governmental competence (functions) may be checked and balanced, so as to
secure the independence of the judiciary, including by the appropriate judicial

15

Ibid.
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review of decisions, to achieve impartial application of the law.17 These four
elements ensure the protection of human rights in a manner consistent with the
rule of law.
To this end, the next section will examine the legal framework of human
rights in Indonesia before 1998. This is necessary to show the state of formal
positive law in the Soeharto era, and the practices under those laws. This overview
will assist when I asses the significance (if any) of Habibie’s law reform,
compared with that of the previous regime.

II. Legal Framework of Human Rights before 1998
A. The 1945 Constitution
Indonesia has been governed by three constitutions since independence:
the 1945 Constitution, the 1949 Constitution and the Provisional Constitution of
1950. The 1945 Constitution came into force on 18 August 1945.

On 27

December 1949, the colonial government was back, and succeeded in breaking up
the Republic of Indonesia (RI), whereupon the new Republic of the United States
of Indonesia (RIS) came into being. A new constitution, known as the 1949
Constitution, replaced the 1945 Constitution.
The 1949 Constitution did not last long, however, because there were
tremendous efforts made within the RIS during its first seven months to transform
Indonesia from a union of states (a federal state) into a unitary state. On 17

17

Ibid.
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August 1950, the Provisional Constitution came into force with the reestablishment of the Republic of Indonesia. The new state did not bring back the
1945 Constitution.
The Provisional Constitution of 1950 was enforced until mid-1959, when a
decree by President Soekarno replaced it with the old 1945 Constitution. It is
interesting to note that it is the Provisional Constitution which was regarded as a
human rights constitution — not the 1945 Constitution.18 The 1950 Provisional
Constitution guaranteed most human rights, even beyond those in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. However, there were also people who took the
view that the Provisional Constitution was too liberal, and inappropriate for the
country. They believed that this Constitution resulted in a weak government, in
which no single cabinet could survive long enough to carry out its programmes.19
In contrast, the 1945 Constitution has been characterised as ‘executiveheavy’. This means that the executive branch has more power than the legislative,
and the judiciary. The need for a strong government which might guarantee
stability — even if it were to be at the expense of human rights — motivated reimplementation of the 1945 Constitution.
The 1945 Constitution was a very short and simple constitution, consisting
of 37 articles, of which only six explicitly dealt with human rights (Articles 2631). Other rights were referred to implicitly, or put in the Elucidation section of

18

See Satya Arinanto, Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Transisi Politik di Indonesia (Jakarta, Pusat
Studi Hukum Tata Negara, Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2003), 7-12.
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See CST Kansil, Christine Kansil and Engeline Palendeng, Konstitusi-Konstitusi Indonesia
Tahun 1945-2000 (Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2001), especially Chapter 1.
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the Articles. At least fifteen human rights principles are honoured in the 1945
Constitution.
1. The right to self-determination (Preamble and Article 1)20
2. The right to citizenship (Article 26)21
3. The right to equality before the law (Article 27)22
4. The right to work (Article 27)23
5. The right to a decent life (Article 27)
6. The right of association (Article 28)24
7. The right to express an opinion (Article 28)25
8. The right to practice a religion (Article 29)26
9. The right of national defence (Article 30)
10. The right to education (Article 31)27
11. The right to social welfare (Article 33)28
12. The right to social security (Article 34)29
13. The right to an independent judiciary (elucidation of Article 24 and 25)
14. The right to preserve cultural traditions (elucidation of Article 32)
15. The right to preserve local languages (elucidation of Article 31)
Todung Mulya Lubis has noted that:
The return to the 1945 Constitution indicated that human rights are
given and are not inherently possessed by human beings, simply by
virtue of their being born. The human rights provision in the 1945
Constitution, as well as in the implementing legislation, explicitly
state that rights will be further regulated.
The fact that the 1945 Constitution empowers the government to
regulate the exercise of human rights signifies that human rights are
20

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR), Article 1, and
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter ICESCR),
Article 1.
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recognized in principle, but that their implementation will be
regulated. Therefore, it is not entirely wrong to argue that the 1945
Constitution acknowledges only human rights principles, not human
rights implementation...30
Several ‘further regulations’ were issued under Soeharto, not to promote
human rights, but to limit and restrict them. Human rights were also regulated by
the manner in which the government chose to exercise its discretion to interpret
the Constitution. For instance, the 1945 Constitution contains a general provision
on the right to freedom of expression. However, laws passed by the Parliament31
and regulations issued by Soeharto government would contradict Article 28 of the
1945 Constitution.32 Soeharto’s Press Law was illustrative.

B. The Press Law of 1966 and 1982

The Basic Press Law of 1966 (1966 Press Law) emerged under Soeharto’s
New Order Government in the midst of the alleged attempted take-over by the
Indonesian Communist Party and the restructuring of government. The 1966 Press
Law guaranteed that journalists would not be subjected to censorship under

30

Todung Mulya Lubis, In Search of Human Rights: Legal Political Dilemmas of Indonesia’s New
Order 1966-1990 (Jakarta, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1993), 293-294.
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1993, Chief Justice Purwoto Gandasubrata laid out procedures for limited judicial review. As a
result of the Amendment to the 1945 Constitution, in 2002, the Supreme Constitutional Court has
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Parliament.
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Article 4. In addition, the first clause under Article 5 granted freedom of the
press, as a basic human right.33 The guarantees provided in Articles 4 and 5 were
significantly undermined by Article 11 of the 1966 Press Law, which restricted
rights to publish only to those not at variance with Pancasila. The 1966 Press
Law further limited press freedom, by requiring that every publication obtain a
License to Publish (SIT), pursuant to Article 20, as follows:
a.

b.

During the transitional period the obligation to have a
publication permit is still valid until a decision to revoke it is
issued by the Government and the House of Representatives.
Provisions concerning the publication permit during the
transitional period are to be regulated jointly by the
Government and the Press Council.

However, Article 20 above contradicts Article 8:

1.

2.

Every citizen has the right of press publication of a collective
nature in accordance with the essence of Pancasila
Democracy.
For this, no publication permit is needed.

The contradiction above could be seen as an indication that the Law served as a
symbol of defeat, which left the press fragile and defenceless, since it faced the
constant threat of being banned, if it ran foul of the government on certain issues.
Despite the seemingly broad guarantees given in Articles 4 and 5, the
government’s reaction to the press over the next sixteen years demonstrated a
retreat from the spirit of the law, which proved detrimental to journalists. In
particular, the Government banned many publications during this period, either by
33

Article 4 states that ‘No censorship or muzzling shall be applied to the national press’ while
Article 5 stipulates that ‘Freedom of the press is guaranteed in accordance with the fundamental
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revocation of licenses or by mandate from the Operational Command for the
Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib). Bans on publications were
especially prevalent during elections and at times of student demonstrations.
Government officials both instructed journalists as to which current events could
be reported, and attacked journalists personally via imprisonment, detention, and
warnings.34
Law No. 21 of 1982 (the 1982 Press Law) incorporated and enacted
revisions and amendments to the 1966 Press Law. Many terms in the 1966 Press
Law which reflected Sukarno’s political ideology were replaced in the 1982 Press
Law with terms charaterising Soehartoe’s reign. Drafters of the 1982 Press Law,
for example, changed ‘guardians of the Revolution’ to ‘guardians of Pancasila.’
In addition, drafters replaced ‘Pancasila Socialist Press’ in the 1966 Press Law
with ‘Pancasila Press’ in the 1982 Press Law. The phrase ‘Betraying the National
Struggle’ in the 1982 Press Law also replaced the 1966 Press Law phrase
‘Betraying the Revolution’.35
Moreover, the formulation in the 1966 Press Law, which reads
‘Pemerintah bersama-sama dengan Dewan Pers’ (The Government together with
the Press Council), was changed to ‘Pemerintah setelah mendengar pertimbangan
Dewan Pers’ (the Government, after hearing the deliberations of the Press

rights of citizens’.
34
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Council).

This indicated a changing role for the press as a partner of the

Government, at least in a normative sense.
An additional clause to Article 13 in the 1982 Press Law requires that
press publications obtain a Press Publication Business License (SIUPP) from the
Minister of Information.36 The Minister of Information led the Press Council,
which supervised the development and control of the National Press, by ensuring
that the press preserves the national interests of Indonesia. The SIUPP clause
replaced the SIT clause in Article 20 in the 1966 Press Law. However, the
consequences of publishing without a licence, under either clause, remained the
same, because both resulted in criminal penalties. In addition to granting SIUPPs,
the Minister for Information could also revoke licenses, pursuant to Article 33 of
the Minister for Information’s Regulation No. 1 of 1984 (1984 Ministerial
Decree) which states
Article 33
The issuance of a SIUPP to a press company/publisher can be
annulled by the Minister of Information after hearing the Press
Council if:
a. The press company/publisher violates the provisions as mentioned in
Article 15 Clauses (1),(2) and (3), and does not carry out the
provisions of Article 16 Clause (1) of this Regulation;

36

In Article 13, section (5) and section (6) shall be added to read as follows:
(5) Every press publication undertaken by a press enterprise shall require a ‘Surat
Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers’ (Press Publication Operation Permit), hereafter
abbreviated ‘SIUPP’ issued by the Government. Provisions on the SIUPP
shall be arranged by the Government, after hearing considerations from the
Press Council.
(6) The advertising media constitute one of the important supporting elements in
the development of a press enterprise. Provisions concerning the advertising
media shall be arranged by the Government after hearing considerations from
the Press Council.
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b.

c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

The press company /publisher takes steps without the consent of the
Minister for Information which are in violation of administrative
provisions, as sanctioned by the Minister for Information;
The press company/publisher is not yet or able to carry out its
publication three months after the issuance of a SIUPP;
A daily publication is not regularly published for 3 (three) months;
A weekly publication is not regularly published for 4 (four) months;
A fortnightly publication is not regularly published for 5 (five)
months;
Monthly and other regular publications are not regularly published
for 6 (six) months;
According to the evaluation of the Press Council, as indicated in
Article 9 of this Regulation, a press company/publisher and the press
publication concerned no longer reflect a sound, free and responsible
Press.
The famous examples of the creation of victims of Article 33 are the 1994

revocation of the licenses of the publications Tempo, Editor, and Detik. Alleged
non-compliance with licensing requirements, and perceived threats to national
security, prompted the closing of Tempo, Editor, and Detik. The Department of
Information sent written correspondence to Tempo, Editor, and Detik, notifying
them of the revocation of their licenses, because of the contents of certain
articles.37 Specifically, the Department noted Tempo’s controversial article which
revealed that Minister Habibie had invested approximately one billion dollars in
naval ships, without approval from the military, and without full disclosure to the
public. Although it was not Habibie who ordered the Department of Information
to annul those licenses, many people believed that Habibie had played a
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See Julian Millie, ‘The Tempo Case: Indonesia’s Press Laws, the Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara
and the Indonesian Negara Hukum’ in Timothy Lindsey (ed), Indonesia: Law and Society
(Sydney, The Federation Press, 1999), 269-278.
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significant role in persuading both President Soeharto and the Department of
Information to carry out such action. 38
Journalists, students, activists, and others expressed disapproval over the
government’s bans, through various demonstrations. Shortly after the bans, fifty
journalists established the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) following the
failure of the PWI (Indonesian Journalists’ Association), the one and only
organisation legally permitted to represent journalists, to support Tempo, Editor,
and Detik. Tempo magazine brought a lawsuit against the government and,
although the lower courts overruled the ban, the Indonesian Supreme Court
ultimately reversed that decision, in June 1996.39
Tempo, Editor, and Detik were not the first victims. In March, 1974, the
Government forbade the ownership, circulation or sale, within the Greater Jakarta
City region, of 174 books and magazines. By one calculation, in the 1980s, on
average, fourteen books were banned per year. In 1996 it was estimated that two
thousand books had been banned since 1965.40 Press freedom was determined in
its entirety by the government, working through a number of unclear guidelines
such as economic development and security. The line between a free press and a
responsible press was far from clear, if not actually blurred. Only the
government’s interpretation could determine whether press freedom had been
misused. For instance, the press did not have the power to challenge the
government’s position on democracy, corruption issues, and law enforcement, as
38
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such challenges would lead the Soeharto government to ban any publication,
accusing the publishers of disturbing public order.

Press Paradigm
The Soeharto government followed the concept of ‘development
journalism’ or ‘Asian journalism’.41 His government described the news media as
the ‘government’s partner’ in the process of nation-building and urged journalists
to be vigilant and attentive, in an effort to discourage the growing elements of
narrow individualism, and to protect the spirit of unity. Soeharto called for the
press to be ‘free but responsible’ (bebas tapi bertanggung jawab) — in contrast to
liberal Western values, seen as libertine and irresponsible — in guarding a
dynamic national stability, maintaining the strength of national unity and speeding
development from a base of Pancasila (the five principles of the Indonesian State)

40
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and the 1945 Constitution. This explains why it was that, during the Soeharto era,
‘development journalism’ was known as ‘the Pancasila Press’.42
As Angela Romano points out, “development journalism evolved along
synchronous, although not identical, lines to general development theories”.43
Romano argued that the concept of ‘development journalism’ is adopted by
developing countries. It is very common for them to raise the issue that journalists
from Western countries highlight the negative aspects such as the coups,
corruption, economic crises, and political instability and chaos of developing
nations. The press can report negative aspects if it “avoids scare headlines and
sensationalism that may lead to or exacerbate existing social turmoil”. 44
In terms of human rights issues, the concept of ‘development journalism’
takes the position that freedom of the press should be restricted, based on the
nation’s economic priorities and developmental needs. As noted in chapter 3, the
Soeharto government argued that order and stability are pre-conditions for
economic growth and that growth is the necessary foundation of any political
order which claims to advance human dignity. Thus, the press should engage in
advancing positive aspects, such as the development and the progress of
economic, social, and cultural issues, in order to assist the development of society.
However, with the appointment of retiring Army Chief of Staff, General
Hartono, as Minister of Information in June 1997, came a sense of optimism
42
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throughout the press community that journalists would be afforded improved
working conditions. Almost immediately General Hartono publicly stated that he
would consider reviewing the 1984 Ministerial Decree, and agreed that certain
issues were ‘substantial enough for discussion.’ General Hartono also promised
the press he would refrain from ‘influencing newspapers’ editorial policies.
However, he maintained that he would not hesitate to invoke his powers if he felt
an article posed a threat to the national stability of Indonesia.
Optimism in the press community quickly diminished in December 1997,
when Hartono took ‘anticipatory steps’ by issuing ‘stern warnings’ to fifteen
publications in the lead-up to the March 1998, General Session of the MPR,
which would elect the President for the next five-year term.45 He also issued
warnings to the publishers of Detektif dan Romantika (D and R) magazine, for
publishing an edition which depicted President Soeharto as the King of Spades on
its cover, thus instilling fear among journalists that the magazine would be shut
down.46
During Soeharto’s New Order regime, the press was stripped of its
political power, tightly controlled, and blatantly co-opted. It was de-politicised,
except in matters such as providing support for the then government, and
justifying the latter’s use of repression. The numbers of licensed publishers was
limited to 289. Bans, and repeals of licenses, took place periodically, in tune with
the political climate of the day. Dissidents who challenged the Government’s
45
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decisions on matters related to the press were harassed, prosecuted, or even
murdered. That explains why a reform in this area was a must when Soeharto
resigned in May 1998.

III. Demands for Reform and Habibie’s Response
According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), during the Soeharto
era, the violation of human rights had become a significant part of the
government’s political strategy to maintain its grip on power.47 Popular protest
movements were routinely repressed by violent means, and dissidents were often
imprisoned after farcical trials. The victims were alleged communists, and
communist sympathisers, who were massacred or imprisoned in large numbers at
the beginning of the New Order era, in 1965-66; Muslim political opponents
imprisoned in their hundreds in the 1980s; Muslim protestors at Tanjung Priok
(Jakarta) in 1984 and Lampung in 1989 who were killed by government forces;
and thousands of petty criminals who were systematically murdered during the
early 1980s. Gross violations also occurred during military operations in
provinces where separatist or independence movements are or were active,
including Aceh and Irian Jaya, as well as in East Timor.48
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When Habibie took over the presidency, he faced a lot of pressure, both at
national and international levels, to improve human rights conditions in Indonesia.
There were at least three demands for human rights reform. First, Indonesia
should have a Bill of Rights to guarantee human rights protection, since the 1945
Constitution, as has been mentioned earlier, had no adequate provisions on human
rights. Second, the Government should investigate human rights violations in the
Soeharto era and punish those perpetrators of past human rights abuses. Third, the
Government should ensure freedom of the press, either by issuing new laws, or
revoking any laws which were in contravention of human rights.49
At the international level, the demands for reform came from the World
Bank, when it raised its concerns over the human rights situation in Indonesia and
East Timor. In a letter to President Habibie, the World Bank stressed the need for
reform ‘for the international financial community to be able to continue its full
support’. The World Bank urged Habibie to take significant steps.50 In a major
new report, released on 4 September, 1998, Human Rights Watch warned that if
the current political opening-up process in Indonesia was not followed by legal
and institutional protections for basic rights, the entire reform effort could
unravel.51
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The Human Rights Watch report is a study of the legal and institutional
mechanisms used by the Soeharto government to silence campus critics,
arbitrarily limit public debate on pressing social issues, and stymie intellectual
inquiry. According to the report, most of those controls were still in place in 1998.
Human Rights Watch stated: “If there is to be lasting reform in Indonesia, the
government must confront Soeharto’s authoritarian legacy head on, and this is the
place to begin.”52
According to Human Rights Watch, although the Habibie government
released a number of political prisoners, existing laws and long-established
institutional practices continued to give authorities the power to imprison or
censor individuals who expressed dissenting views. The report called for repeal of
those laws which had often used by Soeharto to silence dissidents, including
student and faculty critics: the Anti-subversion Law; Article 154 of the Criminal
Code (spreading hatred against the Government); and Articles 134-137 (insulting
the Head of State).53
52
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Human Rights Watch also urged the Social and Political Affairs
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to end the practice of forbidding
government critics from attending seminars and appearing in major media
publications, and called for abolition of research permit procedures, which gave
government and military officials effective veto power over proposed academic
field research.54
Amnesty International also expressed its concern over the Habibie
Government’s commitment to human rights reform. In 1999, Amnesty
International stated that the government had not fulfilled several of its own
commitments nor begun to address many of the legal and institutional changes
needed to protect human rights. As a result, the pattern of human rights violations
remained largely unchanged.55

Habibie’s response
The pressure generated by these criticisms forced Habibie to convey deep
regret on violations of human rights, which had been committed by some
prominente of the apparatus in operations against separatist movements in some
regions, in the past. Within the framework of upholding and respecting the
implementation of human rights, the Government apologised to the people,
particularly the families of the victims. This apology formed part of Habibie’s
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State Address before the MPR session of 15 August, 1998, on the 87th day of his
presidency.56
The government’s efforts to respect and uphold universal human rights
received an important place in Habibie’s address. He stated with reference to
human rights violations against separatist movements that “I am convinced that
we all are apprehensive concerning violations against human values and
dignity.”57

The president also clarified that ‘The Government, including the

military leadership, has emphasised that in the future such occurrences will not be
repeated.’ Moreover, he said, ‘We are determined to make human rights principles
a standard for life as a society, a nation and a state.58
In the same address, Habibie, surprisingly, gave strong support to the idea
of the universality of human rights. He stated, “We have firmly abandoned the
uncertainty phase, which earlier always considered human rights as a Western
cultural product.”59 In addition, he also said, “We are determined to make human
rights principles the yardstick in our life as a nation and country. We will promote
and safeguard human rights in accordance with our democratic and welfare-based
approach.”60
These statements indicated that under Habibie culture would not be made a
pretext for the denial of universal rights, and that Indonesia would be guided by
56
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the international human rights instruments of the United Nations. Habibie’s
statement differed from that of ‘Asian values’ proponents who which ‘attacked’
Western culture, while defending their own. According to Li-ann Thio, the ‘Asian
values’ position rests on three distinguishable bases: a cultural argument, an
‘economics-first’ argument and a contextual ‘Asian values’ argument.61
Anthony J. Langlois takes the view that the Asian-values discourse, as
presented by the state elites of Southeast Asia, is demonstrably politically selfinterested. It fails genuinely to represent cultural traditions. According to him, the
view of Asia sustained by Southeast Asian leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew,
Mahathir Mohammad and Soeharto is not the only possible way of
conceptualising Asia, nor the values held by people who live in, and identify with,
the region. He explains further:
In fact, ‘Asian values’ are extraordinarily diverse, ranging across the
political spectrum and drawing on religion, tradition, politics and
culture in ways that make a definitive articulation of what
characterizes Asia’s values clearly impossible in any overarchingly
representative sense. It is precisely this diversity which makes the
undertaking of an assessment of Asian values a particularly daunting
task.62

Habibie’s statement above indicated that he did not take a position, supporting
cultural relativism, ‘Asian values’ and Asian journalism, to that of the Soeharto
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government. Habibie’s statement distinguished himself from ‘Asian values’
proponents.
Habibie not only made public statements in order to respond to demands
for reform in the area of human rights, he also took some practical steps. In the
first phase of transition under the Habibie presidency, many political prisoners
were released (see Chapter 3); and the Human Rights National Action Plan was
enacted (see below). Also, in 1998, the highest state institution, the People’s
Consultative Assembly, adopted Decree No. XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights.
By this Decree, for the first time in Indonesian history, an Indonesian Charter on
Human Rights was introduced. It was significant that Indonesia’s first ‘Bill of
Rights’ was achieved in the Habibie era.63
The main progressive moves on human rights during the Habibie era were:
1. MPR Charter on Human Rights
Article 19-21 of the 1998 MPR Charter of Human Rights protects citizens’
rights to freedom of expression without interference, and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas, through any media. These civil liberties were
reinforced by Article 14 of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights (discussed
below), which protects the right to seek, own, store and disseminate information,
through any channel.
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2. National Human Rights Plan
In order to deal with the protection of human rights, President Habibie
issued Presidential Decree No. 129 of 1998 on the National Human Rights Plan.
The Decree states that Indonesia, as a member of the international community,
holds in high esteem the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1993
Vienna Human Rights Declaration and Programme of Action. Article 1 of the
Decree also states that the purpose of the National Action Plan is to increase the
protection of human rights in Indonesia, by taking into account the values of
indigenous and traditional communities, as well as national cultures and religions,
based on the Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution.
The Indonesian National Plan of Action, 1998-2003, consists of four
main

pillars:

instruments;

Preparation for ratification of international human rights

Dissemination

of

information

and

education

on

human

rights; Implementation of priority issues on human rights, and; Implementation
of the international human rights instruments which have been ratified by
Indonesia.
3. Ratification of International Conventions
Under Habibie’s presidency, Indonesia ratified the UN Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In the
past, abuse of human rights often occurred in the form of the torture of citizens by
the security apparatus, as a means of obtaining confessions or silencing

Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the 1998 MPR Human Rights Charter, and Law No. 39 of
1999 on Human Rights.
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marginalized members of society, wishing to express their demands for change. In
fact, Indonesia signed the Convention on 23 October, 1985, but it remained unratified until Habibie replaced Soeharto.64
Indonesia also ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination under Habibie. The Habibie government took the
view that the Convention had no fundamental inconsistency with the spirit or
stipulations of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. This ratification provides
evidence that the Habibie government had the intention to eradicate all forms of
racial discrimination.
The concern of Habibie’s Cabinet for human rights was also demonstrated
by the ratification of three International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions,
raising the number of ILO Conventions ratified by the Indonesian government to
seven. The three Conventions are the ILO Convention on the Abolition of Forced
Labour (Law No. 19 of 1999), the ILO Convention on Discrimination in
Employment and Occupation (Law No. 21 of 1999), and the ILO Convention on
the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (Law No 20 of 1999).
On 9 October 1998 Habibie issued Presidential Decree No. 181 of 1998,
on the Establishment of a National Commission for the Elimination of Violence
towards Women (Komnas Perempuan). This decree is consistent with the
ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
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Discrimination against Women and the UN Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
The background to the establishment of Komnas Perempuan was the
incident involving the rape of ethnic Chinese women during riots on 14 and 15
May 1998. Father Sandyawan, leader of the Volunteer Team for Humanity, which
was investigating the rapes, published a report on the sexual violence. The report
indicated that there were 168 cases of sexual violence, with 130 rape cases
reported in Jakarta. The Indonesian government admitted that the riots were
deliberate. On 2 June 1999, the National Commission on Human Rights
condemned the violence and suggested that it was an organised effort. On 23
July, the government appointed a joint fact-finding team, Tim Gabungan Pencari
Fakta (TGPF), to investigate the violence.

The team includes armed-forces

members, government agencies, and human-rights advocates. However, on 26
August 1999, General Wiranto told police that no evidence was found in 103
cases of rape.65 Wiranto’s announcement was condemned by human rights
activists.
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4. Legislative reform
According to President Habibie, the implementation of human rights was a
matter of primary importance, which required the creation of new legislation.66
Reform in this area involved the eradication of legislation not consistent with the
protection of human rights. This led the Habibie government to send the draft bill
regarding freedom to express one’s opinion in public to the Parliament. After
intensive discussion, the bill was ratified by the DPR on 26 October 1998. Law
Number 9 of 1998 on Freedom of Expression states that freedom to express one’s
opinion in a free and responsible way is the right of all citizens both through oral
and written means. This was the first law of the Habibie government which
guaranteed freedom of expression.
Opinion which is expressed in the form of communications made in public
can be in the form of demonstrations, parades, public meetings or expression on
free platforms. According to this law, freedom of expression brings
responsibilities as well as rights. Citizens should be responsible in: respecting the
rights and freedoms of others, and moral rules which are publicly recognized;
adhering to the legislation in force; in guarding and respecting public safety and
order, and the unity and integrity of the nation.67 The Parliament also repealed the
Anti-Subversion Law68, and it subsequently incorporated six crimes specified in
that law into the Criminal Code.
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On 23 September 1999, a month before the presidential election, President
Habibie signed Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. This law implemented
MPR Decree XVII on Human Rights, which had been adopted by the MPR at its
session in November 1998. Law No. 39 of 1999 sets out a long list of
internationally recognised human rights which Indonesia is obliged to protect.
The law contains provisions on human rights and fundamental freedoms, the
responsibilities and obligations of the Government in the promotion and
protection of human rights, and the plan to set up Human Rights Court.
As will be discussed later, Law No. 39 of 1999 strengthens the powers of
the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), which had been
established by presidential decision in 1993, to monitor and report on human
rights abuses. Most importantly for its future investigative role, the new law gave
the commission the legal power to force the attendance of witnesses, including
those against whom complaints have been made.69 This power was soon used to
require senior military officers to give testimony before the East Timor and
Tanjung Priok inquiries.

Presidential Decree, led to its ratification and incorporation into law (Law No. 5 of 1969). The
nature of the Law, such as its vague wording, breadth of application, and the absence of any
protection for detainee’s rights, has rendered this legislation as a perfect tool in the hands of a
repressive regime. The Law contained the provisions for the death penalty, arrest and
imprisonment for peaceful expression of opinion, detention for up to one year without charge or
trial, the imprisonment of witnesses, absence of the obligation to inform detainees of charges
against them, the denial of legal representation, prohibition of family visits to prisoners, denial of
defence lawyers’ access to court documents, and the widespread use of torture. The Soeharto
government used the law to punish people whose ideas were different to those of the government.
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5. Investigation of Human Rights Violations
Meanwhile, the Habibie government initiated investigations of some past
human rights violations. Most of these were conducted by the National Human
Rights Commission (Komnas HAM). These included a report on the May 1998,
riots in which as many as 1,200 people were killed and many women of Chinese
descent were raped. Another Komnas HAM-led inquiry was made into military
activities in Aceh in the 1990s. The report recommended the prosecution of five
cases. There was also an inquiry into the killings and destruction which occurred
in East Timor, following the independence vote in 1999. Finally, there have also
been inquiries into the Tanjung Priok massacre, which occurred in 1984, and a
police investigation into the 27 July Affair, where an opposition party’s
headquarters was attacked by allegedly unknown (presumably military-led)
forces.
6. Press Freedom
Significant reforms were also undertaken in the area of press freedom.
When Habibie succeeded Soeharto as President, the appointment of Lieutenant
General Mohamad Yunus Yosfiah as his Information Minister did not appear to
be a progressive step. A tough-minded Special Forces officer with long service
during Indonesia’s 1975 invasion and occupation of East Timor, Yosfiah did not
appear to have the makings of a liberal protector of human rights and press
freedom.70 Appearances were indeed deceiving in his case. If one government
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official should be credited with removing restrictions against the media, Yosfiah
is the one.
Within days of taking office, Yosfiah was holding impromptu meetings
with press activists from the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) and sitting
down with Goenawan Mohamad and others from banned magazines. He gave a
green light to all, approving new press licenses in a matter of days.71 His
predecessors would wait months or even years before acting on applications, often
in return for hefty bribes. Yosfiah encouraged the drafting of a liberal press law
(Law No. 40 of 1999, discussed in Part V below), and even spoke in favour of
abolishing his own ministry, characterising it as detrimental to press freedom. He
eliminated the requirement that radio and television outlets broadcast hourly,
government-prepared news bulletins, lifted censorship of foreign publications sold
in Indonesia, and ended mandatory membership in the state-sanctioned journalists
union.72
In the past, the position of the Indonesian President was deemed ‘sacred’.
President Soeharto, for instance, held such a highly revered position that there was
never a true dialog between journalists and the President. The capacity for
journalists to communicate with the President was severely limited. The thoughts
of the President were usually conveyed through members of Cabinet.
However, Habibie was different. It was routine for President Habibie to
communicate directly with journalists. After becoming President, he had three
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personal meetings with chief and senior editors of the mass media. He also
forbade government officers to meddle in news reporting. The Government had
not to ‘direct’, ‘guide’, or make telephone calls to the editors of national mass
media, regarding materials which could or could not be broadcast or printed.
Habibie’s position was that the right to determine the nature and content of news
items should reside with the press itself. This was based on Habibie’s approval of
Yunus Yosfiah giving freedom to the media from all regulations which had
previously limited its movements and activities. Yosfiah recalled that, on Friday
29 May 1998 or a week after being sworn as Minister of Information, he walked
to the Mosque with Habibie for Friday prayers, and flatly informed the President
that he intended to lift press controls. Yosfiah remembered Habibie responding
with a simple ‘thumbs up’ gesture, saying, ‘That’s right. That’s democracy!’73
Habibie’s approval of Yosfiah’s actions was based on Habibie’s idea that
the press should be taken into account as the fourth estate of a system of
democracy.74 This means that Habibie was not in favour of adopting ‘Asian
journalism’ paradigm. The fourth estate view was originally borrowed from the
British to suit the modern system of government; whereas the three estates in
England had been the clergy, nobility, and the House of Commons,75 the three
estates in American terminology became the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government. This fourth estate role has not gone un-criticised by legal
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scholars and commentators, especially in its pure sense as the ‘fourth branch of
government.’76
However, the essence of the fourth estate concept is the independence
from governmental influence, interference, and control, in order that unbiased,
provocative commentary might be made. The fourth estate seems rooted in the
‘checking’ value that is free speech. A free press, and free assembly, can serve in
checking the abuse of power by public officials.77 Because autonomy is a crucial
element of the fourth estate, it could be argued that institutional autonomy is a
necessity. This means that once the press’ autonomy is threatened, or otherwise
compromised, its power is considerably reduced. Thus, the term ‘fourth estate’ is
used today to refer to the mass media as a powerful watchdog over democracy,
revealing abuses of state authority and defending the democratic rights of citizens.
This reflects the supposed significance of press freedom in a democratic society. It
is in this context that Habibie’s vision of the press as the fourth estate was
significant.
Within days of Soeharto’s exit, new publications were springing to life,
and journalists were free to say virtually anything without fear of official
harassment. Despite an ongoing economic crisis, news vendors clogged the
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streets, feeding a public clamor for information and opinion about the unfolding
political drama which had overtaken the country.
At least 1,200 registered newspapers and magazines are now published in
Indonesia. The actual number of periodicals is much higher, since many do not
bother to register or to publish as bulletins. Since the abolition of press-licencing
in late 1999, as part of broad legal reforms, ascertaining the number of
publications has become increasingly difficult. The stampede into publishing
began as soon as Soeharto stepped down. In the year following his resignation, the
government granted 718 new press licenses, quite a leap from the 289 issued in
the 53 years since the country’s independence. In the past, political connections,
patience and bribes were needed to obtain the right to print a newspaper. Now,
with laws reformed, anyone can commence publication. The proof is on the
streets, as broad-sheet newspapers compete for public attention with saucy
entertainment magazines, racy tabloids and a host of full-colour magazines.78
To his credit, President BJ Habibie, who had hoped to retain his post under
the Golkar banner, did nothing to interfere with the press, despite the largely
unfavourable coverage he drew, for instance, during the 1999 election campaign.
The press also investigated many political scandals which involved Habibie (or
his close supporters), such as ‘Bank Bali gate’ and the investigation of Soeharto
(these cases will be discussed in Chapter 6). It may safely be stated that Habibie
exposed himself to considerable personal risks in giving the press freedom, as the
press used its freedom openly to criticise Habibie and his government.
78
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Douglas E. Ramage of the Asia Foundation comments on this new
situation:

New developments regarding freedom of the press are extraordinary
and genuine; there is no government censorship to speak of. Virtually
anyone who wishes a publishing license can get one, with the notable
exception of those who are seeking licenses to publish Chineselanguage newspapers. This development has spawned an explosion in
the media industry in Indonesia.
Fears at the beginning of the economic crisis, that Indonesia’s
independent press would go under because of the high cost of
newsprint, have not materialized. In fact, more press licenses and
more magazines and newspapers have appeared in the last 10 months
than in the previous 40 years.79

Although these developments suggested great hopes for the promotion and
protection of human rights in Indonesia, there are several questions and criticisms
regarding human rights protection in the Habibie era. The remainder of this
chapter will be devoted to a detailed examination of two of the most significant
laws promulgated during the Habibie era: Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights
and Law No. 40 of 1999 on the press. There are also some human rights
protection measures in other Laws80, however it is beyond the scope of the thesis
to analyse all laws. Law No. 39 of 1999 has been selected for close examination
because of it is the comprehensive ‘umbrella act’ on human rights protection. Law
No. 40 of 1999 will be examined because reform in the specific area of press
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freedom was of great symbolic and practical significance in post-Soeharto
Indonesia.

IV. The Law on Human Rights
A. Legal and Political Processes
President Habibie sent the Draft Bill on Human Rights and the National
Commission of Human Rights to the Parliament on 8 February 1999. This invited
a controversy in public debate, as to whether or not Indonesia needed such a Bill.
One group took the view that human rights protection should be put in the
Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. Others took the view that the process to
amend the 1945 Constitution would not be easy. At that time, many military
officers believed in Soeharto’s doctrine that the 1945 Constitution should not be
modified, changed, nor amended. Legally speaking, the 1998 MPR Human Rights
Charter stated that, in order to protect human rights in the line of state-law
(Negara Hukum) and democracy, the implementation of human rights should be
guaranteed by law (Article 44). Therefore, the issuance of the Law on Human
Rights was regarded as a must, since the MPR Decree required that.
The Bill was drafted by the Department of Justice. The Minister for
Justice, Muladi, was Professor of Criminal Law at Universitas Diponegoro
(Central Java) and a former member of the National Commission of Human
Rights. Concurrently, he served in Habibie’s Cabinet as State Secretary in the last
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part of Habibie’s presidency.81 With this background, he played a significant role
in the preparation of the Bill.
The draft bill included 10 Chapters and 136 Articles. The first chapter
concerned the definitions of terms such as human rights, human responsibilities,
discrimination and torture, within public decrees and decisions. The proposed bill
stated that basic human rights stem from the status of members of humanity as
creatures of God. As it is appropriate that God is protected and honoured by the
State, humans should also be protected and valued by the Law, the Government
and the Indonesian community, as gifts from Him. The draft bill also emphasised
the importance of human responsibilities, as they form the basis for the
implementing and strengthening of human rights and, without them, respect for
human rights would not be possible.
The second chapter of the draft bill concerned the basic principles which
are fundamental to human rights. Article 2 stated that Indonesia recognises and
values human rights, and human freedom, as inseparable from our human status. It
is thus mandatory that State decisions, as much as possible, contribute to the
respect, clarification, and advancement of human rights, through efforts to raise
the prosperity, happiness, intelligence and equity of the nation and the community
of Indonesia, based on the Pancasila. Article 3, which consists of three sections,
stating that every person is born with equal value and status and blessed with the
intellectual ability and inner strength to live harmoniously within society. Further,
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this article verifies that each person has the right to recognition, protection,
certainty and equality before the Law.
The third chapter of the proposed bill was titled ‘Basic Human Rights’. It
included the right to life, the right to family and to a continued family line, the
right to self-development, the right to personal safety of and to personal freedom,
the right to obtain justice, the right to seek prosperity. It also mentioned rights
pertaining to particular groups and circumstances, such as the right to govern and
the rights of women and children.
Chapter Four, on Human Obligations or Duties, consisted of three articles.
Article 67 stated that every person living within the territory of Indonesia is
obliged to adhere to the legislation and regulations of the Republic of Indonesia.
Article 69 (Section 1) stipulated that every person has the obligation to respect the
human rights of others as well as the morals, ethics, and regulations which are
necessary for the maintenance of harmony and order within community, national,
and State life. Section 2 of Article 69 clearly stated that a logical consequence of
the possession of rights is the possession of responsibilities.
Chapter 5 regulated matters pertaining to the duties and responsibilities of
Government. Meanwhile, Chapter 6 of the proposed bill concerned issues of
limitations and opposition. For instance, according to Article 95, the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the law can be limited by national legislation for no other
reason than to guarantee the recognition and respect of the basic freedoms of other
people and/or the ethics and priorities of the nation.
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Chapter 7 concerned the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas
HAM). In the Soeharto era, the Komnas HAM was established by Presidential
Decree. The draft bill aimed to strengthen the legal basis of the Commission.
Chapter 8 focused on human rights and community participation, while Chapter 9
and 10 concerned the technical aspects of human rights governance, such as
transition and closing provisions.
On 7 April 1999, Muladi explained that the draft Bill was based on the
UDHR and other international human rights instruments. However, Muladi stated
that the Government had selected those rights which did not conflict with the
spirit of the nation, the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila.82 It seems that
Parliament took a similar approach. Since both the Government and the
Parliament adopted the same approach, there was no controversy arising out of
competing philosophies of human rights. While based on the universal values of
the UDHR, the draft bill was ‘customised’ in a manner considered to be reflective
of Indonesian values.
For instance, the UDHR states in Article 16 that “Men and women of adult
age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to
marry and to found a family”. The draft bill also recognises the right to marry but
with the exclusion of “without any limitation due to race, nationality or
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religion”.83 The provision dealing with religious freedom is also illustrative.
Article 18 of the UDHR states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change religion or
belief…”. Article 22 of the draft Bill recognises the right to choose a religion, but
does not include the right to change one’s religion. The bill’s drafter (and
parliament) took the view that in Indonesia, the biggest Muslim country in the
world, it was not appropriate to mention the right to change one’s religion, since
apostasy is condemned in the Shari’a law. Actually, there is no punishment in
Indonesian criminal law for those who change their religion (for example, from
Islam to Catholic) since hudud (Islamic Criminal Code) is not applicable in
Indonesia. However, mentioning the right to apostasy is a different thing, and
would have invited anger from Muslim leaders.84 These are examples of how
Indonesia, under Habibie, followed the UDHR in its ‘own way’.
Unlike the drafting of the political laws examined in Chapter 4 of this
thesis, the political and legal processes of the human rights bill went smoothly.
There were three reasons. First, in terms of pragmatic political calculations,
debate on human rights law was not expected to influence the process, or the
results of the June 1999 General Elections. Second, unlike the political laws, the
human rights law was a statement of norms and values, rather than a set of
83
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specific legal rules. Strictly speaking, they were about rights; not laws. Thirdly,
the legal drafters basically referred to the UDHR and other international
documents. This meant that several articles of the UDHR were translated directly
from the UDHR into the Indonesian language. Other articles were modified,
owing to several considerations, as mentioned above. The rest were adopted from
the MPR Charter of Human Rights.
The draft bill tried to strike a balance between the rights of citizens and
their duties and responsibilities. It was believed that while rights relate more to
freedom, obligations are associated with responsibility. Despite this distinction,
freedom and responsibility are interdependent. Freedom should therefore never be
exercised without limits. Without a proper balance, unrestricted freedom is as
dangerous as imposed social responsibility. This explains why Article 69 of the
draft bill clearly stated that a logical consequence of the possession of rights, is
the possession of responsibilities. The Parliament did not modify this provision,
which indicated that it approved of the government’s approach on this matter.
Since both the government and the parliament took similar paths, there
was no heated debate during the parliamentary meetings. Outside the parliament,
there was also no real public debate on this matter. There were, of course, some
discussions. In fact, in terms of quantity, when Parliament held a meeting to
discuss the draft bill, there were around four hundred issues raised regarding the
Bill. After having discussed the list of problems, 182 issues were sent to the

Bielefeldt, ‘Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate’ (1995) 17(4) Human Rights Quarterly
602.
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Working Team (Panitia Kerja Pansus DPR).85 The Team had to finish all
discussions within five days. The Team failed to achieve this, and finished its
work in fourteen working days. This delay caused a problem in finishing all work.
Parliament could not complete the processing of the bill on 29 July 1999 as
scheduled. The bill was eventually approved by all parties on 8 September,
1999.86 While the draft consists of 10 chapters and 136 articles, the law passed by
the Parliament consists of 11 chapters and 106 articles.
Examples of some of the issues discussed in the parliament are as follows.
The PPP party was concerned about the rights of children to choose their religion
freely (Article 54). This explains why, in its final form, Law No. 39 of 1999
stipulates that children have the right to worship, based on their religion, under the
guidance of their parents.87 The Golkar Party suggested that the title of the bill
should be ‘Law on Human Rights’ without mentioning ‘National Commission on
Human Rights’. The suggestion was accepted on the grounds that the title should
be general. The Golkar Party was also concerned with the language used in the
draft bill. According to them, the definition of ‘vulnerable groups’, ‘public order’,
‘slavery’, and ‘freedom’ were vague. They also argued that limitations on rights
should be clearly defined.88
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Article 188 (c) of the draft bill was omitted, as a result of the
parliamentary debate. This Article would have limited the power of Komnas
HAM to investigation of human rights abuses committed not more than five years
previously. The Parliament was afraid that the article would restrict the Komnas
HAM in its investigations into human rights violations, committed during the
thirty-two years of the Soeharto government.
The draft Bill on Human Rights listed twenty-four responsibilities of the
Government. However, the Golkar party argued that the lists were unnecessary.
They were afraid that the list would be regarded as exhaustive: that the
responsibilities of the Government in the field of human rights would be limited
to those on the lists. Therefore, they suggested that the law should state the
responsibilities of the Government only in general terms.89
Both the Government and the Parliament agreed with the Golkar party’s
suggestion. Therefore the 24 obligations of state were replaced by two Articles
(71 and 72) which consist of the obligations of the government to respect and
protect provisions of the Human Rights Law, other Laws, and international human
rights law which have been accepted by the state.90 This change meant that the
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law lacked detail regarding the government’s obligations, and which meant that
the government might perform according to its discretion on this matter.
It was unfortunate that the government and other parties accepted the
Golkar position. Whilst it was true that government’s obligations should not be
limited to 24 items as drafted, mentioning government’s obligation in general
terms would create an unbalanced situation between the duties of government and
society. There were four articles dealing with the duties and responsibilities of
citizen, whereas only two articles mentioned government’s obligation. In the
context of good governance and the rule of law, twenty-four articles on

•

The duty to ensure active free and meaningful participation (Article 2.3) and to encourage
popular participation in all spheres, as an important factor in development (Article 8.2).

•

The duty to eliminate massive and flagrant violations of the human rights of peoples and
human beings (Article 5) and to eradicate all social injustices (Article 8.1).

•

The duty to eliminate obstacles to development, resulting from failure to observe civil and
political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights (Article 6.3) and the related
duty that the promotion of, respect for, and enjoyment of, certain human rights and
fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental
freedoms (Preamble).

•

The duty of promoting, encouraging and strengthening universal respect for all human rights
and fundamental freedoms (Article 6.1). The duty not to discriminate on the basis of race, sex,
language or religion (Article 8.1).

•

The duty to ensure that the resources released by effective disarmament measures are used for
comprehensive development (Article 7).

•

The duty to cooperate in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development
(Article 3.3), to eliminating massive and flagrant violations of human rights (Article 5) and to
promoting universal respect for, and observance of, all human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all (Article 6.1).

•

The duty of full respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations
and cooperation among States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Article
3.2).

•

The duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development
policies, with a view to facilitating the full realisation of the right to development (Article 4.1
and Article 10).

•

The duty to promote the establishment . . . of international peace and security and, to that end .
. . to achieve general and complete disarmament, and to use the resources so released "for
comprehensive development (Article 7).
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government’s obligation to protect human rights should not be reduced to two
general articles.
Overall, the draft can be seen as occupying a middle position: between
universal and particular or local values. It did not adhere to all articles in the
UDHR, and therefore, could not be considered to achieve the maximum standard
of human rights protection possible. However, it could safely be stated that the
process of the law’s creation was transparent, since there was no particular
political agenda which influenced the drafting or parliamentary discussion on the
bill.
B. Contents Analysis of Law No. 39 of 1999

The 1999 Human Rights Law sets out the fundamental rights and duties of
citizens of the Republic of Indonesia. In this section, the discussion will focus on
several key issues: indigenous rights, self-determination, gross violations of
human rights, equality, and the National Commission on Human Rights. I will
analyse the Law on Human Rights using the draft bill, human rights theory and
international instruments (on the latter, see Table 5).

Equality
The principle of equality is a primary principle of human rights. Human
rights are for everyone — as much for people living in poverty and social
isolation as for the visible and articulate. By international law, the principle of
non-discrimination prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights, on
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any grounds, such as race, colour, gender, language, religion, politics or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The term ‘or
other status’ includes personal circumstances, occupation, life style, sexual
orientation and health status.
Equality requires that all persons within a society enjoy equal access to the
available goods and services which are necessary to fulfil basic human needs.
Equality before the law prohibits discrimination in law or in practice in any field
regulated and protected by public authorities. Thus, the principle of nondiscrimination applies to all state policies and practices, including those
concerning healthcare, education, access to services, travel regulations, entry
requirements and immigration.
The 1999 Human Rights Law forbids discrimination on the basis of
gender, race, disability, language, or social status. It stipulates equal rights and
obligations for all citizens, both native and naturalized. The Law stipulates that
discrimination is (see article 1.3):
...any restriction, embarrassment or excommunication, either directly
or indirectly based on the differences in, inter alia, social status,
economic status or gender, which results in the reduction, deviation
and abolition of recognition, implementation, and use of human rights,
both individually and collectively, in the areas of politics, the
economy, the law, social or cultural spheres and other aspects of life.
Article 2 states a number of basic principles, which include the right to
equal treatment ‘before the law’ and to the protection of human rights and
freedoms,

without

discrimination.

Under

Article

17,

anyone,

without

discrimination, has the right to obtain justice in criminal, civil and administrative
cases. Article 38 provides that any citizen has the right to obtain proper
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employment, in accordance with talent, qualifications and ability, and to choose
the work he/she likes. The principle of equal pay is dealt with under article 38(3)
which provides that, ‘Anyone, either male or female, who does work which is the
same, comparable, equivalent or similar, has the right to obtain the same wage and
agreement requirements’.
Women’s rights are to be considered as human rights (see Article 45). The
law stipulates that a fair representation of women in public appointments in the
executive and judiciary, and in the electoral process, must be ensured (see Article
46). Other rights include the right to obtain teaching and education, to vote, and be
elected, and rights covering property in marriage. Article 49 provides a right to be
‘appointed in work, posts and professions in accordance with the requirements
and regulations’. In addition, women have a right to ‘special protection in
performing their duties, against matters which can threaten their safety and/or
health, relating to the reproductive function.’
Every constitution and human rights treaty contains a clause which
provides for equality. The formulae of the clause may differ, but the central issues
remain the same.91 For instance, Article 1 of the UDHR states that “All human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood”. The provision of ‘equality before the law’ (and anti-discrimination)

91

Kenneth W. Simons, ‘Equality as a Comparative Right’ (1985) 65 Boston University Law Reiew
387.

251

provisions in Law No. 39 of 1999 are in line with the international standard,
established by Article 2 of the UDHR:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be
made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status,
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of
sovereignty.
Indigenous Rights
The Indonesian Government considers all Indonesians, except ethnic
Chinese to be indigenous.92 However, it publicly admits the presence of several
‘isolated communities’ and accepts that they have a right to participate in political
and social life. They are the Dayak population in Kalimantan, who live in remote
forest areas, indigenous communities throughout Irian Jaya, and economically
disadvantaged families living as sea nomads, on boats, near Riau in East Sumatra
and near Makassar, in Southern Sulawesi.93
The new law on human rights provides legal protection of customary and
indigenous rights (Article 6). When disputes cannot be settled, the Government
has the authority to define fair compensation for land. This explains why the
Elucidation of Article 6 of the 1999 Human Rights Law insists that customary and
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indigenous rights will be protected, as long as they do not contradict the principles
of the law-based state (negara hukum).
Table 5: Comparison of Human Rights Provisions94
No.
1

Law No. 39 of 1999
Equality (5)

2
3
4
5
6

Indigenous (6)
Life (9)
Family (10)
Human Dignity (3)
Education (12)

7
8
9
10
11
12

Social security (41)
Taking part in Government (43,44)
Slavery (20)
Criminal Offences (18)
Religion (22)
Opinion and Expression thereof
(25)
Association and Assembly (24, 39)

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

Children (52-66)
Working (38)
Duties (67-69)
Torture (33)
Residence (27)
Nationality (26)
Women (41-50)
Limitations (70, 73-74)
Welfare (36)
Taking part in cultural life and
enjoying the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications (13)
Personal Security (19, 29-32)
State’s Responsibility (71-72)

International Human Rights Instrument
UDHR (2,6,7), ICCPR (26), UNDP (9),
ICESCR (2.2), ICJ (10)
UNDP (7), Vienna Declaration
UDHR (3), ICCPR (6)
UDHR (16), ICESCR (10), ICCPR (23)
UDHR (1)
UNDP (2), UDHR (26), ICESCR (13), ICJ
(6)
UDHR (22), ICESCR (9)
UDHR (21), ICCPR (25), ICJ (8)
ICCPR (8), UDHR (4)
ICCPR (15), UDHR (11)
ICCPR (18), ICJ (5), UDHR (18)
ICCPR (19), UDHR (19), ICJ (2,3)
ICCPR (21,22), UDHR (20), ICESCR (8),
ICJ (7)
ICCPR (24), UDHR (25.2), CRC
UDHR (23), UDHR (23), ICESCR (6)
UDHR (29)
UDHR (5)
UDHR (13)
UDHR (15),
CEDAW
UDHR (29.2)
ICESCR (11)
ICESCR (15)

UDHR (12), ICJ (1,4)
ICCPR
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In the context of good governance, this article was not adequate to force
the government and investors to respect the institutions, cultural values, and the
expertise of indigenous peoples in their management of natural resources down
the generations. One of the major problems for indigenous people is the violation
of their basic human rights, including the right to live free from fear, and the right
of access to and control over their natural resources. The violations had been
committed out by investors who exploited natural resources, based on the policies
and licences issued by the government.95 Not only should the Human Rights Law
guarantee these rights, but also it should mention that “all government decisions
taken must be in consultation with the indigenous people”. This is to ensure their
participation and consensus to exercise their rights.

Self Determination
The right to self-determination can serve as a means, or an instrument, for
members of non-dominant communities which face discrimination and/or gross
human-rights violations, as a result of the central government’s policies. The
exercise of the right to self-determination can take one of a variety of forms (1)
special political, economic and/or social rights; (2) territorial or non-territorial
forms of autonomy; and (3) secession. 96
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Law No. 39 of 1999 has no provision on the right to self-determination.
The main reasons why neither the Government, nor the parliament sought to
include the right to self-determination in the 1999 Human Rights Law, were
concerns for national unity and national integration. The right to selfdetermination is regarded a threat to Indonesian order and stability. One of the
problems faced by the Habibie government was that several provinces demanded
the right to separate from Indonesia. Soeharto’s centralistic policy contributed to
such demands. People in Aceh, Riau, Irian Jaya (Papua), to name but a few, have
questioned their lack of rights to self-determination.
Amongst a series of political reforms, Habibie agreed to allow the East
Timorese to exercise their right to self-determination under the auspices of the UN
in early 1999, and finally East Timor gained independence in October 1999, after
the MPR approved the results of the referendum on independence. After Indonesia
‘lost’ East Timor, the Government put extra efforts into maintaining national unity
among the Indonesian peoples and provinces. It is in this context that one should
read the exclusion, of the right to self-determination, from Law No. 39 of 1999.
Whilst it was politically understood that, after the East Timor referendum,
the Habibie government and the parliament did not mention the right of self
determination in the Human Rights Law, the exclusion of this right contravened
the international human rights laws. For instance, Article 1 of the Declaration on
the Right to Development declares that the right to development implies the right
to the full realisation of the right of peoples to self-determination. This includes
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the exercise of the inalienable right of peoples to full sovereignty over the entirety
of their natural wealth and resources. 97
Moreover, as noted above, the right to self determination does not always
mean gaining independence from the central government, nor secession. The
issuance of the Law on Autonomy in 1999 and special autonomy to Aceh and
Papua in 2002 could be seen as the implementation of the right to self
determination. This means that both the Habibie government and the parliament
should not have excluded the right to self determination in the 1999 Human
Rights Law.

Gross Violations of Human Rights
The 1999 Human Rights Law states that “Provisions of international law
in regard to human rights, which have been accepted by the Republic of
Indonesia, become national law” (Article 7.2).98 Although Indonesia has not
signed the Statute of Rome,99 the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP – Kitab
Undang-undang Hukum Pidana) covers such crimes as murder, assault, torture,
kidnap, rape and the destruction of property. It is, therefore, possible for gross
human rights offences to be prosecuted under this Code. However, ‘genocide’ and
‘crimes against humanity’ are not adequately covered in the Criminal code.
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Article 1 of Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by General Assembly resolution
41/128 of 4 December 1986, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm
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It is interesting to note that the Komnas HAM sent a letter to President Habibie and urged the
Government immediately to ratify the ICCPR and ICESCR. However, the Habibie government did
not respond it. Once again, the Komnas HAM urged the current government (Megawati’s) to ratify
them: Kompas, 21 December 2002.
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The 1999 Human Rights Law foreshadowed the establishment of a special
human rights court ‘within, at the most, four years’ to hear cases involving ‘gross
violations of human rights’ (Article 104). An explanatory note defined ‘gross
violations of human rights’ as mass murder (genocide), arbitrary or extra-judicial
killing, torture, forced disappearance, slavery, and systematic discrimination (The
Elucidation of Article 104). By not signing the Statute of Rome and, at the same
time, establishing a domestic Human Rights Court, Indonesia sought to avoid
pressure from the international community to bring to the ICC several military
officers and civil leaders who had been involved in crimes against humanity in
East Timor, or to avoid the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal for
Indonesia.100
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Several Indonesian scholars such as Ifdhal Kasim, Harkristuti Harkrisnowo, and Asmara
Nababan urged the Government to ratify the Statute of Rome, as reported in Kompas, 4 April
2002.
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Article 1 states that the ICC’s power is ‘limited’ by the principle of complementarity; that is, a
national court’s jurisdiction and authority take precedence over ICC jurisdiction. Under existing
international law, the state in whose territory genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
have been committed, or whose nationals are victims of such crimes, is legally competent, and
obligated, to investigate and prosecute persons accused of such crimes. Since a state already has a
legal obligation to do so individually, states are not prevented from creating an international
criminal court jointly for purposes of implementing this obligation. The Court’s jurisdiction over
nationals of non-party states does not therefore violate any principle of treaty law, and the Statute
of Rome has not created any entitlements or legal obligations which do not already exist under
international law. Besides this, the Statute of Rome has not created any treaty obligations for nonparty states.
The cooperation of non-party states is purely voluntary. This means that ‘complementarity’ will
protect a state, because the statute affords any state adequate notice, before the prosecutor
investigates any of its citizens. Thus, the state can eliminate the prosecutor’s involvement by
conducting its own investigations. Articles 17 and 20 allow the ICC to take over jurisdiction, if
the state is unable or unwilling to prosecute, or if the proceedings are ‘conducted in a manner,
which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.’
The Statute defines ‘unwillingness’ as an attempt to shield the concerned from criminal
responsibility, an unjustified delay, or an obvious lack of independence or impartiality which
would reflect an inability to ensure justice is done (Article 17 of The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court).
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The destruction and killing which took place after the East Timor
referendum on 30 August 1999, made the establishment of a new court a matter of
urgency. In particular, a UN-sponsored commission of inquiry threatened to lead
to the establishment of an international court to try ‘crimes against humanity’,
unless Indonesia dealt with these crimes itself. The Habibie government had to
take urgent steps to show that it was serious. Instead of the time-consuming task
of presenting a new bill to the DPR, it issued on 8 October 1999 a government
regulation in lieu of a law (Peraturan Pengganti Undang-undang - Perpu) to
establish special human rights courts. The 1945 Constitution provides that the
President can issue a Perpu in urgent circumstances, but the regulation needs to be
ratified by the DPR at its next sitting.
However, the Perpu was rejected unanimously on 13 March 2000, at the
request of the Wahid government. The Minister for Law and Legislation under the
Wahid government, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, argued that the regulation which had
been issued by President Habibie did not satisfy the community’s aspirations for
justice, because it did not allow for past human rights offences to be prosecuted in
the new human rights court. It was feared that the lack of a retroactive clause
might fail to satisfy the international community’s demands that those responsible
for gross violations in East Timor should be prosecuted.101 Instead, the
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Law No. 26 of 2000 reflects compromise on this issue. It provides for special ad hoc human
rights courts to try gross violations of human rights which had occurred before the new law came
into force. However, as a safeguard, such courts can be established only to try specific cases,
through a special procedure. The president may establish an ad hoc court by decree, only on the
explicit recommendation of the DPR (Article 43). Provision is also made for the resolution of
gross violations through a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, to be established by a later law
(Article 47).

258

government prepared a bill on human rights courts, which specified a wider range
of human rights offences and provided for retroactive prosecution. In November
2000, President Wahid signed Law No. 26 of 2000 on the Human Rights Court.102
The Habibie government took the view that retroactive prosecution
conflicts with Indonesian statutes, particularly Article 1 of the Criminal Code,
stating that an offence can be tried only if illegal at the time of the crime.
Moreover, it argued that retroactive prosecution contravened the 1999 Human
Rights Law. However, Habibie government neglected the fact that actually some
human rights can be completely suspended in times of a serious and widespread
emergency affecting the very life and existence of the whole country. Such
suspension in times of public emergency is called derogation. States can create
limitations on the exercise of such human rights, so long as they are reasonably
based on one of these grounds, have been created by proper legal procedure, and
are accessible, clear, and understandable to the public.
Only certain rights can be suspended. In the case of crimes against
humanity, Article 4 of the 1999 Human Rights Law clearly recognises the
derogable rights. Without retroactive prosecution of crimes against humanity, it
would be, at least, extremely difficult to convict those most responsible for human
rights violations in East Timor and elsewhere, and to persuade the international
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Soedjono Dirdjosisworo, Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia (Bandung, Citra Aditya
Bakti, 2002); Rozali Abdullah and Syamsir, Perkembangan HAM dan Keberadaan Peradilan
HAM di Indonesia (Jakarta, Ghalia, 2002); Amnesty International, INDONESIA: Comments on the
draft law on Human Rights Tribunals, AI Index: ASA 21/25/00, June 2000; Amnesty
International, Amnesty International’s Comments on the Law on Human Rights Courts (Law
No.26/2000), AI Index: ASA 21/005/2001.
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community that Indonesia was making a serious effort to hold those responsible
for gross violations accountable.
Habibie’s attempt to include provisions on ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against
humanity’ in the 1999 Human Rights Law, should be acknowledged as a
significant improvement. Habibie’s 1999 Human Rights Law went further by
introducing the establishment of a human rights court. However, the
unwillingness of the Habibie government to use retroactive prosecution to deal
with gross violations of human rights would save Indonesian military personnel
involved in crimes against humanity in East Timor. It was not, however, in line
with international law103, and most importantly, with Article 4 of the 1999 Human
Rights Law signed by Habibie himself.

Participation and Inclusion
An essential principle of the international human rights framework is that
every person and all peoples are entitled to participate in and contribute to civil,
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised. This means that participation is
not simply something desirable from the point of view of ownership and
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Three months after the end of World War II, at the culmination of six-weeks of intensive
negotiations in London, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France signed an
agreement creating the International Military Tribunal (IMT) for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis. The judges held that the Charter was not ex post
facto law designed to punish Germans only. “The law is not static” said the Tribunal, “but by
continued adaptation follows the needs of a changing world.” Both the Charter and Judgment of
the IMT were unanimously affirmed by the first General Assembly of the United Nations. Its
principles were thereby confirmed as valid expressions of binding international law. See Benjamin
B.
Ferencz,
‘From
Nuremberg
to
Rome’,
May
1998,
available
at
http://www.benferencz.org/bonnlec2.htm
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sustainability, but rather a right with profound consequences for the design and
implementation of development activities. It is concerned also with access to
decision-making, and the exercise of power in general.
The principles of participation and inclusion mean that all people are
entitled to participate in society to the maximum of their potential. This, in turn,
necessitates provision of a supportive environment, to enable people to develop
and express their full potential and creativity.
The Law on Human Rights guarantees that the Indonesian people have the
right to meet others, organise assemblies, and speak freely (Article 24 and 39).
These are universal rights (Article 20 of the UDHR and Article 21 and 22, Article
8 of the ICESCR), and their exercise is essential in securing all other rights in the
development process, as well as being crucial in building civil society, in social,
economic, political and legal terms.
According to Law No. 39 of 1999, the Indonesian people have the right to
social security, and to take part in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications (Article 13). This is in line with Article 15 of the
ICESCR. The Indonesian people also have the right to take part in government
(Article 43 and 44). These articles confirmed international provisions such as
Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR.
It could safely be stated that the inclusion of these articles indicated that
Habibie’s Human Rights Law followed the universal rights of participation and
inclusion. It is worth noting that public participation is very much in line with the
idea of good governance.
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National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM)
The 1999 Human Rights Law strengthened the powers of the Komnas
HAM, which had been established by presidential decision in 1993, to monitor
and report on human rights abuses. Komnas HAM, which is independent of the
Government, was given the right, by the Human Rights Law 39 of 1999, to
subpoena witnesses and physical evidence, to further its investigations into human
rights abuses. This power was not given to Komnas HAM in Soeharto’s time.
This meant that an independent agency has substantial power to compel testimony
when investigating human rights issues, even from government officials (Articles
89.3.c and d, Article 95). This power was soon used to require senior military
officers to give testimony before the East Timor and Tanjung Priok inquiries.104
The provisions of Law No. 39 of 1999 which extended the power of
Komnas HAM were significant on the grounds the Komnas HAM can play a
significant role in human rights protection. For instance, it can establish a viable
forum for the investigation and resolution of human rights complaints, although it
has no power to issue binding decisions in response to complaints of human rights
violations.
Linda C. Reif points out that national human rights commission, like the
Komnas HAM, can assist in building good governance by increasing government
accountability through the legality and fairness of government administration. It
also can act as a tool for the national implementation of the international human
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More information on Komnas HAM can be found in Saafroedin Bahar, above n 80, Chapter 5,
6 and 7.
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rights obligations of the state, and assist in the reinforcement of human rights
protection.105
Reif explains that:
A national human rights institution may be able to develop a stronger
human rights culture in the state in transition, and thereby contribute
to the democratisation process. Also, regardless of the level of
democracy in a state, a national human rights institution may be
resorted to by persons who have problems which are not justiciable in
that state — for example, economic, social, and cultural rightsviolations, and faulty administrative conduct, which is not contrary to
law — or by individuals who cannot afford to litigate the problems
they experience.106

Thus far I have examined several significant issues of Law No. 39 of 1999
which are related to the general theme of the thesis since it is beyond the scope of
the thesis to discuss all issues. As can be seen, Law No. 39 of 1999 adopts some
rights and provisions from ICCPR and ICESCR. This clearly indicated that Law
No. 39 of 1999 covers more rights protection than the provisions of rights in the
1945 Constitution. In other words, it fills the gap left by the 1945 Constitution.

C. Implementation of Law No. 39 of 1999
The main purpose of this section is to identify and analyse obstacles to the
effective implementation of the 1999 Human Rights Law. I will focus on the
Komnas HAM, punishing perpetrators of human rights violations, and crimes
against humanity in East Timor.
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Linda C. Reif, ‘Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights
Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection’ (2000) 13 Harvard Human Rights
Journal 1.
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Komnas HAM
It is hard to deny that in the post-Soeharto era, the Komnas HAM has been
divided into two groups. One group was led by the Secretary-General, Asmara
Nababan, and consists of members of the Komnas HAM who have backgrounds
as NGO activists and university lecturers. The other group was led by the Chair of
the Komnas HAM, HR Djoko Soegianto, and consists of ex-bureaucrats, former
Judges, and retired military officers.

They had different views on the 1999

Human Rights Law.107 Nababan’s group took the view that the Law was not
adequate to support the activity of Komnas HAM. According to them, the
membership required by Article 83 (35 members) was too large. They argued that
Komnas HAM needed only eleven members, supported by professional staff, and
that an excess of members would make the work of the Komnas HAM ineffective
and inefficient.
They also took the position that, in order to assure the independence of the
Komnas HAM, the Secretary-General should be selected from amongst the
members, rather than being appointed from the ranks of the civil service. The
independence of the Komnas HAM is a very important matter, since the Paris
Principle requires that the National Commission of Human Rights be free from
government intervention.108 The members of the Komnas HAM were afraid that
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Bahar, above n 80, 740.
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In 1992, the UN Commission on Human Rights endorsed a set of internationally recognised
principles concerning the status, powers and functioning of national human rights institutions. The
UN Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions, known as the Paris Principles, which
were subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1993, set out the basic guidelines
recommended by the UN in the establishment of a national human rights institution. The UN
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the appointment of a government official to the position of Secretary-General may
allow the Government to indirectly influence the activities of the Komnas HAM
and limit its independence.
Soegianto, a former Judge of the Supreme Court, and his supporters took
the view that the position of Law No. 39 of 1999 dealing with membership and
the appointment of the Secretary-General was not in contradiction with the Paris
Principle. In support of their position they cited the Report of the Accreditation
Sub-Committee to the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of
National Human Rights Institutions, held in Colombo, Sri Lanka (24 – 27
September 2001). Based on the 1992 Paris Principle, this report recommended
that the Komnas HAM be accorded Category A status (the highest status).109
Moreover, Soegianto’s group argued that the fact that someone has been a
professional civil servant does not necessarily disqualify him, or her, from holding
the position of Secretary-General. What the Komnas HAM needs was to assure
that any individual appointed as the Secretary-General be clearly responsible only
to the Komnas HAM and not receive instructions from any other source. The
reason is that the function of Secretary-General is ‘only’ to serve and help the
daily activities of the Commission.

defines a national human rights institution as a government body established under the constitution
or by law, whose functions are specifically designed to promote and protect human rights. The UN
broadly groups national human rights institutions into three categories: human rights commissions,
ombudsmen, and specialised national institutions designed to protect the rights of a particular
vulnerable group (such as ethnic minorities, indigenous populations, refugees, women or children.
See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm
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In 2001, the Komnas HAM asked the Government to amend Law No. 39
of 1999 on this matter by providing that: the Secretary-General should
himself/herself be a member of the Komnas HAM. The Minister for Justice,
Baharuddin Lopa (a respected figure who served as the first Secretary-General of
the Komnas HAM) rejected the idea on the grounds that the function of the
Secretary, like other secretaries in state bodies such as the MPR and the DPR, is
only an administrative one.110
This controversy has led to the failure of the Komnas HAM to follow
Article 105 of Law No. 39 of 1999, which states that “in two years (maximum)
the structure, organisation, membership, and function of the Komnas HAM should
follow this regulation”. Future members are to have 5-year terms, and be
nominated by the Commission, but must be confirmed by the Parliament and
made official by the President. However, it took more than two years for the
Komnas HAM to re-organise and re-structure itself, based on the new law. This
invited savage criticisms from all level of societies.111 In 2003, the Komnas HAM
has a new Chairperson, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, a very well-known and
respected human rights activist.
The conflict within the Komnas HAM could be seen as one example of
how progressive groups and status-quo groups share different views on human
rights protection. The progressive group is alleged to be too liberal, while the so-
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called ‘status-quo group’ is alleged to support the military and Soeharto. Whilst
no obvious political agenda could be detected during the process of drafting the
Law on Human Rights, it has become apparent that political tensions have
surfaced and have influenced the implementation of Law No. 39 of 1999.

Punishing Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations
There are two competing challenges which transitional societies face:
establishing democracy, and pursuing justice over the abuses of previous regimes.
A reformist government has a large amount of political and moral capital, which
is limited by time and bureaucratic capacity. Therefore, it must be used quickly
and cautiously. On this view, a new government has only enough political and
moral capital to succeed at either law reform, or accountability for past human
rights violations, but not both. 112
Some scholars have argued that efforts at accountability reinforce the
development of democracy and the rule of law in transitional societies. Jaime
Malamud-Goti, for instance, points to five ways that criminal trials infuse society
with democratic values.113 First, the precise facts established by trials weaken
legitimacy for authoritarianism. Second, criminal sentences draw a bright line
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See Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven, Yale University Press,
1992), 71-73.
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Jaime Malamud-Goti, ‘Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma of Transitional
Democratic Governments’, in Aspen Institute (ed) State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon, 1989, 8182. This is a report of the November 4-6 1988, Wye Center, Maryland conference to discuss the
moral, political, and jurisprudential issues that arise when a government which has engaged in
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See also Daniel W. Shuman and Alexander McCall Smith, Justice and the Prosecution of Old
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Psychological Association, 2000).
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between the policies of the current and previous regimes. Third, trials show that,
unlike under the previous regime, no one is above the law. Fourth, these trials
empower the people as citizens in a democratic society which respects their rights
and dignity.
Finally, trials persuade the military to reform itself, because criminal
sanctions are the most effective way to show institutional disapproval of
individual behaviour. In other words, prosecutions may help a society to unify and
focus on its future. Malamud-Goti explains further that “By singling out the worst
perpetrators, convictions not only bear on the sentenced but also facilitate the
integration of the rest of the officers into the new political arrangement.” 114
In this context, Juan Mendez argues that the decision of a new regime not
to prosecute former human rights abusers will undermine the rule of law.115 This
means that the Habibie government had to choose accountability and justice, over
the abuses of previous regimes, since accountability mechanisms can help to
accelerate reform, remove perpetrators from the government, and chip away at the
patronage systems which continue to provide the ‘old guard’ with power. Did
Habibie do that? The answer is ‘No’.
The Habibie government’s record of bringing perpetrators of past human
rights abuses to justice was unimpressive. The Habibie regime was reluctant to
investigate and to prosecute those who were responsible for human rights abuses,
because most of them were members of the military. This reluctance is illustrated
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by the evidence which shows that since 1998 perpetrators have been brought to
justice in only four cases (the Trisakti shooting, the kidnapping of activists, the
killings in Aceh in January 1999, and the killing of Teuku Bantaqaiah and his
followers in Aceh). Five other cases have the status of investigations, while others
are classified as un-addressed cases. The other major cases which are classified as
under investigation are: the riots of 1998; the cases of violence in Aceh during the
military operations, from 1989 to 1999; the 27 July Affair116; the East Timor cases
after the referendum; and the Tanjung Priok case from 1984117. The last two cases
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In 1996 President Soeharto was worried about the growing public support for the Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia) led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter
of his predecessor, President Soekarno. In June a government-manipulated party congress
unanimously elected a government-backed candidate to replace Megawati, who clearly enjoyed
the support of the majority of party members. Despite their victory in the party congress, the new
leadership was unable to occupy the party headquarters in Jalan Diponegoro, Jakarta, which
became the site for daily anti-government rallies until it was attacked by ‘unknown’ forces on 27
July. It has never been revealed how many PDI supporters died or were wounded while trying to
resist the attack, but an investigation at the time, by the Komnas HAM, of the ensuing riot,
revealed that five people were killed, while 27 had disappeared. After the fall of Soeharto,
Megawati’s wing of the party constituted itself as the PDI-Struggle (PDI-Perjuangan) and became
the leading party in the 1999 election. Megawati was elected Vice-President in October 1999. In
the new circumstances, party supporters agitated for an investigation of those responsible for the
attack on the party headquarters in 1996. See Edward Thomas Aspinnal, ‘Political Opposition and
the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: the Case of Indonesia’, PhD Thesis, Australian National
University, 2000, 257.
In February 2000 the newly appointed Chief of Police, Lt. Gen. Rusdihardjo, launched an
investigation which questioned 190 witnesses, including 29 police officers and 29 military
officers. At the end of May, eleven civilians were declared ‘suspects’, including the former PDI
chairman, Soerjadi, and other PDI officials. The leader of the Golkar-linked Pemuda Pancasila
youth movement, Yorrys Raweyai, was also placed on the list with four gang members. The
police, however, had (and still have) no authority to charge members of the military. Following the
conclusion of the police investigation of civilians, a joint military-police team took over, in July
2000, the investigation of the roles of military and police personnel. In August it was announced
that twelve senior officers were ‘suspects’. Among them were Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid (former
Armed Forces Chief of Staff for Political and Social Affairs); Lt. Gen Sutiyoso (Governor of
Jakarta and former Jakarta Regional Army Commander); Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim
(former head of the Military Intelligence Agency); and, Police Inspector-General Hamami Nata
(former Chief of Police in Jakarta). Among those questioned but not named as suspects were
former Commander of the Armed Forces, General Feisal Tanjung, and former Army Chief of
Staff, General R. Hartono. So far, however, no generals have been brought to court.
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On 12 September 1984, the Indonesian Armed Forces opened fire on Muslim protestors
gathered in North Jakarta’s Tanjung Priok harbour. Scores of protestors were shot. Numerous
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are in the process of prosecution before the new Ad Hoc Human Rights Court, but
no progress has been made on the other three major cases. It should be noted that,
to date, the Government has not yet established the Human Rights Court for the
Aceh cases.
In June and August 1998 at the height of its influence and credibility as an
independent and critical body, the Komnas HAM conducted a survey of human
rights abuses which had taken place in Aceh between 1990 and 1998, when Aceh
was formally designated as an area of military operations (daerah operasi militer
or DOM). It found that gross violations of human rights had been committed by
Indonesian government forces, in the form of summary executions, torture,
enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, rape and sexual assault,
and property destruction. It recommended prosecution of those responsible;

others were detained, and allegedly tortured, in connection with the demonstration. Eyewitnesses
at the scene reported trucks carrying away loads of dead bodies. The day after the massacre
General LB ‘Benny’ Moerdani, commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, gave the official
version of the event in a publicly broadcast announcement: “Irresponsible agitations were the
cause of the incident and the inevitable casualties.” That remained the Indonesian Government’s
last word on the incident until the fall of the Soeharto regime. On 6 July 2000, the Komnas HAM
presented President Abdurrahman Wahid with the final report of its special investigation into
Tanjung Priok, one of the worst tragedies under Soeharto’s reign. Although the Komnas HAM’s
report on Tanjung Priok was not made public, the Commission did issue an official statement
summarising its conclusions. Recommending only further investigations, the report failed to call
for trials to proceed against the senior military officials who had command responsibility over the
armed forces involved. The Attorney-General’s Office, however, during Habibie’s period, did
some investigations on this case, since many Indonesian Muslim scholars forced them to do so.
On 29 August 2003, Kompas (Indonesian newspaper) reported that the Tanjung Priok case would
be brought to the court soon. However, while some human rights activists believe the massacre
was masterminded by Try Sutrisno (who was Jakarta Military commander when the massacre
occurred) and the former Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) Commander, General (ret.) Benny
Moerdani, their names will not be on the list. The generals are untouched; only soldiers will be
brought to the court.
In June 2003, I met one member of the Attorney General’s Office who dealt with the Tanjung
Priok case. After explaining the case, he admitted that he received money from Try Sutrisno (who
was also vice president from 1993 until early 1998). He smiled, “It was not a big amount, though.
It was only six million rupiah. It was nothing!”
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compensation for the victims; restoration of civilian institutions; ending the
culture of impunity within the military; a wholesale review of military law and
education; and re-allocation of resources between the central and provincial
governments. Nothing happened. 118
Following two major massacres in Aceh in February and May 1999,
Komnas HAM issued strong statements, concluding that the military approach to
the Aceh conflict had resulted in only increased violence, and that new anti-riot
teams containing, both military and civilian elements, were exacerbating the
conflict, rather than reducing it. The statements were forceful, but they had no
impact. In July 1999, the Komnas HAM recommended to then-President Habibie
that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission be established, specifically for Aceh.
Nothing came of it, though not for want of effort by some Komnas HAM
members; it was the Habibie government which showed no interest.119
Indonesia’s failure properly to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of
gross human rights abuses has been caused by the reluctance of the Habibie
government (and subsequent government) to take political risks in the realisation
of the supremacy of law. One of the reasons was most human rights perpetrators
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See Human Rights Watch, ‘Indonesia: Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Aceh’,
Vol. 14, No. 1 (C), March 2002. On July 30, 1999, however, through Presidential Decision
(Kepres) No.88, President Habibie set up a special commission to investigate human rights
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woman who was widely known to be a business associate of then-Commander of the Armed
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were members of the Armed Forces, which were closely linked to Soeharto’s
policies. It is worth noting that although the military has lost much political power
in the post-Soeharto era, it is still a factor to be considered carefully in many
governmental policies. The improvement of law enforcement measures, as a
component of legal reforms could harm the military particularly in the case of
human rights violations. These considerations have contributed to the slow pace
of the judicial process in many human rights. The lack of action on these fronts
seriously undermines the rule of law, including the principle of equality before
and under the law. The Far Eastern Economic Review has been highly critical of
Indonesia on this matter: “This is a country of equal opportunity impunity.
Nobody gets punished for anything”.120

East Timor
Special attention should be paid to the handling of cases of gross human
rights violations in East Timor after the referendum. The attention of the
international community towards East Timor was very great, after the immense
violence in 1999. The United Nations, as a response to the pressure of the UN
Human Rights Commission and the UN High Commission on Human Rights,
established an international investigation commission which, amongst other
things, recommended the establishment of an International Tribunal to bring to
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justice those responsible for the violence.121 Thereafter, international attention
weakened after Indonesia gave the impression it was going to act by establishing
the human right court. Thus, the Indonesian government was entrusted to
prosecute the criminals by itself. However, several years later, the question
remains: Is Indonesia capable of ensuring a just prosecution of those responsible
for the crimes against humanity in East Timor?
Before and after the ‘Popular Consultation’ on 30 August 1999, which was
held to determine the future political status of East Timor, violence inflicted upon
civilian citizens of East Timor increased immensely. The UN Commission on
Human Rights held a special session on 23-27 September 1999, which was only
the fourth special session ever held since the UNHCR’s establishment, 50 years
121
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ago. According to Commission President, Anne Anderson (Ireland), 27 of the
commission’s 53 members voted in favour of the proposal to set up an
international inquiry into human-right abuses committed in East Timor, while 12
voted against. Eleven members abstained and three were absent.122 This special
session on East Timor brought forth Resolution 1999/S-4/1, dated 27 September
1999, which: requested the UN Secretary-General to form an international
commission to investigate, with experts from Asia as members, and to work
together with the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) in
Indonesia, as well as to send a delegate to report on East Timor.123
On 22 September 1999, the Komnas HAM established the Commission to
Investigate the Human Rights Abuses in East Timor (abbreviated as KPPHAM).124 Its tasks were to gather facts regarding the human rights abuses in East
Timor, from January 1999 until the date of the parliamentary regulation in
October 1999, which verified the outcome of the Popular Consultation on 30
August 1999.
The investigation was given the special task of finding out whether the
following might have happened: genocide, massacres, lynching, forced removal of
the population, crimes against women and children, and “scorched earth”

Timor. It is interesting to note that the Parliament passed the Law on Human Rights on 13
September 1999.
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activities. The KPP-HAM was also given the task of investigating government
authorities and/or other organisations. The legislation giving the KPP-HAM
authority for the activities is Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, and the
Government Regulation in Lieu of a Law (Perpu) to establish special human
rights courts. The latter gave the KPP-HAM authority to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Carry out an investigation and examination regarding the assumption that
there have been human rights violations in East Timor,
Request explanations/information from victims,
Call and examine witnesses,
Collect evidence,
Examine various places, including buildings, which were in need of
investigation,
Examine and request of institutions documents as needed,
Grant safety to witnesses and victims, and
Process and analyse facts found which are important to the accusations and
for publication.
According to the KPP-HAM, international standards were being used in

implementing their work, specifically the Manual on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, and the
Guidelines for the Conduct of United Nations Inquiries into Allegations of
Massacres. The KPP-HAM visited West Timor six times (including once when
they dug up a victim, which involved the work of a forensic expert) and visited
East Timor three times. The KPP-HAM interviewed 55 victims, 23 witnesses, and
conducted examinations of 45 people ‘who are connected to the human rights
abuses’ including Major General Adam Damiri, Major General Zacky Makarim,
and General Wiranto. 125
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The KPP-HAM also held three meetings with the International
Investigation Commission on East Timor, which was established by the UN. In
the final report, released on 30 January, 2001, the KPP-HAM stated that the facts
and evidence it has gathered give a strong indication that ‘serious human rights
abuses’ took place, and that they were ‘planned, systematic, and done on a large
and broad scale’. The serious crimes referred to are: massacres, torture and
lynching, forced disappearances, crimes against women and children (including
rapes and sexual slavery), forced deportation/moving of the population, “scorched
earth” actions, and the destruction of property. According to the KPP-HAM, all
these actions are crimes against humanity.126
The evidence gathered showed that the civil administration and military
authorities, including the police, cooperated with the militia, which created a
situation and conditions which encouraged the perpetration of crimes against
humanity. These crimes were committed by civilians, the military, police, and
groups of militia. This report also gave the names of the civil administration and
military officers who are alleged to be responsible, from militia commanders,
district administrators, Military Sub-district commanders, even up to the District
Commander and the Governor of East Timor.127 It was also stated that General
Wiranto, as the Chief of the Indonesian military, has to be held accountable.128
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President Habibie also regretted that military officers had failed to manage the situation in East
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referendum. It seems that the Government was reluctant to bring officers to the court, as none of
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It is reasonable to conclude from this discussion of events that Law No. 39
of 1999 opened the door for the investigation of human rights violations in East
Timor. The Habibie government and military officers were accused of violating
human rights in East Timor, and, under a lot of international pressure, Habibie
used Law No. 39 of 1999 to establish a human rights court. The Komnas HAM
also played its role in the case by using, as its justification, the same law. It was
ironic that, on the one hand, Habibie should be given credit for the issuance of the
1999 Human Rights Law, but, on the other hand, this law provided an opportunity
to investigate his government. It was unfortunate that his government was
unwilling to follow up the report of such investigations.129
The discussion in this section has highlighted the way in which lack of
commitment, political calculations, influence of military officers, and different
views and choices on the demands of democracy, impunity, and accountability
were all obstacles for the Habibie government in its attempts to fully implement
Law No. 39 of 1999. Despite the adoption of a new Human Rights Law, the road
to successful prosecution for human rights offences has been far from smooth.
When, if, and how human rights violators will be made to account for their
crimes, remains a highly political question. One could well argue that law reform

the high-ranking officers, believed to be responsible for the chaos, were among those who were
even named as defendants. Wiranto’s explanation can be read in Idi Subandy Ibrahim (ed),
Selamat Jalan Timor-Timur, Pergulatan Menguak Kebenaran: Penuturan Apa Adanya Seorang
Wiranto (Jakarta, Institute for Democracy of Indonesia, 2002).
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without accountability for human rights violations is not adequate in a democratic
society.

V. The Law on the Press
A. Legal and Political Processes
The parliamentary and public debate on the proposed press legislation
reflected the residual power of the New Order culture and the organisational
intensity of the parties which hoped to cement a legislative framework, which
would provide the foundation for a more liberal press culture. Various supporters
of the status quo in the Armed forces and other socio-political institutions argued
that removal of the old restrictions on the press could lead to civil strife, and even
national disintegration.130
As has been mentioned earlier, M. Yunus Yosfiah, the Information
Minister during the period of the Habibie government, was a key figure in
opposing the status quo arguments. Yosfiah, a retired three-star general, promoted
media law reform by using the same precepts which were supported by the
UNDP, the World Bank and IMF: that a free press is the pillar of democracy
which could help to eliminate corruption, collusion and nepotism, promote

2002. Press releases and progress reports about Human Rights Ad Hoc Court on East Timor could
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responsible government and reduce the social conflicts and riots which often
result from rumours.131
Yosfiah promptly responded to demands made by the Persatuan Wartawan
Indonesia (PWI-Indonesian Journalists’ Association), Solidaritas Masyarakat Pers
Indonesia (SMPI-the Indonesian Society for Press Solidarity), communication
experts, journalists, and students: to restore press-freedom by revoking the 1984
Ministerial Decree, and lifting the regulation which recognized the PWI as the
only legal journalists’ association. The public quickly criticised Yosfiah for
failing to commit to complete reform despite his seemingly ‘good-faith’ efforts to
meet the requests of the press community in enacting Ministerial Regulation
Number 1 of 1998 (the 1998 Ministerial Regulation).132
Although Information Minister Yosfiah’s new policy did away with the
practice of arbitrary licence revocation, publishers might still be subjected to a
lawsuit if they violated licensing terms. In addition, the Information Minister still
maintained the discretionary power to suspend licenses for an indefinite period of
time. Finally, under Yosfiah’s reforms, a journalist was still required to be a
member of a journalistic organisation. Some critics viewed this as a human rights
violation (the right to freedom of assembly).
Yosfiah recalled:
I was alone at that time: other ministers and military officers criticised
me, saying that revoking the ministerial regulation on the press would
lead to the disintegration of the nation. I strongly disagreed with them.
131
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I am not that stupid. There is no precedent in the history of nations
that freedom of the press would break the nation’s unity. By contrast,
journalists criticised me, saying that I had not done enough to free the
press. What I did was too little for them. They had to understand that
what I could do was to revoke regulation of the previous Minister of
Information. However, I could not issue a decree which would
contradict the 1982 Press Law.133
Having made these initial steps towards reform, Yosfiah and his department began
the process of drafting the new press law which was needed if more
comprehensive reform was to be effected.
At the end of 1998, press freedom remained fragile in Indonesia, and
journalists remained sceptical of the recent changes. Human Rights Watch was
calling for more extensive reforms, including the repeal of provisions of the
Criminal Code used to control and gag the press.134 Journalists expressed concern
over excessive scrutiny by their peers. The Institute for the Study of the Free Flow
of Information (ISAI) referred to a report of a ban imposed by the owner of a
weekly, because of his displeasure that journalists were abusing their new press
freedom by including inappropriate content in their articles.135
Whilst Yosfiah was preparing the new press law, General Wiranto, the
Minister for Defence and Commander of Armed Forces, made a proposal to
President Habibie which could be seen as mirroring the control tactics utilised by
former President Soeharto over the press. The proposal called for a ‘Regulation on
Freedom of Expression’ and a licensing scheme. It raised concerns among many,
133
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that Habibie was taking the art of controlling the press one step further than
Soeharto, who ‘only’ controlled the publishing licenses. On 24 July 1998, at a
moment when Parliament was in recess, a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law
(Perpu), No. 2 of 1998 on Freedom of Expression was issued. The regulation
required that a permit be obtained for demonstrations in which more than 50
people participated. If this number was not exceeded, notification to the police
was sufficient (Articles 10 and 11).
According to the 1945 Constitution, and the 1966 MPR Decree, the
President has the emergency power to promulgate ‘Regulations in Lieu of Law’
(Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang - Perpu) which have the same
standing as Laws, but must be withdrawn unless approved by the Parliament at its
next session. The preamble to the 24 July regulation mentioned the wave of
seemingly uncontrollable demonstrations taking place at the time all over
Indonesia, right down to the village level. According to the Government, these
constituted a threat to national unity, and often led to senseless destruction, arson,
and looting, causing material and non-material damage and generating a feeling of
insecurity.
Amongst the articles most disputed was Article 8 which included
dissemination through print and electronic mass media among the forms of public
expression of opinion which therefore had to be reported to the police three days
in advance. This meant that the licensing plan would require journalists to obtain
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working permits.136 This also meant that the police would have the authority to act
on such notifications, thereby opening the door wide for press censorship.137 The
regulation brought forth additional concerns over the already present criticism
among the press community, that Information Minister Yosfiah’s 1998 Ministerial
Regulation was an inadequate to response to reform demands.
On 13 August 1998, due note having been taken of the many protests, it
was decided by the Government to postpone the implementation of the regulation
until Parliament had pronounced its opinion. However, at the end of September,
when it looked as if Parliament would reject the regulation, General Wiranto, on
behalf of the government, announced that it would be withdrawn. On 28
September 1998 Habibie then signed Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No.
3 of 1998, in order to annul the previous regulation.
Subsequently, the Government sent a draft Bill on Freedom of Expression
to the Parliament.138 Law No. 9 of 1998 was then issued. In contrast to Perpu No.
2 of 1998, the new law did not require permits, requiring only that the police be
136
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notified in writing, three days in advance. Under the law, the police, and the coordinators of public expressions of opinion are expected to work together to
ensure that public expression of opinion is carried out in a safe, orderly and
peaceful manner. No notification is required for scholarly meetings at universities,
nor for religious gatherings.
The Information Minister’ promised in June 1998, that the 1982 Press Law
would be repealed in 1999. In early 1999 President Habibie publicly promised to
commit himself to ending press censorship in Indonesia. The Habibie government
promised to make press freedom a reality. ”The government will no longer control
the press ... no longer telephone news editors about news they wish to publish.”139

Drafting the law
The process of Law No. 40 of 1999 started when the Department of
Information drafted the law. It took several attempts for the legal drafters to write
and re-write the draft bill with assistance from UNESCO. When UNESCO
decided in 1998 to contribute to the development of the Indonesian media, one of
the first concerns was to establish a consultative process between the Government,
the Parliament, and the media, and to launch a wider discussion on prospective
media legislation, with a view to creating legislative provisions which were on par
with those of other democracies. In this way, a draft bill was intensively discussed
between the Ministry of Information and an expert team from UNESCO,
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consisting of UNESCO staff members and legal experts from Article XIX, a
British NGO concerned with freedom of expression. The Government and
UNESCO organised a seminar, ‘The Media and the Government: In Search of
Solutions’, on 23-24 March 1999. The final version of the draft bill was the main
subject of the seminar. The seminar, which was opened by President Habibie
himself, was a significant step in the direction of genuine and legitimate press
freedom.
The draft of the new Press Law was produced not only by the Government
but also benefited from the input of many elements of society.140 The Indonesian
Press and Broadcasting Community (MPPI), for example, had been pushing for a
new Press Law. Both journalists’ organisations, PWI and AJI, also contributed to
the drafting of the new law. The draft bill was circulated for a period of months.
Several members of the Parliament also decided to assist in drafting the new Press
Law, and submitted a different bill to the Speaker of the House.141 The United
Development Party (PPP) took the initiative of submitting to the Parliament its
own draft of a press bill to replace the 1982 law. It is unclear whether the PPP’s

140

Putut Tri Husodo, above n 78.

141

Bambang Sadono, SH., MH (FKP), Soenarto, SH (FABRI), Drs. H. Hadimulyo, M.Sc (FPP),
YB Wiyanjono (FPDI), Razian Agus Toniman (FKP), Drs. Darul Siska (FKP), Aminullah Ibrahim
(FKP), Amir L. Sirait, MBA (FKP), H. Sofyan Lubis (FKP), Ir. Ny. Arijanti B. Sigit Prakoso
(FKP), Ridwan Sani (FKP), Lukman R. Boer, MBA (FKP), Drs. Moeljono MS, SE, SH (FKP),
Karsidi, SH (FKP), Kamil Husni, SE (FKP), Ir. Ny. Endang W. Rama Boedi (FKP), Ansel da
Lopez (FPDI), K.H. Amin Bunyamin (FPP), H. Oesman Sahidi, SH (FPP), Drs. Ign. Koes
Sujudono, SH (FABRI), Drs. F. Isnawan, M.Phil (FABRI) dan Ishak Latuconsina, M.Sc (FABRI).
It should be noted that 13 out of the 22 members of Parliament above were from the Golkar Party,
whereas four were from the Military. Their concept of the press law was a combination of PWI
and MPPI’s drafts. However, before the Parliament decided to discuss their concept, the
Government had sent the draft bill there. It is important to note that during the Soeharto era, it was
very rare that members of Parliament used their rights to initiate a draft bill. The drafts normally
came from the government.

284

move was motivated by a genuine concern for the future of the press, or by a
desire to win public sympathy ahead of the General Session of the People’s
Consultative Assembly (MPR) in October 1999.142
What is clear, however, is that the DPR was already faced with too many
bills to endorse, given that it would be dissolved in two months, to give way to
newly elected legislators. Time went very fast. The results of the June 1999
General Election showed that Habibie’s party, Golkar, was defeated. Many
members of parliament who were involved in the discussion of the Press Law
were not re-elected. It was possible that Habibie and Yosfiah might not be reappointed. There was no guarantee that the new office-holders (the new President,
Minister of Information, and members of parliament) would support the new Press
Law.
With all the political struggles and pressures above, the Parliament and the
Habibie government formally completed the new Press Law in only 13 working
days. Although the process of drafting took more than a year, the bill was
completed before the Parliament in less than two weeks (26 August 1999 – 13
September 1999). This is not to suggest that there was no hot debate in the
Parliament. In fact, there were at least 101 problems discussed at that time.143 The
Golkar party asked 64 questions, the PPP Party submitted 32 questions, the PDI
Party mentioned 63 problems in the draft, and the military officers in the
Parliament indicated 38 points for discussion. Outside the Parliament, the press
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experts and legal scholars also gave their comments on the draft. As the bill was
drafted with the support of press associations and input from international and
local experts, it may safely be stated that the process has at least the appearance of
being both transparent and participatory (two elements of good governance).
During the brief 17 month Habibie presidency, media leaders worked
quickly and furiously with a forward looking Information Minister and concerned
legislators to make press freedom legally binding. On September 13, 1999, the
House of Representatives passed a 21 article press bill. On September 23, BJ
Habibie, in one of his last official acts as president, signed the bill, making it Law
No. 40/1999 of the Republic of Indonesia on the Press, or simply the 1999 Press
Law.

B. Content Analyses of Law No. 40 of 1999
Law No. 40 of 1999 is Indonesia’s third press law, annulling the 1966 and
1982 Press Laws, made under Soeharto. However, the difference between the two
previous laws (1966 and 1982 Press Laws) and the current one (Law No. 40 of
1999) is the difference between an obstacle course and a toll-way.144 The 1999
Press Law owes its difference to three features: protection, de-regulation, and
generation. First, it guarantees press freedom and gives it protection. Second, it
puts the legal imprint on the on-going process of de-regulation which started when
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Habibie replaced Soeharto and carried out by Yosfiah. Third, de-regulation has
generated a multitude of print media start-ups.
Law No. 40 of 1999 is based on the principle that press freedom is a
manifestation of the people’s sovereignty.145 Article 4 of the new law states press
freedom is guaranteed as a basic right for citizens. This means that ‘the press is
free from any form of prevention, prohibition and or pressure, so that the public
right to information is guaranteed.’ It further says that the press is free from
censorship and is not subject to publication and broadcasting bans.146 During the
New Order years of President Soeharto, Jakarta editors were often invited to
briefings, at the Information Ministry, on what they might and might not print.
Under Law No. 40 of 1999, this practice was history. Article 4 states that to
guarantee press freedom, the national press has the right to seek out, obtain and
disseminate ideas and information.
Article 3 states that ‘the National Press has the function of an information,
education, entertainment and social control medium, as well’. Actually the draft
bill did not contain the last function: ‘social control medium’.147 It is interesting to
note that it was the Golkar parliamentary party in the Parliament which urged the
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inclusion of ‘social control’ as one of the functions of the press.148 The
Government agreed with this proposal.149
In exercising its social control function, the press may criticise a
government’s policies, provide public debate on political and economic issues,
and provide wide access to the public to obtain information. The inclusion of the
social control function in Article 3 has created the opportunity to end the basis for
‘Asian journalism’ or ‘developmental journalism’, and has also opened the door
for the press to act as the fourth estate.
Following on from the Article 3 statement of press function, Article 6
states that:
The National Press must play its roles in the following ways:
a.
fulfil the public’s right to know;
b.
enforce basic democratic principles, promote the embodiment
of the supremacy of the law and human rights, while at the
same time respecting diversity;
c.
develop public opinion based upon factual, accurate and valid
information;
d.
conduct control, provide criticism, correction, and offer
suggestions regarding any matter of public concern;
e.
fight for justice and truth.
Once again, in its final form, Article 6 differs from the draft Bill prepared
by the Government. The draft Bill did not mention human rights (b), nor control
and criticism (d). The Bill draft said only:150
The National Press executes its role as follows:
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a.
b.
c.
d.

fulfils the public’s right to know;
assists the development of public opinion, based on adequate
and accurate information;
upholds the dignity of the law and democracy along with
respect for diversity;
fights for the principles of righteousness and justice.

The inclusion of ‘human rights’, ‘control’, and ‘criticism’ are significant in
advancing the principles of good governance and the rule of law.
Moreover, in Article 4.3 the Law uses the words kemerdekaan pers for
press freedom, instead of using the term kebebasan pers, which was
conventionally used in the Soeharto government’s policy and legislation on
journalism. It was the PPP Party which insisted on a change from kebebasan to
kemerdekaan. The latter was considered to represent a significant change in
official consciousness, as it has powerful connotations of liberation, independence
and emancipation.
The PPP’s suggestion was attacked by other political parties in the
Parliament. The PPP argued that Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, which
guarantees freedom of opinion uses the word kemerdekaan, and therefore, the
Press Law should use the same word. Others rejected this argument on the
grounds that the use of the word kemerdekaan in the 1945 Constitution should be
read in the context as meaning ‘independence’. M. Yunus Yosfiah, as Minister for
Information, took the view that this has only a semantic matter, and he would
accept the use of either kebebasan or kemerdekaan. Having discussed the issue at
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length, the Parliament decided to accept the PPP’s proposal.151 One of the
considerations was that the word kemerdekaan could be seen as a point of
departure, or a symbol of independence, not from the colonial era, but from the
dark era of Soeharto’s reign, during which press freedom had been absent.
Similar sentiments also influenced the wording of the statement of the
philosophical bases of the new Press Law. The draft Bill originally used the word
kebebasan, but later during discussion in the parliament this was replaced by
kemerdekaan. In addition, the draft Bill mentioned only two philosophical bases
for the new Press Law:
a. that freedom of the press is a very important element in the life of
democracy in Indonesia, guaranteed by the clause on freedom of
expression, as contained in Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution.
b. that the national press, as the vehicle for disseminating mass
communication, information, and as an opinion shaper, must be able to
execute its functions, rights, duties and roles in the best way possible;

The Parliament amended and expanded the statement of the philosophical base for
Law No. 40 of 1999:
a. that the freedom of the press is one of the many embodiments of the
sovereignty of the people and is the most important element in creating a
democratic society, nation and state in order to insure the freedom to
express ideas and opinions, as stated in Article 28 of the Indonesian
Constitution of 1945;
b. that in the existence of a democratic society, nation, and state, the freedom
to express ideas and opinions, in accordance with one’s conscience, and
the right to acquire information, is a substantial right – necessary to
preserve justice and truth, promote general welfare, and advance the
nation’s intellectualism;
c. that the national press, as the medium of mass communication,
information dissemination, and the shaping of public opinion, must be able
151

See Hinca IP Pandjaitan, ‘Menuju Kemerdekaan Pers 2000: Penelusuran Pemahaman UndangUndang Pers’, March 2000, available at http://www.internews.or.id
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to perform at its best, according to its principles, functions, rights,
obligations and roles, based upon the professional freedom of the press,
guaranteed and protected by law, and free from any interference and
intrusion;
d. that the national press has the role of protecting the order of the world in
accordance with freedom, eternal peace and social justice.

This statement signals a significant change to the press paradigm of the
Soeharto Government — from a ‘free but responsible press’ to ‘professional
freedom of the press’ (see c., above).152 It ended the Soeharto position that
journalistic freedom should match governmental policy. The new paradigm has
brought the Indonesian press into a new era: from ‘Asian journalism’ to
‘professional journalism’.
However, it does not follow that Law No. 40 of 1999 allows the press to
do whatever it wants, using the justification of press freedom. The phrase
‘professional freedom of the press’ suggests that the press should work in a
professional way, such as by engaging in accurate and truthful reporting, and
avoiding sensational reporting which degrades human dignity, and the supremacy
of law. If the press fails to do so, there is no longer a risk that the government will
annul the relevant license. Instead, the new press would be reported to the courts.
The only limitation on press freedom should be the Law itself. This is in line with
Article 19 of the ICCPR that:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall cover freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
152

The new paradigm was proposed by the PPP Party. See ‘Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Persatuan
Pembangunan DPR-RI terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Pers’, 13 September 1999.
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ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of his
choice.
3. The exercise of the right provided for in Paragraph 2 of this
Article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall be such
only as are provided by law, and are necessary:
a. For respecting the rights or reputation of others;
b. For the protection of national security or of public order, or
of public health or morals.

Another aspect of the draft Bill which was amended by the Parliament is
the definition of the press. The proposed Bill drafted by the Government defined
the press as the source of ‘printed press material published periodically and aimed
at the general public, containing news or commentary connected with the public
interest.’ This means that the Bill would regulate only the printed press. After
discussions on the issue, the new Press Law gives a broader definition:
The press is a social and mass communication institution, which
operates within [the bounds of] journalistic activities, including the
seeking, acquisition, ownership, recording, analysis, and
dissemination of information, in all forms, either written, or in the
form of sound, picture, sound and picture, with data and graphics in
any other form, by use of the print medium, electronic media, and all
kinds of available channels.153

In order to protect journalists in their legitimate exercise of press freedom,
Article 18 has a set of criminal sanctions. It states that anyone who intentionally
impedes the national press in exercising that press freedom, as provided in Article
4, can face up to two years imprisonment, or be fined up to 500 million rupiah
(about US$80,000).

153

Article 1.1 Law No. 40 of 1999.
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Furthermore, to protect press freedom, Article 15 of the 1999 Press Law
provides the framework for the establishment of a Board of the Press. Unlike
Article 6 of the 1982 Press Law, which allowed government officials to be
members of the Press Council, the 1999 Press Law limits Board of the Press
membership to journalists, press corporations, and communications experts.154
Allowing government officials to serve on the Press Council under the 1982 Press
Law meant that they could exercise greater control over the press. By abolishing
the Press Council, responsibility and control was conferred solely upon the press,
thus eliminating unnecessary government interference.

No More SIUPP
In the Soeharto years, a person required a press license to print a
newspaper. Called a surat izin usaha penerbitan pers or SIUPP, the license
entailed a long-winded and costly process. The license was a device used to keep
the press in compliance with government directives. Any deviation from the
directive could mean withdrawal of the license. The license scheme also kept the
numbers of publications in check.

154

Membership in the Board of the Press for the period of 2000 - 2003 is: Goenawan Mohamad
(Journalist), R.H. Siregar S.H (Journalist), Atang Ruswita (Journalist), Drs. Jakob Oetama (Press
Business Owner /Manager), Surya Paloh (Press Business Owner/Manager), H. Azkarmin Zaini
(Press Business Manager-Television), Zainal A. Suryokusumo (Press Business Manager-Radio),
Atmakusumah Astraatmadja (Society leader), Benjamin Mangkoedilaga, S.H (Society leader).
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Table 6: The History of the Press in Indonesia155
No.
1.

The Beginning of the New The New Order The Reform Era
Order Era (1970-1980)
Era (1980-1998)
(1998-present)
Press: Agent of
Press: Partner of
Press: Agent of Development
Social Control
the Government
-Govt. subsidy for press
-Independent press
-Govt. subsidy for
-Govt. protection for press
-Free competition
press
-Govt. protection
for press

2.

-Press Law guaranteeing
press freedom was nonexistent
-Broadcast Law was nonexistent
-Court decisions made on “case
by case” basis

3.

-Press as tool for development
-Press as part of development
-Media banning was common
practice

-Govt. mentoring
for press
-Press Law
emphasis on a
responsible and
free press.
-Heavy emphasis
on the term
‘responsible’,
-Press as tool for
government
propaganda
-Media banning
was common
practice

-Press Law
guarantees
press freedom
-Press as business
institution

-Press as agent of
social control
-Media banning
practice
no longer exists

Unlike Article 13 of the 1982 Press Law which required that publications
be licensed, the 1999 Press Law has eliminated license requirements.
Consequently, newspapers and magazines no longer have to fear license
revocation, pursuant to the 1984 Ministerial Decree, which in the past usually
resulted in the termination of the publication; because a license requirement no
longer exists.
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Adopted from Ishadi SK, ‘A Swinging Pendulum; the Freedom of the Press in Indonesia (19702000)’, 9 September 2002, available at http://www.aspeninst.org/c&s/nonpub/20020909/ishadi.pdf

294

Under the new Press Law, no such permits are required. Any Indonesian
can simply start a paper by setting up a legal body. The investor is obliged to
announce only the name, address, name of the person in charge, and the name and
address of the printing house. Foreign investors can become minority shareholders
with a local print media company. For journalists, the new law abandons the old
rule that journalists must belong to a government-sanctioned journalists’
organisation. Now journalists can join the organisation of their choice.

Criticisms
The 1999 Press Law is broadly acceptable to the media in Indonesia and
forms the basis for meaningful legal protection for the press for the first time in
Indonesia’s history. However, this does not mean that there is no criticism. First,
the 1999 Press Law does not contain any provision directly prohibiting the
mistreatment of journalists. In other words, the 1999 Press Law does not address
the issue of journalistic safety.
Actually, the Press Law states, ‘In conducting the activities of his
profession, the journalist is protected by law.’156 This provision is the result of a
political compromise between the Golkar Party and others. Mr. Bambang Sadono
of Golkar proposed that the Press Law should give ‘special protection’ to
journalists. He made an analogy with the protection given to members of the Red
Cross during wars. Minister Yosfiah agreed with this proposal. However, other
members of the Parliament, particularly from the military and the PPP, rejected
156

Law No. 40 of 1999, Article 8.
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the idea. They took the view that the roles of the press and the Red Cross are
different.157 The law should protect journalists, like other citizens or ordinary
Indonesian people; special protection for journalists is not needed.158
Second, according to Angela Romano, Law No. 40 of 1999 is meant to
protect journalists’ rights vis-à-vis a press company, but it has arguably failed to
do so.159 The evidence comes from Article 10: ‘A press company must ensure
welfare for its journalists as well as its employees, with shares and/or distribution
rights and other fringe benefits’.160
The critics say that the stipulations above lack detail, noting that a
company which gives as little as one per cent of its shares to workers would be
complying with the law. With no real policing of Article 10, the division of shares
or other forms of company profits is unlikely to be undertaken widely, even
among those organisations which make a profit.161
Another criticism is that while the enactment of the 1999 Press Law is a
significant victory for the press community, there remains a barrier to absolute
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See Hinca IP Panjaitan, ‘Undang-Undang Pers Vs. KUH Pidana atau UU Penyiaran’, paper
presented at Seminar Hukum, Etika dan Kemerdekaan Pers, Jakarta, 5-6 June 2000.
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Putut Tri Husodo, a senior journalist and Editor of Gatra magazine, explains that although the
press has functions as watchdog of democracy, journalists should not felt that their extraordinary
citizens. In fact, journalists are not the only ones who promote social control over government’s
policy. There are other groups in society such as NGO’s, students, labour, and so on. Those groups
do not have special legal protection, why should journalists ask for it? Putut Tri Husodo, above n
78.
159

Romano, above n 43, 84.
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The Elucidation of Article 10 states that ‘other forms of benefits are increases in wages,
bonuses, insurance and other things, with the total package to be decided ‘based on agreement
between company management and journalists and other press employees.’

161

Kompas, 7 September 1999.
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freedom of expression.162 The Indonesian Government may still indirectly censor
the press through Article 154 of the Criminal Code. Article 154 mandates
sanctions against anyone who publicly expresses feelings of ‘hatred’ or ‘hostility’
toward the Indonesian Government. Some critics have noted that this leaves the
Indonesian Government with the option of using the Code to curb press freedom,
as governments have done in the past.163 While it is true that Article 154 provides
officials with an alternative method for indirect censorship and control of the
press, it should be mentioned that this problem lies on the ‘outside’ of the 1999
Press Law. The problem is indeed in the Criminal Code, which, to date, has not
been changed.164
Thus far I have examined the content of Law No. 40 of 1999, by
comparing the draft with the ICCPR, and providing some criticisms. I have also
highlighted some significant changes between Soeharto’s press law and Habibie’s
press law. As has been discussed, Habibie’s press law followed the elements of
good governance and the rule of law. The 1999 Press Law provided the legal
framework to allow the Indonesian press to serve as the fourth estate by exercising
its function as social control medium. It also changed the old paradigm based on

162

See Deborah M. Bies, ‘Freedom of the Press Undermined by Indirect Censorship in Indonesia:
The Impact of Criminal Sanctions and Safety Concerns on Journalists’ Ability to Freely and
Accurately Report Current Events’ (2001) 24 Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 279.
163

More discussion on the relationship between the Criminal Code and Press freedom during the
Soeharto era can be found in Wina Armada, Wajah Hukum Pidana Pers (Jakarta, Pustaka Kartini,
1989).
164

In Australia, there are no special causes of action for, or laws prohibiting, insults against the
Head of State or other government officials or institutions. See Australian Press Council, ‘The
Media and the Law’, available at http://www.presscouncil.org.au/pcsite/fop/auspres.html#insult
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‘Asian’ journalism to professional journalism. This is the most significant change
to have occurred during Habibie’s time.

C. Implementation of Law No. 40 of 1999
The de-regulation of the press has led to the generation of numerous new
tabloids, newspapers, and magazines. Start-ups do not have to register with the
Information Ministry. Sidewalk vendors, near bus terminals and malls, hawk a
variety of such newspapers. However, many of these new titles appear and vanish,
because a steady number of readers cannot absorb increasing numbers of choices.
Press freedom and deregulation is one thing. Content quality is another. To some
‘new generation’ journalists, press freedom is perceived as a licence to print lurid
stories and outrageous headlines, if not quite letting fiction pass as fact. 165 Three
important implementation issues will be discussed here: professionalism,
protection, and the press vis-à-vis a society.

Professionalism
The first issue is that of professionalism and quality in press matters.
Although the 1999 Press Law introduced a new paradigm, ‘professional freedom
of the press’, it is apparent that full implementation of these rules and principles is
still a long way off. The case of Hoessein Madilis is illustrative. In 1999, the
165

Djajanto, above n 144. In order to deal with this problem, a number of media-watch
organisations around the country have sprung up. They are run by media study centres and publish
newsletters to critique general media content. The newsletters are circulated to news organisations
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South Jakarta District Court sentenced Madilis, the managing editor of the biweekly Warta Republik tabloid, to six months in jail for publishing a falsified
report of an alleged ‘triple sex scandal,’ involving former Vice President Try
Sutrisno, former minister of defense Edi Sudradjat, and a widow, identified only
as ‘Nani’.
In his verdict, the presiding judge contended that the defendant had failed
to provide strong evidence that Try Soetrisno and Edi Sudradjat were involved in
a fight for a woman. The conclusion: the defendant had defamed both Try and Edi
and therefore had violated Article 310 of the Criminal Code, which violation
carries a maximum four-year gaol sentence.
The most interesting part of the case is the bizarre story behind the story,
as disclosed by Madilis in interviews with a number of publications prior to his
trial. According to Madilis, the story started a few years ago when, during a
driving trip, he made a stop in Cirebon, a coastal city some 200 km east of Jakarta.
There, he gave a lift to a woman he identified as Nani. During the conversation,
Nani confessed to him that she once lived in Jakarta as a ‘call girl’ and she
bragged how famous she was, with many men vying for her affections. She told
Madilis that two of her ‘admirers,’ Try Sutrisno and Edi Sudradjat, once had a
fight over her. The winner was Try Sutrisno, who gave her 1 billion rupiah.166

for the benefit of working journalists. These newsletters include Sendi in Surabaya, Buletin Media
Watch in Makasar, Kupas in Medan, and Independenwatch! in Jakarta.
166

See A. Lin Neumann, ‘Press, Power & Politics: Indonesia’, the Freedom Report, 2000,
http://www.freedomforum.org/publications/international/mediaforum/2000/asia/
available
at
indonesiaprereport2000.pdf
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The years passed and suddenly Madilis found himself in a new
environment. The fall of Soeharto in May 1998 was followed by the liberation of
the Indonesian Press. Publication licenses, which in the past were a major obstacle
to setting up newspapers, could now easily be obtained. Madilis, who had some
experience as a reporter, was appointed managing editor of a tabloid. In the midst
of the fierce market competition for readers, and in an effort to outdo other
tabloids, he suddenly remembered his encounter with Nani, the widow. Believing
that the public should know about the scandal, he decided to publish the story in
November 1998. He used a banner headline, titled ‘Triple Love Story of Two
Generals’.
None of the widow’s supposed lovers were interviewed for the story;
neither did the widow, who has not been found, corroborate the article. When
asked whether he had tried to reconfirm the story with Nani, he was reported to
have replied, “How could I do that? I don’t even know her present whereabouts.”
In response to questions on his efforts to check and confirm the story with the two
men who were allegedly Nani’s lovers, Madilis simply said, “They are high
ranking officers. It is impossible to interview them.” However, he confessed that
he did once try to call Try Sutrisno on the telephone, but could not obtain a
connection. In the court, when confronted with Try Sutrisno, Madilis could only
offer his apologies to both Try Sutrisno and Edi Sudarajat.167
This story indicates that professional freedom of the press is not something
which can be achieved by merely reforming the law on the press and officially
167

‘Try Sutrisno dan Edi Sudrajat Berebut Janda?’, Bali Post, 3 August 1999.
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changing the old paradigm. Another obstacle to genuinely applying a new
paradigm is ‘envelope journalism’. Journalists acknowledge that the practice of
‘envelope journalism’ remains rampant at most levels of the profession.168 Editors
of major national publications like Kompas and Tempo have admitted that it is not
easy to prevent their reporters from accepting the packets of money which are
routinely distributed to journalists at press conferences and other events. In the
words of Neumann, “Some extortion artists even pose as ‘journalists,’ using press
cards to gather bribes from companies and others seeking favourable press
coverage.”169 This phenomenon indicates that there is no necessary correlation
between the growth of the media and professional standards.

Free but unprotected
The second issue is the protection of press freedom. Although Habibie
himself tolerated daily criticism of his government and its policies, some of his
allies and supporters were less forgiving. Unrest to reject Habibie erupted in
Jakarta when MPR Special Session convened in November 1998 to confirm
Habibie and his policies. Soon afterwards, private television station SCTV came
under pressure. A State-owned bank called in the station’s $34 million loan,
which triggered the sale of a majority stake in the company. It was reported that a
firm run by Habibie’s brother took the lead in negotiating for a share. In a
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Putut Tri Husodo, above n 78.
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Neumann, above n 166.
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statement, SCTV News producers claimed that the government was punishing the
station for its reports on the tumult.170
Another obstacle for press freedom came from the press companies
generally. In December 1998 around 100 Gatra journalists resigned in protest
against what they supposed to be the unreasonable discharge of their senior
directors on 20 November 1998 by the board of shareholders. Many of these
aggrieved journalists argued that the dismissal was a reprisal for the controversial
coverage in Gatra’s edition dated 8 June 1998 of the ill-gotten wealth of Soeharto.
Bob Hasan, Soeharto’s close friend, holding more than 50 percent of the
company’s share, was said to be unhappy with the report.171
Obstacle also comes from military officers who are not aware of press
freedom. Shortly after the issuance of Law No. 40 of 1999 in September 1999,
three military personnel of the Blangpidie Koramil [Military Territorial unit at
sub-district level] allegedly tortured Nasrun Yunan, a journalist from the Aceh
Ekspres, on 20 December 1999. Nasrun Yunan was at the Sarinah Tailor shop,
Blangpidie, South Aceh, when, unexpectedly, a soldier, Private First Class Lalu
Kamal, criticised Nasrun by screaming, “Why didn’t you write anything about the
lowering of the Indonesian red and white flag?”172 Before being able to answer the
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More discussion can be found in Kukuh Sanyoto, ‘Indonesian Television and the Dynamics of
Transition’, in Russell Hiang Khng-Heng (ed), Media Fortunes, Changing Times: Asian States in
Transition (Singapore, ISEAS, 2002).
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Ariel Heryanto and Stanley Yoseph Adi, ‘Industrialized Media in Democratizing Indonesia’, in
Russell Hiang Khng-Heng (ed), Media Fortunes, Changing Times: Asian States in Transition
(Singapore, ISEAS, 2002), 59.
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The context of the question is that journalists have quite often reported violations of human
rights in Aceh. The soldier asked why the journalists did not report the activity of Acehnese
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question, Nasrun was suddenly punched and kicked by this TNI [Indonesian
National Defence Force] member of the Blangpidie Koramil.173
This soldier also pointed his weapon at Nasrun and threatened to kill him.
Not only did he beat the journalist, but he also used his weapon to strike Nasrun.
During the beating, the soldier threatened: “If you report this, I will kill you. I
don’t care about any human rights violations.” Nasrun received serious injuries to
his finger, left eye, head, chest and waist.174
The TNI soldiers had clearly violated freedom of the press and insulted the
journalistic profession. As members of the security forces, they also acted
arbitrarily, in defiance of the law, and demonstrated the abuse of power and the
arrogance of those in power. Their actions were certainly not consistent with the
spirit of press freedom which was meant to be embodied in Law No. 40 of 1999.
The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) has also reported that the
following incidents occurred in 2000, after the new Press Law was adopted:
On March 3, in Medan, North Sumatera, Kadispen Polda Sumatera
Utara (the head of the Information Division of the North Sumatra
Police), Police Lieutenant Colonel Amrin Karim, threatened to slap a
Radar Medan journalist named Salamudin. Amrin and also insulted
other journalists. “You are dogs,” Karim yelled to the journalists.
Karim was angry after he had been boycotted by journalists who were
not satisfied with his answers to their questions, which they
considered rude and inappropriate.
Meanwhile, on March 7, in Surabaya, East Java, a Surya
photographer, Erik Siswanto, was punched by PDIP (Partai
Independence Movement (GAM) in lowering of the Indonesian red and white flag, and raising the
GAM flag, since such activity was against national unity.
173

See AJI Press Release, ‘Journalist
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by

military

officers’,

available
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Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan – Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle) security men while taking pictures of the inauguration of
Surabaya’s mayor and vice-mayor at the town hall. At the same time,
the camera of a photographer, Trisnadi, was broken by a member of
the security forces.
On March 9, in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, Menara journalist
Hoesin KH was kidnapped and tortured by unidentified assailants.
Hoesin was kidnapped while on his way to the Governor’s office. He
was pushed into a car by two men, and three other men were waiting
for Hoesin inside the car. They took Hoesin around the city,
interrogating him and beating him up, accusing him of spreading
information on a forestry-fund corruption case in East Kalimantan.
Afterward, they released him by throwing him out of the car. The
following day, March 10, Hoesin also got a death threat from a
stranger.
On March 12, in Solo, a photographer was again beaten by PDIP
security men. Sigit Tri Pamungkas, from the Libero tabloid, was
beaten by a member of party security staff while taking pictures of a
soccer match.175
Press groups in Indonesia are understandably worried that unless lawenforcement agencies are able to protect the media, other groups will be
encouraged to take the same vigilante approach. The irony is that these attacks are
taking place when there is a government which supports press freedom, and after
the passage of a new Press Law which provides far greater protection for
journalists than was ever enjoyed in the past.176 This, once again, indicates that
there is a gap, between formal legal reform and practical change.

175

AJI,
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The attacks on the press remain in the post-Habibie era. On 6 May 2000, dozens of members of
the Nahdlatul Ulama [Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation] civilian guard, called Banser
occupied the office of the Jawa Pos in Surubaya, East Java, to protest articles accusing top leaders
of their organisation of corruption. To end the occupation, in which Banser members were
switching off computers and disconnecting phone lines, the newspaper agreed to publish a
retraction and apology, and to donate $4.4 million for the construction of a mosque. The press has
been especially hurt not only by assaults by Islamic groups but also by attacks from separatist
movements, fighting for independence from Jakarta. On 28 January 2000, the Papuan pro-
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Despite these ‘negative effects’ of press freedom, many local journalists
happily report a reduction in — even the disappearance of — military or
bureaucratic interference in their work. Habibie kept his promise that there would
no longer be calls to editors directing them not to publish their reports. However,
public officials’ reluctance to provide prompt and accurate information makes it
difficult to report on governmental activities, much less suspected corruption. One
such example was a scandal involving the siphoning off of over $70 million in
bank-restructuring funds by figures connected to the government and Golkar
party. For over three months, Habibie’s government refused to release an
independent audit detailing the money trail and identifying beneficiaries. The
reason cited was banking secrecy.177 Press freedom is not only about being able
to ‘publish’ freely. It is about being able to seek and obtain access to information
freely.

In search of a new position
The third issue is the position of the press vis-à-vis Indonesian society.
Journalists have to worry about not only those in positions of power. PostSoeharto Indonesia, with its economic collapse, rising separatist, ethnic and

independence militia group Satuan Tugas attacked the office of state-owned Radio Republik
Indonesia - RRI in Fakfak, West Papua, when they were not allowed to issue a statement on air.
The militiamen destroyed buildings and equipment, paralysing the radio station for four days.
Three weeks later, on 16 February 2000, several hundred militiamen armed with knives, bows and
swords destroyed the building of the RRI office in the West Papuan town of Merauke. The
militiamen perceived the radio station as being biased in favour of the regional government, which
opposes independence. The station was so devastated by the attack that it had to suspend
broadcasting for a week. More information can be found in Lukas Luwarso (ed.), Natural Press
Attackers: Pressure Against Indonesian Press 2001 (Jakarta, SEAPA, 2002).
177

See Chapter 6 for the discussion of the Bank Bali case.
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religious sentiments, and politically charged atmosphere, is simply a much more
dangerous place to work, for journalists. Not everyone accepts the need for, nor
even the principle of, a free press. The resistance lies both in a lingering sense that
the media is responsible for political education and in perceptions by the public of
bias by particular publications or journalists.178
Actually, journalists themselves are the first to admit that the Indonesian
press has sometimes abused its freedom. They even say that some of the anger
against the press is justified. Putut Tri Husodo has observed, “Many in the press
do not distinguish between fact and fiction, between news and opinion, or
between rumour or gossip and news.”179
In several places throughout the country, angry crowds have gone to
newspaper offices and radio stations to protest coverage by the media. In other
areas, journalists have been threatened with physical attack if they anger local
interests. “We are no longer afraid of the government but the threat now is from
the people,” said the editor of Jubi, an alternative tabloid newspaper in Irian Jaya.
The prevailing attitude was summed up by an editor in East Kalimantan. “In a
multi-polar conflict environment, no matter what you write, someone is going to
be angry,” said Yasmin Umar, chief editor of the Pontianak Post, the province’s
largest daily newspaper. “The easiest thing to do is to not to write anything.”180
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See AJI and LSPP, Pers Indonesia Pasca Soeharto: Setelah Tekanan Penguasa Melemah
(Jakarta, AJI-LSPP, 1999).
179

Putut Tri Husodo, above n 78.

180

As reported in Neumann, above n 168. The end result of such constraints can be a lack of vital
information about local situations and issues. This contributes to the misunderstanding of events in
the country. Given Indonesia’s immense size and diversity, the Jakarta-based national and
international press must rely on local media and local correspondents for accurate information
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With the sudden collapse of government restrictions, one oft-repeated complaint
is that local journalists are not aware of their responsibilities and duties, much less
their rights.
One example is the coverage of conflict between Muslims and Christians
in Ambon, the capital of multi-religious Maluku province. After riots broke out
there in early 1999, the city was practically partitioned between the two warring
groups. Christian reporters felt safe only in Christian areas. The same went for
Muslim journalists in Muslim neighbourhoods. The inability to cover both sides
complicated the already sensitive and emotional issue of reporting religiouslinked violence. Ambonese Christians felt that the national press focused more on
attacks against Muslims, and became hostile to Indonesian Muslims working for
local news organisations.181
As Douglas Ramage points out, one of the big problems is that journalists
do not know how to report on issues on which they are suddenly permitted to
write. For example, to write about human rights violations in a thoughtful and
careful way is not an easy task. “How do you talk about international instruments
relating to human rights that the Indonesian government has not acceded to in the
past several months?”182 It may safely be stated that the more the press is given
freedom, the greater is the responsibility it must assume.

about regional events. If local journalists feel constrained in reporting critical events, the rest of the
nation and the world may be unable accurately to appreciate current events and national trends.
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The benefits flowing from press freedom are obvious. A free press is the
bedrock of most other freedoms of all peoples —to be informed, to have and to
exercise choices, to seek redress for just grievances, to hold governments
accountable. However, a free press does not automatically translate into an
excellent professional press or ethical press; nor a press fully aware of its
responsibilities, as much as of its rights. Press freedom, de jure, does not even
guarantee that journalists will cease being the victims of intimidation, harassment
and raw force from groups and forces outside the government.
Freedom has a peculiar tendency to unmask the flaws, weaknesses and
failings of the media in their most acute forms. As has been demonstrated above,
freedom has unleashed a perverse competition for sales and ratings, and all at
once the result is a slide to sensationalism, with smart and intriguing tabloid
journalism, which lacks the professional standards of accuracy, fairness and
balance.
The Indonesian media is now unfettered. But it is also unprotected.
Government restrictions and direction have vanished, but what is left is
disturbingly ill-defined. Indonesian journalists and editors have to find out for
themselves how far their communities will let them go; in other words, how free
their readers or viewers will let them be. No consensus has been reached over how
far the press can go in reporting the unprecedented changes shaking Indonesian
society.
What may be the most exciting development for the Indonesian media
over the last four years has been the process. It is all still very new. Despite
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tensions and uncertainties created by a free press, a remarkable national dialogue
has been created. The Indonesian public, for the most part, has learned to trust
freedom as its best hope for emerging from an authoritarian past and coping with
the crises besetting its nation.
Albert Camus points out that:
A free press can of course be good or bad, but, most certainly, without
freedom it will never be anything but bad…..With freedom of the
press, nations are not sure of going toward justice and peace. But
without it, they are sure of not going there.183

Conclusion
Good governance and the rule of law are closely related with the
protection of human rights. Reform in the area of human rights was one of the key
demands in the period following the resignation of President Soeharto. Having
analysed two laws signed by Habibie, the 1999 Law on Human Rights and the
1999 Law on the Press, a number of concluding observations can be made about
the nature and quality of the law reform in this area. First, human rights protection
in both Laws generally follows international human rights instruments. Although
Indonesia under Habibie (and also under the current Cabinet) has still not ratified
the ICCPR and ICESCR, a number of articles from these major international
human rights instruments have been enacted into Indonesian law.
Second, whilst Habibie made a public statement that his government
believed in the universality of human rights, this chapter has demonstrated that his
183
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government drafted a Human Rights Law by combining two approaches: the
universality of human rights, and Indonesian uniqueness. This indicated either that
Habibie had a different opinion on this issue from that of his ministers,
particularly the Minister of Justice, who was responsible for preparing the draft
Bill, or his statement was only political rhetoric, in response to national and
international pressures.
It is worth considering that the Habibie government did not use the
combination approach above when drafting the Press Law. It seems that there was
a conflict of views between Minister Muladi and Minister Yosfiah. The latter,
who was responsible for drafting the Press Law, did not use the paradigm of
‘Asian journalism’ or Indonesian uniqueness. One could sense different
approaches taken by both Ministers.
However, it would be a mistake to see the notion of the uniqueness of
Indonesia endorsed under Habibie, as simply a restatement of the idea of
development or ‘economics first’ argument which prevailed in the Soeharto era.
Under Soeharto the enactment of human rights law based on international
standards was not pursued, since the government’s priority was to develop the
country; not to protect human rights. Under Habibie, the situation was different.
Although economic considerations were not irrelevant, one of the reasons for
producing the Law on Human Rights was the pressure of international donors
owing to the economic crisis. It could be said, then, that Habibie also followed an
‘economics-first’ or ‘right-to-development’ argument — though in rather a
different sense than his predecessor.
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Third, despite some criticisms discussed in this chapter, both the process
and the content of these laws were broadly consistent with the characteristics of
good governance: the rule of law, transparency, participation, responsiveness,
consensus orientation and accountability. The main deficiencies of both laws are
in relation to implementation.
The significance of this observation with respect to Habibie’s achievement
can be considered with reference to Risse and Sikkink’s ‘spiral model’ of human
rights. During the Soeharto era Indonesia was in the first and second phases of the
spiral model. Under Habibie, Indonesia entered a new phase of the spiral model.
Governments accused of violating human rights norms frequently adjust to
pressures by making some tactical concessions (phase 3). As Risse and Sikkink
point out, the government may release political prisoners or sign some
international agreements in order to regain foreign aid, to overcome international
sanctions, or to strengthen their rule vis-à-vis domestic oppositions.184 They might
also engage in a bargaining process with the international community and/or the
domestic opposition. They might even start ‘talking the talk’ of human rights in
international fora, such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission. This
instrumental adaptation to growing international and domestic pressures is a
typical reaction of norm-violating governments.
As has been illustrated in this chapter, steps of exactly this kind were taken
by Habibie during his presidency. Habibie welcomed the UN Human Rights
Commission’s visit to East Timor, and he was forced by the World Bank to
184
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change human rights conditions in order to get funds from the Bank. It was in this
context that he made public statements which not only offered apologies to the
victims of human rights abuses, but also confirmed that Indonesia would no
longer rely on the ‘Asian values’ argument to ignore international human rights
instruments.
The Habibie government then moved to a fourth phase: prescriptive status.
The Habibie government ratified several international human rights covenants.
The international norms were institutionalised in the national law. Law No. 39 of
1999 also provided a mechanism for citizens to complain about human rights
violations. Under Habibie, the Indonesian government no longer sought to
denounce criticism from the UN and other foreign observers as ‘interference in
internal affairs’. Habibie also engaged in a dialogue with his critics, particularly
from the press.
However, it seems that under Habibie, Indonesia did not enter the final
‘rule-consistent behaviour’ phase of the spiral model. Habibie’s government
accepted the validity of human rights norms in his State Address of August 1998.
However, in practice, the government continued to violate human rights norms.
Habibie was not fully in control of his police and military officers who committed
human rights violations. His government lacked the strength vis-à-vis domestic
opponents (especially the military) to effectively implement international and
national human rights law. Habibie had no ability to punish perpetrators of past
human rights abuses, which allegedly involved former top military leaders and the
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previous president, even though Komnas HAM recommended that they be
punished.
Therefore, it may safely be concluded that under the Habibie government,
Indonesia moved forward from the first and the second phases to the third and the
fourth phases of the ‘spiral model’. However the government reached its limit,
and was not able to bring Indonesia into the final phase, owing to political
constraints.
The fourth concluding observation relates to the four elements of the
relationship between the rule of law and human rights identified by Chen.
Habibie’s law reform on human rights satisfied the first criteria: transparency. An
important factor here was that unlike the circumstances of the political laws
discussed in Chapter 4, the discussion on human rights and press laws took place
after 7 June 1999, the date of the general elections. By this time, the tensions
associated with the drafting of the new political laws were substantially reduced.
There was no ‘political game’ behind the drafting of the human rights and press
laws.
It is argued that the Habibie government did not follow Chen’s second and
third elements of the rule of law vis-à-vis human rights. Habibie did not punish
the perpetrators of human rights abuses involving top military officers and the
previous president. Only low ranking officers were brought to court, whereas the
generals could walk free. However, consistent with the fourth of Chen’s criteria
the Habibie government’s reforms did lay the foundation for the establishment of
a Human Rights Court. Overall, when Habibie’s law reform in the area of human
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rights and the press are assessed against these theoretical models, it is apparent
that they were only partially successful.
This assessment of Habibie’s achievements draws attention to the issue of
timing and priority in democratic transitions. Instead of choosing accountability
(punishing perpetrators of human rights abuses), Habibie chose political stability.
It seems that during the transitional period, Habibie did not have the support he
needed to fully to implement human rights and press laws. Not only did he govern
for less than two years, but also, more importantly, he needed political support
from the military during this time, in order to keep his job. This was the main
obstacle to him punishing human rights violations. Habibie’s experience reveals
that the potential will always exist for tension between the rule of law and
political realities, resulting in compromised law reform.
There is also an important reflection concerning the media. In nascent and
fragile democracies, it may be questioned whether it is enough to achieve media
freedom. The Habibie government made significant progress in lifting censorship,
and, most importantly, changing the paradigm from ‘Asian journalism’ (free but
responsible) to professional freedom of the press. However, again, significant
problems arose in the implementation of Law No. 40 of 1999. The Indonesian
press faced a new challenge: a lack of professionalism. This condition led many
press outlets to publish fiction and gossip rather than to report facts, with negative
consequences for the standing and safety of journalists and the press generally.
The sudden collapse of government restrictions led to another obstacle:
lack of public trust; most vividly demonstrated by scenes of angry crowds outside

314

newspaper offices protesting media coverage. It is worth considering that without
public trust, it is difficult for the Indonesian press to act as the fourth estate. One
of the possible answers is that the media should make a special effort to link with
and reflect the problems of local communities, in ways which facilitate their
resolution. Where such practices occur, then the shifting of the prevailing
paradigm, from ‘Asian developmental journalism’ to ‘professional journalism’,
will be seen to have occurred in line with the principles of good governance.
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CHAPTER 6
ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION∗

Introduction
Corruption is closely linked to the way governments conduct their affairs
in modern societies, and therefore also to the growth of governments’ economic
activities. It is unlikely that corruption can be substantially reduced without
modifying the way governments operate. The fight against corruption is thus
intimately linked with the reform of the state. This means that in order to combat
corruption, one must turn one’s attention to governance factors: corruption is
principally a symptom of bad governance. Corruption undermines democracy,
reduces accountability and representation in policy making, suspends the rule of
law, and ultimately results in unequal provision of services.
Corruption cannot co-exist with the rule of law. Check and balance
mechanisms between the government and parliament cannot properly function,
nor the independence of the judiciary be assured, when corruption is part of the
game.

The situation will deteriorate when democratisation is reduced, as a

political compromise between political actors and/or legal actors, and there is
neglect of the interests and the welfare of society.

∗

An earlier version of Part IV of this chapter which examines Law No. 28 of 1999 has been
accepted for publication in the Asia Pacific Law Review (2004) 1 (forthcoming). An earlier version
of Part V of this chapter which examines Law No. 31 of 1999 has been accepted for publication in
the European Journal of Law Reform (forthcoming).
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The failure of a government in fighting corruption will undermine its
political legitimacy. Demands for reform in the area of governance were a
significant factor in bringing huge mass demonstrations to Indonesia’s capital city
and the provinces during 1997-1998. When President Habibie took over the
leadership on 21 May, 1998, following the resignation of Soeharto, everyone
expected that the eradication of KKN (the Indonesian acronym for corruption,
collusion and nepotism) would have to become his top priority.
Combating corruption became a national commitment, as determined in
the People’s Consultative Assembly Decree No.XI/MPR/1998. This commitment
was reflected in new laws and regulations, most notably, Law No.28 of 1999
concerning State Functionaries being Free and Clean of Corruption, Collusion and
Nepotism, and Law No.31 of 1999 on the Eradication of the Criminal Act of
Corruption. Whilst the first piece of legislation, Law No. 28, requires senior
government officials to disclose their wealth and subjects them to audits, the
second, Law No. 31, widens the scope of the subject of corruption, increases
penalties and establishes an anti-corruption commission. The issuance of those
laws indicated that the Indonesian people expected that the government would be
forced by law, not only to build a government free from the practices of collusion,
corruption and nepotism, but also to bring an end to the problems of collusion,
corruption and nepotism, which emerged during the previous government under
former President Soeharto, and which were beneficial to only certain parties.
In the context of the thesis, the main question examined in this chapter is:
have Law No. 28 of 1999 and Law No. 31 of 1999 provided adequate tools and
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measures to win the battle over KKN, as the ultimate goal of law reform? In order
to answer this question, this chapter will first discuss theories of corruption,
democracy, good governance and the rule of law. This theoretical framework will
facilitate an assessment of whether or not Habibie’s anti-corruption reforms
followed the elements of good governance, and promoted the rule of law.
Part II of this chapter examines the legal framework of anti-corruption
prior to the 1998 reforms, followed by a discussion in Part III of corruption
practices under the Soeharto government, and the demands for reform which
Habibie faced. Looking back at the past will make possible a comparison of the
situation regarding corruption before and after the Habibie era.
In Part IV and V I will critically analyse the legal and political processes
leading to the enactment of Law No. 28 of 1999 and Law No. 31 of 1999. The
parliamentary debate, public responses, and compromises achieved between elites,
will be demonstrated.

It is expected that this analysis will assist in the

determination of whether or not the process was democratic, accountable and
transparent. It also goes further by analysing the content of both Laws using good
governance and the rule of law as a standard or criteria.
Afterwards, I will analyse the implementation of the two laws above. This
analysis will draw on data from Transparency International (TI) and the Political
& Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC). The dilemma faced by Habibie, to strike
a balance between his interests and the demands of reform, will also be
demonstrated. His actions, which involved several legal and political scandals
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involving members of his inner circle, once again, will be judged from the
standpoint of the concept of good governance and the rule of law.
Having discussed all the issues above, I argue that there was no significant
improvement in the reduction of corruption practices in the Habibie era. The
main reason is that the process, the content and the implementation of Laws No.
28 of 1999 and No. 31 of 1999 fell a long way short of the maximum standard for
promoting good governance and the rule of law. The 1998 Indonesian reform
movement was very keen to end corruption, and considered it one of the chief
evils of the state. It was unfortunate that law reform in the post-Soeharto era
(1998-1999) was not supportive of the satisfaction of their demands.

I. Anti-Corruption, the Rule of Law, and Good Governance
The aim of this section is to establish a link between good governance, the
rule of law and anti-corruption measures. As has been mentioned earlier, both
good governance and the rule of law are the main evaluation reference points used
in this thesis. Reform of anti-corruption laws is in line with the principle of good
governance and the promotion of the rule of law. This section will provide a
framework to understanding the causes and consequences of corruption, and for
identifying and evaluating strategies combating corruption.

Establishing a Linkage
Corruption is defined as “the misuse of public power, office, or authority
for private benefit - through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism,
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fraud, speed money [payment for priority] or embezzlement”.1 Corruption tends
to follow a formula: C = M+D - A, i.e. corruption equals monopoly plus
discretion minus accountability.2 One will tend to find corruption when someone
has monopolistic power over a good or service, has the discretion to decide
whether or not any one person receives it, and how much any one person gets,
and, most importantly, lacks accountability. The key element of accountability
refers to the extent to which government officials are subject to oversight, and
held to a standard, and how much information is available to measure
performance against that standard.
Susan Rose-Ackerman takes the view that “widespread corruption is a
symptom that the state is functioning poorly”.3 This means that the presence of
perceived corruption retards economic growth, lowers investment, decreases
private savings and hampers political stability. Foreign direct investment has
demonstrated a special negative reaction to the presence of corruption, within the
public sectors of developing countries.4 Taking into account the pernicious effects
of corruption on economic development, in August 1997, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for the first time suspended aid to Kenya, and since that
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time the presence of systemic corruption has been one of the factors considered at
the IMF when considering the granting of a loan.5
As has been indicated above, corruption can be seen as a failure of
governance.

The opposite of good governance is bad governance, that is,

basically, corruption. While good governance restrains power and monopoly,
limits discretionary power, and requires accountability, corrupt governance
enables monopolies, discretionary power and limits to accountability. Corruption
often co-exists with electoral politics. Politicians can buy votes, using their
money. Money politics can also play a role in lobbying members of parliament or
cabinet ministers to support one’s aspirations or interests. It is also feasible that
corruption can play an important role in political competition. Compromise is
achieved, not by mediating between differing interests to reach a broad consensus
on what is in the best interests of the group (and, where possible, on policies and
procedures), but by illegal actions such as blackmail, bribery, and so on.
In the context of this chapter, accountability, transparency, effective means
of combating corruption, collusion, and nepotism will be given special attention.
Decision-makers in government should be accountable to the public. This means
that any programme must be audited. Furthermore, processes, institutions and
information must be directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough
information provided to understand and monitor them. Unclear information can be
used as an opportunity to ask for ‘fees’, ‘rewards’ or ‘a commission’. Corruption
manifests itself in various ways, from small bribes given to local officials to
5
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obtain a service, through to avoiding regulations, and up to much-publicised
scandals, involving senior politicians and major businesses.
The lack of transparency in rules, laws, and processes may create fertile
ground for corruption. Rules are often confusing, documents specifying them are
not publicly available, and, at times, the rules are changed without properly
publicised announcements. Laws, or regulations, including anti-corruption laws,
are written in such a way that they can be understood only by trained lawyers, and
they are often conceptually opaque about important aspects, thus leaving grounds
for different interpretations.

Anti-corruption Measures
Corruption in Indonesia can be seen as being both systemic and
systematic.6 Systemic corruption within the public sector can be defined as “the
regular, habitual use of public office for private benefit, resulting in a reduction in
the quality, or availability, of government-provided goods and services”.7
Corruption is systemic when a government agency supplies a good or service only
if an unwilling and uncompensated transfer of wealth takes place between the
market and the public sector (e.g. bribery, extortion, fraud or embezzlement).
Systematic corruption is organised, not necessarily pervasive or
institutionalised, but recurrent. It usually involves large gains, and is often the
subject of popular scandals. While it is entrenched, and is the norm among large
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See ‘The Aksara Journal’, Tempo, 19 February 2001, 40.
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See Edgardo Buscaglia, ‘Introduction’, in Edgardo Buscaglia, William Ratliff, and Robert
Cooter (eds), The Law and Economics of Development (Greenwich, JAI Press, 1997).
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numbers of officials, intermediaries and entrepreneurs, corruption originates with
high-level civil servants who recognise and exploit illegal opportunities in
government departments and agencies. This practice contravenes the rule of law,
but, unlike systemic corruption, if the offenders are removed the corruption is
removed. Systemic corruption is pervasive, institutionalised (perhaps accepted but
not necessarily approved), and built into economic and political institutions.8
The probability of detecting corruption decreases as the corruption
becomes increasingly systemic, and, therefore, the traditional methods of
detection and enforcement become less effective. Under these circumstances,
Buscaglia and Ratliff argue, such preventative measures as organisational change
(the reform of the civil service by, for example, reducing procedural complexities
in the provision of public services) and salary increases are more effective.9
However, the mere imposition of preventative measures is not adequate. It
may be added that corruption can effectively and systematically be contained only
when anti-corruption strategies are consistent with the rule of law. Corruption of
officials responsible for the rule of law thus impairs the institutions of government
itself, and erodes the potential effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in other
aspects of a society. Therefore, besides the taking of preventative measures,
imposition of repressive or punitive measures should also be considered.
C.V. Narasimhan identifies three types of anti-corruption measures:
preventative, punitive and promotional. The term ‘preventative measures’ refers to

8
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those electoral and administrative reforms concerned with making all government
transactions, “more transparent and accountable to the people.”10 Punitive
measures include the “laws, rules and the mechanism for effective investigation,
court trial, departmental disciplinary action and other means, to deter the corrupt
functionaries.”11 Finally, promotional measures focus on the “encouragement of
value-based politics, inculcation of moral and ethical principles among the
younger generation in schools and colleges, and the build-up of a kind of social
ostracisation of corrupt people by society”.12
Robert Klitgaard advocates eradicating systemic and systematic corruption
by ‘frying the big fish’.13 When there is a culture of engaging in corrupt acts with
impunity, the only way to begin breaking it up is for a number of major corrupt
figures to be convicted and punished. However, any leader who undertakes this
task must have an enormous amount of political will from the ruling party, and/or
relevant government officials.

Political Will
The principal challenge in assessing political will is the need to distinguish
between reform approaches which are intentionally superficial, and designed only
to bolster the image of political leaders; and substantive efforts which are based
on strategies to create change. It is, of course, difficult to objectively evaluate the
10
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intent of political reformers. Many well-intended regimes have engineered their
own destruction through inept or ineffective efforts, while exploitative rulers have
successfully hidden their motives behind a facade of cosmetic measures.
The indicator which demonstrates genuine political will is the willingness
of the government to bring people, suspected of corruption, to justice. An
individual found guilty of corruption offences, regardless of his position or status
in society, should be punished accordingly. Syed Hussein Alatas has reminded us
that:

Cases of high-level corruption are rarely truly punished. The regime
has always been permissive towards its ruling elite. Corruption has
developed to the extent that offices can be bought, as newspaper
accounts reveal. Involvement of the highest leadership, in turn causes
permissiveness towards corruption. This is the greatest cause of its
perpetuation.14

Law Enforcement Agencies
Anti-corruption work cannot proceed until enforcement agencies are
strengthened. Those writing anti-corruption statutes must take into account the
weaknesses of the agencies which will enforce the laws they draft, particularly
when the police, prosecutors, lawyers, and judges, might not be independent when
it comes to money. There are two alternatives here: establishing several agencies
or one independent agency. Jon S.T. Quah explains both:
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In India, the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) is implemented by
the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Central Vigilance
Commission (CVC), the anti-corruption bureaus and vigilance
commissions at the state level. Similarly, in the Philippines, the antigraft laws and policies are supplemented by the Sandiganbayan
(special anti-corruption court), the Ombudsman, and the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), the latest
presidential anti-graft agency, created by President Ramos in 1994.15
…[The] most effective pattern of fighting corruption is the
combination of comprehensive anti-corruption legislation which is
impartially implemented by an independent anti-corruption agency.
Singapore and Hong Kong employ this effective combination to curb
corruption and it is not surprising that they are both perceived to be
the two least corrupt countries in Asia.16

Public Servants
Anti-corruption laws generally encompass a variety of statutes which
prohibit bribery, nepotism, conflicts of interest, and favoritism, in the award of
contracts or the provision of government benefits. Such laws often also require
public servants to disclose their incomes and assets. Nepotism in governmental
hiring is perceived as a serious problem. The existence of an anti-corruption law
will forbid a government employee hiring friends or relatives except when such
persons are best qualified for the job.
In recent years, several countries have adopted whistle-blower protection
laws, which encourage government employees to reveal — without fear of
retaliation — corrupt acts uncovered in the course of their work17 A journalist
who accuses an office-holder of accepting bribes, or otherwise acting corruptly,
can sometimes be fined and gaoled, regardless of whether the allegation is true or
15
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false. To ensure that fear of prosecution does not deter the press from exposing
corruption, many developed nations make it difficult for government officials to
obtain redress, if they are libeled by the press.18
Thus far, I have tried to demonstrate why good governance and the rule of
law are against corruption. I have also shown that corruption has become a
prominent issue in the governance discourse. In order to take a broader view of
anti-corruption laws, I will discuss ‘Asian values’ briefly.

Corruption and ‘Asian Values’
Can corruption be prevented, when the practice of it is seen as part of the
culture, or is tolerated culturally, in some societies? Can good governance and the
rule of law work in such a society? Can fighting against corruption be continued
in such a society, since good governance and the rule of law are seen as Western
concepts? These questions prompt a brief discussion of the relationship between
corruption and the so-called ‘Asian values’.
The implication, in using ‘Asian values’ as a justification, is that legal
models from Western countries cannot work in Asian societies. This idea is used
by both scholars from developed countries, and some Asian leaders. For the first
group, the existence of Asian values is an indication that Asian culture is inferior.
In the words of Tim Lindsey, “culture is often simply the excuse given by
proponents of law reform—particularly foreigners introducing a new law into
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Asian jurisdiction—for why their new, imported anti-corruption Governance
reform does not work.”19
Accordingly, the sources of Asia’s financial crisis can be traced to such
values as excessive loyalty to family, clan, or otherwise favored ‘in-groups’,
leading to nepotism, cronyism, and corruption. From this perspective, Asian
values are blamed for the cumulative economic distortions and resource misallocations, which, in turn, precipitated the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In some
Asian countries, Asian values have been used as a justification for dictatorship,
human-rights abuses, and corrupt practices.20
For the other group (Asian leaders), ‘Asian values’ mean that Asia has its
own cultural essence. Since Asia is unique, the transplant of legal reform from
Western countries will not work. Whilst the first group portrays ‘Asian values’ in
a negative way, Asian leaders are proud of ‘Asian values’. Asian governments
have the belief that law reform (including anti-corruption laws) should be imposed
in line with their own values and cultures; not based on Western liberal
democracy and culture values. However, it is important to note that Asian leaders
do not take the view that corruption is in line with ‘Asian values’.
Professor Tommy Koh, executive director of the Asia-Europe Foundation
(Asef) and Singapore’s Ambassador-at-large, takes the view that corruption,
collusion and nepotism have nothing to do with Asian values:
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Some East Asian political leaders have given Asian values a bad name
by seeking to justify abuses of power and inequities of their societies
in the name of Asian values. They have everything to do with bad
Asian values but nothing to do with good Asian values... There are
good Asian values and bad Asian values, just as there are good
Western values and bad Western values.21
According to Francis Fukuyama, whilst the rule of law might not be as
profound in Asia as in the West, it has been successfully applied in Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Fukuyama argues that it should not be
generalised that Asian countries are in one way or another more corrupt, or more
given to collusion and nepotism, than Western societies. He goes further,
explaining that:
In fact, the case can be made that cultural factors contributed to a
relatively low rate of corruption in Northeast Asia. One of the
interesting features of industrial policy in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is
how little corruption there appears to have been during these
countries’ high-growth periods, in light of the enormous powers given
to planning bureaucrats and the opportunities this provided for corrupt
or rent-seeking behaviour.22

Fukuyama is right. If Asian values were to blame, how do we explain the
different levels of corruption in Asian countries such as Pakistan, Singapore,
Hong Kong and Indonesia? According to the corruption perception index (CPI)
released by Berlin-based Transparency International, Singapore’s No. 5 ranking
made it the least corrupt of the 13 Asian countries in the study. Singapore’s
ranking was higher than Australia (11), Canada (7), and USA (16), Pakistan (77),
21
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Hong Kong (14), and Indonesia (96).23 In addition, Hindu, Confucian and
Buddhist teachings dating back over two millennia warn of the dangers of bribery.
Islamic teachings also forbid the practices of corruption. Those religions are
practiced in Asian countries, and considered as contributing to the values of Asian
people. As has been mentioned earlier, the definition of so-called ‘Asian values’
remain unclear, since Asia has many different ethnicities, religions, languages,
and cultures.
History also provides reason to hope that corruption is not culturally
embedded in Asia. The experiences of Singapore and Hong Kong demonstrate
that much can be done, if the proper legal and administrative systems are in place.
There is no basis for concluding that corruption is an inherent part of ‘Asian
values’. With improved professionalism in the public sector, and enhanced
accountability, transparency, and predictability, countries can be transformed to
the point at which incidents of corruption are no longer widespread, but rather
isolated, and rare. Anti-corruption efforts must not be neglected by Asian
countries, since anti-corruption reform should be at the core of reforms aimed at
good governance and the rule of law.
Checks and balances and the rule of law can constrain the arbitrary
exercise of power by governments. Judicial and administrative institutions,
devoted to providing clear and transparent mechanisms for private and public
sector interaction, are also essential to prevent corruption. All these lead to a
conclusion that preventing corruption is one of the key elements in promoting
23
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good governance and the rule of law. Culture cannot be used as a justification for
corrupt practices or the absence/failure of anti-corruption efforts. Law reform in
this area should be read in this context.
To sum up the discussion in this section, effective anti-corruption
strategies should be based on good governance and the rule of law. This means
that anti-corruption reform should promote transparency, accountability, effective
decision making, both preventative measures (including disclose of public
servant’s wealth), and repressive measures (including ‘frying the big fish’), strong
political will to combat corruption, and the strengthening of law enforcement
agencies, by establishing an independent agency,

II. Legal Framework of Anti-Corruption before 1998
A lack of accountability, transparency, democratic institutions and a free
press, are important contributing factors to the extent of corruption within a
particular society. Unfortunately, Indonesian politics under Soeharto was marked
by the virtual absence of all of those things. In the latter years of Soeharto’s rule,
endless complaints were directed at the rapacious rentier business practices of his
children, grandchildren, and business associates, as well as the off-spring and
associates of other senior government officials.
The most dramatic instance of this can be found in the pages of
Time Magazine, which, in mid-1998, pegged the accumulated assets of President
Soeharto and his family at US$ 15 billion.24 Time Magazine’s report argued that
24
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two factors pushed Indonesia into ‘a league of its own’, as far as corruption was
concerned. The first was the cascade of funds pouring into businesses and real
estate, with the World Bank estimating that Indonesia received more than US$130
billion in foreign investment, from 1988 through 1996. The second was the impact
of all six of the President’s children becoming major players in business in
Indonesia. An estimated US$73 billion passed through the family's hands between
1966 and 1998.25 It seemed self-evident to many within Indonesia that such
wealth could not have been accumulated legally, particularly in light of the fact
that several of the large business empires owned and run by the presidential
family had been built in less than a decade.
Corrupt practices in the Soeharto era could be identified in almost all areas
of Government involvement. One may note that rather than completing
investigations and bringing the KKN (korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme- corruption,
collusion and nepotism) cases to court, many high ranking officials preferred to
rely on rhetoric in their ‘battle’ against KKN practices. In practice, the
investigation of KKN cases faced several hurdles, such as the difficulty in
collecting sufficient evidence to bring a case to court. Most incumbent
government officials did not make proper investigations, since they themselves
often had political links with the case being investigated.
When Soeharto came to power, he promised to end corruption. Tackling
corruption, however, was not one of the priorities of the Soeharto regime.26 As has
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been discussed in Chapter 2, Soeharto was more concerned with national integrity
and economic growth. From the late 1960s to the mid 1980s, Indonesia focused on
macro-economic management and successfully established effective mechanisms
for controlling inflation. By the early 1980s, inefficiencies in the economy started
to impinge significantly on further growth prospects. This led to a gradual, and
perhaps selective, process of trade and market liberalisation, and with this the
GDP continued to grow at an impressive rate.
However, this era of un-interrupted growth spanning three decades, which
catapulted the country from a poverty-stricken nation to a middle-income
economy, came to a sudden halt in 1997, as the financial crisis in Thailand
engulfed the whole East Asian region, and Indonesia in particular, in a severe
economic crisis. As the crisis unfolded, unprecedented demands (from the
citizenry) for institutional change emerged. At the core of these on-going demands
has been the desire to curb corruption at all levels of government. Indeed, the
acronym KKN has come to symbolise the calls for fundamental change; change
which the public hoped would lead to renewed and sustainable economic growth,
fostered by greater participation by the citizenry in public decision making.

Soeharto’s anti-corruption laws
There were three principal sources of law prohibiting corruption during the
Soeharto era: the Indonesian Criminal Code, Law No. 3 of 1971, regarding the
suppression of criminal corruption, and Law No. 11 of 1980, regarding bribery. In
substance, this legislation made it a crime, punishable by a fine and/or
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imprisonment, for any person to commit, or (with a few exceptions) attempt or
conspire to commit, any of the following infractions:
a. wrongfully to enrich oneself or others in a manner harmful to the
state’s finances or economy;
b. to make a promise or gift to a civil servant because of such person’s
office or position;
c. to make a promise or gift to a civil servant for the purpose of inducing
him to act, or not act, in a manner contrary to his duty, or to reward
him for having so acted, or not acted;
d. to make a promise or gift to any person, not otherwise proscribed by
law, to induce such other person to do, or not do, something in the
performance of his duties which would abuse his authority, or
contravene public policy;
e. to receive any proscribed promise or gift, knowing of, or having reason
to know of, its illegality; or otherwise to misuse any authority,
opportunity or facility which one had, by reason of one’s office, or
position, in order to enrich oneself, or another.

The legislation also authorised confiscation of movable and immovable property
of a corrupt person to the full extent of that corruptly obtained, or used in the
commission of a corrupt act, and provided for payment of compensation to the
state in an amount equal to the value of any property corruptly obtained.
However, the legislation had some weaknesses, such as the exclusion of
the collusion and nepotism elements. It also did not cover corporate crime. It
seems that the law assumed an objective public interest in the health of the
finances or the economy of the state. It was not a conception of corruption based
on the probity of public office, or about breaking public ethics norms, but about
weakening the economic base. If there was a conception of an objective public
interest in Indonesia, it grew around the concept of economic development.27
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“National development, or pembangunan as it is called in Indonesia, was the
rallying cry of the Soeharto government and the public justification for his strong
personal leadership”.28
Corrupt practices were most pervasive and acted as a disincentive to direct
foreign investment. Demands for ‘facilitation fees’ to obtain required permits or
licences, government awards of contracts, and concessions based on personal
relations, and a legal system which was often perceived as arbitrary, were
frequently cited problems. A number of high-profile corruption cases were widely
reported in the press, although none of the accused was brought to trial. For
example, in 1995 the press reported the allegation of corruption against Haryanto
Dhanutirto, Minister for Transport, based on the three secret memos from
Inspector General Kentot Harseno. Vice President investigated the case and
publicly announced that some of the charges against Haryanto were wrong, while
others were correct. When student demonstration urged Haryanto to resign based
on “while others were correct”, Soeharto himself declared that Haryanto’s
problem was cleared and the case closed.29
Meanwhile, petty corruption appeared to be flourishing. Foreign
companies had little success in filing formal complaints, through either legal or
administrative channels. Foreign companies continued to report difficulties in
obtaining and renewing necessary immigration permits for expatriate staff based
in Indonesia. In some cases, unsubstantiated corruption allegations were made by
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government officials against foreign companies, particularly those operating in the
resources sectors, but there was no evidence presented, nor any prosecution of
corruption cases against foreign investors.
The Soeharto government established several agencies which dealt with
anti-corruption (see Table 7). On one hand, such commissions were needed, on
the grounds that corruption in Indonesia was both systemic and systematic. No
‘legal actors’ during the Soeharto era were free of corruption. Ibrahim Assegaf
describes this:

This can be seen as three-level food chain. At the first level, the
alleged corruptors feed the police and the prosecutor (or, alternatively,
the police and prosecutor devour the alleged corruptors) in the
investigation process, during which the police or the prosecutor are
required to decide whether corruption has actually occurred, and
commence further investigation (penyidikan). If the case advances to
prosecution and trial in the court, in the second stage, the prosecutor
will play a significant role in deciding the charge (dakwaan) which
will be filed against the alleged corruptors. Eventually, the process
reaches the courts, at the top of the food chain. The judges decide
whether the alleged corruptors are guilty or innocent and, if guilty,
what the proper sentence should be. Lawyers representing the alleged
corruptors act as corruption brokers throughout the process.30
However, these commissions during the Soeharto era failed to reduce
corruption rates. There was no strong political will from the president to follow up
the recommendations of the commissions. The public did not have access to the
full texts of the reports of the commissions. It was widely alleged that members
of the commissions (ministers, the attorney-general, the chief justice, and the chief
of police) were themselves not free of corrupt practices.
30
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Table 7: Indonesian Anti-Corruption Agencies under the Soeharto Government31
Institutions
Corruption Eradication Team
(1967-1982)
under
the
Attorney General’s control

Commission of Four (January
– July 1970)

Anti-Corruption
Committee
(June – August 1970)

Operasi Penertiban (July 1977
– March 1981)

Corruption Eradication Team
(1982)

31

Members
Chairman: Attorney General:
Soegih Arto
Advisers: Minister of Justice,
Army and Police Chief of
Staff
Members: Sutopo Juwono,
Sudomo,
Saleh
Basarah,
Soebekti, Deputy Attorney
Generals: P. Abdurrasjid and
Kusnun
Adviser: Mohamad Hatta
(former Vice President)
Chairman: Wilopo
Members:
Anwar
Tjokroaminoto,
Herman
Johannes, JJ. Kasimo
Secretary: Sutopo Juwono

Members included student
activists,
namely
Akbar
Tanjung, M. Setiawan, T.
Mutis, J. Kendang, Imam
Waluyo, Tutu Surowijono.
Agus J. Batuta. M. Surachman,
Alwi
Nurdin,
Lucas
Luntungan,
A.
Nababan,
Sjahrir, Amir Karamoy, E.
Pesik, Vitue, Managadang
Napitulu and Chaidir Makarim
Minister
of
Finance,
Commander of Kopkamtib
(TNI’s Peace and Security
Command) and the Attorney
General, assisted by regional
officials and the Head of
Police
Members: Minister of Finance,
JB Sumarlin; Commander of
Kopkamtib, Sudomo; Chair of
the Supreme Court, Mudjono;
Minister of Justice, Ali Said;
Attorney
General,
Ismail
Saleh, and Police Chief,
Awaludin Djamin
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Result
Not available

In the six months of its
operation,
it
found
irregularities
in,
and
recommended
countercorruption measures to the
government in relation to,
Pertamina, Bulog, Telkom,
and
several
logging
companies. None of these
findings or recommendations
were followed up by
the
government
Not available

Processed
1,127
cases
involving
8,026
persons,
mostly petty corruption cases
involving lower rank officials.

The necessary implementing
regulation was never issued

By any standards, the 1971 Anti-Corruption Law was ineffectual when
President B.J. Habibie took over the power from Soeharto as President of
Indonesia. By the time Soeharto lost his authority, Indonesia had become one of
the most corrupt countries in the world. This clearly indicated that the Soeharto
Anti-Corruption Law had failed to eradicate corruption. Reform was a must.

III. Demands for Reform and Habibie’s Response
The toppling of Soeharto and the start of the era reformasi (Reform Era)
had, as one of its main planks, the ending of corruption, collusion and nepotism
(KKN). This was the cry of the student movement, which formed the vanguard of
opposition to Soeharto, and this was formalised as soon as the MPR and DPR
(Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament), were elected, by a unanimous
declaration that KKN would be eliminated.32 The front line institutions which
would eliminate corruption were determined to be: the Courts, the Attorney
General’s office, the Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK - Supreme Audit
Council), the Police, the Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan (BPKP Financial and Development Supervision Agency),

the Tim Gabungan

Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (TPGTPK - Joint Investigating Team to
Eradicate Criminal Acts of Corruption) which was set up as an interim
organisation to bring corruption cases to court), the Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan
Penyelenggara Negara (KPKPN - Examining Commission of Wealth of State
Functionaries), and the planned Anti-Corruption Commission. It was also
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considered that the regional autonomy laws would reduce corruption by breaking
up state corruption monopolies, and it was considered that the institutions of
democratic government (political parties, the DPR and the DPRDs [regional
Lower Houses]) would bring greater local accountability, and thus limit
corruption.
In this section, I will identify the main pressures and demands for reform
in the area of anti-corruption. Habibie’s responses and actions will also be
evaluated. This section will give an overall picture of the relationship between
anti-corruption demands and anti-corruption reforms, before moving to specific
cases.

Pressures on the Habibie Government
Since everyone was expecting that Habibie would eradicate KKN
practices, all of his actions were closely watched. For example, when Habibie
appointed Hasan Basri Durin as his Minister on Agrarian Affairs, students in West
Sumatra strongly opposed this decision. They alleged that the former Governor of
West Sumatra, over a decade, had been guilty of four cases of corruption, ten of
collusion and seven of nepotism. When Durin visited his hometown, students
stopped the bus in which he was travelling and forced Durin to get off and to
account for the cases of which the students considered him guilty. After four
hours the students let him go, snarling at him that he need not return to his home
town.33 There was no precedent for such actions during the Soeharto era.
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Fanny Habibie, the new President’s brother, stepped down as the
chairperson of the Batam (an island South Singapore) Industrial Development
Authority. His son, Ilham Akbar, resigned from his position in the Badan
Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (BPPT - Body for the Study and
Application of Technology). During the Soeharto era, Habibie was Head of BPPT
and the Batam Industrial Development Authority. His family became the target of
the war on KKN.34
The demands for an end to corruption and nepotism focused primarily on
Soeharto’s family and their business associates. Soeharto’s fall from power had
devastating consequences for their business endeavours. Not only did the shares
of the companies they controlled take a desperate plunge, but the firms associated
with them became the object of attacks, threats, and demonstrations. What then
people expected Habibie to do, was to bring Soeharto and his cronies to justice.
The criminal prosecution of Soeharto was, without a doubt, one of the principal
goals of the students’ reform movement.

International Donors
Combating corruption is increasingly recognised, by both donor and
recipient countries, as a crucial step in stimulating economic growth and reducing
poverty. With the eyes of international financial institutions and foreign investors
upon him, Habibie would need to be seen to be moving towards this goal. In
addition to the domestic pressures on him, Habibie was faced with international
34
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pressure to clean up the economy, through more regulatory reforms. The
International Monetary Fund had already left its mark. The economic collapse
which has engulfed Indonesia since 1997 has highlighted distortions in the
Indonesian economy, which were tolerated while it continued to grow and offer
lucrative investment opportunities, but which have since been identified as serious
short-comings, standing in the way of recovery and renewal. Some of those
distortions were in the process of being eliminated, as part of the deals worked out
with the IMF in exchange for massive bail-outs. The IMF reforms were expected
to eliminate some high-level corruption, by demanding greater financial
transparency. New regulations had been passed, which aimed to eradicate
corruption in government tenders, for example, and a Bank Restructuring Agency
was set up to implement reforms of the banking system.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been a strong supporter of
governance reform in Indonesia. In Indonesia, the ADB supports the promotion
of good governance, including anti-corruption initiatives, which predate the
Bank’s adoption of its anti-corruption policy. As a major initiative for improving
public financial management and corporate governance, the ADB approved a $1.5
billion loan to support policy reforms to: improved regulation of, and corporate
governance within, the financial sector; a greater competition; revision of the
anti-corruption law, institutional strengthening of the BPKP (the national audit
agency); and research on public administration reforms.
In September 1998, the Habibie government requested ADB support,
specifically to combat KKN. In response, in May 1999 the ADB adopted an anti-
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corruption action plan for Indonesia, based on its Anti-corruption Policy. The
action plan called for implementation of various measures to fight corruption
(both by the Government and the ADB). It would also provide technical assistance
to support, amongst other things, workshops/seminars, activities encouraging and
developing greater involvement of the civil society in anti-corruption efforts,
assistance to implement the anti-corruption strategy for the Government, a study
on improving the efficiency of public financial management, and capacity
building for improving public sector procurement.35

Habibie’s Response
In his inaugural speech, Habibie announced that his goal was to create
transparent and efficient governance, free from corruption, collusion and
nepotism.36 Raising the level of the monitoring of government services became a
priority issue at the first session of the Reform Cabinet, on 25 May 1998. At the
meeting President Habibie stated that the reform priorities were primarily directed
towards eradicating KKN, as a basic step towards the creation of good
governance.
A few days after taking up office, Habibie requested the Coordinating
Minister for the Monitoring of Development and Efficient Use of the State
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Apparatus to instruct the Ministers of State to take the following steps.37 First,
increase the efficiency of work practices within their departments, by carrying out
assessments and monitoring of work practices, clarifying job descriptions for all
bureaucratic positions, and eradicating all levies hampering development.
Second, co-ordinate programmes, to improve accountability in their
formulation and implementation, particularly in regard to programmes connected
with services to the community and the business sector. Third, carry out
evaluations of governmental institutions and organizations, and develop better
systems for classifying competency levels, and for identifying work needs and
requirements. Fourth, co-ordinate at the central level, governmental institutions
involved in the designing of regional autonomy packages as a means to increase
efficiency.38
Fifth, carry out systematic modernisation of the state apparatus, by, for
instance, maximising the appropriate use of telecommunications technology, in
order to raise the state’s efficiency and effectiveness in facing the challenges of
globalisation. Sixthly, more effectively coordinate the mechanisms for monitoring
governmental services and development, including inclusive monitoring,
functional monitoring, and community monitoring. Seventhly, consistently
implement follow-up actions, based on the outcomes of monitoring meetings of
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the BPKP, the Inspector General’s Department and all community complaints of
KKN, particularly those registered through a write-in campaign.39
Habibie then delivered further directives. First, he issued Presidential
Instruction (Inpres) No. 1 of 1999 on the provision of documents declaring
financial responsibility to the financial investigation board, which standardised the
surveillance of government procedures. Second, he took steps to follow up the
results of investigations carried out by the BPKP, the Inspector General’s
Department and other monitoring apparatuses. Third, he endeavoured to ensure
that proper disciplinary procedures were put in place, in cases of clear
misbehaviour. Fourth, he agreed to carry out random checks in government workplaces.40
In addition, the Habibie Administration carried out investigations of
business contracts and licences based on special favours, and illegal interest
levels, fees and levies. This involved re-negotiation, restructuring and even
cancellation of contracts which contained elements of KKN. More importantly,
Habibie annulled the Presidential Decree, issued by Soeharto, which regulated the
matter of funding for foundations/charities.41
As part of its policy to stamp out KKN, the Habibie Government made a
request to the Indonesian people for anyone with knowledge of KKN within the
government, or the private, sector to inform the government by mail. In total,
14,614 letters were received, including 5,917 letters from Jakarta and 8,697 letters
39
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from the regions. The letters came from all segments of society; some were
anonymous and some were not.42
Letters were classified into those relating to corrupt, collusive, and
nepotistic practices, and those related to other matters, such as requests for
protection or funds. The letters were further divided into cases requiring civil or
criminal actions to be filed in District Courts, and cases which should be dealt
with by government departments. The District Attorney’s Offices also received
information about KKN from other sources such as newspapers, journals, and
Judicial Intelligence Operations. More details of the accusations were obtained,
for those cases believed to be worth persevering with, in order to check their
validity.43
Meanwhile, in relation to the fight against corruption, Parliament passed
Antimonopoly Law. The law bans price-fixing cartels or any agreements between
firms, which constrain competition through the division of product ranges or
marketing territories. It also provides a mandate for the establishment of an
Independent Supervisory Commission to investigate and impose administrative
penalties for violations of the law (although it failed to specify clearly the
authority of the commission in relation to the enforcement of its decisions). 44
The main thrust of the efforts to reform public administration was in the
area of decentralisation. The President signed two laws which significantly
42
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changed the relationship between the central and local governments. Law No. 22
of 1999 on Local Government Administration, and Law No. 25 of 1999 on
Central-Local Fiscal Balance, were signed by the President on 7 May and 20 May,
1999, respectively. Both laws were approved by the Parliament, with considerable
debate on the latter. Law 22 of 1999 replaces Law 5 of 1974 on Local
Government Administration and Law No. 5 of 1979 on Village Administration.
The latter was the first major government commitment to the principle of
decentralisation, with the express intent of devolving many functions of
government to the local level. This new law, which essentially deals with
administrative decentralisation, introduces landmark changes in central/local
governmental relations. The law will change radically the nature of local politics
and public administration.45 It was expected that the issuance of those laws would
also assist in reducing corruption at national level.
Habibie also signed specific anti-corruption legislation. The new law, Law
28 of 1999, which provides the legal basis for the commission (KPKPN), requires
public officials in ‘corruption-sensitive’ positions, such as Ministers and Judges,
to declare their assets prior to assuming their posts, and to agree to have their
assets open to an official audit, during/and or after their terms of office.
Law No. 31 of 1999 not only implements several new Articles of the
Indonesian Criminal Code, but also clarifies further the applicability of criminal
sanctions to corrupt practices by government officials and other involved parties.
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It also provides for penalties and criminal sanctions which considered as more
severe than those under Law No. 3 of 1971. Law No. 31 of 1999 also invites
community participation in the prevention, identification and eradication of
corrupt practices amongst government officials, by granting several rights,
including rewards for those who provide information on corrupt practices.
Theoretically, Law No. 28 of 1999 and Law No. 31 of 1999 should be applicable
to any misconduct in business practices, including banking practices. Both laws
will be examined fully below.

IV. Law on State Functionaries being Free and Clean of
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism
A. Political and Legal Processes
In November 1998, during its Special Session, MPR issued Decree
No.XI/MPR/1998, regarding State Functionaries being Free and Clean of
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, declares its objectives as follows:
a. To increase the government’s transparency in implementing
efforts to eliminate corruption, collusion, nepotism, and other
practices resulting in economic losses.
b. To develop public servants who are free from corruption and who,
in accordance with the law, are able to improve the credibility of
the government in the public’s eyes.
c. To prepare infrastructure and programmes designed to create a
corruption-, collusion- and nepotism-free atmosphere.
d. To encourage state administrators to be honest, fair, transparent,
trustworthy and free of KKN practices.

As a follow up to this decree, on 4 February 1999, President Habibie sent
to the Parliament the draft bill on State Functionaries being Clean and Free of
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism. It consisted of nine chapters and twenty
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three articles. However, on 16 February 1999, the government sent a letter to the
Parliament, which listed some amendments and modifications, particularly
regarding Articles 2, 5, 13 and 16.46 This suggests that members of Parliament
had only two days to re-read the draft, before their first meeting with the
government, on 18 February, 1999. Although this incident could invite some
questions on the process of drafting the Bill within the government, no party in the
parliament issued a formal complaint on this matter.
On 18 February 1999, Professor Muladi, the Minister for Justice,
introduced the Bill and provided formal explanation before the parliament. He
explained that the Bill was part of the attempts of the government to create good
governance consistent with the spirit of reform and national development. He
acknowledged that corruption, collusion and nepotism had been practiced widely
for 32 years, under the previous government, and that an ‘irresponsible culture’
had developed.47 He considered the function of the Bill in criminal policy as
spiritual and preventative, in dealing with KKN.

The Bill was drafted in

accordance with other regulations, such as those in criminal, civil and
administrative law. At the end of his speech, the Minister stated clearly that “good
governance is not primarily about legislation. It is rather located in the
implementation of legislation.”48
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See a letter from Director General of Law, Department of Justice, to Secretary General of DPR
on 16 February 1999.
47

See ‘Keterangan Pemerintah di hadapan Rapat Paripurna DPR Republik Indonesia mengenai
RUU tentang Peyelenggara Negara yang Bersih dan Bebas dari Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme’,
Jakarta 18 February 1999.
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As can be seen from the draft, the Bill relies on seven principles. There are
outlined in Article 3:
•

the principle of legal certainty,

•

the principle of the state organising orderliness,

•

the principle of transparency,

•

the principle of public interest,

•

the principle of proportionality,

•

the principle of professionalism,

•

and the principle of accountability.

No single Member of Parliament questioned these principles, and, therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that they were fully accepted. In fact, these principles are
in line with the elements of good governance.
Article 2 of the Bill defines the State Functionaries to whom the law
applies: State Functionaries in the State Supreme Institutions, State Functionaries
in the State High Institutions, Ministers, Governors, Judges49 and Other State
Functionaries, under the Regulations and Legislation in force. Examples of those
in the last category are: Ambassadors, Deputy Governors, and Mayors, at district
level. Having discussed this topic, both the Government and the Parliament agreed
to add another category: Other functionaries having strategic functions in relation
to the Administration of the State under the Regulations and Legislation in force.
This amendment extended the law to cover directors of state companies, members

49

The original draft did not mention the word “judges”. It was amended by the Bill drafter later on
16 February 1998.
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of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Indonesia, Rectors (Vice Chancellor
equivalents) of state universities, and Attorneys.
The bill required that all these State Functionaries make a report of their
accumulated assets and funds before, during, and after taking up office within the
Government. This led the draft bill to create a new commission, the Permanent
Examining Commission (Komisi Tetap Pemeriksa), in order to examine the assets
of State Functionaries. The Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) Party questioned
the need to establish a new commission. They also questioned the independence
of such a commission, since the draft bill stipulated that “the President establish
the Commission” (Article 13.1) and “members of the Commission will be
appointed by a Presidential Decree after consultation with the Parliament.”50
The Minister for Justice replied that a new independent commission was
needed on the grounds that MPR Decree No. XI/MPR/1998 requires such a
commission, with special tasks, whereas the current state institutions did not have
legal authority to carry out the tasks of collecting data, and evaluating assets and
funds of State Functionaries, before, during and after their terms in office. For
instance, the BPK would be acting beyond its powers under Article 23 of the 1945
Constitution, if it examined corruption, collusion and nepotism amongst
government officers.51
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See ‘Pemandangan Umum Fraksi PDI terhadap RUU tentang Penyelenggara Negara yang
Bersih dan Bebas dari Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme’, Presented by YB. Wiyanjono, SH, 4
March 1999.
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See ‘Jawaban Pemerintah atas Pemandangan Umum Fraksi-fraksi DPR Republik Indonesia
terhadap RUU tentang Peyelenggara Negara yang Bersih dan Bebas dari Korupsi, Kolusi dan
Nepotisme’, Jakarta, 15 March 1999.
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As a body established by the President, as Head of the State, the
commission would be an independent institution, directly accountable only to the
Head of State. However, the Golkar Party criticised the draft bill: why was it that
the performance of the commission would be evaluated by the Minister of Justice
and other related Ministers, as stipulated in Article 18, if the commission was
directly accountable to the President as the Head of State? How could the
Commission conduct an examination of the Minister for Justice, for example,
regarding his or her assets and funds, whilst it was the Minister who had the
authority to evaluate the work of the Commission?
This criticism led the Government and the Parliament to delete Article 18
of the draft leaving Members of Cabinet with no authority to evaluate the
performance of the Commission. Article 19 of Law No. 28 of 1999 stipulates that
“monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the duties and authority of
the Examining Commission shall be carried out by the President and the House of
Representatives”.
Furthermore, the Parliament also succeeded in forcing the government to
change the word “consultation” in Article 13 (3). The Law now says that: “The
appointment and termination of the Examining Commission members shall be
determined by a Presidential Decree, after his receipt of approval from the House
of Representatives.” The change is significant, since the President is required not
only to consult with the Parliament on this matter, but also to get the Parliament’s
endorsement before appointing and dismissing members of the Commission. It
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follows that the President cannot easily put his/her own close associates into the
Commission.52
Although Parliament changed the title of the Commission from ‘the
Permanent Commission of Examination (Komisi Tetap Pemeriksa)’ to ‘The
Commission for the Examination of the Assets of State Functionaries (Komisi
Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara)’, it agreed to the draft bill on the
functions of the Commission (to prevent State Functionaries engaging in
corruption, collusion and nepotism). Parliament also accepted the draft bill’s
approach to membership of the Commission (the Commission shall consist of
government and public elements), although it modified the provisions regarding
the number of members so as to set 20 as the minimum number of members,
rather than a fixed requirement and limit (Article 15).
The draft bill outlined five duties and the authority of the Commission.
The Parliament modified only the last one. As a result, Law No. 28 of 1999 states
that:
Article 17
(1) The Examining Commission shall have the duty and authority to
make an examination of the assets of State Functionaries.
(2) The duties and authority of the Examining Commission as meant
in Paragraph (1) shall be:
a. to monitor and clarify the assets of State Functionaries;
b. to examine reports or complaints from the public, NGOs, or
Government Institutions, on suspicions of the existence of corruption,
collusion and nepotism committed by State Functionaries,
c. to make an examination, on its own initiative, of the assets of State
Functionaries on the basis of the possible existence of corruption,
52

The Parliament also requires the candidates for the commission to pass the ‘fit and proper’ test
conducted on members of the Parliament. The candidates are required to demonstrate their vision
and at the same time the Parliament re-checks the candidates’ records and credibility, by opening
the door for any information to be received from society in general, regarding the candidates.
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collusion and nepotism by State Functionaries, towards any State
Functionary concerned.
d. to seek and obtain evidences, to cause witnesses to be present for
examination regarding a State Functionary who is suspected of
committing corruption, collusion and nepotism, or to request
documents from the parties involved in the examination of the assets
of the State Functionary concerned.
e. if it is considered necessary, besides asking for ownership evidence
of part, or the entirety, of assets of a State Functionary, which are
suspected of being obtained from corruption, collusion and nepotism
during his term of office as a State Functionary, it shall also ask the
competent authority to prove the suspicion in accordance with the
provisions of the regulations and legislation in force.

When the draft bill and the law signed by the President are compared, it
can be stated that there was no significant change in Chapter VI, Articles 8 and 9,
regarding public participation. Both the Government and the Parliament took the
view that public participation in the prevention of KKN is very important.
However, on the issue of age, the members of parliament made a small
modification. Instead of being over 30 and under 70 years old, as proposed by the
draft, prospective members shall be at least 40 (forty) years old and at the very
most 75 (seventy-five) years old. This has opened a wider door for people to
participate as members of the commission.
Another significant change is that the draft did not mention sanctions. This
led the Parliament to propose an additional Chapter. While the sanctions on
corruption have been regulated in the Anti-Corruption Law (discussed below),
Law No. 28 of 1999 restricts sanctions to those who commit collusion and
nepotism:
Article 21
Every State Functionary or member of the Examining Commission
committing collusion, as defined in Article 5, Paragraph 4, shall be
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subject to criminal imprisonment for at least 2 (two) and at the very
most 12 (twelve) years, and a penalty of at least Rp. 200,000,000.00
(two hundred million rupiah) and, at the very most, Rp.
1,000,000,000.00 (one billion rupiah)
Article 22
(1) Every State Functionary or member of the Examining Commission
committing nepotism as defined in Article 5, Paragraph 4, shall be
subject to criminal imprisonment for at least 2 (two) and, at the very
most, 12 (twelve) years, and penalty of at least Rp. 200,000,000.00
(two hundred million rupiah) and, at the very most, Rp
1,000,000,000.00 (one billion rupiah)

The new law goes further, by providing definitions of collusion and
nepotism. Collusion is defined as a conspiracy or co-operation, in a manner
contradictory to the Law, between the State Functionaries themselves or between
the State Functionary and another party, which causes losses to other people,
society, and/or the state. Nepotism is seen as any act of a State Functionary in a
manner contradictory to the Law, which brings about benefits to the interests of
his family and/or his crony/ies above the interests of the people, nation, and state.
The main debate in the parliament was the title of the bill. The Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), which invited NGOs such as the Indonesian
Corruption Watch (ICW)53 and Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia (MTI-People
for Transparency in Indonesia)54 to discuss the draft bill, asked the Government to
change part of the title from ‘State Functionary’ to ‘Administration of the State’.
This would have created a wider focus: the law would touch not only state
functionaries but also other parties involved in administering and managing state
affairs, such as private companies. The PPP also highlighted the fact that the draft
53

ICW held public discussion on the draft bill on 19 April 1999.
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bill was only a small part of the legal changes required by MPR Decree No.
XI/MPR/1998. The MPR Decree asks the President to examine both former and
current State Functionaries, their family members and their cronies, and even
private companies/conglomerates. The draft bill dealt with only current
government officers, and, according to the PPP, it was not enough. It also took the
view that the duties and authorities of the Examining Commission were
inadequate. Therefore, it suggested that not only should the new law deal with
former and current State Functionaries, and other elements of Indonesian society,
but also that the Examining Commission be given more powers and authority.55 In
fact, the major tool for the implementation of this law lies in the Commission.
The views above were strongly rejected by other political parties. The
Golkar party argued that, by changing the portion of the title from ‘State
Functionaries’ to ‘Administration of the State”, the subject of the bill, and even
the whole draft bill, would also be changed. According to them, the spirit of the
MPR Decree, above, is to deal with people who have strategic functions in the
state; not all officers. This does not mean that other parties may easily commit
corruption, collusion and nepotism. They would be punished by other laws such
as anti-corruption and/or criminal laws.56 The Government also approached the
PPP and guaranteed to examine and investigate both former and current State
Functionaries, their family members and their cronies, and even private
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MTI submitted written comments on the draft bill to the Parliament.
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See ‘Pendapat Akhir FPP DPR-RI terhadap RUU tentang Penyelengaraan Negara yang Bersih
dan Bebas dari KKN’, Presented by Drs. H. Hadimulyo, MSc, Jakarta 22 April 1999.
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See ‘Pendapat Akhir FKP DPR-RI terhadap RUU tentang Penyelengaraan Negara yang Bersih
dan Bebas dari KKN’, Presented by H. Sofyan Lubis, Jakarta 22 April 1999.

355

companies/conglomerates, by considering this new law and others. The ten
members of the PPP agreed to keep the title and the focus of the bill.57 This
agreement was commented on by the Golkar Party, saying that the PPP, finally,
was enlightened by God.58
In total, there were 127 problems discussed in 13 working days. Fifty
members of parliament sat on the special committee to discus the draft bill, word
by word.59 On 22 April 1998, the Speaker of the Parliament passed the bill and
forwarded it to the President. President Habibie signed Law No. 28 of 1998 on 19
May, 1998. The Parliament’s failure to adopt the PPP position, on the wider focus
of the law, indicated that both the Government and the Parliament did not succeed
in fulfilling all demands for reform, as stipulated in MPR Decree No.
XI/MPR/1998.
To make the situation worse, the Government declared that State
Functionaries needed time to deal with the law. This is why the draft bill said:
“This Law shall come into force 6 (six) months from the date of promulgation”.
The Parliament not only agreed with this Article, but also added another
provision: “Within at least 6 (six) months from the start of the enforcement of this
Law, every State Functionary shall report and announce his assets and shall be
prepared for the examination of his assets, in accordance with the provisions of
the regulations and legislation in force”.
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See ‘Pendapat Akhir FPP DPR-RI, above n 55.
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See ‘Pendapat Akhir FKP DPR-RI, above n 56.
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See ‘Laporan Ketua Pansus dalam Pembicaraan Tingkat IV/Rapat Paripurna DPR-RI mengenai
Pembahasan RUU tentang Penyelengaraan Negara yang Bersih dan Bebas dari KKN’, Presented
by I Dewa Putu Supartha Nida, SH, Jakarta 22 April 1999.
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The two provisions above are odd, since it gives twelve months for State
Functionaries to comply with the new law. This is considered long enough for
State Functionaries to ‘hide’ or ‘modify’ their wealth before disclosing it to the
public. Another serious issue is why it took nearly a month for Habibie to sign the
law (see Table 8). If one combines these provisions and the delay in signing the
Law, one may come up with an interesting observation. According to Article 24,
“This Law shall come into force 6 (six) months from the date of promulgation”. If
Habibie had signed the law in April 1999, immediately after Parliament passed the
bill, the law would have come into force in October 1999. According to Article 5
(2 and 3), Habibie would then have been required to report his assets before
running as a presidential candidate for a second term, since the MPR General
Session would be held in October 1999. Habibie’s term ended on 20 October
1999. However, by signing the Law on 19 May 1999, instead of the previous
month, Habibie saw the law come into force on 20 November 1999.
Consequently, whatever the outcome of his presidential candidacy, the public
would not know the details of Habibie’s wealth. It seems that this law was
designed not for the Habibie government, but for the next government.
There is a school of thought that, given the speed with which he signed
other laws, Habibie’s delay in signing Law No. 28 of 1999 must have been
intentional. This is important, since there was some speculation that Habibie
himself was an unclean politician. It was alleged that Habibie had committed
corruption, collusion and, nepotism during his terms as a member of the Soeharto
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Cabinet, for more than twenty years.60 Constitutionally speaking, Habibie did
nothing wrong in postponing the law.61 Politically speaking, it was perhaps a
brilliant move to avoid an unpredictable situation in the 1999 MPR General
Session. In terms of legal reform, this delay could be one of the indications that
Habibie was not interested in real reform.

Table 8: Comparison of Dates of Passing and Signing Laws
No

Law

Passed by Parliament

Signed by President Habibie

1

Law No. 2/1999

28 January 1999

1 February 1999

2

Law No. 3/1999

28 January 1999

1 February 1999

3

Law No. 4/1999

28 January 1999

1 February 1999

4

Law No. 39/1999 8 September 1999

23 September 1999

5

Law No. 40/1999 13 September 1999

23 September 1999

6

Law No. 28/1999 22 April 1999

19 May 1999

7

Law No. 31/1999 23 July 1999

16 August 1999

I have examined the political and legal processes leading to the enactment
of Law No. 28 of 1999. Special focus has been given to the modifications of the
draft bill by the Parliament, the establishment of the Examining Commission, the
independence of that commission, public participation and sanctions. Whilst the
seven principles contained in the bill were in line with the elements of good

60

See George Junus Aditjondro, Guru Kencing Berdiri, Murid Kencing Berlari, Jakarta, MIK and
PIJAR, 1998. “Guru” refers to Soeharto, whereas “Murid” refers to Habibie.
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According to the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution (2001), the Law shall come into force
one month after the Parliament passing it regardless whether the President signs the Law or not.
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governance, the parliament devoted little attention to considering the relationship
between those principles and other articles in the bill. For example, members of
parliament might have asked whether the principle of accountability was
sufficiently accommodated through provisions on the rights and duties of sate
functionaries. Another observation is that the original bill was poorly drafted. The
draft did not even mention sanctions, and led the parliament to add it, in cases of
collusion and nepotism. However, as will be shown in the next section, the bill
failed to nominate penalties for State Functionaries who decline to report their
wealth.

B. Content Analysis of Law No. 28 of 1999
Law No. 28 of 1999 created an independent committee (the KPKPN),
made up of representatives of government and of society, to examine the wealth
of Cabinet ministers, governors, judges, and senior civil servants. It also requires
such persons to publish their wealth, before and after occupying their positions.
Law No. 28 of 1999 provided the opportunity for members of the wider
community to take an active role in the development of transparent state services,
free from improper activities, through the reporting of cases of corruption,
collusion and nepotism. In this section, the law will be analysed focusing on the
three main features of the law: the role of the Examining Commission (KPKPN);
the rules for State Functionaries; and public participation.
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Authority of the KPKPN
Unlike other commissions set up in the Soeharto era, as will be explained
later, the KPKPN has a new and different task. It does not have a role as an anticorruption agency. Instead, it sends a form to State Functionaries and asks them to
fill in the form, reporting and declaring their assets and funds. The philosophy
behind its establishment sees it as a preventive measure. The KPKPN then
monitors and clarifies the assets of the State Functionary, by examining the
reports or complaints from the public, communal self-supporting institutions
(NGOs), or government institutions, on suspicions of the commission of
corruption, collusion and nepotism, by State Functionaries. It also has authority to
initiate an examination of the assets of State Functionaries, on the basis of the
alleged existence of corruption, collusion and nepotism.
This is a significant reform for several reasons. First, in the Soeharto era,
every minister was required to report his/her wealth to the President.62 However, it
was unclear who would evaluate the report and monitor changes in ministers’
wealth. Furthermore, the public did not have access to the reports, and the
President merely instructed his Ministers, whilst other State Functionaries did not
have to report their assets; and, surprisingly perhaps, even the President did not
need to report his own wealth. Second, because they are obliged under Law No.
28 of 1999 to declare their assets and funds, State Functionaries are forced to
separate their own assets from the facilities provided by the state. They have to
manage this matter clearly, in order to avoid criminal charges.
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See Interview with Minister Siswono Yudohusodo in Gatra, 20 January 1996.
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Third, the KPKPN, the police, the Attorney General and the public can
initiate questioning of State Functionaries whose assets and funds are more than
those commensurate with their annual incomes. If the officer owns more than one
property, which is not in keeping with his/her salary level, he/she could be queried
on how he/she obtained the means to purchase them. This will reduce
opportunities for corruption. Lastly, the declaration form can be used as a piece of
evidence, before a court.
However, Law No 28 of 1999 has serious weaknesses. First, it does not set
penalties, punishments or sanctions for State Functionaries who do not report their
wealth to the KPKPN. It stipulates that they have the obligation to be prepared for
an examination of their assets before, during and after holding their positions, and
to report and announce their assets, before and after holding their positions
(Article 5). Based on Article 20, they will suffer only administrative sanctions if
they violate this provision. As will be shown in the next section, many State
Functionaries have not returned their forms to the KPKPN and their unwillingness
cannot be judged as a crime, or even an indication of corruption, collusion and
nepotism. There is no penalty for State Functionaries who have not returned the
KPKPN forms.
The second concern is that the KPKPN does not have the authority to
perform operational audits and to investigate the asset reports from State
Functionaries. For instance, when a person reports having one hundred billion
rupiah, and cannot provide evidence as to how he or she could have legally
obtained that amount, such a person can easily declare that this is a gift (hibah).
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Legally speaking, the KPKPN cannot investigate further to ascertain whether the
money is a gift or a bribe. It has power only to record, examine, monitor and
clarify the reports.63 For instance, if the KPKPN receives information that a
person owns three houses, whereas the declaration says that she/he only owns two
houses, then the KPKPN will seek clarification of this inconsistency. However, it
cannot go further on investigate how it is that the person can afford to own two or
three houses.
Third, if, in the results of examination or clarification, there is found an
indication of the existence of corruption, collusion or nepotism, the results of the
examination will be submitted to the competent authority (police or Attorney
General), in accordance with the provisions of the regulations and legislation in
force, for follow-up action.

The role of the KPKPN will end at this stage.

Prosecution and conviction is left in the hands of the Attorney General and the
notoriously corrupt, poorly-trained and poorly-paid, judiciary.64
It should be explained here that, legally, there is a distinction between
‘examination’ (penyelidikan) and ‘investigation’ (penyidikan).65 According to
KUHAP (Indonesia’s Code of Criminal Procedure) an examination is the first step
in criminal procedure in order to determine whether a crime has indeed occurred.
If so, then it will be decided to move to the second stage (penyidikan) in order to
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Enny Sunniyah, Member of KPKPN, Personal Communication via Telephone, Jakarta, 20 June
2003.
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On the notoriously corrupt, poorly-trained and poorly-paid judiciary, see ‘Survey Report on
Citizen’s Perception of the Indonesian Justice Sector’, The Asia Foundation, August 2001.

65

Others translate penyelidikan and penyidikan as investigation and prosecution respectively. I
would prefer to use examination for penyelidikan and investigation for penyidikan since
prosecution would be better to translate it as penuntutan or pendakwaan.
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collect the related evidence to support allegations for purposes of prosecution,
including legal actions such as searches, detention, seizure, and prohibiting
suspects from leaving the country. Both the police and the Attorney General have
the authority to perform examination and investigation, while the KPKPN has
only the power to conduct an examination (the first stage). It is up to the police
and the Attorney General to decide to move forward from examination to
investigation.
One of the reasons for establishing an independent commission to prevent
KKN is that that the prosecutor and the police do not enjoy a high level of trust
among the Indonesian people in dealing with KKN cases. The public has learned
from 32 years of the Soeharto government that these two institutions are not
serious about fighting corruption. Indeed, it is no secret that many of them are not
themselves free and clean of corruption, collusion and nepotism. Unless a clean
and able prosecution can be ensured, proper examination will achieve little. The
overall effectiveness of the KPKPN must be questioned, given that its
examinations may be terminated at the hands of the Attorney General and police
officers.
Fourth, Law No. 28 of 1999 does not give detailed guidance on how the
KPKPN should conduct its examination. Article 17.4 states that: “The provisions
on the procedure for the examination of the assets of the State Functionary as
intended in paragraphs (2) and (3) shall be stipulated by a Government
Regulation”. This gave the Habibie government room for discretion on this
matter, and this invited problems. The evidence for this was seen when
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Government Regulation No. 65 of 1999 stated in its elucidation that: “on the
suspicion of the existence of corruption, collusion and nepotism by a state
functionary, the KPKPN should wait for orders or instructions from the President
to perform such examination”.
Government Regulation No. 65 of 1999 has gone beyond Law No. 28 of
1999, since the law does not ask the KPKPN to wait for the President’s
instructions or the President’s approval. It could be argued that through the
issuance of Government Regulation No. 65 of 1999, the Habibie government has
limited the role of the KPKPN. This indicates that Government Regulation gives
the office of the President a power to intervene the work of the KPKPN.
Moreover, since the role of the KPKPN is to perform an examination (not an
investigation), then, according to Yusuf Syakir, approval or permission from the
President is unnecessary.66
Another criticism is that Law No. 28 of 1999 does not give clear authority
to the KPKPN to publicly announce the results of its examination of the assets of
State Functionaries. According to Article 18 (1), the results of an examination
should be submitted to the President, the Parliament and the Supreme Audit
Council (BPK). However, in practice, the KPKPN goes further, not only by
announcing publicly, in the Tambahan Berita Negara (TBN-Supplementary
Government Gazette), the results of its examinations, but also by announcing
them to the press. Everyone can access the TBN. This practice has invited anger
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See Interview with Yusuf Syakir on 3 December 2002 in http://www.hukumonline.com.
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from members of Parliament.67 However, a public announcement of the results of
the work of the KPKPN may find its justification in Article 9 of Law No. 28 of
1999:
(1) Public participation as intended in Article 8 shall be manifested in
the form of:
a. the right to seek, acquire, and give information on the organising of
the state,
b. the right to receive equal and just service from State Functionaries,
c. the right responsibly to pass suggestions and opinions on the policy
of State Functionaries; and,
d. the rights to receive legal protection:
1) in executing their rights as meant in letters a, b, and c;
2) in being requested to be present at the process of examination,
investigation, and in the court session, as a reporting witness, witness
or expert witness, according to the provisions of the regulations and
legislation in force.

Thus, it is the right of the public to seek information regarding the assets
of State Functionaries. If the public cannot have access to this information and the
KPKPN is not allowed to announce the results of its examinations, how can
society be expected to participate in the prevention of KKN? Moreover, such
restrictions would also contravene one of the general principles of public
administration (Article 3.4): the principle of transparency. It is for these reasons
that, even though Law No. 28 of 1999 does not have clear rules on this matter.
Abdullah Hehemahua, Deputy Chairperson of the KPKPN, has announced that,
based on the principle of transparency, the KPKPN will regularly announce the
results of its examinations in Rakyat Merdeka, a Jakarta newspaper.68
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See Kompas, 8 November 2002.
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Abdullah Hehemahua, Vice-Chaiperson of the KPKPN, Personal Communication, Jakarta, 30
May 2003.
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Rules on State Functionaries
Law No. 28 of 1999 outlines several of the rights and obligations of State
Functionaries:
Article 4
Every State Functionaries shall have the rights:
1. to receive salaries, allowances, and other facilities according to the
provisions of the regulations and legislation in force;
2. to use the right of response to every warning, measures taken by his
chief, threat of punishment, and public criticism;
3. to express an opinion in public, responsibly, according to his
competence; and
4. to receive other rights according to the provisions of the regulations
and legislation in force.
Article 5
Every State Functionaries shall have the obligations:
1. to swear an oath or pledge according to his religion before holding
his position;
2. to be prepared for the investigation of his assets before, during and
after holding his position.
3. to report and announce his assets before and after holding his
position;
4. not to commit the acts of corruption, collusion and nepotism;
5. to perform duties without ethnic, religious, racial and organizational
discrimination;
6. to perform duties with full responsibility, not to commit ill-behaved
acts, not to seek benefit either in his own interests, in the interests
of his family, crony, or group, and not to expect compensation in
whatsoever kind of form which is contrary to the provisions of the
regulations and legislation in force; and
7. to be prepared to become a witness in lawsuits concerning
corruption, collusion and nepotism, and other lawsuits, according to
the provisions of the regulations and legislation in force
Article 6
The rights and obligations of State Functionaries, as meant in Articles
4 and 5, shall be executed according to the 1945 Constitution and the
provisions of the regulations and legislation in force.
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However, it is worth noting that the law does not stipulate what the State
Functionaries can and cannot do, in order to be free and clean of KKN.
Accordingly, the law should go further by talking about the ethics demanded of
State Functionaries. In other words, there should be three things covered by the
law: rights and obligations, permitted and forbidden practices, and ethics. The last
two items cannot be found in Law No. 28 of 1999 on State Functionaries being
Clean and Free of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism. Merely mentioning rights
and obligations is not adequate. This should be complemented by rules on
permitted/forbidden practices and ethics, in order to promote both good
governance and the rule of law.
The Soeharto government issued Government Regulation No. 30 of 1980,
which listed what civil servants have to do, and what they are not permitted to do,
but the Government Regulation did not touch on State Functionaries, such as the
President, ministers, governors, and so on. Law No. 28 of 1999 fails to fill the
gap: the Law touches on the President, ministers, governors and judges, but
remains silent on what the State Functionaries may do, and are not permitted to
do. Specifically, the law should make it clear that State Functionaries cannot
borrow money from, or in any way put themselves under a financial obligation to,
any person who is under their official authority or has official dealings with them.
The legislation should also establish that State Functionaries cannot use any
official information to further their private interests.

367

Law No. 28 of 1999, which is aimed to prevent corruption, collusion, and
nepotism, does not provide that State Functionaries are not permitted to receive
any presents, in money or in kind, from people having official dealings with them.
In the absence of such a prohibition, the KPKPN cannot ask the Attorney General,
nor the police, to carry out legal investigations into ministers, or members of
parliament, who report having received gifts such as cars, houses, and money
from their friends, relatives or colleagues. It is reported that Fuad Bawazir, a
former Director General of Taxation and Finance Minister in the New Order
regime, and current member of the MPR, listed his Rp 30 billion (US$3.33
million) assets as ‘gifts’.69
Receiving gifts is a problematic issue for State Functionaries. The
presentation of gifts to them is a time-honoured practice, and is generally
perceived as an expression of respect. On occasion, however, gifts represent
compensation for political and/or economic favors. In order to protect both State
Functionaries and the integrity of their positions, the law should develop methods
to govern this practice. For example, the law should establish that if anyone with
whom he/she has official dealings presents a State Functionary with any gift,
he/she has to reject it. Where it is not practical to do so (such as a souvenir from a
visiting dignitary), the State Functionary can accept the gift and surrender it to
his/her head of department. The rules should provide that a State Functionary can
retain the gift only if he/she pays for it at the value assessed by the Accountant
General. Law No 28 of 1999 does not provide sufficient guidance on the issue of
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gifts, particularly when it is recognised that existing laws, such as Law No. 11 of
1980 dealt only with the issue of criminal provisions regarding bribery.
Currently, the law does not clearly distinguish bribes from gifts. In many
instances, bribes can be disguised as gifts. A bribe implies reciprocity, while a gift
should not. However, even though the distinction is fundamental, it is at times
difficult to make. At what point does a gift become a bribe? Does the distinction
depend on the size of the gift? What about cultural differences, which can explain
different sizes of gifts? What if a large gift is given, not to the person who
provides the favour, but to a relative of that person? Does the distinction depend
on whether the gift is given in broad daylight, for everyone to see, or privately?
Clearly, the identification of a bribe (and gift) is not always simple. In addition,
State Functionaries should not be permitted to accept any entertainment which
will place them under any real, or apparent, obligation. The entertainment
provided can be seen as a kind of gift, and also a kind of bribe.
Another observation is that although Law No. 28 of 1999 relies on seven
principles: the principle of legal certainty, the principle of the orderliness of state
business, the principle of transparency, the principle of public interest, the
principle of proportionality, the principle of professionalism, and the principle of
accountability (Article 3), it is unfortunate that Law No. 28 of 1999 does not
elaborate upon those principles to create a detailed code of conduct for State
Functionaries. In addition, although Article 1 (6) stipulates that “The General
Principles of a Good Public Administration shall be the principles which highly
regard the norms of morality, decency, and legal norms for producing State
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Functionaries who are clean and free of corruption, collusion, and nepotism”, the
law does not show the detailed connection between “norms of morality, decency,
and legal norms” and the preventative measures against corruption, collusion and
nepotism.
Law No. 28 of 1999 fails to provide the tools and processes necessary to
regulate undesirable conduct, and provide incentives for good conduct.
Legislation which did provide such a framework was necessary to trigger the
bureaucratic reform which is arguably the necessary pre-condition to the
effectiveness of the preventative measures against corruption, collusion and
nepotism.70 Legislation which demonstrated the desirability and feasibility of
ethical behaviour could have helped to offset public mistrust and cynicism.
Legislation should establish a strong relationship between accountability, public
ethics and anti-corruption measures,71 and such relationship is in line with
principles of good governance, as has been discussed earlier. Unfortunately, Law
No. 28 of 1999 neglects this crucial point.
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Ethics and Code of Conduct
In several countries, a code of conduct of State Functionaries has been
established as part of attempts to eradicate corruption. In Brazil, the Commission
for Public Ethics was created in 1999 by a Presidential Decree, and a Code of
Conduct for Senior Government Officers of the Federal Executive Branch was
approved in 2000. Composed of six Commissioners from civil society, the
Commission covers 193 federal executive agencies, including the Cabinet, heads
of federal departments, and national secretaries, presidents and directors of state
and mixed enterprises. The Code obliges senior public officials confidentially to
declare their personal assets – including transfers to family members, direct or
indirect acquisition of control of companies, and significant changes in the value
or nature of their assets. They must publicly declare equity holdings of five per
cent or more in companies of mixed stock ownership, or which have business with
the public sector. They are barred from accepting monetary compensation or other
favours conflicting with their positions and face a restriction on accepting gifts.
They are also subject to public communications restrictions and the postemployment restrictions, of being barred from conducting activities related to
their previous public sector positions.72
Another example is the Guide to Key Elements of Ministerial
Responsibility, which was introduced by the Australian government, to assist
recently appointed ministers, parliamentary secretaries and ministerial staff. This
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document serves as a reference to the principles, conventions and rules by which
those in positions of public trust are to conduct themselves.
When Law No. 28 of 1999 is compared with the rules which operate in
Brazil and Australia, it can be said that the Habibie government did not take the
opportunity to issue clear guidance on ethical conduct for State Functionaries.
This failure represents a significant weakness in Habibie’s law reform
achievement. The parliament also failed to take up the chance to be involved in
creating a set of standards to govern members’ conduct and a system to administer
those standards. The nature of their positions requires members of parliament
continually to face difficult ethical dilemmas. They must constantly decide
between competing interests: national, constituent-based, political and personal.
This difficulty is amplified by the fact that most members of parliament
simultaneously hold positions in the private sector, and, because of this, are
perpetually ‘changing hats’ from one position to the other. In addition, they are
subject to intense scrutiny by the media, non-governmental organisations, and the
public at large. Given this environment, it is in the best interests of the parliament
to develop a code of conduct and financial disclosure rules, which guide difficult
decisions, and protect against false accusations.
Article 1 (5) of Law No. 28 of 1999 says that nepotism is recognised in
every act of a state official who contravenes the law to benefit the family’s
interests, or that of cronies, over the interests of the public, the nation and the
state. The rule on nepotism is not concrete, and control over it is, therefore, not
easily achieved. The practice of nepotism, as illustrated by actions of state
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officials, is hard to control. This does not mean that it is impossible to control, as
long as the rule is clear. A recent proposal from Argentina provides an example:
There, nepotism and favoritism in government hiring are perceived as
serious problems. Draft legislation would have prohibited government
employees from hiring a friend or relative unless he or she was
“qualified” for the position. But if prosecutors and courts were left to
determine who was qualified, they would have tremendous leeway in
enforcing the law. Suppose instead that the law were to prohibit the
hiring of any friend or relative—with no exceptions or qualifications.
Were this kind of bright-line rule the law, enforcers would have no
discretion.
Such a rule would make it easier to monitor compliance and
enforcement. If hiring a relative were against the law, and an official’s
nephew suddenly appeared on the payroll, the ethical breach would be
obvious. On the other hand, if the law contained an exception for
“qualified” individuals, endless arguments about the nephew’s
qualifications could ensue, muddying the question. With bright-line
rules, citizens, the media, and watchdog groups can readily determine
whether government is serious about enforcing anticorruption laws.73

Public Participation
As noted above, Law No. 28 of 1999 encourages public participation in
preventing the practices of corruption, collusion, and nepotism by State
Functionaries. Article 8 clearly states: “Public participation in the organising of
the state shall be the right and responsibility of the public, so as to be able to
participate in the materialisation of clean State Functionaries”. Since Law No. 28
of 1999 does not provide a procedure for public participation, the Habibie
Government issued Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 on this subject. This
regulation states that, based on the principle of transparency, State Functionaries
are asked, but not obligated, to give information to the public. The public has the
73
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right to provide information to the KPKPN regarding the assets and funds of State
Functionaries.
Law No. 28 of 1999 states that members of society will have legal
protection in executing their rights, and in being requested to be present in the
processes of examination, investigation, and at court sessions as reporting
witnesses, witnesses, or expert witnesses. However, the law does not protect
public participation by introducing a witness protection programme. Witnesses
who are reluctant to give evidence in open court are compellable, but the
obligation to give testimony is fair only if the witness does not have to fear for
his/her life. As the risk of intimidation increases, the rights and needs of persons,
whom the criminal justice system requires to give testimony, need greater
recognition. It is unacceptable that the criminal justice system might fail to bring
defendants to trial, and to obtain a judgment, because witnesses are effectively
discouraged from testifying freely and truthfully.
It follows that in the interests of a fair and effective criminal justice
system, the Habibie Government had to find a way to handle the problem of
witnesses at risk. In other words, it is unfair to encourage public participation in
preventing corruption, collusion and nepotism by State Functionaries but neglect
to protect witnesses. Law No. 28 of 1999 does not provide adequate legal
protection, a weakness which is most vividly illustrated by the failure to establish
a witness protection programme. I will return to this subject later when I discuss
Law No. 31 of 1999.
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Thus far I have discussed the draft bill and analysed the content of Law
No. 28 of 1999. I have shown that the final version of Law No. 28 of 1999 reflects
a number of compromises which were part of the process of drafting and creating
the law. I have also raised some criticisms regarding the role of the State
Functionary, the authority of the KPKPN and the unbalanced situation between
public participation and public protection. Overall, then, I have concluded that,
although it is an improvement over the laws which operated in the Soeharto era,
Law No. 28 of 1999 failed to achieve the maximum standard of preventative
measures against corruption, collusion and nepotism, when compared against the
principles of good governance and the rule of law, and the demands for reform of
the Indonesian people.

C. Implementation of Law No. 28 of 1999
As noted earlier, when Minister Muladi introduced the draft bill on State
Functionaries Free and Clear of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, he was
aware that “good governance is not primarily about legislation. It is rather located
in the implementation of legislation”.74 However, several weaknesses in Law No.
28 of 1999, which have been identified above, have contributed to ineffective
implementation of the legislation. Just as good governance cannot be seen in the
content of this legislation, good governance also cannot be seen in the
implementation of this legislation.
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It is worth remembering that the aims and the spirit of Law No. 28 of 1999
are to prevent corruption, collusion and nepotism by around 50,000 State
Functionaries, ranging from the President down to officials at regency and
mayoralty levels, nationwide. Therefore, the main question that must be asked in
assessing the effectiveness of Law No. 28 of 199 must be: has the law succeeded
in preventing corruption, collusion and nepotism? To date, the answer is: no.
Corruption is still a big problem in Indonesia.75
One piece of evidence of poor implementation comes from the failure to
establish the KPKPN on time. Law No. 28 of 1999 stipulates that the KPKPN was
to be established within one year from the date of promulgation (19 May 1999).
The process of recruiting the candidates to become members of the KPKPN was
performed unprofessionally and without transparency. Some discordance within,
and deviations from, the procedure were not clear, particularly who was to choose
the members, including the group which nominated persons to sit as candidates
for membership of the KPKPN. In fact, some candidates were nominated by
political parties. The circumstances surrounding the appointment of KPKPN
members provided yet another example of one of the central feature of law reform
in the post Soeharto era: genuine democratic change took a ‘back-seat’ to a battle
between elites over political power.
There were 204 names on the list of people nominated to become
candidates, but when the ‘fit and proper’76 test was applied by the parliament,
some names were called and some were not. The parliament, particularly Golkar
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Party MP Ferry Mursyidan Baldan, who chaired the working committee to select
members of the KPKPN, did not explain clearly to the public why names such as
those of Baharuddin Lopa, Tini Hadad, and Luhut Pangaribuan were omitted from
the list, whereas Jeferson Dau, Djakfar Murod and Aidil Fitrisah, whose names
were not on the list, were called and invited to join in the ‘fit and proper’ test.
Zoemrotin KS, who was called to participate, and then passed the ‘fit and
proper’ test, is reported to have said that the Parliament (DPR) did not indeed
perform the ‘fit and proper’ test on all candidates:
Frankly speaking, I was startled. I didn’t see my friends whose names
were recorded in the former list (the list of 204 names). I asked them
whether they were invited to the ‘fit and proper’ test. They answered
that they didn’t know, and had received no invitation to the ‘fit and
proper’ test.77
Seeing the lack of transparency of the process, Zoemrotin decided to step
down as a candidate for the KPKPN. Zoemrotin was one of the candidates
proposed by the DPR. When asked why he stepped down, Zoemrotin said it was
better not to become part of a body which had the task of eradicating KKN, but
whose sincerity was doubted by society. He further said that, “I am not convinced
that these people can independently investigate state officials. Therefore I'm not
proud to become part of a body of which it is not clear, where it will be
directed.”78 Zoemrotin also said that KPKPN’s domination by politicians and the
bureaucracy would become separate problems.

76

See footnote number 52 on ‘fit and proper’ test.

77

Kompas, 10 July 2000

78

Ibid.

377

It is interesting to note that only 58 out of 350 members of parliament
attended the plenary session to approve 45 members of the KPKPN. Their names
were then sent to the President. It seems that whilst some members of parliament
were playing political games in selecting candidates for the KPKPN, the majority
did not regard it as significant or important. It was inconceivable that the approval
session of the House of Representatives (DPR) for such a strategic commission
was attended by only 58 members. This indicates that the Parliament was not
serious about the prevention and eradication of corruption, collusion and
nepotism.
The next controversy arose when President Abdurrahman Wahid delayed
signing the Presidential Decree to approve the 45 names of those to become
members of the KPKPN. After having considered information from the members
of society, President Wahid then approved only 25 names from the list, in
September 2000. This incited the anger of the DPR. The installation of the 25
members was postponed, when the DPR asked the President to appoint 10 more
members from the 45 names it had proposed by the DPR. Currently, membership
of the KPKPN numbers 35.79 All of these controversies not only led to
questioning of the credibility of KPKPN, but also contributed to the delay in the
establishment of the KPKPN until after the date required by Law No. 28 of 1999.
The Government also did not provide basic support, such as the payment of
salaries and the operational budget of the KPKPN, for more than a year.80
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The wealth of members of the KPKPN has been audited with the result
that 14 members out of 35 were found to have ‘problems’, particularly
incompatibility between their own asset reports and the auditor’s examination
report.81 This invited the criticism that members of the commission charged with
the task of scrutinising the assets of State Functionaries were not themselves clean
and free from KKN. To date, there has been no further investigation of the assets
and funds of those 14 members about whom questions were raised.82
As has been discussed in the previous section, the KPKPN has limited
authority, and its power is limited to asking the Attorney General’s office and the
police to conduct further investigations where its examination suggests
irregularities. However, when the Attorney General himself was reported to the
police, the problem became real and complex. On 3 December 2002, the KPKPN
reported the Attorney-General, MA Rachman, to the police on suspicion of
corruption, as a result of a KPKPN examination. Previously, the KPKPN had
reported to the President, and asked her to sack Rachman on the basis of the
administrative sanction mentioned in Law No. 28 of 1999. President Megawati
Soekarnoputri did not follow the KPKPN report, and kept Rachman in his
position. Meanwhile, the public asked the question: how can the police investigate
an Attorney General who is supported by the President? This is further proof that

81

Pikiran Rakyat, 18 October 2002.

82

In order to answer my question, Hehemahua claims that the problem occurred since the standard
of auditing between KPKPN and the auditors is different. Hehemahua himself is one of fourteen
members who were found to have ‘problems’. According to him, he miscalculated his wife’s
jewellery. Hehemahua, above n 68.

379

in the process of democratic law reform, political will matters. To date, the case is
still in the hands of the police.
Further evidence of KPKPN’s lack of authority has emerged when State
Functionaries have refused to report their wealth, and KPKPN has been able to do
nothing to force them to comply with Law No. 28 of 1999. On 7 March 2002, it
was reported that 27,000 State Functionaries, including 157 out of 500 Members
of Parliament, had not yet reported their wealth to the KPKPN.83 On 3 April 2002,
the KPKPN suggested that the Government replace 9 government officers in
North Sumatra, who refused to report their assets and funds to the KPKPN.84 On
13 May 2003, 11 two-star generals of the Indonesian police were examined by the
KPKPN, in order to clarify their reports. Meanwhile, around 60 generals of the
Indonesian police have not declared their wealth, although they have been asked
to do so since 2001.85
As noted above, Law No. 28 of 1999 does not provide for the imposition
of penalties on State Functionaries who do not cooperate with the KPKPN. Later
the KPKPN found out that Article 216 of the Criminal Code —which provides for
a four-month term of imprisonment for neglecting to report to ‘legalised’
commissions like the KPKPN — could be imposed. The existence of this Code, or
the fact that it could be used in this way, had not been appreciated at the time of
the establishment of the KPKPN. However, to date, there has been not a single
instance of a State Functionary being sent to gaol.
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On 15 April, 2002, 39 Members of Parliament had asked the KPKPN not
to announce publicly their assets and funds. They had reported their assets and
funds, but for one reason or another, they did not want their wealth known by the
public.86 The KPKPN declined such requests on the grounds that if the wealth of
parliamentarians was not announced publicly, it would be impossible for the
public to participate in monitoring and combating KKN, as encouraged by Law
No. 28 of 1999. At the time, the Minister of Justice, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, agreed
with the suggestion that the role of the KPKPN should be made more efficient by
revising and amending Law No. 28 of 1999. The KPKPN itself also submitted to
the government a formal statement that the revision of Law No. 28 of 1999 was
necessary.
However, instead of revising Law No. 28 of 1999 to strengthen the power
and authority of the KPKPN, both the Parliament and the Government agreed to
dismiss the KPKPN through the issuance of Law No. 30 of 2002. The KPKPN
soon will be replaced by The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPTPK). This
change has invited further public controversy. The KPKPN has alleged that the
government and members of the parliament have decided to dissolve the KPKPN
because they fear the efforts of the KPKPN in examining and monitoring their
assets and funds.87 Although the KPKPN has done ‘too little’ in preventing KKN,
none the less, according to some members of the parliament, it has done ‘too
much’ (kebablasan).88 The KPKPN has requested a judicial review by the
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Supreme Court, on the grounds that Law No. 30 of 2002 conflicts with MPR
Decree XI/MPR/1998 and Law No. 28 of 1999. To date, the Supreme Court has
not responded to the case. The issue of the dissolution of the KPKPN will be
considered further below when I discuss the anti-corruption commission.
I have argued that Law No. 28 of 1999 is deficient because it lacks details
about both what State Functionaries may and may not do, and the ethics required
of State Functionaries. The law’s inadequacy was vividly illustrated by what
became known as ‘Brunei-gate’. President Wahid was alleged to have
misappropriated a US$2 million gift from the Sultan of Brunei. The money was
given by the Sultan of Brunei, Hasanal Bolkiah, for humanitarian aid in Aceh, and
the gift was handled informally, with no record kept of its disbursement. It was
claimed that the money was a “personal gift” from the Sultan to the President for
the people of Aceh. Legally, the Attorney-General’s office found, in early June
2001, that there was no evidence to support claims that the President had been
involved in any wrongdoing, in relation to this matter. However, politically, this
case became one of the reasons why the MPR moved to impeach the President on
23 July 2001, leading to the replacement of President Wahid by his VicePresident, Megawati Soekarnoputri.
Neither the KPKPN, nor Law No. 28 of 1999, was involved in the battle
between President Wahid and DPR/MPR. The reason is quite simple. Law No. 28
of 1999 does not regulate ‘gifts’ and the KPKPN does not have the power to
investigate allegations of the type which were made against President Wahid. The
KPKPN did not undertake any examination, nor did it seek to clarify ‘Brunei-
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gate’, or to comment on whether the President’s undeclared receipt of the gift
contravened the ethics required of State Functionaries. Although Law No. 28 of
1999 promised to be an important component of the Habibie Government’s law
reform efforts in the area of preventative anti-corruption measures, in the case of
‘Brunei-gate’ Indonesian politicians had their own method of dealing with the
allegation against President Wahid (political bargaining and impeachment).
Whilst politicians did not participate firmly in introducing Law No. 28 of
1999 to the people at large, public participation was also limited. It was expected
that when the KPKPN opened its office, people would come or send their input,
suggestions or reports concerning State Functionaries’ assets. According to Yusuf
Syakir, of the 14,000 reports on State Functionaries which had been placed in the
TBN (Tambahan Berita Negara-Supplementary Government Gazette), as at
December 2002, the response from individuals and groups in Indonesian society
was minimal.89 In 2001, 1,306 out of 1,344 reports were examined and clarified,
leaving only 38 for further examination.90 In 2003, only seven Members of
Parliament were subjected to special examination by the KPKPN, and it is only
the case of MA Rachman, the Attorney General, which has been reported to the
police.91 Evidence raises serious questions about the effectiveness of KPKPN.
Many State Functionaries have assets and funds exceeding the capabilities of their
annual income, but the KPKPN has, without reservation, accepted their
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explanations that those assets and funds have resulted from gifts or grants. They
were not considered as products of corruption.
In Part IV of this thesis, I have examined Law No. 28 of 1999 at three
levels: legal and political processes, content, and implementation of the law. It has
been demonstrated that the bill was poorly drafted, and the content of the law is
vague. The implementation of the law has not promoted good governance and the
rule of law. Law No. 28 of 1999 could be characterised by a lack of ‘bright-lines’
reflecting the compromise and political self-interest that were central to its
drafting and enactment. It can safely be stated that Law No. 28 of 1999 has not
meet the demands for reform of the Indonesian people for meaningful reform in
relation to the entrenched problem of KKN.

V. Law on Eradication of The Crime of Corruption
A. Political and Legal Processes
On 8 February 1999, President Habibie sent a draft bill on the Eradication
of the Crime of Corruption to the Parliament. On 1 April 1999, Minister Muladi
introduced and explained the draft bill. According to him, the bill was drafted on
the basis that corruption cannot long co-exist with democracy and the rule of law.
He admitted that Law No. 3 of 1971 on Corruption was out of date.92 The Habibie
government took the view that drafting a new law was a necessary step in
combating corruption, as demanded by the reform movement.
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Muladi explained that one of the improvements contained in the draft, in
dealing with corruption, was that payment of compensation for losses inflicted
upon the finances of the state, or the economy of the state, would not annul the
punishment of the perpetrator of a criminal act of corruption (Article 4). This
position differed from the practice under Law No. 3 of 1971, whereby according
to Muladi, many cases did not go to the court after the state received
compensation, such as the return of assets, or monies.93 All political parties
agreed with the Government on this matter, and therefore Article 4 was fully
accepted.
Another improvement was that the draft bill recognised corporate crime,
whereas the old law did not mention it. Although both the PDI and Golkar
questioned this matter,94 at the end of the discussion, all political parties accepted
the explanation from the Government that corporate liability had been recognised
in criminal law. Corporate criminals and crimes by corporations were new
developments, which demanded a new law. Thus, as a result of the debate on this
matter, the 1999 Anti-Corruption law explicitly extends criminality to acts of
companies, as well as to those of individuals, and authorises punishment of
managers and directors for a company’s corrupt acts. In the case of corrupt
companies, it authorises revocation of the company’s licences/permits and other
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facilities, as well as the suspension of some or all of its business, for up to one
year.
The Habibie government proposed the reversal of the burden of proof in
combating corruption. The Government took the view that defendants would be
entitled to prove that they were not involved in acts of corruption. However, at the
same time, the Government accepted that the public prosecutor would remain
under the obligation to prove the charges. This means that the Government
supported a limited and balanced reversal of the burden of proof. I will discuss
this issue, particularly in relation to human rights and the presumption of
innocence, in the next section.
The PPP party responded positively to this proposal. They claimed that the
idea had been proposed by their own party a long time ago, but the Soeharto
government and other political parties had always rejected it. In their formal
statement on 8 April 1999, the PPP party also reminded both the Habibie
Government and other political parties of the political compromise on Article 3
(3) of MPR Decree No. XI/MPR/1998. According to them, in Ad-Hoc Committee
II at the MPR Special Session of November, 1998, there was a consensus between
the parties that the reversal of the burden of proof would be mentioned in Article
3(3).95 However, in only a matter of hours, members of the PPP Party were
lobbied to cancel the consensus, on the grounds that the reversal of the burden of
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proof violates the principle of presumption of innocence.96 They stood firm, but
then, when the voting was held at the Plenary Session of the Working Committee,
they lost.
It was unclear who lobbied the PPP party to cancel the consensus. Apart
from the political tension described here, two months after the 1998 Session of the
MPR, the Habibie government accommodated itself to the idea of the reversal of
the burden of proof in the draft bill. Having discussed this issue, all political
parties agreed on a limited, or balanced, burden of proof arrangement in which
both the defendant and the prosecutor would have roles.
Another distinct feature is that the draft bill took the position that the
penalty imposed plays an important role in determining the probability of criminal
or illegal acts taking place. It was based on the assumption that corruption can be
reduced by increasing the penalties imposed upon those caught. Therefore, the
draft bill provided for longer prison terms and heavier fines than the 1971 AntiCorruption Law. No single political party expressed dissatisfaction over this step.
As if this was not enough, the Golkar Party proposed capital punishment
under certain circumstances, such as a national emergency, or an economic and
monetary crisis.97 Again, not a single political party disagreed with the proposal
for capital punishment. Having considered the reactions from outside the
parliamentary debate, as reported in the mass media, it can be said that people
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generally did not reject the capital punishment proposal from Golkar.98 The
situation can be explained by looking at the demands for reform, particularly to
eradicate corruption. It was assumed that the imposition of capital punishment
could have a deterrent effect on society.
Based on Law No. 28 of 1997 concerning the Indonesian Police, and Law
No. 5 of 1991 regarding the Attorney General, both the Attorney General and the
Police can act as both investigator and prosecutor in cases of corruption. This
invites chaos, and tension between the two institutions. Considering this situation,
members of parliament hoped that the draft bill could end the controversy by
allocating the tasks to either the Police or the Attorney General. However, as
explained by Muladi, the Habibie government chose to keep both, in order to
maximise the fight against corruption. This means that there was no conflict
between the draft bill and other laws. Instead of selecting one of the parties, the
draft recognised both of them.
As a result of tension between the two institutions, the draft bill introduced
the possibility of establishing a joint investigation team. The idea of the joint
team served as a compromise between the Attorney General, the Police and the
Government/ Parliament, on the issue of dualism of the roles of the Police Force
and the Attorney General’s office. Article 27 of Law No. 31 of 1999 stipulates
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that “In the event that a case of corruption being found to be difficult to prove, a
joint team under the coordination of the Attorney General may be formed”.
The Elucidation of the law explains that corruption cases which, inter alia,
involve sectors such as banking, taxation, the stock market, trade and industry,
and futures trading are classified as “difficult cases”. Corruption cases which are
difficult to prove also include those concerning monetary and financial
transactions, which involve the use of sophisticated technology, or which
implicate public officials, as defined in Law No. 28 of 1999. This means that the
Joint Team will function pro temp, and on a case by case basis. It consists of the
Police Force, the Public Prosecutors of the Attorney General’s Office, and other
experts needed for the investigation. Muladi hoped that it would be the embryo of
an Anti-Corruption agency.

Anti-Corruption Commission
Unlike Law No. 28 of 1999, which proposed the form of a new commission,
the draft bill did not propose the establishment of the Anti-Corruption
Commission. It was thought that the establishment of a joint team was enough, as
a start, to form such a commission in the future. The parliament took the view that
it was not enough. A new commission was needed in the short term in order to
gain public trust since both the Police and the Attorney General’s office were
widely seen as tainted by corruption.
The PPP Party went further by suggesting the establishment of a special
court to deal with corruption. One of the reasons for this suggestion was that it
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would allow both civil servants and military officers to charged and tried in the
one court. The judges could be ‘hired’ from society as Ad Hoc Judges. It seems
that the PPP was trying to say that not only the Police and the Attorney General
are unclean, but also judges are not free from allegations of corruption. Again, a
compromise was achieved. The PPP was forced to withdraw its proposal on the
grounds that there was not enough time to discuss it.99 Minister Muladi also took
the view that a special court was unnecessary.100 Therefore, the proposal for a new
commission was accepted, but the proposal for a special court was not. However,
it was agreed that the role and authority of the commission would be regulated by
a new law, and that a two year time limit for the establishment would be adopted.
Article 43
1.
2.

3.
4.

By no later than 2 (two) years from this law taking effect, a
Corruption Eradication Commission shall be formed.
The commission, as referred to in paragraph (1), shall have the
task and authority to coordinate and supervise, as well as to
make inquiries, investigate and press charges, in accordance
with the provisions of the applicable laws and regulations.
Membership in the commission, as referred to in paragraph (1),
shall comprise elements from the government and the public.
The provisions regarding the formation, organizational
structure, work procedures, accountability, duties and
authority, as well as membership, as referred to in Paragraphs
(1), (2), and (3), shall be set forth in law.

The debate above invited a question: why did the legal drafter not propose
the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission on the draft bill? The story
below will explain the political struggle behind the attempt to form the
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Commission. By the end of November 1998 (two months before the President sent
the draft bill to the Parliament), President Habibie was ready to move ahead with
granting unprecedented powers to an independent commission, with a mandate to
investigate, and order the prosecution of, the Soeharto family and its cronies.101
The commission, which was to be headed by the outspoken human rights lawyer
and activist Adnan Buyung Nasution, had received the President's agreement in
principle that it would be allowed to carry out its duties, with the right to conduct
its own investigations and interrogations, independently of the Attorney General’s
Department. Habibie also agreed in principle that the Commission was to receive
the legal mandate to issue subpoenas, ordering parties to provide testimony and
documents. Most significantly, Nasution and his Commission were to be given the
right to order the confiscation of Soeharto family assets and bring charges against
Soeharto, his children, and cronies.102
However, shortly after the President gave his word to Nasution that the
commission would be allowed to perform its duties without undue interference
from third parties, troubles started. Only one day after Habibie offered his
blessings to Nasution, the President’s top advisors stepped in and tried
to convince the President not to allow the commission to go ahead as
planned. General Wiranto, Minister of Defence and Commander of the Armed
Forces would consent, only if the Armed Forces were represented on the
commission. It was also apparent that some people inside the Habibie inner-circle
were leaking information to the Soeharto family, prompting Soeharto’s lawyer to
101
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issue threats to the Habibie government that it, too, would suffer the consequences
if the Commission were to be given official approval to move ahead. In a signed
statement by Yohannes Yacob, Soeharto’s lawyer, a thinly veiled threat to the
Habibie government was prepared on the same day Habibie met Nasution: “We
need to point out that the probe, [if] taken to court, will also drag down
government officials, ex-officials and all the cronies who are also suspected of
improper gains through corruption, collusion and nepotism.”103
After much wavering, and a flurry of late-night meetings between
Habibie’s men and Nasution, the commission was called off, just hours before it
was supposed to be announced to the public.104 In its place, Habibie issued a
presidential order to Attorney General Ghalib, to pursue the investigations
on his own, without the independent commission. Ghalib was the one who had
strongly rejected the idea of such a commission. As the Attorney General, Ghalib
thought that the commission was unnecessary, since his office was ready to fight
and combat corruption.105 He could not agree to a commission which had the
same powers as his own office. According to Nasution, members of the Habibie
Cabinet also feared that the commission would expand its work to include
officials still in office.106 As a result of this political battle, no commission was
formed.
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This story reveals the role which political compromise played in law
reform under Habibie. Habibie planned to establish an anti-corruption
commission, but later changed his mind. This shifting position led the government
to prepare a draft bill which did not provide for the establishment of a
commission. However, the Parliament pushed the government to include
provisions for the establishment of an anti-corruption commission. The
Government then agreed, on the condition that a time-year time frame be adopted
for the establishment of the commission.
A Special Committee, consisting of fifty Members of Parliament,
discussed the draft bill from 19 April 1999 to 22 July 1999. This committee
consisted of 30 members from the Golkar Party, 8 members from the Indonesian
Military representatives in the parliament, 10 from the PPP party and 2 from the
PDI party. The draft bill consisted of five chapters and forty four articles. Having
discussed the draft, both the Parliament and the Government agreed to modify the
draft to seven chapters and forty five articles. On 23 July 1999, the Chair of the
DPR, Harmoko, sent a letter to the President, saying that the revised draft had
been passed. President Habibie signed Law No. 31 of 1999 on 16 August, 1999.
As from the time this law took effect, Law No. 3 of 1971 became null and void.

B. Content Analysis of Law No. 31 of 1999
Whilst Law No. 28 of 1999 (discussed in the previous section of this
chapter) might be seen as a preventative measure, Law No. 31 of 1999 could be
seen as a repressive or punitive measure, in fighting corruption. However, several
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features of Law No. 31 of 1999 contributed to the inability of the Habibie
government (and also the next government) to deal effectively with corruption. In
this examination of the content of Law No. 31 of 1999, the focus will be on the
penalty system, public participation, the reversal of the burden of proof,
transitionary provisions and an independent commission. I argue that the content
of Law No. 31 of 1999 is vague, and does not achieve the maximum standard of
reform in this area.

Penalty Systems
As noted above, Law No. 31 of 1999 is based the view that the magnitude
of the penalty imposed plays an important role in determining the probability of
criminal or illegal acts taking place. Having considered the deterrent effect, it was
thought that corruption could be reduced, by increasing the penalties imposed on
those caught. Unlike the Criminal Code and the 1971 Anti-Corruption Law, Law
No. 31 of 1999 goes further, by setting minimum and maximum sentences, or
penalties. It also modifies the penalties imposed by the two previous laws.
However, although, at least theoretically, higher penalties may reduce the
number of acts of corruption, they may also lead to demands for higher bribes for
the corrupt acts which still take place. There seems to be a wide gap between the
penalties specified in the laws and regulations, and the penalties which are
effectively imposed. This means that increasing the specified penalty will not help
much in itself, if not followed by other measures such as effective and consistent
enforcement. Also, there is the danger that an unscrupulous government could use
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the weapon of high penalties to go after political opponents. In other words,
penalties could be used selectively or, worse, they could be used in connection
with fabricated accusations.
It is worth noting that the basic conclusion of work done on the economics
of crime holds that the optimal amount of corruption is not zero, once one takes
account of the costs of prevention. Deterrence expenditures should be set so that
marginal benefits equal marginal costs.107 Deterrence against criminal behaviour
depends on the probability of detection and punishment, and on the penalties
imposed—those imposed by the legal system, and more subtle costs, such as loss
of reputation, or shame. In addition, there should be a close connection between
increasing the penalty and limiting the judge’s discretion. This is particularly
important in the Indonesian context, when minimum and maximum sentences set
by the law can be used as a ‘bargaining chip’ between all parties involved before
the court.
However, it is not entirely true that Law No. 31 of 1999 sets higher
penalties for corruption than had previously been available under Indonesian law.
Indeed, it sets a higher fine, compared to the Criminal Code and Law No. 3 of
1971, but if one contravenes Article 387 or 388 of the Criminal Code, a person
convicted of this offence faced a maximum penalty of 7 years imprisonment under
the Criminal Code, whereas under Law No. 3 of 1971, he/she will be punished
with life imprisonment or 20 years. In the Habibie era, under Law No. 31 of 1999,
which was supposed to be a central instrument in the Habibie Government’s effort
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to crack down on corruption, a person convicted of this offence would be
punished with 2 years (minimum) to 7 years (maximum) imprisonment.108 It safely
can be stated that the previous law set higher penalties than the 1999 law on this
matter. The comparison shows that the claim of the Habibie Government, that it
had reformed anti-corruption laws by increasing the penalty, was not entirely true.
Another problem is that, whilst Law No. 31 of 1999 uses and modifies 19
articles from the Criminal Code, it does not state that those 19 articles become
null and void at the time Law No. 31 of 1999 is promulgated. It states only that
Law No. 3 of 1971 is null and void; but does not define the status of the Criminal
Code. This leaves room for ‘bargaining’ between all parties (defendant, Police
and/or Attorney General, lawyers and judges), in choosing between invoking the
Criminal Code or Law No. 31 of 1999, depending on which one is of greater
‘benefit’ to the disparate parties. The resulting uncertainty regarding the
appropriate manner in which to proceed against individuals accused of corruption
risks creating a perception that penalties will be applied selectively, or arbitrarily.
This is not in line with the principles of good governance and the rule of law.

Public Participation
Successful law enforcement and anti-corruption strategies are largely
dependent upon both the willingness, and the availability, of individuals to
provide information, and/or to give evidence. Individuals will not be willing or
108
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available, unless they have confidence that the Government will protect their
rights, as well as their safety. Potential accusers are often reluctant to come
forward, and to spend the time and effort to go through the full process required,
to punish someone. Also, when corruption is widespread, the costs to the accusers
in terms of social capital, such as loss of friends and family relations, can be high.
The drafters of the bill were aware of the significance of public
participation. The bill encouraged public participation, by providing grant
recommendations to members of the public who had rendered assistance in efforts
to prevent and eradicate acts of corruption. Members of parliament thought that
the draft bill did not provide adequate legal protection, and lacked detailed
provisions on the rights of the public to participate in combating corruption.
Minister Muladi agreed with the suggestion that amendments were needed and the
text of Article 41 became:
1. The public shall be able to participate in assisting in efforts
towards the prevention and eradication of corruption.
2. The participation of the public, as referred to in Paragraph (1),
may be realised in the following forms:
a. the right to seek, obtain and provide information, regarding
suspicion of the commission of acts of corruption;
b. the right to obtain assistance in seeking, obtaining and providing
information, regarding suspicion of crimes of corruption having
been committed, to/from law enforcement authorities handling
criminal acts of corruption;
c. the right to convey advice and opinions, in a responsible manner,
to law enforcement authorities handling criminal acts of
corruption;
d. the right to obtain answers to questions, regarding reports
submitted to law enforcement authorities, within 30 (thirty)
days;
e. the right to obtain legal protection with regard to:
hundred million rupiah) and not exceeding Rp 350,000,000 (three hundred and fifty
million rupiah).
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1. implementing one’s rights, as referred to in Sub-paragraphs a,
b, and c;
2. being summoned to be present during the inquiry,
investigation process, and in court sessions, as witnesses or
expert witnesses, in accordance with the applicable laws and
regulations.
3. The public, as referred to in Paragraph (1) shall have the right
and responsibility to make efforts to prevent and eradicate
acts of corruption.
4. The rights and responsibilities, as referred to in Paragraphs (2)
and (3), shall be conducted with due adherence to the
principles and provisions set forth in the applicable laws and
regulations, and with due adherence to religious, and other
social, norms.
5. Provisions regarding the procedures on the implementation of
public participation in the prevention and eradication of
criminal acts of corruption, as referred to in this Article,
shall be further stipulated by a government regulation.

Although Law No. 31 of 1999 encourages public participation, it does not
establish a witness protection scheme. Minister Muladi said only that the
Government would consider it in the future, since, borrowing his own words, “it is
a key component, or valuable instrument, of good government”.109 As a professor
of criminal law, Muladi was aware of the significance of legal protection for
witnesses. However, as the Minister of Justice, he did not take the opportunity to
utilise the process of drafting and discussing the Anti-Corruption Law as a step
towards the establishment of a witness protection scheme.
Witness protection usually starts with a risk-based assessment of the direct
threat to the witness, and the vulnerability of the witness.110 Where the risk is

109

See ‘Jawaban Pemerintah atas Pemandangan Umum Fraksi-fraksi DPR RI terhadap RUU
tentang pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi’, Jakarta 16 April 1999.
110

See John Feneley, ‘Witness Protection Schemes- Pitfalls & Best Practice & Covert
Investigations’, paper presented at 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), held by
Transparency International, 7-11 September 1997.

398

assessed as relatively low, there is a wide range of actions which can be taken.
They include, but are not limited to:
•

involving local police in patrolling the person’s home on a regular basis

•

improving the person’s home security by upgrading their door locks,
security bars for windows and doors, securing the mail box and entry
gates, etc.

•

installing an alarm, monitored by the law enforcement agency

•

screening phone calls with an answering machine

•

having malicious calls traced through the local telephone authority

•

and providing immediate protection at the person’s home or safe house.111

Where the risk is assessed as very high, the person can be placed in a
formal witness protection scheme, and this can involve the person and/or his/her
family being relocated to another province, or even overseas, and being given new
identities. A substantial amount of witness protection involves counselling the
witness and/or his/her family, to allay their fears. Witness protection legislation
would encourage testimony, by protecting material witnesses and improving the
prosecution and conviction of corrupt people.112
Neither Law No. 31 of 1999 nor Law No. 28 of 1999, discussed above
provides these forms of protection. Instead, Law No. 31 of 1999 says only that the
public has “the right to obtain legal protection”. As will be discussed below, the
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failure to provide for witness protection has seriously hampered the effective the
implementation of Law No. 31 of 1999.

Burden of Proof
As a general rule, the party which asserts a case against the other must
establish or prove it, by evidence sufficient to satisfy the tribunal that the assertion
is well made. He/she who asserts must prove the elements of legal claim which is
asserted. It is said that he/she bears the onus of proof.113 In some circumstances
the other party may carry the burden of displacing a presumption which, unless
evidence to the contrary is provided, will result in a certain conclusion.
In modern criminal legal systems, the prosecution carries the legal burden
of proving all the elements of the crime with which the accused is charged. This
includes disproving any defence put in issue by evidence adduced by the
defendant. However, in some countries, there are exceptions to this general rule.
For example, the legal burden of proving certain defences may have to be
discharged by the defendant. In this case the legal onus of proof is stated to be
‘reversed’ because, on the particular issue, the onus is put on the defendant.
However, it significant to understand that in most cases where a reverse onus
operates the so-called reversal is so, only in the sense that the defendant is obliged
to proof an issue which the defendant has raised himself or herself. It is rare for
such a reversal to require the defendant to disprove an assertion made by the
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prosecution.114 As noted above, it is widely regarded to be an essential element of
a fair trial that he/she who asserts must prove. The onus of proof is stated to lie on
the party which makes the assertion. It is generally considered that it would be
unjust to require a party to disprove a mere assertion made by the other.
In criminal proceedings, the international and regional declarations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, all protect the right of the individual to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Most add the words “according to law”
and the words “by a competent court or tribunal”. Article 11 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights stipulates, “Everyone charged with a penal offence
has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, according to
law...”.Likewise Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights says: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have
the right to be presumed innocent, until proven guilty according to law.”
In summary, the right to a fair trial, and the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty according to law, require that the onus of proof must fall upon
the prosecution. However, Law No. 31 of 1999 states:
Article 37
1. Defendants shall be entitled to prove that they were not involved in
acts of corruption.
2. In the event that defendants are able to prove that they were not
involved in corruption, such information shall be used in their favour.
This means that besides the right to be presumed innocent, the 1999 Law
gives additional rights to the defendant: the right to prove his innocence. At the
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same time, the public prosecutor remains under an obligation to prove the charges.
It seems that the question here is not so much whether having to contradict an
assertion by the other party is inconsistent with human rights and norms, but
rather whether ‘requiring’ the defendant, in criminal proceedings, to prove any
element of his defence, is inconsistent with those universal norms, established for
the protection of the individual.
In relation to corruption offences the question becomes important when
anti-corruption policy makers have to decide how to strike the right balance
between ensuring the successful prosecution of the corrupt, and safeguarding the
accused from unfairness or wrongful conviction. Given the difficulty of proving
that a bribe was sought or paid, especially in relation to senior officials, is it
justifiable, for example, to make it an offence for a public official to own assets,
acquired since he took office, which far exceed his official salary, and to require
him to explain how he came by those assets? The policy-maker and the legislator
would need to consider whether requiring the defendant to rebut the allegations
that he/she has commit a criminal offence would fall foul of the universal norms
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
It seems that both the Habibie Government, and the Parliament, thought
that the obligation to prove assertions may be transferred to the accused, when
he/she is seeking to establish a defence. They took the view that provisions which
enshrine the right to be presumed innocent do not prohibit presumptions of fact, or
law, against the accused, although such presumptions must be confined within
reasonable limits, which take into account the importance of what is at stake and
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maintain the rights of the defence as far as possible. Nor do fundamental human
rights principles prohibit offences of strict liability, namely offences which do not
require a criminal intent on the part of the accused.
Law No. 31 of 1999 attempts to take a balanced approach to the burden of
proof. In this respect, it could be argued that a presumption of fact, or of law,
which an accused is required to rebut, is not necessarily inimical to the accused’s
fundamental rights. Moreover, the implementation of the reversal of the burden of
proof could be useful, in cases where the accused appears to have in his/her
possession or to have available, directly or indirectly, goods or assets and means
which are clearly beyond his/her normal financial standards. In other words,
anyone who is, or has been, maintaining a standard of living, or holding pecuniary
resources or property at a level, which is significantly disproportionate to his
present or past known legal income, and who is unable to produce a satisfactory
explanation for this, could be charged under Law No. 31 of 1999. This is a
positive feature of Law No. 31 of 1999, from the point of view of bringing to
justice individuals who have benefited from corrupt behaviour.
In this context, Law No. 31 of 1999 is in line with an increasing tendency,
evident in a number of countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong, to criminalise
the possession of unexplained wealth, by introducing offences which may be seen
to jeopardise current (and former) public servants. Several national legislative
bodies have introduced such provisions and, also at the international level, the
accusation of ‘illicit enrichment’ or ‘unexplained wealth’ has become an accepted
instrument in the fight against corruption. Examples of such a trend come from
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Section 10 of the Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance; Article 34 of the
Bostwana Corruption Economic Crimes Act; and Article IX of the Organization
of American States’ Inter-American Convention against Corruption.

Transitionary Provision
Given that an anti-corruption law already in existence in Indonesia at the
time of the enactment of Law No. 31 of 1999, one would have expected to find in
Law No. 31 of 1999 a provision along the lines of: “By the enforcement of this
Act, Law No. 3 of 1971 remains in effect, as long as its functions are not
superseded by nor supplanted by, new ones, in accordance with Law No. 31 of
1999”. In fact, there is no such transitionary provision in Law No. 31 of 1999.
What the 1999 Law says is:

Article 44
As from the time this law takes effect, Law No. 3/1971 regarding the
Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption (Government Gazette of
1971, No. 19, Supplement to the Government Gazette No. 2958) shall
be null and void.

This invites the question: Can a person, suspected of having engaged in
corruption during the New Order period be prosecuted under Law No. 31 of
1999? Can one use the 1971 Law to trap persons suspected of having engaged in
corruption before 16 August, 1999 — the date when Habibie signed the new law?
It is worth remembering that one of the chief demands of the reform movement
was that Soeharto and his followers be brought to justice.
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There are three possible answers. The first option is that no prosecution is
possible since the 1999 Law is without retroactive force, and because Article 44
of the 1999 Law states that “the 1971 Law shall be null and void at the time the
1999 Law takes effect”, corruption cases which happened in the Soeharto era are
immune from both the 1971 Law and the 1999 Law. In other words, persons who
allegedly committed corruption, before Law No. 31 of 1999 came into effect, may
escape court trials, since Law No. 3 of 1971 has long since been annulled, and,
also, they cannot be charged under Law No. 31 of 1999, since it came into effect
after their alleged commission of a crime.
A second answer might be: the promulgation of the 1999 law annuls only
the 1971 law, but not the Criminal Code. This means that a person suspected of
corruption during the New Order period, who cannot be charged using Law No.
31 of 1999, can still be arraigned using the Criminal Code. The reason is that the
Criminal Code remains as Indonesia’s main law for dealing with criminal acts,
including corruption. Laws No. 3 of 1971 and No. 31 of 1999 are only special
developments of the Criminal Code, which were enacted in accordance with the
demands of the time. However, this answer is weakened by the widespread
recognition that the Criminal Code, as a legal mechanism for dealing with
corruption, is out of date — the ultimate reason why both the 1971 and the 1999
Laws were created.
The third possible answer is that although Law No. 31 of 1999 does not
include transitional regulations, this does not mean that persons suspected of
corruption in the past may go free. They can still be tried, using Law No. 3 of
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1971. This is in accordance with universal law principles (lex temporis delicti).
Although there is a new regulation, the old revoked regulation can still be
implemented, particularly to judge past violators of that (revoked) regulation.
Universal criminal codes also admit that, if there are various regulations about a
criminal act, the regulation most advantageous to the suspect will be implemented
against him/her. Law No. 3 of 1971 remains in force to judge these acts.
In order to avoid this controversy and remove uncertainty, the Parliament
and President Megawati Soekarnoputri amended the 1999 Anti-Corruption Law,
by passing Law No. 20 of 2001, which consists of transitionary provisions.
However, although the gap has now been filled, the question of why it existed in
the first place remains controversial. The impression of a conspiracy between the
Habibie government and members of parliament at the time of the drafting of Law
No. 31 of 1999 is still strong. Even Marzuki Darusman, the Attorney-General in
the Wahid Cabinet, and Todung Mulya Lubis (a prominent lawyer), admitted that
Law No. 31 of 1999 could be suspected of being the product of a government-led
conspiracy, with the aid of Parliament, to protect corrupt leaders.115
Teten Masduki, of the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), is certain of a
conspiracy behind Law No. 31 of 1999, as it was drawn up by legal experts. The
law was drawn up by a team chaired by former Minister of Justice, Professor
Muladi. That law was drafted by persons who know the law very well. Masduki
claims that the ICW once reminded Parliament that it would need to insert a
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transitionary provision into the draft bill. However, the House of the time (elected
in 1997), did not pay attention to this warning.116
It is reported that Professor Muladi strongly denied this. He claimed that
there was no conspiracy. According to him, no transitionary regulation was
mentioned because it was assumed that people already knew that, if new laws
were passed, it did not mean that the old laws were no longer in effect. On this
reasoning, the old anti-corruption laws could still be used to prosecute a person
suspected of corruption committed during at a time prior to the enactment of Law
No. 31 of 1999. Muladi, therefore, admitted that a transitionary regulation had
indeed been intentionally unstated, not to create an immunity for corruption in the
Soeharto era, but because there was already a universal legal principle which
ensured that there was no ‘gap’ in Indonesia’s anti-corruption laws..117
Upon reading the minutes of the meeting during the parliamentary debate,
one can confirm that parliamentary members did not ask why the transitionary
regulation was not mentioned in the draft bill. So, the claim of a conspiracy
cannot be proven through formal documentation. A conspiracy theory also cannot
be justified easily here, since in practice prosecutors have since used Law No. 3 of
1971 to deal with persons suspected of corruption in the past. For instance, former
President Soeharto was investigated under Law No. 3 of 1971, although Law No.
31 of 1999 had annulled it.118 If suspects of corruption went free, this was not
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caused by the absence of transitionary provisions. They avoided prosecution
because of other factors.
What can be seen is that, as with other laws, Law No. 31 of 1999 was
drafted and debated in a very hurried manner. The Habibie government’s
ambitions to reform the law by swiftly passing more than 50 laws in a short period
of time, had a negative impact on the quality of the laws. In addition, since
Members of Parliament from the PPP and PDI parties were not as numerous as
members of the Golkar party (as a result of the 1997 General Election under the
Soeharto government), several Members of Parliament joined a number of
different committees, to discuss two or three different draft bills at the same time.
From another perspective, this was also a dilemma for the Habibie
administration. On the one hand, Habibie needed immediately to settle corruption
cases in Indonesia in order to be seen as responsive to the demands of the reform
movement. This forced him to reform the law. On the other hand, however, he
could not investigate suspects of corruption in the Soeharto era, using a reformed
law, since it came into effect after they had allegedly committed crimes. This
means that creating a new law was only part of the story in combating corruption.
He had to proof that his government was capable of bringing the corrupt persons
to justice, whatever the law was used for this purpose. The critical question of
whether he succeeded in this respect is considered below (See Part V, Section C).
After considering each of the major features of Law No. 31 of 1999, I have
concluded that the most significant reform was reversal of the burden of proof.
This is a new development for Indonesian criminal law and signalled a real
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determination to tackle corruption. On the other hand, claims by the Habibie
Government that it had significantly increased the penalty for corruption were not
entirely accurate. In addition, the scope for public participation was still limited,
particularly as there was no provision for a witness protection programme. The
delay in the establishment of an anti-corruption agency indicated that the Habibie
Government mainly relied on the existing law-enforcement agencies. In other
words, Law No. 31 of 1999 neglected the aspirations of the reform movement for
the immediate establishment of a powerful and independent anti-corruption
agency. I have highlighted the degree of scepticism which existed regarding
whether Habibie was genuinely concerned to combat corruption as evidenced by
the controversy over the lack of transitionary provisions. Overall, the analysis in
this section supports the conclusion that despite the efforts of the Habibie
Government to reform Indonesia’s anti-corruption laws, Law No. 31 of 1999 did
not provide adequate tools for combating KKN.

C. Implementation of Law No. 31 of 1999
The main question considered in this section is: Did the Habibie
Government succeed in reducing the practice of corruption by issuing Law No. 31
of 1999?

Data from Transparency International (TI), and the Political &

Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) have been analysed to see whether
corruption was reduced under the Habibie government. The data are summarised
in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. According to TI, in 1997 and 1998, Indonesia’s
Corruption Perception Index was 2.72 and 2.0 respectively, whereas, in 1999,
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Indonesia achieved a 1.7. Since the score ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0
(highly corrupt), it could be stated that corruption was getting worse during the
Habibie period (1998-1999).
Table 9: Indonesia and the CPI – Transparency International119
Year
2001
CPI Score 1.9
Ranking
88 out of 91

2000
1.7
86 out of 90

1999
1.7
97 out of 99

1998
2.0
80 of 85

1997
2.72
46 out of 52

Note:
CPI = Corruption Perception Index
CPI Score = relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption, as seen by business
people, risk analysts and the general public, and ranges between 10 (highly clean)
and 0 (highly corrupt).

Table 10: Corruption in Indonesia according to the Political & Economic Risk
Consultancy120
Year
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
Grade
9.67
9.88
9.91
8.95
8.67
Note: Grades are scaled from zero to 10, with zero being the best grade possible
and 10 the worst
If we compare the data with surveys in Asian states conducted by the
Political & Economic Risk Consultancy, a similar conclusion can be reached.
119
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Indonesia obtained a grade of 8.67 in 1997 and 8.95 in 1998, and one of 9.91, in
1999. Here, grades are scaled from zero to 10, with zero being the best grade
possible, and 10 the worst. The fact seems to indicate an increase in corruption, in
terms of both quantity and quality.
It could be argued that it would be unreasonable to expect immediate
change during Habibie’s brief term as President, and that levels of corruption in
subsequent years should be considered. Unfortunately, these figures reinforce the
conclusion that there has been not much improvement in the battle against KKN
practices.
In February 2002, the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia
released the final results of its Diagnostic Study of Corruption in Indonesia. The
total sample population was 2,300 respondents, consisting of 650 public officials,
1,250 households, and 400 business enterprises. The survey found that corruption
in the public sector was regarded as very common by approximately 75% of all
respondents. It was considered the most serious social problem by household
respondents, ahead of unemployment and the poor state of the economy.
Approximately 65% of households also reported actually experiencing corruption
involving public officials.121
Respondents were asked to rank a list of 35 public institutions, in terms of
integrity, from the least, to the most, honest. The Traffic Police, Customs, and the
judiciary were ranked the most corrupt institutions, whilst the news media, Post

region, to identify growth opportunities, and to develop effective strategies for capitalising on
these opportunities. See http://www.asiarisk.com/lib10.html
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Office and religious organisations (mosques, churches and temples) were
considered the least corrupt. Mean scores were computed, which ranged from a
low of 2.13 for the Traffic Police, to a high of 4.55 for religious organizations.122
Donald P. Warwick illustrates the distinction made by civil servants
between ‘Wet’ and ‘dry’ agencies. ‘Wet’ agencies are generous with honoraria,
allowances, boards, and development projects, and opportunities for foreign
training. They are departments which deal in money, planning, banking, or public
enterprises. ‘dry’ agencies are those doing traditional administrative work.123
Thus, ‘Wet’ agencies will provide more opportunities for corruption than ‘dry’
agencies, which do not interact with the public. Following Warwick’s views,
above, in the Indonesian context, ‘Wet’ agencies are the Traffic Police, the
customs authority and the judiciary, whereas the news media, the Post Office, and
religious organisations are considered as ‘dry’. The survey illustrated above
suggests that in terms of ‘Wet’ agencies no perceived change in levels of
corruption.
I argue that Habibie’s failure at combating corruption could be seen as the
failure of the enforcement of Law No. 31 of 1999 on Anti-Corruption. Which
aspects of the law could not be implemented, and which factors contributed to
such failure, will be analysed below. Focus will be centred on the political will of
the Habibie government, the Bank Bali Scandal, the Soeharto case, the Joint
Investigating Team, and the Anti-Corruption Commission.
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Political Will
The enforcement of law depends primarily on the political will of the
Government. In other words, the key factor is strong political will, demonstrated
by a commitment from the leadership at all levels of government. ‘Political will’
refers to the demonstrated credible intent of political actors to attack perceived
causes, or effects (of, here, corruption), at a systemic level. It is a critical starting
point for sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and programmes.
Without it, governments’ statements of their determination to eradicate corruption,
remain mere rhetoric.
During the Habibie interegnum, the government should have galvanised
supporters through moral exhortation, or by attempting to redefine a new public
morality, or service ethic. There is a school of thought that political will amongst
government officials and politicians should be especially strong during
transitional periods. However, Habibie did not take this chance; rather he faced a
dilemma. I have argued in Chapter 2 that Habibie’s government may simply have
been a case of ‘old wine in a new bottle’, with many Soeharto-era politicians and
bureaucrats still in place. On the one hand, demands for reform were very strong,
on both the international, and the national levels. On the other hand, Habibie was
forced by political circumstances to make compromises, and even to engage in
political bargaining. The Soeharto case is an illustrative.

413

The reason why Soeharto has so far managed to remain relatively
unscathed in the government investigations into corruption is a simple one: many
of the family businesses were tied up in ventures, either directly or indirectly
linked to members of the Habibie administration. This meant that if the Habibie
government was to have carried out wide-ranging and politically untainted
investigations of the business ventures between the Soeharto family and their
cronies, there could have erupted an uncontrollable momentum and groundswell
of public demand for accountability, which, ultimately, might have landed on the
doorstep of Habibie’s office. Therefore, the failed implementation of Law No. 31
of 1999 largely attributed to self interest on the part of Habibie and the members
of his government.
On 1 June 1998, the Attorney-General, Soedjono Chanafiah Atmonegoro,
announced the launching of an investigation into the assets of state officials,
including Soeharto and his family. A team of 35 members was formed. On the
morning of 15 June 1998, Atmonegoro met Habibie, in order to report his
preliminary findings on KKN cases. On that occasion, he is said to have presented
proof of illegal practices perpetrated by Soeharto’s ‘charitable’ foundations. In his
legal opinion, the evidence was enough to allow Soeharto to be interviewed as a
suspect, with possible detention, and indicative of KKN crimes having been
committed by several of Habibie’s top ministers, such as the Co-ordinating
Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industry (Ginandjar Kartasasmita), the
Co-ordinating Minister of Politics and Security (Feisal Tanjung) and some
Habibie relatives. Surprisingly, Atmonegro claims also to have told Habibie that
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he had legal evidence that even Habibie himself could become a suspect in
allegations of corruption.124
Habibie then asked Atmonegoro to visit his office again in the afternoon of
the same day. Atmonegoro was told that he had been replaced by Major General
Andi Muhammad Ghalib (two days later promoted to Lieutenant General).125
Habibie offered Atmonegoro the chance to become an Ambassador, but
Atmonegoro rejected the offer. This case indicated that Habibie did not have
strong political will to combat KKN.
The irony of Andi Muhammad Ghalib’s appointment was that, just before
his promotion, in his capacity as Head of the Legal Department of the Armed
Forces, he had been selected as part of the team to defend Soeharto in legal
proceedings instituted against him over the transfer of power to Habibie. As a
retired General (with five stars), Soeharto had turned to the legal department of
the military, which has a section providing free legal aid to active and retired
military officers.126
This fact partly explains why Attorney General Andi Ghalib limited his
investigations of the Soeharto family’s wealth to land, and cash-holdings in local
banks. Since coming to office, Ghalib had acted like a well-rehearsed strip-tease
dancer, in uncovering the extent of the Soeharto wealth: bit by bit, at an
excruciatingly slow pace. His office revealed that the former President’s family
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controlled nine million hectares of forest concessions (an area the size of Austria),
and that Soeharto held around US$3 million in local bank accounts.
Not surprisingly, Ghalib’s audience remained unimpressed and frustrated.
Most Indonesians suspect that the Soeharto family has billions of dollars, stashed
in foreign bank accounts, and practically the entire country is aware of the huge
amount of wealth tied up in Soeharto family businesses — many of which enjoyed
(and still enjoy) monopoly licences, and which still permeate practically every
major industrial sector in the economy.127
What did Habibie do with the Soeharto case? While sending a message to
the public that he was not Soeharto’s crown prince, Habibie also carefully built
the concept in the minds of Soeharto’s supporters in Golkar, and those of
members of the Cabinet, ABRI, and other groups in society, that he had not
betrayed Soeharto. This made his decision ambiguous.
On 2 December 1998, in response to a mass demonstration, he instructed
the Attorney General to investigate Soeharto’s wealth. On 8 March 1999, he also
agreed when Andi Ghalib, the Attorney General, reported that his office had
found that there was enough evidence to prosecute Soeharto.128 However, when
General Wiranto (ABRI Chief) came to the meeting on that same day, Habibie
changed his mind. He asked the Attorney General to wait for the results of the
June 1999 General Elections.129 This was the second known time that Habibie
127
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had changed his mind due to Wiranto’s influence (the first example discussed
earlier was when Habibie changed his mind on establishing an anti-corruption
agency).
The results of the elections were that Habibie’s Golkar Party did not
emerge as the winners. On 11 October 1999, the Attorney General’s Office, in a
decision signed by the Acting Attorney General, formally cancelled the
investigation of the Soeharto case, on the grounds that there was not enough
evidence. Ghalib himself admitted that, whether there was enough evidence or
not, the future of the Soeharto investigation depended on Habibie’s decision; not
on the law.130 Clearly, Habibie influenced the legal process, and this sort of
intervention by a President contravenes the rule of law and is inconsistent with the
principles of good governance. The making of specific legal orders or
administrative directives should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general
rules; not by political interest and calculation.
Why did Habibie wait for the results of the General Elections? He might
have calculated that, if his party won, he would have had strong support to take
any action necessary regarding Soeharto. There was speculation that, by
postponing the prosecution of Soeharto, he hoped to get support from Soeharto’s
followers, in running the country. When his party lost, he knew that he had not
received support from Indonesian society generally, nor from Soeharto’s
followers specifically. It seems likely that he realised that if he could not win the
Indonesian people’s hearts, he still had a chance to get support from Soeharto
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himself. What Habibie did was ‘too little’ for others, but it was ‘too much’ for
Soeharto. It was widely known that the Soeharto family was angry about
Habibie’s decision to start the examination. Therefore, Habibie might have
thought that they would be happy if he stopped the examination. He could thereby
have repaired his relationship with Soeharto. When Habibie was reminded, by his
advisors, that this decision would involve him loosing his position at the MPR
Session,131 he was reported to have said, “I will not betray Soeharto, and am ready
to face the consequences, including my position”.132
The Soeharto case concerned a ‘big fish’. If Habibie had been able to catch
the big one, he would be seen as sincerely committed to the elimination of
corruption. However, if the ‘big fish’ (the rich and famous) are protected from
prosecution for corruption, and only the ‘small fry’ (ordinary people) are caught,
the government lacks credibility. This, once again, conflicts with the desired
linkage between good governance, anti-corruption laws, and the rule of law.
The Soeharto case has become a symbol for law reform advocates, in so
much as it promised to signal the eradication of corruption, collusion, and
nepotism in Indonesia. As has been shown, Habibie’s hesitation in pursuing the
investigation of Soeharto was based on his long personal relationship with
Soeharto and his own political calculations. In this case, Habibie not only failed to
follow good governance and the rule of law, but he also failed to meet the popular
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demands of the reform movement. In the section below, I will elaborate on other
obstacles to the full implementation of Law No. 31 of 1999.

Scandals which Involved Habibie’s Inner Circle
The first money-politics scandal to affect the Habibie administration
surfaced in May 1999, when the World Bank postponed the disbursement of funds
for the government’s social safety-net, because of worries that the funds would be
misused. Indonesia has historically not had much of a social safety-net system, so
introducing one in mid-1998, to address poverty and unemployment, on an
emergency basis, was difficult. The government initially created programmes in
three areas to help the poor: ensuring food availability (almost 10 million
households were said to be purchasing rice at subsidized prices, as of February
1999); supplementing purchasing power through job-creation and loans to small
enterprises (for example, labor-intensive public works projects); and preserving
access to education and other critical social services (in part through block grants
to poor schools).133
Gunawan Sumodiningrat, Deputy Head of the Badan Perencanaan
Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas-National Development Planning Agency),
revealed that at least Rp 8 trillion, of the total Rp 17.9 trillion of social safety-net
funds for the 1998/1999 fiscal year, had failed to reach its intended targets,
namely dismissed workers, and people facing food shortages.134 Only Rp 9 trillion
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of the funds had been properly channeled to provide subsidized rice for the poor,
and to subsidise agriculture, health care and education. The World Bank then told
Bappenas to stop using the funds for labor-intensive projects and povertyalleviation programmes. The World Bank delayed the payment of a US$ 600
million loan to Indonesia, scheduled to be disbursed on 31 March 1999, because
the government had failed to provide a reliable system to monitor the allocation of
the money for its poverty-alleviation programmes.
Meanwhile, opposition parties and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) alleged the government had used the money to ensure votes. They
claimed that the Social Safety-Net Programme, promoted by the IMF and initiated
as a result of World Bank balance-of-payments support, failed to reach the right
targets, as a result of poor planning, corruption, poor design, poor implementation
and poor monitoring. The Habibie government admitted publicly that Rp. 8.6
trillion out of a total of Rp. 17.9 trillion, for the Social Safety-Net Fund, had been
mistargetted or misappropriated,135 including sixty per cent of education
scholarship funds.136
Secondly, the Supreme Audit Council (BPK) disclosed that, in his capacity
as head of Bulog (the State Logistics Agency) the Minister for Industry and Trade,
Rahardi Ramelan, had in 1999 authorised the allocation at least Rp. 40 billion in
spending on ‘state needs’ to a private foundation, in order to have it distribute
food and rice to those in need. However, in 2001, it was found that the foundation
had never distributed the food. It was alleged that it was Akbar Tanjung (Sate
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Secretary in the Habibie Cabinet and General Chairperson of Golkar) who
received the funds. Another suspicion was that the money made its way into
Golkar coffers, to help fund its 1999 election campaign.137 Later, in 2003,
Ramelan and Tanjung were found guilty and were sentenced to three years
imprisonment. They appealed and, to date, are awaiting a Supreme Court decision
on this case. Habibie denies any involvement and, so far, he is merely one of the
witnesses in this case.
It is notable that the Attorney General’s office did not use the reversed
burden of proof, or Article 2 (2) of Law No. 31 of 1999 on capital punishment in
either the Ramelan or Tanjung cases. I asked one member of the Attorney
Generals Office why. He replied:
Have you visited the Attorney General’s car park? When you see
luxurious cars over there, you would understand why we never use the
reversal of the burden of proof. Since it is impossible to buy such
luxurious cars based on our salary, the first victim of the use of the
reversal of the burden of proof would be our office itself.138
I take the view that Ramelan and Tanjung could have been charged under
Article 2 (2) of Law No. 31 of 1999, since they committed corruption when
Indonesia was facing a national emergency (food crisis), and economic crises.
136
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Based on the article, capital punishment could have been imposed. However, not
only in Tanjung’s case, but in fact in all corruption cases during 1999-2003,
Article 2 (2) has never been used, although Indonesia is still in economic crisis.139
This indicates a lack of serious and genuine willingness to combat KKN cases.
The third serious scandal was revealed in July 1999 by the Indonesian
Corruption Watch (ICW). This group published bank documents, which showed
that the Attorney General, Andi Ghalid, had received over Rp. 50 billion paid
directly into his personal bank accounts. The payments were made by tycoons,
who were under investigation by Ghalib’s office. The implication was that Ghalid
had been using his office’s power to extort bribes from wealthy individuals. ICW
also produced receipts showing that Ghalib’s wife had used 500 million rupiah
from one such account to purchase jewellery.
Ghalib denied all these accusations. According to him, contributions from
Prajogo Pangestu and The Nin King, mentioned by ICW, were not deposited into
his personal account. It was a joint account with the Treasurer of the PGSI
(Indonesian Association of Wrestling). Therefore, all the money belonged to the
PGSI, since Ghalib was the Chairperson. He claimed that he was not aware that
Prajogo Pangestu and The Nin King contributed to the PGSI, because the treasurer
did not report this to him. Later on he was told about this. He stated: “[If] certain
people have transferred funds to your account, without you knowing about it, of
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course you can’t be blamed for this, can you? If I was informed of this
beforehand, we should have rejected the funds.” 140
It was too late then, to reject the funds. Habibie was forced to sack Ghalib.
Then Habibie asked Ghalib to become ‘non-active’ and chose Ghalib’s Deputy,
Ismudjoko, to run the Attorney General’s Office. Although the prosecutor claimed
that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with a criminal prosecution against
Ghalib, he had nonetheless lost face. Later, in his biography, he claimed to believe
that all of the allegations were part of a political conspiracy and plot against
him.141
The fourth scandal was ‘Bank Bali-gate’. The scandal involved a
$US72.8-million payment by Bank Bali to two businessmen — Setya Novanto,
former Golkar vice-treasurer, and his business partner Djoko Tjandra, owners of
PT Era Giat Prima — linked to the Golkar party.142 Back in late 1998, when the
saga began, Bank Bali was failing. It needed $US320 million to keep operating.
To qualify for a bailout, Bank Bali had to come up with 20% of the $US320
million by July 22 1999. Otherwise, IBRA (the Indonesian Bank Restructuring
Agency) would take it over. Rudy Ramli, whose family controlled the bank, was
desperate to reduce its re-capitalisation burden, by reclaiming the $US120 million
in credits.
Ramli believed that the government’s deposit guarantee scheme, which
was introduced by Soeharto in January 1998, covered the claim. He tried for more
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than a year to secure his claim from IBRA and Bank of Indonesia officials. In
early 1999, he was forced to use the ‘facilitation’ services of a private company,
whose owner acted as a middleman between the bank and the government. The
‘fee’ or ‘commission’ was a staggering sixty per cent of the claim. Because
interbank loans are guaranteed by the government, no commission should have
been paid. Critics say much of the money went into Habibie's re-election war
chest. According to rumours, the $US78 million “commission” was to have been
used as bribes to buy votes in the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). The
rumours were never substantiated.
The Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P), Megawati’s party,
accused one of Habibie's younger brothers, four cabinet ministers, two Golkar
party leaders and five businessmen of being directly involved in the Bank Bali
transaction. A PDI-P statement claimed that three other senior government
officials, and a close presidential confidante, were also implicated.143
The purported transcript of a police interview with former Bank Bali
president, Rudy Ramli, was circulated to journalists in Jakarta. In the document,
Rudy named Finance Minister Bambang Subianto, Bank of Indonesia Governor,
Sjahril Sabirin, State Minister of the Empowerment of State Enterprises, Tanri
Abeng, head of the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), A.A. Baramuli, President
Habibie’s younger brother, Suyatim “Timmy” Habibie, IBRA Deputy Chairman,
Pande Lubis, and five top businessmen, as being involved in the case.144
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The IMF called for a full investigation, including of the Central Bank. On
19 August 1999, the ‘commission’ payment was returned to Bank Bali. The IBRA
agreed to an independent audit of its actions. Satrio Billy Yudono, chief of the
BPK, said he would not make public a 123-page report on the scandal, submitted
by auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in early September 1999. This was
despite pressure from both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
which had suspended loans to Indonesia over the controversy. Yudono cited
banking secrecy laws as a reason for giving the PWC report only to the police.
Meanwhile, members of parliament demanded the resignation of Finance
Minister Subianto and other officials, but Habibie rejected the demands. Whilst
the businessmen, Satya Novanto and Djoko Tjandra, were released by the court,
the Governor of the Bank of Indonesia, Sjahril Sjabirin was found guilty by
District Court and is awaiting the Supreme Court decision on this case.
In addition to these political scandals the story of the fight against
corruption in the Post Soeharto era also involved legal scandals. It will be
demonstrated below that the capacity of anti-corruption agencies is weakened not
only by insufficient mandates and resources but also by the weaknesses of its
political and legal institutions. Whilst demand for the effectiveness of such
agencies or commissions have been high, other ‘legal actors’ have tried to limit
and weaken their performance.

Joint Investigating Team
The establishment of the Joint Investigating Team to Eradicate Criminal
Acts of Corruption (TGPTPK) was based on Government Regulation No.19 of
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2000, as mandated by Article 27 of Law No.31 of 1999, which stipulates that: “In
the event that a criminal act of corruption, which is very hard to prove, is detected,
under the coordination of the Attorney General, a joint team shall be set up”.
According to that article, the TGPTPK was responsible to the Attorney General,
and in performing its duties and powers, the TGPTPK was subject to the Attorney
General’s coordination. The Anti-Corruption Joint Investigation Team was
considered independent in performing its duties and exercising its powers, free
from any interference involving executive and legislative power.
However, as has been discussed earlier, the team was designed to function
on an ad hoc basis (temporarily) depending on the needs of particular cases. It
could be imagined that there would be no single team. In other words, there would
be several joint teams assembled to deal with individual cases as the need arose.
For example, in the Soeharto case or the Bank Bali case, or in other cases, the
Attorney General could set up different commissions. However, on 17 May 2000,
the government signed a commitment with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), by a Letter of Intent (LoI), requiring the government quickly to establish a
joint team to focus on complex corruption cases, and the court system.145
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Less then a week after the LoI was signed, the government established the
TGPTPK through Government Regulation No. 19 of 2000, dated 23 May 2000.
Being intended as the ‘embryo’ or forerunner of the Anti-Corruption Commission,
the TGPTPK was expected, culturally and structurally, to unite law enforcers and
civil society.146
Under this regulation, the TGPTPK became one unit, which dealt with all
very

hard-to-prove

cases.

Instead

of

establishing

the

Anti-Corruption

Commission, as it was obliged to do by Law No. 31 of 1999, the government
chose to establish the TGPTPK as the permanent anti-corruption body. One of the
reasons for this decision was that Article 43 (4) of Law No. 31 of 1999 provided
for a two-year ‘set-up’ period to allow for the formation, organisational structures,
work procedures, accountability, duties and authority, as well as membership of
the Anti-Corruption Commission to be finalised.
On the one hand, the government needed the IMF’s funds, and had to
provide evidence of its progress in combating corruption. On the other hand,
setting up a new Anti-Corruption Commission would follow the same lengthy
process as drafting a new law, involving a parliamentary debate, and so on. The
government (and the IMF) could not wait too long. The situation forced the
Wahid government to establish the TGPTPK through a ‘shortcut’ —a
Government Regulation. The TGPTPK was to dissolve once the Commission took
its place. As will be explained below, the TGPTPK was dissolved by the Supreme
Court, whilst the Anti-Corruption Commission has not yet been formed.
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The detailed tasks and authority of the TGPTPK were specified as follows:
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

To coordinate the investigation and prosecution of every
individual strongly suspected of committing difficult-to-prove
corruption;
To query relevant bank(s) and instruct them to block suspects’
accounts, if necessary;
To open, investigate and confiscate letters and packages sent via
mail, telecommunications or other devices, believed to be
related to an on-going investigation;
To conduct communications interception;
To propose refusal of exit permits for potential suspects, and
other such like measures;
To recommend to a suspect’s superiors, if there is sufficient
evidence, that the suspect’s employment be suspended.147

The membership of the TGPTPK consisted of active National Police
officers, active prosecutors, related institution officials and prominent leaders of
society. The duties and tasks of the Joint Investigation Team were to coordinate
the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes considered difficult to
prove. In performing investigations and prosecutions, these duties were carried
out by the members and the task force of the Joint Investigation Team, who had
the power to investigate and to prosecute, owing to their function as active police
officers, and public prosecutors.148
The first six months of the TGPTPK, however, were useless, since there
was no budget disbursed to run its tasks and functions. At the same time, no office
space was available and no secretariat was provided.149 The government was in
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Law, the University of Melbourne, 18 October, 2001.
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such a hurry to establish the TGPTPK, as a result of the pressure being applied by
the IMF, that it neglected to provide facilities for the TGPTPK. In other words,
the establishment of TGPTPK served only to increase the government’s ‘credit
points’ with the IMF.
The establishment of the TGPTPK did not come from an explicit provision
in Law No. 31 of 1999. Rather, it was established as a condition of the
government’s LoI (letter of Intent) with the IMF; with a legal basis put in place.
Subsequently, although the circumstances of its establishment were somewhat
irregular, there is no doubt that an institution like the TGPTPK was very much
needed, and called for, by the people. One must also consider that it inevitably
takes quite some time to formally establish such a commission.
Another criticism was that the TGPTPK investigated cases before the
promulgation of Law No. 31 of 1999. On 6 July 2000, the TGPTPK announced
that two active, and one retired, Supreme Court judges would be investigated for
corruption.150 The judges were suspected of receiving bribes from Endin
Wahyudin, a witness in a land dispute. The bribes were aimed at influencing the
verdict of the three judges. It is alleged that, between them, the judges received
Rp. 196 million. The three judges were: Supraptini Suprapto, Marnis Kahar and
Yahya Harahap (retired).

Based on the work of the TGPTPK, Supraptini

Suprapto and Marnis Kahar had been tried at the Central Jakarta District Court,
whilst retired justice Yahya Harahap had been brought before the West Jakarta
District Court.
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These cases invoked anger from the Judges’ Association (IKAHI). This
was the first time that three Supreme Court judges had been formally brought
before a lower court on corruption cases. The Judges Association was afraid that
the credibility of Judges and the Supreme Court would be lost.151 They struck
back by proclaiming that they would question the authority of the TGPTPK to
handle a corruption case which had allegedly occurred in 1998, whilst the
TGPTPK itself had not been established until 2000, pursuant to Law No. 31 of
1999.
In a pre-trial hearing at the District Court, the judge decided that the
TGPTPK was not authorised to investigate cases in which the alleged offence had
occurred under Law No. 3 of 1971. The TGPTPK was authorised to investigate
only cases arising after the enactment of Law No. 31 of 1999, whilst the alleged
corrupt acts in the three judges’ case took place before the new law establishing
the TGPTPK came into force. This was another problem of retrospectivity, as has
been mentioned earlier.152 The judge then stated that the case involving the judges
was not within the meaning of “difficult to prove”, as explained in the Elucidation
of Article 27 of Law No. 31/1999.153
The three justices (Supraptini Suprapto, Marnis Kahar and Yahya
Harahap) also initiated criminal litigation against the witness, Endin Wahyudin,
persuading the police to initiate criminal defamation proceedings. It was alleged
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that Wahyudin had defamed their good names, by reporting the bribery to the
TGPTPK. The court found Wahyudin guilty. He was also charged with
corruption, for bribing the judges, whereas the judges were untouched. He was
found guilty of ruining the justices’ credibility, and was convicted.154
Wahyudin should have had legal protection. Here is solid practical
evidence of the need for a witness protection scheme (discussed above). The
Wahyudin case would obviously discourage public participation in combating
corruption. Wahyudin was a key witness for the TGPTPK, under the coordination
of the Attorney General, but the Attorney General’s Office also prosecuted him on
the related cases. How could the Attorney General use Wahyudin as a witness,
and as a defendant, at the same time? The law does not protect the public from
any possible allegations, in regard to their testimony. So far, the message from
this story is that whoever dares to disclose a corruption case could suffer the same
fate.
The story of the TGPTPK ended when the lawyers for the judges filed a
petition for judicial review with the Supreme Court, against Government
Regulation No. 19 of 2000. On 23 March 2001, the Supreme Court decided
through its decision No. 03/P/HUM/2000 that Government Regulation No. 19 of
2000 was invalid, since it violated higher laws and regulations. Accordingly, it
went too far beyond what was authorised by law, by giving investigation and
prosecution authority to a new institution.
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Based on this decision, on 8 August 2001, the Attorney General dissolved
the TGPTPK.155 However, the legal scandal remained. Article 42 Paragraph (1) of
Law No. 14 of 1985 clearly stipulates that “A judge must not hear a case in which
he himself has a conflict of interest, directly or indirectly.” According to Hamid
Chalid, Justice Paulus Effendy Lotulung was appointed to chair the presiding
Supreme Court panel of justices, on this judicial review case, even though, at the
same time, he acted as legal counsel for the suspects, pursuant to an order from
the chairman of the IKAHI.156
These events demonstrate that the attempts by the TGPTPK to combat
corruption were not supported by other ‘legal actors’ such as the Judges
Association, the Attorney General and even the Supreme Court. Giving priority
to combating corruption in the judicial institutions, mainly the Supreme Court,
was based on the principle that Indonesian people are entitled to expect the
Supreme Court, as the last fortress of justice, to be a clean and honest institution,
which people can trust, and where they may obtain real justice. On the contrary,
TGPTPK’s attempts to enforce anti-corruption laws faced strong resistance from
most of the accused judges’ colleagues, who felt that the TGPTPK had hurt
collective sentiment towards the Corps of Judges.
From the beginning, the establishment of the TGPTPK was not serious
attempt at corruption fighting. Instead of setting up an anti-corruption
commission, as stipulated in Law No. 31 of 1999, the government was in a hurry
to meet IMF demands, and so it created the TGPTPK. This was a lesson that
155
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combating corruption should be undertaken according to the rule of law; not
motivated by the government’s self-interest.

Anti-Corruption Commission
Article 43 (1) of Law No. 31 of 1999 provides that a form of independent
commission against corruption must be established, no later than two years after
the enactment of the Law, and must consist of representatives of government
bodies and elements of civil society. A new law was to be established to regulate
the formation, organisational structure, work procedures, accountability, duties
and authority, as well as the membership of the Commission. Since Law No. 31
of 1999 was signed by President Habibie, on 16 August 1999, the Anti-Corruption
Commission should have been established by 16 August 2001, at the latest.
However, to date, no commission has been established. This is an obvious
example of the failure to implement Law No. 31 of 1999.
According to the Department of Justice, one of the reasons for delaying the
establishment of the commission, required by Law No. 31 of 1999, was that the
government and the parliament had different opinions on the authority of the
Commission.157 One group took the view that the Commission should have the
power to examine; not to prosecute. Others believed that, in order not to duplicate
the failure of such a commission in the past, the new Commission should have the
power to both examine or investigate, and to prosecute; and even to take over
corruption cases handled by the Attorney General’s Office and the Police Force; if

156

Chalid, above n 149.

157

Kompas, 13 June 2001.

433

these bodies prove unable, or unwilling, to handle the case properly. A draft bill
on a permanent anti-corruption commission was submitted by the Government in
June 2001.
Having considered all the issues, finally, on 27 December 2002, President
Megawati Soekarnoputri signed Law No. 30 of 2002, on the Anti-Corruption
Commission.

The Commission will be established in December 2003. The

Commission will work in four areas: prevention of corruption, follow-up legal
action, information and data, and internal monitoring and public reports. Once the
Anti-Corruption Commission is established, the KPKPN, established under Law
No. 28 of 1999, will be merged with the Commission. Law No. 30 of 2002 also
stipulates the establishment of an Ad Hoc Corruption Court. This will be a special
court, dealing with corruption cases by appointing ad hoc judges from society.
As has been mentioned, the stipulation on the KPKPN attracted anger
from members of the KPKPN. They rejected the merger on the grounds that the
Anti-Corruption Commission will not have the characteristics of the KPKPN.158
Until the Supreme Court announces its decision on the judicial review requested
by the KPKPN, the controversy over the establishment of the Anti-Corruption
Commission remains.

Another significant matter to note is that, in this respect,

the Anti-Corruption Commission cannot be a substitute for a corrupt and
dysfunctional legal system (police, prosecution and judiciary). A corruption free
and functioning legal system is essential to the rule of law in society. In other
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words, the commission may serve as an ‘antibiotic’, but if the patient does not
change his lifestyle and follow all the treatments, the ‘antibiotic’ will not assist
much.
In the evaluation of the implementation of Law No. 31 of 1999 presented
here, I have argued that the failure to fully implement the law was the result of
several significant factors. The Habibie government had no strong and genuine
political will to combat KKN, as illustrated by the Soeharto case. Popular
perception, as surveyed by the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia,
data from TI and PERC, and the political scandal which involved Habibie’s inner
circle, indicated that Habibie’s efforts in this area did not meet the demands for
reform. In fact, the situation was getting worse during the Habibie era.
I have also shown, in the case of the TGPTPK, that the failure of Law No.
31 of 1999, to include a witness protection scheme, served to discourage public
participation in combating KKN. Above all, there were two main obstacles to
combating KKN: the flaws in the law itself, and the unwillingness of the
government to eradicate systemic and systematic corruption. A well-known
Indonesian joke captures these sentiments well:
In the Soekarno era, people were afraid to commit corruption, so they
made deals under the table; in Soeharto’s time, they were not afraid to
commit corruption, so they made deals on top of the table; in the
reform era, even the table is corrupt.159
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Conclusion
In order to meet one of the demands for reform, eradication of corruption,
collusion and nepotism (KKN), President BJ Habibie (1998-1999) signed Law
No. 28 of 1999 and Law No. 31 of 1999. Whilst the first law serves as a
preventative measure, the second one has a function as a repressive or punitive
measure. It was expected by the Habibie government that the issuance of both
laws would significantly reduce the practice of KKN. In this chapter I have
examined and evaluated both laws, using good governance and the rule of law as
standards of analysis.
Generally, domestic and foreign investors want to be assured of a
politically stable and economically predictable environment in a country, before
they commit their resources. The rule of law, along with transparency and
accountability in the public sector, not only affect economic development, but also
play a critical role in the governance of a nation. The two concepts of
transparency and accountability go hand-in-hand, since, without adequate
information on performance, outputs, and justifications, it is difficult to hold
governments accountable for their actions. Transparency and accountability serve
as checks against mis-management and corruption, on the part of public officials.
Thus they are pillars of sound governance, which is so crucial to winning and
maintaining the confidence of citizens, investors, and the international
community.
Anti-corruption efforts must always be an integral part of promoting good
governance and the rule of law. Law enforcement institutions are crucial in the
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struggle against public and private corruption and, at the same time, the integrity
of these institutions is essential for the credibility of that struggle. In the beginning
of this chapter, I established that the success of anti-corruption law reform is
dependent upon a combination of strong political will, clean and solid law
enforcement agencies, preventative measure to eliminate opportunities for corrupt
actions, repressive measure to provide legal standards, civil and criminal penalties
for corruption, and the encouragement of public participation, through a witness
protection scheme.
Having examined the major anti-corruption laws introduced under
President Habibie, this chapter has shown that Law No. 28 of 1999 and Law No.
31 of 1999 suffer several similar problems. First, the Habibie government saw
corruption, collusion and nepotism as merely an ‘ordinary crime’. Whilst
corruption has been seen as both systemic and systematic in Indonesia, Habibie
did not take the opportunity to declare corruption a special crime, needing special
measures. This had an impact on the way the Habibie government drafted and
implemented the laws.
For instance, the Habibie government did not propose to establish a special
commission or agency and special courts, to deal with corrupt actions. Another
example is that the issuance of Law No. 28 of 1999 did not lead to Civil Service
reform. Codes of ethics for government officials and employees should have been
introduced, following the enactment of the law, as a first step to promoting public
administrative reform. One of the goals of declaring corruption as a special crime
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is to raise political and public awareness of the fight against corruption.
Consequently, corruption should have attracted a zero tolerance approach.
Second, the laws were poorly drafted. As has been discussed, the draft bill
contained many conflicting and confusing articles. Indeed, the draft bill on State
Functionaries, then passed as Law No. 28 of 1999, had several modifications and
corrections made, only two days before the Minister for Justice introduced the
draft at the Plenary Session. Regarding the draft bill on Anti-Corruption, one
might see from the draft that the Habibie government was unwilling to establish
the Anti-Corruption Commission, but the parliament pushed the idea firmly. This
indicated that Habibie still relied on the Attorney General and the Police to deal
with corruption, whereas the strong popular perception was that these two
agencies suffered from a lack of public trust.
Third, the content of both laws was vague. Whilst Law No. 28 of 1999
requires all State Functionaries (including the Government and Members of
Parliament) to declare and report their assets, the law does not set penalties for
those who do not comply with this requirement. Moreover, the KPKPN has only
limited authority to deal with State Functionaries. Law No. 31 of 1999 does not
have a Transitionary Provision. This invites public suspicion that the law was a
product of a conspiracy, the purpose of which was to ensure that Soeharto and his
followers avoided prosecution..
Fourth, both laws face serious problem in terms of implementation. The
delay in signing Law No. 28 of 1999 can be seen as the first indication of the
unwillingness of Habibie to comply with it. As has been demonstrated, several
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political and legal scandals, allegedly involving Habibie’s inner circle, made the
laws more difficult to enforce. The failure to fully implement anti-corruption laws
in the Habibie period was owing not only to political scandal, but also due to the
content of the laws themselves. The laws do not clearly distinguish bribes from
gifts. The unclear provisions allowed State Functionaries to cover up the bribes
they received, as gifts.
The data from Transparency International and the Political & Economic
Risk Consultancy (PERC) also show that corruption was getting worse in the
Habibie era. There was no significant improvement in the level of corruption. One
of the biggest failures was in failing to prosecute former-President Soeharto.
Habibie was buying time by ordering the Attorney-General to examine Soeharto’s
(allegedly charitable) foundations. After the results of the June 1999 General
Elections showed that the Golkar party had been defeated, Habibie ordered the
Attorney-General to stop all Soeharto-related examinations and investigations. His
actions conflicted with popular demands for reform, which considered the
Soeharto case as a symbol in the drive for reform, and as a clear indication as to
whether or not Habibie was reformist. Habibie’s unwillingness to bring Soeharto
to justice was in contravention of good governance and the rule of law.
Fifth, both laws could be seen as products of political compromise,
between the Habibie administration and the members of parliament. According to
Law No. 28 of 1999, the KPKPN was to have been established one year after the
Law took effect. According to Law No. 31 of 1999, the Anti-Corruption
Commission would be established two years after the Law took effect. This means
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that the two laws were designed not for the Habibie government and members of
parliament (elected at the 1997 General Elections), since their period in office
ended in October 1999. They did not have to report their assets to the KPKPN,
and they did not have the worry of being investigated by the Anti-Corruption
Commission. This was a gap between formal legal reform and the hidden political
agenda based on self-interest.
What lessons can be learnt from Habibie’s failure to combat KKN? The
main point is that political will matters. Habibie was seen as not having a strong
will to combat corruption. His close relationship with Soeharto was one of the
reasons for his hesitation in having a clear anti-corruption strategy, and
consistently following the strategy. By delaying the signing of Law No. 28 of
1999, and the establishment of the KPKPN, Habibie lost the chance to prove to
the public that he was free and clean from corruption. Instead of providing
evidence that he was clean, he sacked Soedjono, the Attorney-General who had
pointed the finger at Habibie as suspected of corruption. Both systematic and
systemic forms of corruption could only be minimised if there was demonstrated
political will on the part of the political elite, to end the causes and effects of
corruption. Such resolve was sadly lacking in the post Soeharto period (19981999).
The second reflection is that neither of the laws analysed in this chapter
mention, or consist of provisions regarding, ‘Asian’ values, which suggests that
‘Asian’ culture has nothing to do with corruption. The absence of law
enforcement in the Habibie period has continued the ‘culture’ of impunity of the
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Soeharto government. It is not surprising that Indonesia is considered as one of
the most corrupt countries in the world, when corrupt people are not only walking
on the street freely, but are also serving the country as State Functionaries. If there
is no radical change, corruption will become even more entrenched.
The point is that it is not ‘Asian values’ but the absence of a shaming
culture concerning corruption, as well as misperceptions and misunderstandings
of the harmful impact of corruption on the country’s political, economic and
social development which allows the problem of KKN to go unchecked. All in all,
the corruption problem is so rampant in Indonesia, that even the outgoing chief
representative of the World Bank, Mark Baird, proclaimed that corruption in
Indonesia is the most serious problem – and that he did not expect much
improvement any time in the near future.160
The third lesson is that the fight against corruption might not be cheap, and
cannot be independent from the reform of the state and the political leadership.
Political leaders must show exemplary conduct, and should not be involved in
corrupt practices themselves. The scandals, discussed above, indicated that
Habibie and his inner circle were not free and clean of corruption, collusion and
nepotism, and this was another reason that Habibie failed to meet the demands of
reform.
Corruption, collusion and nepotism became the rallying cry of the
Reformasi forces, which proved instrumental in the fall of President Soeharto, in
May 1998. The failure of his successor, President BJ Habibie, to put his mentor
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on trial for corruption, and to resolve several other high-profile cases of alleged
corruption, were decisive factors in the rejection of Habibie’s re-election bid by
the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), in October 1999.161
Finally, good governance means not only having reformed laws, but also
implementing them, in a way which is open, predictable and fair. Corruption is
one of the greatest threats to good governance. Rather than the bureaucracy
serving the public interest, the bureaucracy itself can become an instrument for
propagating the political interests of the leadership, its own self-interest, or the
personal interests of those within it. The failure of law reform on anti-corruption
leaves good governance as little more than an item on a wish list.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

This thesis has traced the process of major law reforms which took place
in Indonesia during the Habibie era, from May 1998 to October 1999, as part of
the democratic transition. In particular, I have focused on three political laws, the
human rights law, the press law, and two anti-corruption laws. I have examined
whether Habibie’s law reform met two important criteria: promoting good
governance, and establishing the rule of law. In making this assessment I have
considered the process, the content and the implementation of the laws, and have
highlighted the impact of politicians’ bargaining power and interests in a context
of fluctuating uncertainty over political outcomes.
This concluding chapter has two purposes.

First, it summarises the

findings of each of the main chapters. This summary is designed to clearly
identify answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 1 and to emphasise the
contribution which this thesis has made to the scholarly literature. The second
purpose of this chapter is to look ahead at the prospects for the establishment of
good governance and the rule of law in Indonesia. In particular, I will consider
how the legal changes made under Habibie in 1998-1999 — to the political
system, human rights and press freedom, and anti-corruption strategies — might
influence the current and future situation.
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Summary of Findings
The resignation of President Soeharto, in May 1998 (see Appendix),
opened a new era in Indonesia. The time to reform the Indonesian political
system, to protect human rights and press freedom, and to eliminate systematic
and systemic corruption, had arrived. However, when BJ Habibie took over the
presidency, the question was whether the changes would merely be a shift from
one authoritarian government to another or a change from authoritarianism to
democracy.
In this thesis I have argued that the promotion of good governance and the
rule of law should be the ultimate goal of reform, in order to move from
authoritarianism to democracy. The 1945 Constitution states that Indonesia is a
state based on the rule of law (Rechtsstaat or Negara Hukum). The rule of law
provides the foundation for legal respect for human dignity. It is rightly regarded
as a central principle of constitutional governance.

Meanwhile, the United

Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s concept of good governance consists
of three legs: the economic, political and administrative. I establish a link between
law reform and good governance by adding another leg: ‘law’. The implication is
that the rule of law and good governance are related not only to human rights
protection, as suggested by the UNDP. They are also related to the reform of the
electoral system, the position and function of parliament, the role of political
parties, and anti-corruption measures.
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At the outset of this thesis (chapter 2) I acknowledged that the use of good
governance and the rule of law in transitional societies has been subjected to
criticism. In particular, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have been
criticized for misusing and manipulating these concepts. However, the thesis takes
the position that although the meaning of the rule of law is contested, there is
considerable common ground, building on Joseph Raz and Lon Fuller’s influential
suggestions that laws be general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of
being followed, stable and enforced. These elements are classified into the ‘thin’
version of the rule of law. By not adopting the ‘thick’ version of the rule of law,
the thesis avoids the neo-liberal political ideology of the IFIs’ rule of law
programmes, which have invited the debates on law and economics, legal culture,
legal transplants, and the regulatory state. At the same time, by removing good
governance from the arena of practical donor programmes, the thesis uses
transparency, accountability and participation as the core elements of good
governance. The thesis has used the elements of the rule of law and good
governance as analytical tools.
I have demonstrated that Indonesia, under the Soeharto regime, did not
follow these two desired standards (good governance and the rule of law). The
concept of Negara Hukum, under Soeharto, was subordinated to the goals of
economic development. Accountability and transparency were absent in the 32
years of the Soeharto regime. This explains why popular demands for reform,
voiced by student and mass demonstrations, not only asked Soeharto to step
down, but also demanded the reform of the Indonesian political, economic and
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legal systems. Three of the major demands for law reform were: the repeal of the
laws on politics, the elimination of corruption, collusion and nepotism, and the
placing of the perpetrators of human rights abuses before the courts.
In this thesis, I have considered Habibie’s response to these three demands
as case studies for determining whether or not law reform in the Habibie period
was consistent with principles of good governance and the rule of law. I have
examined seven laws signed by Habibie during his time as President, and have
analysed them at three levels: process, content, and implementation.
Each of the laws discussed in this thesis was unique in some respect —
whether in terms of the theoretical background, political background, legal
process, characteristics, nature, significance, problems and impact. A number of
other significant features of the reform process were examined, including:
pressures and demands for reform, from both national and international levels;
Habibie’s political motives, interests and calculations; and compromises achieved
amongst political elites.

The case study approach revealed that there were

differences in the processes and outcomes of law reform in the three areas under
investigation. However, the case studies also support a number of general
findings.
The overall finding of this thesis is that Indonesian law reform during
Habibie’s term as President (May 1998-October 1999) was not adequate to
achieve the maximum standards possible with respect to promotion of good
governance and the rule of law. There are three main reasons for this claim.
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First, law reform in the Habibie era was pragmatic and politically oriented.
It served mainly political purposes. Compromises between Habibie, the military,
Golkar, and other political parties were a recurring dimension of the reform
process. This observation could be seen as clichéd, but it is nonetheless important
to recognise that such compromises were a very real feature of the reform process
during the transition period (1998-1999) when Soeharto’s influences were still
strong. Bureaucrats, attorneys, military officers, and politicians, and the
proponents of promoting good governance and rule of law had to face this
situation. For instance, whereas a thin rule of law requires procedural rules for
law-making, Indonesia’s legislative system in the Habibie period was in disarray.
Members of Parliament, who were elected at Soeharto’s 1997 general elections,
became the key players in discussing the bills. New parties, emerging after the fall
of Soeharto, could not participate in discussions of the draft bills in formal and
legitimate ways. Under these circumstances, despite it being one of the core
elements of good governance, political participation was limited by the Indonesian
elite which drafted the political laws in order to protect their own interests. I have
also shown, as in the cases of the anti-corruption laws, that a lack of
accountability, limited public participation, non-transparent policies, weakness of
political will, and unlimited discretion, contributed to the failure of law reform.
Second, despite some sporadic improvements, as a product of the political
battle, the laws were vague and unclear. This is in contradiction with the
requirements of the ‘thin’ rule of law that laws should be relatively clear
consistent and stable. For instance, although Ryaas Rasyid’s team significantly
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changed the electoral systems in their draft, other political actors, inside and
outside the parliament, rejected it. As a result, the parliament produced a
complicated hybrid system of proportional representation. Meanwhile, the anticorruption law failed to nominate penalties for state functionaries who decline to
report their assets. This made the law stand only as a ‘moral’ norm. I have also
identified the failure to provide for a witness protection scheme as a major
weakness. Furthermore, the human rights law took a compromise approach, partly
following the standards set out in international human rights documents, and
partly considering Indonesian uniqueness. The law which resulted did not fully
adhere to the maximum standard of human rights protection.
Third, the implementation of the laws was the weakest ‘link’ in Habibie’s
attempts at law reform, when assessed by the standards of good governance and
the rule of law. There was often a wide gap between laws on the books and actual
practice. Even when laws were implemented, there were questions as to the
fairness of the way in which they were implemented. Although the Habibie
government successfully managed the 1999 General Elections, this thesis has
identified evidence of some serious gaps in the election regulations, concerning, in
particular, the electoral system, and the election of functional representatives to
the MPR. The lack of a proper complaint resolution mechanism was also a general
area of concern, whereas, at the same time, the KPU was too powerful.
The Habibie government was unable to punish perpetrators of human
rights abuses involving top military officers, and to bring Soeharto to justice, as
demanded by the reform movement. The changing of the press paradigm was not
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followed by the achievement of the professionalism of the press. Corruption was
still a common practice during the Habibie era. The Anti-Corruption Commission
has not yet been established. Delays also occurred in following the provisions in
the re-structuring and re-organising of the Komnas HAM.
From the observations above, a pattern can be identified. Many of the
problems identified in this thesis were products of the overcrowded reform
agenda, carried out in a very short time. These problems occurred mainly because
of huge problems left by the Soeharto government, and the fact that all parties,
such as the students, new political parties and non governmental organisations
(NGOs), including the IMF, World Bank and other international donors, required
Habibie to reform economic, political and legal systems simultaneously. The
thesis demonstrates that the seven laws examined here were drafted and discussed
in a very short time. For instance, the draft bill on the Press was discussed in only
13 working days. Habibie’s failure to promote good governance and the rule of
law in this environment suggests that there can be no shortcuts to meaningful
democratic reform. Gradualism and long-term planning are critical to the agendas
of a reformist government.
Notwithstanding

these

weaknesses,

there

were

some

significant

achievements in Habibie’s law reform, such as the eradication of the power of the
Minister for Information to issue or withdraw a Press Publication Business
License (SIUPP); the adoption of the multi-party system; the peaceful transfer of
power, based on the 1999 General Elections; the issuance of Indonesia’s first
comprehensive human rights law; the establishment of the KPKPN; and the
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introduction of the reversal of the burden of proof in the anti-corruption law.
Despite these achievements, the thesis has shown that the Habibie government
could not move forward, as demanded by the reform movement, and as required
by the idea of good governance and the rule of law, to achieve the maximum
possible standard of law reform.
By providing a detailed examination of selected areas of law reform during
Indonesia’s transition from authoritarian to democratic government, this thesis has
attempted to make a valuable contribution to the literature on Indonesian legal
development, and the process of law reform.

Reflections
In my examination of law reform in the post-Soeharto era, I have
highlighted the struggle between two broad camps: the reform group and the
status quo group. It is worth noting that the lines between the two camps were
often blurred. One of the reasons is that following the fall of Soeharto the status
quo group quickly raised the same issues as students movement proposed. Even
many Soeharto supporters publicly criticised the Soeharto regime as if they were
not part of that regime. On the other hands, as a result of Soeharto’s New Order
policy of disorganising civil society, the elements of the reform group — such as
students, NGOs, new political parties, lawyers, and journalists — differed not
only in their strategy and response to reform issues, but also in dealing with old
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forces. They might have shared common visions, but when it came to the details
of the law reform agenda, they took different positions.
As has been noted in chapter 3, Soeharto made himself the fulcrum
between civilians and soldiers, Christians and Muslims, indigenous Indonesians
and ethnic Chinese. He was the only effective institution for 32 years. When he
fell from power, the balance was shattered. Its components, including the reform
group, were left to battle each other. It is in this context that one may see the
trajectory of a central figure like Adnan Buyung Nasution: a prominent lawyer
and supporter of democratic constitutional government, who rejected a new
electoral system proposed by Habibie government, but, at the same time, proposed
a new Anti-Corruption Commission (a proposal which was sadly rejected by
Habibie at the last minute).
Although their ‘neatness’ should not be overstated, the

categories of

‘reform’ and ‘status quo’ are a useful way of highlighting the tensions and
competing influences which were central to the reform process. The very fact that
it was Habibie who replaced Soeharto allowed the status quo group to reconstitute
themselves within new political vehicles and institutions, and therefore remain
ascendant.1 This means that the 1998 reform movement did not sweep aside the
political forces nurtured by the New Order government. In such circumstances,
through the network, power, money and political machine they had developed in

1

See Vedi R Hadiz, ‘Retrieving the Past for the Future? Indonesia and the New Order Legacy’
(2000) 28 Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 2, 11-34.
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the past, they could take advantage of the opening up of political space. They
were merely ‘old wine in a new bottle’.
In the meantime, elements of the reform group pushed its idea to reform
the electoral system, to strengthen the position of political parties and parliament
vis-à-vis the government, to guarantee freedom of the press, to punish perpetrators
of human rights abuses, and to eliminate the practice of corruption, collusion and
nepotism, as prerequisites to the achievement of democracy in Indonesia based on
the principles of good governance and the rule of law.
Not all these demands for reform were satisfied promptly by the Habibie
government. In fact, one of the underlying stories revealed by the case studies
examined in this thesis is the eventual ‘victory’ of the status quo camp, in
negotiating, bargaining, and moderating major substantive demands for reform.
The status quo group including Habibie’s inner circle, military officers, the
Attorney General’s Office, major political parties, along with Habibie’s own
personal political interests, exerted a significant influence on the process of
drafting the laws, the content of the laws, and the implementation of the laws.
Law reform in the Habibie era was a political battle. It arose as a result of
compromises and trade-offs between the reform group and the status quo group.
However, this fact should not be overstated. Like it or not, the reform group had
to work together with the status quo group. In Lindsey’s words, “the compromises
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inherent in the political process…are often the only way effective reform can be
achieved from a realpolitik perspective.”2
For instance, the proposal from the students’ movement that political
reform should have proceeded without Golkar’s involvement, owing to its
‘political sins’ during the Soeharto era, was challenged by the results of the 1999
General Elections, which showed that the Golkar party emerged as the second
place-getter. The reform group could not neglect nor ignore the 22.43%, or
23,742,112 people, who voted for Golkar. In addition, I have also shown that, as
in the case of the political laws, Syarwan Hamid, a man who suffered from ‘past
political contamination’, supported Ryaas Rasyid’s Team of Seven, which drafted
the bills. Hamid’s role and contribution in preparing for the election were also
remarkable. This suggests that political compromise is a complex matter, and
does not always carry negative connotations. However, as has been shown
through the thesis, the bottom line for political compromise is that: whatever the
compromise reached, it should not sacrifice the elements of the rule of law and
good governance. This thesis has demonstrated that, during the period of the
Habibie government (1998-1999), these values were sacrificed and compromised.
What then are the prospects for good governance and the rule of law in
Indonesia in the future? During the time this thesis was written (2001-2003),
many political and legal developments occurred in Indonesia. However, the
struggle between the two groups identified above has continued. The status quo
group continues to play the dominant role, and heavily influences the Indonesian
2

Tim Lindsey, ‘Legal Infrastructure and Governance Reform in Post-Crisis Asia: The Case of
Indonesia’ (2004) 18 Asian Pacific Economic Literature 1, 36.
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political atmosphere. This is a major barrier to meaningful law reform. In other
words, it seems that achievement of the ultimate goal of law reform, as outlined in
this thesis — the promotion of good governance and the rule of law — is still a
long way off in Indonesia.
A number of signals support this assessment. During 1999-2002, Indonesia
amended its Constitution four times. In fact, thirty one articles (83.79%) have
been amended or modified, and only six articles (6.21%) have not been changed at
all. However, the overall results of the constitutional reforms have been highly
criticised by scholars and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).3 Such
criticisms forced the MPR to provide for the establishment of the Constitutional
Commission, in 2003, in order to re-read, review, and revise the Constitution.
Thirty one members of the commission have recently been selected.4
In 2001, President Abdurrahman Wahid, who replaced Habibie in October
1999, was impeached by the MPR, following his Presidential Decree to dismiss
the MPR and the Golkar party.5 One of the primary causes of the presidential
crisis of 2001 was conflict between the president and legislators, over the weak
status of the presidency. This weak status was a result of the rules of the game,
contained in the First and Second Amendments.
3

On the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, see Bivitri Susanti, ‘Constitution and Human
Rights Provisions in Indonesia: An Unfinished Task in the Transitional Process’, in Tessa MorrisSuzuki, Constitutions & Human Rights in a Global Age: an Asia-Pacific Perspective (Canberra,
The Australian national University, 2003), 5-14; Blair A. King, ‘Negotiating Presidential Power:
the Politics of Constitutional Reform in Indonesia, 1998-2002, PhD thesis, Ohio State University,
2002; Slamet Effendy Yusuf and Umar Basalim, Reformasi Konstitusi Indonesia: perubahan
pertama UUD 1945 (Jakarta, Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2000).
4

Kompas, 10 October 2003.

5

Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi: the struggle for power in post-Soeharto Indonesia (Sydney, Allen
& Unwin, 2002), 402.
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In October 2003, Transparency International released its Corruption
Perception Index. It is no surprise that Indonesia obtained a score of less than two
out of ten in the new index, and stands in place number 122 out of 133 countries.6
In the same month, the World Bank released its report on corruption in Indonesia.7
The report said that pervasive corruption in nearly every aspect of Indonesian
society poses a significant threat to the country’s efforts to have a more
democratic and prosperous future. The World Bank highlighted that the
government’s will to tackle the problem has been missing and the efforts made so
far to combat corruption have been plagued by poor follow-up and weak
implementation.8
In December 2003, the Anti-Corruption Commission should be established
by President Megawati Soekarnoputri. Yet, at the time of writing, the process of
selecting members of the commission has not yet started.9 Last-minute political
compromises are likely to be reached again. Meanwhile, freedom of the press is
again under attack as demonstrated by incident in March 2003, when the Chief
Editor of Tempo magazine was beaten by mass demonstrators in a police station,

6

See
Transparency
International,
‘Press
Release’,
available
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.10.07.cpi.en.html

at

7

The World Bank, ‘Indonesia at a Critical Juncture in the Fight Against Corruption’, Press
Release, Jakarta, 20 October 2003.
8

The World Bank, ‘Combating Corruption in Indonesia: Enhancing Accountability for
Development’, available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/Attachments/03-1020combatingcor/$File\/Combating+Corruption+in+Indonesia-Oct15.pdf
9

This thesis was originally completed in November 2003.
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without legal protection from the police.10 Four years after the enactment of the
1999 Press Law, press freedom remains fragile.
In 2003, the parliament, which was elected based on the 1999 General
Elections, passed new political laws.11 The electoral system remains one based on
proportional representation. For the first time in Indonesian history there will be a
direct election to select the President and Vice President. The MPR will no longer
determine these two top positions. It is too soon to tell whether the outcome of the
2004 General Elections will promote good governance and the rule of law, or will
lead to a political and legal crisis. The political and legal developments during the
Habibie era which have been examined in this thesis suggest that unless the
reform parties win the majority of votes in the coming elections, law reform will
not have been, to borrow, once again, the words of Justice Kirby, “a change for
the better”.12

10

As reported in Kompas, 9 March 2003.

11

Law No. 12 of 2003, Law No. 22 of 2003, and Law No. 23 of 2003.

12

Michael Kirby, Reform the Law: Essays on the Renewal of the Australian Legal System,
(Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1983), 7. I quote Kirby’s words above in Chapter 2 of this
thesis.
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Appendix

Chronology
1998
21 May 1998: Soeharto resigned and Habibie took over the presidency
22 May 1998: Habibie named his Cabinet, including many Soeharto ministers but
dumps Soeharto’s daughter and family friends
1 June 1998: Habibie said the government will investigate alleged corruption
during Soeharto’s rule.
8 June 1998: The private foreign commercial debt steering and contact
committees announced a three-part arrangement to deal with trade credit, interbank obligations, and corporate external debt (the “Frankfurt Agreement”).
24 June 1998: The Habibie government and IMF reached agreement on the third
amendment to the stand-by arrangement
17 June 1998: The rupiah again hit 17,000 against the US dollar.
29 July 1998: The Habibie government and IMF agreed to the fourth amendment
to the stand-by arrangement. The IMF approved converting the stand-by to an
Extended Fund Facility program. IMF disbursements resumed.
29-30 July 1998: The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) met in Paris under
World Bank chairmanship. Donors pledged $7.9 billion in assistance for
Indonesian fiscal year 1998/99 (April-March), largely to alleviate hardship
resulting from the severe economic downturn. This in addition to extraordinary
measures (including rescheduling of some sovereign obligations) was designed to
cover the fiscal gap that had been exacerbated by declining revenues and rising
subsidies for basic goods. The total in financial support mobilized for FY 1998/99
was $13.9 billion.
11 September 1998: The IMF announced that Indonesia was in compliance with
its economic stabilization and reform program. The GOI and IMF agreed to the
fifth amendment of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies.
21 September 1998: Soeharto questioned at home over his wealth, subsequently
questioned several times.
24 September 1998: Paris Club rescheduled $4.2 billion of sovereign debt.
Annual inflation at 82.4 percent in September.
19 October 1998: The Habibie Government and IMF agreed on seventh revision
of the memorandum on Economic and Financial policies.

457

9 November 1998: The armed forces said it is prepared to water down its political
role.
10 November 1998: Special session of the People’s Consultative Assembly
(MPR) began to discuss election and political reforms.
12-13 November 1998: Students and police clashed near parliament, capping a
week of violence in which at least 11 die in Jakarta.
22 November 1998: Ethnic Ambonese Christians clashed with Muslims in
Jakarta’s Chinatown, leaving at least 13 dead.
16 December 1998: IMF agreed to disburse approximately US$ 1 billion to GOI,
bringing total disbursements to approximately US$ 9 billion since November
1997.

1999
3 January 1999: At least 25 killed in several days of unrest in Aceh. Unrest in
other areas follows, continues throughout 1999.
19 January 1999: Christian-Muslim fighting erupted in Ambon, went on for
months, killed hundreds in and around eastern island.
26 January 1999: Habibie raised the option of giving the East Timor
independence if it refused a special autonomy package.
1 February 1999: Habibie signed three political laws (Law No. 2 of 1999 on
Political Parties; Law No. 3 of 1999 on General Elections; Law No. 4 of 1999 on
Composition and Structure of the MPR, DPR and DPRD.
18-26 March 1999: Ethnic violence between indigenous people and migrants
engulfs Borneo's Sambas region, at least 176 die.
3 May 1999: Indonesian security forces shoot unarmed protesters in Aceh
province, kill 42. Upsurge of violence there follows.
5 May 1999: the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal signed the Agreement
Between Indonesia and Portugal on the Question of East Timor (General
Agreement), formally requesting UN electoral assistance for East Timor.
19 May 1999: Campaign started for June parliamentary election, campaign period
largely peaceful, but security was tight. On the same day, President Habibie
signed Law No. 28 of 1999.
7 June 1999: General Election to elect members of the DPR and the MPR.
20 July 1999: Soeharto hospitalised after a stroke.
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30 July 1999: Through Presidential Decision (Kepres) No.88, President Habibie
set up a special commission to investigate human-rights violations in Aceh, called
Komisi Independen untuk Tindak Kekerasan Aceh.
3 August 1999: Habibie declared result of election valid, ending months of delays
in count.
6 August 1999: Finance Minister Bambang Subianto admitted there were
irregularities in loan-recovery deal involving PT Bank Bali. Scandal ultimately
implicated members of Habibie’s inner circle and prompted IMF and World Bank
to suspend loans.
16 August 1999: President Habibie signed Anti-Corruption Law No. 31 of 1999.
30 August 1999: Referendum in East Timor to determine the future political
status of East Timor.
4 September 1999: U.N. announced East Timorese overwhelmingly rejected
Indonesian rule in vote. The announcement triggered wave of killings, martial law
imposed but Indonesian security forces widely accused of complicity.
7 September 1999: Indonesia freed East Timor resistance leader Xanana
Gusmao.
22 September 1999: the Komnas HAM established a commission to investigate
the human rights abuses in East Timor (abbreviated as KPP-HAM).
23 September 1999: Habibie signed Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights.
23 September 1999: Habibie signed Law No. 40 of 1999 on Press.
1 October 1999: Indonesia announced seventh month of deflation, with annual
inflation down to a mere 1.25 percent.
1 October 1999: People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), Indonesia’s top
legislature, opened session which will elect new president. Top Soeharto opponent
Amien Rais later elected to speakership.
2 October 1999: Election set for October 20. Habibie, Megawati, Abdurrahman
Wahid main candidates.
11 October 1999: Corruption probe into Soeharto charities dropped.
13 October 1999: Habibie named military chief Wiranto as running mate.
14 October 1999: Habibie gave speech accounting for actions of his presidency.
Cited control of inflation as key achievement. Several factions of lawmakers urge
rejection. More violent protests during and after speech.
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On same day corruption case against Soeharto’s youngest son, the only member of
the former first family to be prosecuted, is dropped by a Jakarta court.
18 October 1999: Wiranto declines to be Habibie’s running mate.
20 October 1999: The People’s Consultative Assembly elected Wahid president
ahead of Megawati. Habibie quit the presidential contest moments before the vote.
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